Title
Mao and China's relations with the superpowers in the 1950s: A new look at the Taiwan strait crises and the Sino-Soviet split
Abstract
This article reexamines the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-55 and 1958, and the initial Sino-Soviet conflict, with particular attention to Mao's dominant role in the events. In contrast to previous scholarship, based on newly available sources it finds Mao to have been an erratic dictator who micromanaged China's military and political operations in the Taiwan Strait against the U.S.-Taiwan alliance with neither a long-term strategy nor a short-term plan. Mao's grandiose ambition to be the leader of the communist world led him into a conflict with Moscow, and the Sino-Soviet alliance began to unravel when China most needed allies. In the end, Mao's policy behavior was counterproductive and self-defeating; China's national interest, which Mao thought he was protecting and enhancing, suffered a great deal of damage.
Department(s)
History
Document Type
Article
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/0097700408315991
Keywords
1950s, Mao, Sino-Soviet-American relations, Taiwan Strait crisis
Publication Date
9-22-2008
Recommended Citation
Sheng, Michael M. "Mao and China's Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino–Soviet Split." Modern China 34, no. 4 (2008): 477-507.
Journal Title
Modern China
