Family Resemblances, Relationalism, and the Meaning of 'Art'


Peter Kivy has maintained that the Wittgensteiman account of 'art' 'is not a going concern' and that 'the traditional task of defining the work of art is back in fashion, with a vengeance'. This is true, in large part, because of the turn towards relational definitions of 'art' taken by philosophers in the 1960s; a move that is widely believed to have countered the Wittgensteinian charge that 'art' is an open concept and which gave rise to a 'New Wave' in aesthetic theorizing. So successful has this New Wave been that today the philosophy of art is awash with relational definitions, which are increasingly characterized by their technical sophistication and logical complexity. The aim of this essay is to oppose this trend; to demonstrate that relationalist definitions cannot avoid the problems which provided the impetus for the Wittgensteinian view and to show that the New Wavers cannot explain why anyone would want the definitions which they are offering, irrespective of their success or failure. I will also explore, in detail, the uses, as well as the limitations, of the Wittgensteiman approach to the concept of art.



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British Journal of Aesthetics