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THE BOY BATTERY: A SOCIO-MILITARY STUDY OF
THE 2ND MISSOURI LIGHT ARTILLERY

A Thesis
 Presented to
 The Graduate College of
 Missouri State University

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts, History

By
Claire Marie Momot

August 2007
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ABSTRACT

This thesis contributes to the “New School” of military history by providing a social analysis of the Confederate 2nd Missouri Light Artillery during the American Civil War. It examines the 2nd Missouri’s genesis in the Missouri State Guard and its service in the Confederate Army, following the unit under three successive captains, Clark, King, and Farris. This study, the first to focus on a State Guard artillery unit, discusses historiography, the war in Missouri, the organization of the Missouri State Guard, and the challenges faced by its artillery. The analysis is based on muster rolls, the 1860 Federal Censuses, county histories, newspaper and magazine articles, and other primary and secondary source materials. The majority of the 2nd Missouri’s soldiers were young, unwed, and childless, living at home with their parents and siblings. Most came from poor or middle class subsistence-level farming families residing in the Boonslick area. Although formed in Lafayette County, the men were drawn from 32 different counties. Compared to the populous state as a whole, the 2nd Missouri’s soldiers had a higher ratio of slave ownership, but most did not own slaves. They came from counties supporting moderate candidates in the 1860 Presidential election. Only a slim majority were native-born Missourians. Well-educated for the times, they had a very low desertion rate. Trained as horse artillery, the unit was often split into sections that served independently. The 2nd Missouri gained a stellar reputation fighting in the Trans-Mississippi and Western theatres. The thesis ends with a brief examination of the soldiers’ post-bellum lives.

KEYWORDS: Samuel Churchill Clark, Missouri State Guard, 2nd Artillery, Lafayette County, Houston King, James Farris

This abstract is approved as to form and content

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

Most studies of the American Civil War and of the units that fought its battles focus on operations in the Eastern theater. Very little has been written about the war west of the Mississippi, and even less about the Missouri State Guard, a volunteer army which was closely aligned with the Confederacy and which operated in the Trans-Mississippi theatre. The Missouri State Guard figured prominently in the complex political and military struggle that plagued Missouri during the first two years of the war. After 1862 most State Guard units joined the Confederacy and the Missouri Confederate brigades were organized largely from a nucleus of State Guard units. In 1879, R.S. Bevier, a lieutenant colonel in the Missouri State Guard, wrote a history of the 1st and 2nd Missouri Confederate Brigades in furthering the Confederate war effort. Most modern studies, however, have tended to discuss the Missouri State Guard only as a minor footnote to the larger study of a particular campaign or battle. Very little has been done to bring to light information about individual state Guard units or the men who volunteered to fight on its behalf.\(^1\)

\(^1\)R.S. Bevier, History of the First and Second Missouri Confederate Brigades 1861-1865 and from Wakarusa to Appomattox, a Military Anagraph Plus Appendix List of Survivors of The First and Second Missouri Brigades with Present Residence and Occupation (St. Louis: Bryan, Brand & Company, 1879), 27.
The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery is one such neglected unit.\(^2\) Organized by Captain Samuel Churchill Clark in 1861, this artillery battery fought as part of the Missouri State Guard in 1861 and was later attached to the Confederate service, where it fought under varying commands until the end of the war. Better information, in the form of memoirs, diaries, and the like, exists for other Missouri batteries such as Hiram Bledsoe’s 1st Lexington Light Artillery, Henry Guibor’s 1st Light Artillery, and Alexander Lessueur’s 2nd Light Artillery Battery. Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was chosen as a fit subject for study due to extant statistical data. The object of this thesis is to present a socio-military prosopography of the men of this unit, as well as a general history of its actions during the Civil War.

Scholarship has only recently begun to focus on the oft-ignored Missouri State Guard. Phil Gottschalk and Phillip Tucker have examined the Missouri Confederate Brigade in two relatively new chronicles.\(^3\) Carolyn Bartels and Richard Peterson have compiled invaluable books about the Missouri State Guard’s organization and internal makeup. Peterson’s Sterling Price’s Lieutenants contains a few brief chapters on the history and formation of the Missouri State Guard, and provides detailed information on the organization of the Guard’s units and officers. Bartels’ The Forgotten Men of the

\(^2\)There were other units within the Missouri State Guard designated as 2nd Missouri Light Artillery (see Appendix), not to mention Northern-aligned units. However, for the sake of brevity and clarity, this moniker has been assigned exclusively to Clark’s battery for the purposes of this paper. Over the course of the war the 2nd Missouri Artillery was captained by three men; Samuel Churchill Clark, Houston King and James Farris. A battery is commonly referred to in conjunction with the name of its commander, thus “Clark’s battery.” However, upon transference of command, the name may also change to that of the subsequent commanders. Thus, Clark’s Battery became known as King’s Battery after Clark’s death, and as Farris’ Battery when King received a promotion and was transferred west of the Mississippi.

Missouri State Guard provides a partial list of soldiers who were enlisted in the State Guard, along with their service histories, where available.⁴

William Garrett Piston and Thomas Sweeney’s article “‘Don’t Yield an Inch’: The Missouri State Guard” discusses the Guard’s formation, makeup, and organization under Sterling Price, as well as the numerous logistical problems which hindered its effectiveness during the first two years of the war. This article also provides biographical sketches of several officers who served in its ranks. In addition, Christy Thurston’s unpublished master’s thesis, “A Socio-Military History of the Jackson and Callaway Guards,” provides an in-depth examination of these two infantry companies, relying upon muster rolls, compiled service records, diaries, census information, and newspaper articles to draw some conclusions about the types of men who served in these units, and their motivations for doing so.⁵

If there is a paucity of information available on the Missouri State Guard, in general, there is even less concerning the Missouri State Guard’s artillery. Three major scholarly works have focused upon the role of artillery during the Civil War. Jennings Cropper Wise’s two-volume work, The Long Arm of Lee, an exhaustive study of the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia, focuses upon its organization, deployment, and battlefield tactics, from First Bull Run through Gettysburg. Wise also discusses the central figures in command of the artillery and recounts the functioning of the


Confederate Ordnance Bureau. Larry J. Daniel’s *Cannoneers in Gray* provides a similar account of the role of artillery in the Confederate Army of Tennessee. Daniel evaluates the artillery’s strengths and weaknesses, and the problems with which it had to contend, not the least of which was the Confederacy’s neglect of its forces west of the Appalachians. Daniel argues that the artillery in the Army of Tennessee was placed at a severe disadvantage, due to the receipt of minimal logistical support and a succession of commanding generals who lacked the understanding of how to utilize artillery to its best advantage in an engagement.⁶

L. VanLoan Naisawald makes a similar diagnosis of the Federal artillery in his mammoth work *Grape and Canister*. This book provides a much-needed complementary study to the works of Wise and Daniel, giving the history of the major battles from the perspective of the Union artillery. Naisawald concentrates upon major personalities involved, and on the larger question of how weaponry, artillery tactics, and the deployment of batteries evolved throughout the conflict, and into the future. He argues, “Federal cannons were never used to their fullest potential until the Battle of Gettysburg [where the guns were massed], and even after suffered from the disadvantage of restricted fields of fire in the woodlands of Virginia.”⁷ To date, no comprehensive study of the role of the artillery in the Missouri State Guard has been published.

In terms of social analysis of Civil War soldiers in general, some broad-based

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studies do exist. Irvin Bell Wiley’s groundbreaking work The Life of Johnny Reb provides a composite history of the experiences of the Confederate soldier during the Civil War, through an examination of personal letters, diaries, memoirs, regimental histories, newspapers and battle reports. He wrote a similar study of the Union soldier, entitled The Life of Billy Yank. Recent scholarship has furthered Wiley’s original aim. James Robertson’s Soldiers Blue and Gray is a supplement to Wiley’s work, relying upon additional information to augment our understanding of the average Civil War soldier. James M. McPherson’s What They Fought For continues to probe the question of what motivated soldiers to take up arms during the Civil War. Douglas Hale’s The Third Texas Cavalry in the Civil War relies on census records to provide a detailed socio-military examination of one particular unit. Most recently, Charles E. Brooks undertakes a similar analysis of the men who fought in John Bell Hood’s Texas Brigade, including a section devoted to how these men viewed and dealt with their officers.8

Despite the surge of interest in this type of scholarly research, there exists not a single socio-military study of any of the artillery batteries that operated under the Missouri State Guard’s auspices. This study rectifies part of the oversight. It develops a clearer image of the Missouri State Guard artillery by focusing on the men who comprised one particular battery, that of Captain Samuel Churchill Clark.

Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was trained and outfitted as part of the

Missouri State Guard. It fought in the Trans-Mississippi theatre early in the war. After the Battle of Pea Ridge, the soldiers’ terms of enlistment expired. Most of these men signed on with the battery again, this time as part of the Confederacy. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was sent east of the Mississippi River in 1862 and continued to fight in the Western Theatre until the close of the war, functioning as horse artillery for much of its later existence. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery thus fought engagements in Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Georgia.\textsuperscript{9}

In order to understand the role of the artillery in the Missouri State Guard it is first necessary to discuss the events surrounding the formation of the Guard. The focus must then shift to an examination of the organizational, training, and supply problems that the Missouri State Guard artillery encountered during the first years of the war, prior to its absorption into the Confederate service in 1862. Of necessity, much of the primary source material for this section is drawn from the diaries and writings of artillery officers in the Missouri State Guard, including William P. Barlow, Henry Guibor, and Alexander Lessueur. These men did not serve in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, but did fight alongside the battery in various engagements. Guibor’s battery, as part of the Missouri Brigade, saw service in the same general area of operations as the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery after joining the Confederacy. Jo A. Wilson, a member of Clark’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, wrote articles about Bledsoe as well as the experiences of Clark’s battery. His contributions provide valuable insight into the specific problems faced by the artillery

\textsuperscript{9}Clark’s men began to be used as horse artillery in the summer of 1862 and officially assumed that role in February of 1863. Janet B. Hewett, ed., Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 51 vols. (Wilmington: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1996), 38: 353-55; Stewart Sifakis, Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, the Confederate Units and the
in general and by the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery in particular.\textsuperscript{10}

The thrust of the investigation then shifts toward furnishing a composite picture of the men of Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. To that end, a narrative of the basic history of Clark’s unit, from its inception as a State Guard unit in September 1861, through its absorption into the Confederate army, which occurred between December 1861 and April 1862, to its final surrender in at Citronelle, Alabama, on May 4, 1865 is provided. This history is primarily pieced together from details provided in the county histories, government documents, newspaper and magazine articles, and various other primary and secondary sources. A detailed statistical analysis of the ages, occupations, nativity, counties of residence, wealth and slave-ownership among the soldiers of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery follows. For this purpose, data extracted from the unit’s muster roll has been cross-referenced with information drawn from the compiled service records collected by the National Archives, the 1881 History of Lafayette County, R.S. Bevier’s history of the 1st and 2nd Missouri Confederate Brigades, as well as the 1860 Federal Population Census for Missouri, the 1860 Slave Census for Missouri, and the 1860 Agricultural Census for Missouri. Miscellaneous sources that contained biographical information on some of the officers were also utilized.

No study can claim to be one hundred percent comprehensive in its scope, due to the limitations in available primary source material, some of which has been irretrievably lost. Historical research of this nature can only hope to provide answers to a single piece

of a far larger puzzle. In order to gain a truer understanding of the men who enlisted in the Missouri State Guard artillery, further investigation is needed. Only by striving toward a better perception of the Missouri State Guard, can future historians gain an accurate understanding of the men who fought and died in the Civil War.
CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

The 2nd Missouri Artillery had its origins in a state where loyalties were sharply divided and the political events leading up to the American Civil War were complex. At the outbreak of the war, most residents still favored compromise above coercion. Missourians had overwhelmingly supported the moderate candidates in the recent Presidential election, Northern Democrat Stephen A. Douglas and John Bell of the Constitutional Union Party. The incendiary political views of John Breckenridge’s Southern Democrats were in contradistinction with the basic desire of Missourians to avoid war. This hope for neutrality fell by the wayside in short order. The majority of Missouri’s inhabitants retained an ultimate allegiance to the Union. However, a significant and influential proportion of her residents were either sympathetic to the Confederate cause, or favored secession outright. Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson was a notable example. In the highly charged atmosphere of the times, the spirit of impartiality that characterized the early months of the war did not prevail for long in this bedeviled border state.\(^{11}\)

On February 21, 1861, the Missouri general assembly adopted a joint resolution in

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which the members noted “with profound regret, that the states of New York and Ohio have recently tendered men and money to the President of the United States for the avowed purpose of coercing certain sovereign States of the South which have seceded, or may secede . . . into obedience to the Federal Government.”12 It went on to state:

. . . we regard with the utmost abhorrence the doctrine of coercion as indicated by the action of the States aforesaid, believing the same would result in civil war, and forever destroy any hope of reconstructing the Federal Union. So believing, we deem it our duty to declare that if there is any invasion of the slave States for the purpose of carrying such doctrine into effect, it is the opinion of this general assembly that the people of Missouri will instantly rally on the side of their Southern brethren, to resist the invaders at all hazards and to the last extremity.13

While the state government was busy proclaiming its steadfast resistance to any talk of aiding the Union outright in the commencement of hostilities, another prominent Missouri politician, Francis Preston Blair Jr., took matters into his own hands. A staunch Unionist, the St. Louis native spent the early months of 1861 converting the local paramilitary “wide-awake clubs,” whose membership consisted largely of recent German immigrants with strong Republican party leanings, into a well-equipped, pro-Union volunteer force. Blair allied with a number of green recruits from Illinois and one company of U.S. Army Regulars, which had been dispatched from Fort Riley, Kansas, under the leadership of Captain Nathaniel Lyon. A fanatical Republican, Lyon viewed the punishment of secessionists as a personal mission from God. Through contacts in Washington, Blair saw to it that control of the St. Louis arsenal, which housed around 60,000 muskets and other military ordnance, was transferred to Lyon. This decision

12Record and Pension Office, War Department, Organization and Status of Missouri Troops (Union and Confederate) in Service During the Civil War (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), 239.

13Ibid., 239.
proved to be of lasting significance for both Missouri and the Union.\textsuperscript{14}

On March 4, 1861, the general reluctance of Missouri’s government to take sides in the coming conflict was again made manifest. A state convention that had been convened in St. Louis to consider the state’s relations with the federal government refused to pass an ordinance of secession. Lincoln’s call up of 75,000 militia the month following the fall of Ft. Sumter met with resistance. Governor Jackson refused the directive, dubbing it “illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman and diabolical.”\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, he ordered various units of the Volunteer Militia of Missouri into training at Lindell Grove, on the outskirts of St. Louis. Although this militia muster was legal, Jackson hoped to employ these men as Confederate soldiers at a future date and he saw the St. Louis arsenal as a worthwhile target. On May 6, around seven hundred men assembled for training at “Camp Jackson,” under the command of Brigadier General Daniel M. Frost.\textsuperscript{16}

The threat posed by the presence of these troops was actually negligible. Their numbers were few and Lyon’s men had already occupied the St. Louis arsenal and the armaments and munitions contained within. The fiery Captain Lyon was more concerned with punishing secessionists than with propriety. Acting on his own initiative while his


\textsuperscript{15} Organization and Status of Missouri Troops, 246.

\textsuperscript{16} Hatcher and Piston, 9-10; Patrick, 20-22; Organization and Status of Missouri Troops, 246; W. E. Woodruff, \textit{With the Light Guns in ‘61-‘65} (Little Rock: Central Printing Company, 1903), 11; Fellman, 10-11; Peterson, 4-5.
superior officer, Brigadier General William Selby Harney, was conveniently away on a trip to the nation’s capital, Lyon launched a preemptive assault on Camp Jackson. On May 10, 1861, with a force numbering around 6,000 men, Lyon successfully captured the position.\(^1\) Frost’s men surrendered without a fight, and these prisoners were immediately subjected to the indignity of being marched through the streets of St. Louis under armed guard, toward the arsenal where they were to be paroled. This spectacle was too much for several Southern-leaning firebrands who stood poised in the gathering crowd. In protest, these onlookers began to pitch rocks and bottles at Lyon’s troops, and may also have directed some sporadic gunfire in their general direction. The riot was immediately quashed, however, when Lyon’s soldiers turned and opened fire on the crowd, killing thirty civilians and wounding a further seventy, some of whom were women and children. Lyon’s undertaking was immediately branded the “Camp Jackson Massacre,” and it proceeded to boost Pro-Southern sentiment within Missouri. Many people who had heretofore either favored the preservation of the Union, or been hesitant to choose sides in the secession crisis, now moved resolutely into the Southern camp. Among these were several of Missouri’s legislators. Had Governor Jackson acted with swiftness and determination at this point, he might well have forced an ordinance of secession through the assembly, with the full support of Missouri’s citizenry. As it was, however, he restricted his concerns to a strengthening of Missouri’s armed forces.\(^1\)

In direct response to Lyon’s operations, the Missouri general assembly disbanded

\(^1\)Hatcher and Piston stated the troops involved at Camp Jackson were 6,000. Patrick places the number of troops at 8,000, while Peterson states that there were 7,000. Hatcher and Piston, 10; Patrick, 21; Peterson, 3-5.

\(^1\)Hatcher and Piston, 10; Patrick, 21; Peterson, 3-5.
the existing militia system and authorized the creation of the Missouri State Guard. On May 10, 1861, it appropriated $20,000\textsuperscript{19} to Governor Jackson “for the purpose of maintaining the peace and safety of the State in such manner as his discretion may direct.”\textsuperscript{20} On the following day, it created a militia fund to provide further for Missouri’s defense. This money was designated for the purchase of “such arms, munitions of war, and books of instruction as [Jackson] may deem necessary . . . The governor is also empowered to use a portion of said military fund for the purpose of establishing an armory in the state penitentiary . . . [and] may use any portion of the convict labor.”\textsuperscript{21} On May 13 and 14, Jackson was authorized to take charge of all railways and telegraph lines in the state, and to establish foundries. Also on May 14, the general assembly passed an “Act to Provide for the Organization, Government and Support of the Military Forces of the State of Missouri.” Section 1 proscribed that “All able-bodied free white male inhabitants of the State of Missouri between the ages of 18 and 45 years old who shall be enrolled as liable to military duty under the provisions of this act shall constitute, be known, and designated as the ‘Missouri State Guard’ and the State of Missouri is hereby divided into nine military divisions,”\textsuperscript{22} each of which was to provide a body of soldiers, which would be collectively organized and labeled as a division of the Missouri State Guard. On May 18, 1861, former governor Sterling Price, who had gained prior military

\textsuperscript{19}One day earlier, the general assembly had granted Jackson $10,000 for this purpose. Thus, the grand total was $30,000. Note: all monetary denominations within this thesis are given in U.S. 1860 dollars.

\textsuperscript{20}Organization and Status of Missouri Troops, 250-251.

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., 251.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., 252.
experience during the Mexican War, was installed as a major general and field commander of the Missouri State Guard. Three days later, nine brigadier-generals were chosen to command the regional divisions.\textsuperscript{23}

Despite this anticipatory move toward war, the hope for a peaceful resolution to Missouri’s internal conflict did not abate, at least not publicly. Partially to stall for time while the Guard could begin to be assembled, Price entered into a preliminary round of negotiations with Harney, who had recently returned from the East. On May 21, 1861, they hammered out an agreement in which Federal forces would garrison St. Louis and its surroundings, and Price’s men safeguarded various locales throughout the rest of the state. Serenity was short-lived. Lieutenant Governor Thomas C. Reynolds had already been in contact with the Confederacy, hoping to arrange for an alliance with his own state, and requesting that an army of Confederate troops be dispatched at once to Missouri to join forces with the embryonic Missouri State Guard. Meanwhile, through further machinations on the part of Blair, Harney was removed from command on May 30, 1861, and replaced by Lyon. On June 11, at a conference at the Planters’ House Hotel in St. Louis, Lyon informed Price and Jackson in no uncertain terms that he would never agree to compromise. Lyon then “unilaterally declared war on the State of Missouri.”\textsuperscript{24}

The following day, Jackson took preparatory steps of his own, calling for 50,000 men to come to the aid of their state. General Order No. 11 commanded the nine brigadier generals to assemble “all available troops in their [respective] district[s] for actual

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., 250-56; Peterson, 5.

\textsuperscript{24}Hatcher and Piston, 10.
service.” Open hostilities would commence within days.26

Thus, despite the general desire for compromise and moderate action that had characterized the 1860 election, the actions of Lyon, Jackson and others ensured that Missouri was plunged headlong into the Civil War. Once the war began, however, opinions within the state grew far more extreme. This is reflected in the fact that Missouri eventually became enmeshed in a “Civil War” of its own, as neighbor fought against neighbor, and guerilla units viciously terrorized the populace.27 Early in the war, however, the divisiveness was reflected in somewhat calmer fashion, through organized battles and skirmishes between the opposing armies. Missouri provided units for both the Union and Confederate armies. Clearly, the era of peaceable compromise was over. This was the backdrop under which the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery would be organized in 1861.

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25 Organization and Status of Missouri Troops, 263-64.

26 Ibid., 257-65; Hatcher and Piston, 10; Patrick, 21-22; Peterson, 3-5.

27 Fellman, xv-xx, 266.
CHAPTER 3
THE MISSOURI STATE GUARD ARTILLERY

Upon its formation, the Missouri State Guard was organized into nine geographic divisions, commanded by brigade generals, each of which was to have numbered regiments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery raised within and assigned to it. Potentially, each division might contain multiple batteries. For instance, Brigadier General James Rains’ Eighth Division, under which Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was first organized, was raised in the counties of Barry, Barton, Bates, Benton, Cass, Cedar, Dade, Henry, Hickory, Jackson, Jasper, Johnson, Lafayette, Lawrence, McDonald, Newton, Polk, St. Clair, and Vernon, in the western part of the state, and had five batteries assigned to it. 28

Individual companies and batteries were habitually recruited from within a single county, and the majority of the men in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were from Lafayette County. However, there were also soldiers from Barry, Bates, Jackson, Johnson and McDonald counties (all within Rains’ Eighth Division) in the battery, although the soldier from Bates County and several men from Lafayette County were not a part of the initial enlistees, having been transferred in at later dates. The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was even more unusual because it also contained men from many other counties, which

28Peterson, 23.
did not encompass the area of recruitment designated for Rains’ Division. These outside counties included Livingston, Audrain, Callaway, Carroll, Clay, Dent, Gentry, Greene, Grundy, Howard, Laclede, Livingston, Marion, Osage, Phelps, Pike, Randolph, Ray, St. Charles, St. Francois, St. Louis, Saline, Stone, Taney, and Texas. Soldiers from four of these counties, Dent, Laclede, Saline, and Taney, were not members of the initial group of enlistees. It is logical to speculate that these soldiers might have joined the battery while it was in winter quarters at Springfield, and in the process of reorganizing for Confederate service, during the winter of 1861. Some men from Carroll, Johnson, Laclede, Livingston, Ray, St. Charles, St. Louis and Taney counties were also transferred into the battery later, although those eight counties were still represented in the original makeup.  

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Missouri Light Artillery was reassigned from Rains’ Eighth Division to Brigadier General William Yarnell Slack’s Fourth Division quite early in its existence. This fact certainly accounts for some of the diversity of its soldiers’ pre-war residency, since Slack’s Division encompassed men from Caldwell, Carroll, Clinton, Daviess, DeKalb, Gentry, Grundy, Harrison, Livingston, Mercer, Ray, and Worth counties. Even this fact, however, does not explain all of the diversity among the recruits, since each of the nine original geographical divisions of the Missouri State Guard contributed soldiers to the unit. Thus, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Missouri Light Artillery stands as a noteworthy exception to the conventional means by which units were raised.  

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<sup>29</sup>See Chapter 4: Statistical Analysis of the Soldiers of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Missouri Light Artillery.

<sup>30</sup>Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Guns &c in the Clark Battery,” April 17, 1862, William Clark Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St Louis; hereafter cited as Clark, “Memorandum of Guns”; Peterson, 23, 151-52; Sifakis, 72-73.
Of the nine divisions of the Missouri State Guard, only eight ever had artillery attached to them. Moreover, due in part to piecemeal recruitment, the Guard never exceeded fifteen batteries in operation at any given time. Each battery was designated to contain no fewer than forty-eight men and no greater than one hundred men. Each artillery battery contained between four and six cannons, which were organized in sections consisting of two guns each. These sections could be split between commands for detached duties or earmarked for disjunctive assignments. These Missouri State Guard units were eventually organized as shown in the appendix.

The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was created in September 1861, just prior to the Battle of Lexington, although it was not yet officially designated by this moniker. The battery’s commander, “Churchy” Clark, had been enrolled as a West Point cadet, in the Class of 1863, when the war broke out. Upon hearing the news, he resigned immediately and traveled to his home state of Missouri, where he offered his services to Sterling Price and the Missouri State Guard. His initial occupation, in August of 1861, was as a “drillmaster and instructor of tactics,” but he was given control of an artillery battery the following month.32

On September 16, 1861, Clark was given control of one 6-pound iron cannon. The next day, a brass 6-pounder was added to the fledgling unit. On September 18, 1861, Clark acquired three brass 6-pounders in place of these guns, “for temporary use” during

31Clark’s battery was unusual in this regard. Wilson states that it contained 150 men, but a total number of over 200 were found in various sources. This latter number does include at least nine of the twenty men of McNally’s Arkansas battery which was attached to the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery in the autumn of 1863, whose identities are known. Eleven other soldiers are known to have transferred to the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery from McNally’s battery, but their names have yet to be positively identified. See Chapter 4: Statistical Analysis of the Soldiers of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery.

32Peterson, 151, 145n.
the siege. With one of these brass cannons, Clark shot down the Union flag flying above the Federal fortifications at Lexington. He won a gold medal from Rains, who made him a “captain on the field.” This noteworthy event occurred on September 18, 1861. Clark continued to use these three brass cannons until Federals surrendered two days later. After the Battle of Lexington, Clark’s Missouri Battery was organized in earnest, with fresh armaments.\(^{33}\)

As noted earlier, this unit was originally part of Rains’ Eighth Division, but it was reorganized and transferred to Slack’s Fourth Division, Missouri State Guard, on October 9, 1861. It was comprised of 64 men at that time, and Clark was reelected as its captain. The new battery consisted of four guns, including two brass 12-pound howitzers, one brass 6-pound cannon, and one iron 6-pound cannon, as well as three caissons, a forge, and four horses to each carriage. On December 2, 1861, another brass 6-pounder was added to the battery, in preparation for the unit’s impending entry into Confederate service.\(^{34}\)

On December 27, 1861, Clark’s Missouri battery “was transferred from Slack’s 4th Division, Missouri State Guard, to the 1\(^{st}\) Brigade, Missouri Confederate Volunteers, Colonel Little Commanding,”\(^{35}\) and reorganized, yet again. At this time, Clark still had the five aforementioned cannons in his Battery, in addition to six caissons and one forge, 

\(^{33}\) Clark, “Memorandum of Guns.”

\(^{34}\) Peterson states that this transfer occurred on October 23, 1861, but Clark, “Memorandum of Guns,” contradicts this and has been considered the more reliable source since Clark’s own father was the man who inspected the armaments and filed the report. Clark, “Memorandum of Guns”; Peterson, 151-152; Sifakis, 71-72; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Phillip Tucker, “Captain Samuel Churchill Clark: The West’s Forgotten Confederate Battery Commander,” Confederate Veteran, 20 (September-October 1990), 14, 16-20.

\(^{35}\) Clark, “Memorandum of Guns.”
with 6 horses to each carriage. He had one surplus caisson, which was later blown up (probably at Pea Ridge). Clark’s Missouri battery was now officially designated the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery.\footnote{Ibid., Peterson, 151-52; Sifakis, 71-72; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Tucker, “Clark,” 14, 16-20.}

While in winter quarters, at Springfield, Clark’s men “soon became noted for proficiency in drill and military manoeuvres.”\footnote{Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.} Clark and his men must have been impressive, indeed, because on Feb 20, 1862, Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch augmented the battery with the addition of yet another brass gun, as well as a caisson and a battery wagon, which had been captured from the Seigel [sic] Battery at the battle of Wilson’s Creek on August 10, 1861. Clark now had a full gun battery, composed of six cannons, complete with a forge, caissons and battery wagons. There were six horses for each carriage.\footnote{Clark, “Memorandum of Guns.”}

Clark served admirably as the captain of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery until his death at the Battle of Pea Ridge on March 8, 1862. An inspection of the battery was performed at Des Arc, Arkansas, on April 17, 1862, by Meriwether Lewis Clark, and Ordnance Commander William C. Kennerly. This inspection occurred just after Clark’s death. The results revealed that, at this time, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was, once again, composed of five guns, six caissons, and one forge. The battery wagon had been lost, and the fifth brass cannon was no longer listed. The following details about the specific guns in the battery were noted. The first gun was a brass 12-pound howitzer, and bore no particular description. The second gun was another brass 12-pound howitzer,
which Clark had received from Captain William Wade’s battery at Cassville, on November 3, 1861, along with two caissons, and twenty horses. The third gun was a 6-pound brass cannon. It was marked “US” between the trunnions. On the left trunnion, the year “1831” was inscribed, while on the right trunnion, “McC & Co” was inscribed. On the upper part of the muzzle face were the letters “IB,” and on lower part, “No 107.” This gun “had been captured at Lexington, and was Churchy’s favorite gun.”

It was with this cannon, that Clark dismounted one of the Union’s cannons, during the battle of Pea Ridge, on March 8, 1862. The fourth gun, another brass 6-pounder, had also been captured at Lexington, on September 20, 1861. It was also marked “US” between the trunnions. The left trunnion bore the date “1842,” while the right trunnion contained the words “N.P. Ames founder Springfield Mass.” At the top of the muzzle face was the number “19,” and at the bottom, were the initials “JWR.” On the base of the gun, its weight was inscribed as being “890” pounds. “On the right of the sight, on the swell of the muzzle, it [was] cut flat to appearance by a ball.” The last gun was an iron 6-pound cannon. Once again, “US” was inscribed between the trunnions. On the left trunnion, was the date “1847.” On the right trunnion the name “N.P. Ames Mo[?]” was marked. The weight of the gun was given as “887” pounds.

The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery had carriages for all five of these pieces, as well as six caissons and one traveling forge. There were six horses for each component. At this time, however, the unit lacked a battery wagon. The battery was reorganized.

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39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
following the inspection, and on April 26, 1862, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery fell under the command of Houston King.\textsuperscript{42}

The presence of experienced officers such as Clark was a great boon to the Missouri State Guard artillery. There were several other men who also lent their skills and tactical knowledge to the artillery. Captain Guibor and Lieutenant Barlow had served respectively as first and second lieutenants in the light battery of the Missouri state force kept in active service on the Kansas border during the preceding winter [1860-1861], known as Bowen’s Southwest battalion. Six months’ service under [John S.] Bowen’s West Point discipline and drill had made fair soldiers of [them].\textsuperscript{43}

Hiram Bledsoe, for his part, had seen active service during the Mexican war with Alexander Doniphan’s cavalry, and he apparently taught himself many aspects of artillery drill. John C. Landis, who was to become major of the 1st Artillery Battalion, 5th Division, was, in fact, a graduate of West Point. Colonel Richard H. Weightman of the 1st Brigade, 7th Division, who oversaw the command of several batteries at the Battle of Carthage, had also attended West Point for a brief time. Although he did not graduate, he did serve as a major in the Mexican War, in command of the St. Louis Artillery Battalion, thus gaining expertise which was doubtless invaluable to the raw, untrained men of Price’s army.\textsuperscript{44}

Despite these advantages, however, there remained one major stumbling block for the Missouri State Guard’s artillery. No Chief of Artillery was ever designated, a fault

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid.; Peterson, 151-152; Sifakis, 71-72; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Tucker, “Clark,” 14, 16-20.

\textsuperscript{43}Patrick, 28; David C. Hinze and Karen Farnham, \textit{The Battle of Carthage: Border War in Southwest Missouri July 5, 1861} (Campbell: Savas Publishing Company, 1997), 74-75.

\textsuperscript{44}Wilson, “Bledsoe,” 316, 320; Peterson, 14-15.
that produced considerable consternation in the months following its formation. This oversight translated into inefficiency and disorganization on the battlefield, as the Southern artillery on more than one occasion failed to take advantage of its opportunities to wreak considerable damage by massing in force against the enemy. At the Battle of Wilson’s Creek, for instance, the Missouri State Guard might have done considerable damage to the scattered Union cannons, had they massed their guns for counter-battery fire. At Lexington, a favorable 3 to 1 advantage over the Federal cannons was similarly wasted.45

At the Battle of Pea Ridge, March 7-8, 1862, the Missouri State Guard’s weapon superiority was even greater, standing at a ratio of over 4 to 1 on the first day.46 While these cannons were mainly 6-pounders, as compared with the superior 12-pound guns of the Union artillery, the Guard’s exceptional numbers still should have provided more help in carrying the field. This did not happen, due to a multitude of problems surrounding the command and control of the army. Price’s State Guard failed to utilize its artillery to its full advantage, because there was still no chief of artillery and thus the guns were uncoordinated. The numerical superiority of the Confederate guns was wasted because most of the batteries never saw action, on either day. Those that did enter the fray on the first day achieved some spectacular results. The remarkable accuracy of the Southern barrage saw several Federal cannons silenced throughout the day’s fighting.

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45Peterson, 19-20.

46Price’s Missouri State Guard had fifteen batteries of artillery at their disposal on the first day. Eugene Carr’s opposing 4th Division had only 2 batteries. At one point during a firefight in Cross Timber Hollow, however, twenty-one State Guard cannons faced off against only three Federal guns. William L. Shea and Earl Hess, Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 331-39.
Two Union caissons were also destroyed, and a third was lost when the horses pulling it bolted.\textsuperscript{47}

These accomplishments were ultimately wasted, however, because the infantry failed to capitalize upon the gains being made. The State Guard infantry operated in a generally confused and piecemeal fashion, with little unit cohesion. Their assaults were unsupported and uncoordinated, and although the men were ultimately successful in gaining possession of Elkhorn Tavern and the Telegraph Road, casualties were enormously high. Furthermore, the opportunity to rout their opponents just before nightfall was lost because their final attack, which almost broke the Federal lines, was not bolstered. If Price's infantry had more aggressively and cohesively pressed the advantage conferred by the effective use of their artillery on the first day of battle, they might have routed the Union army, rather than the reverse. These problems with command and control hampered the effectiveness of both branches of the service.\textsuperscript{48}

By the second day, the Missouri State Guard cannons had advanced to a forward position where maneuvering them was not a problem. However, their line of sight was not ideal for the following morning's engagement. Moreover, they were short of ammunition, because the army's supply train had been sent away. Major General Earl Van Dorn, the Confederate commander, was therefore reluctant to use his cannons at all. No more than three State Guard batteries were ever deployed in unison on March 8,

\textsuperscript{47}Five batteries initially went into action on the first day: Guibor's, Clark's, Wade's, MacDonald's and Bledsoe's. In the late afternoon, Gorham's Battery was also deployed. Peterson, 19-20; Shea and Hess, 41-43, 161-172, 181-83, 198-201, 231-39, 250-52; Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, 3 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), 1: 283-88.

1862. Instead, it was the Union batteries, under the personal direction of Brigadier General Franz Sigel, who worked in concert to concentrate their fire upon specific targets.⁴⁹

This left the burden resting squarely upon the shoulders of a few determined men, such as Captains William Wade and Samuel Churchill Clark. Ultimately, this allowed the Federal guns to focus in on the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, one of the Guard’s most successful units throughout the conflict, with devastating effect. Captain Clark, arguably the most skilled and effective artillery officer in the Guard’s service, was killed on the last day of fighting, while covering the confused Confederate retreat.⁵⁰

The lack of an appropriate command staff to oversee the functioning of the Missouri State Guard’s artillery was extremely harmful to its unit cohesiveness and its effectiveness on the field in these early battles. Lack of communication between batteries, and within the army in general, made it extremely difficult to coordinate assaults and bring the full power of the artillery to bear on an often out-numbered enemy. For the most part, the artillery captains who commanded batteries seem to have acted on their own initiative, sometimes with a fair measure of success, as with Clark. At other times, the results were ineffective. At worst, it led to a complete breakdown of order and discipline. In reference to this latter, Hart’s Arkansas Battery, which was not a State Guard unit but served alongside them at Pea Ridge, provides a good example of how things could go wrong with green recruits. At one point during the battle, acting against


orders, this unit abandoned its position, entirely. The battery was reprimanded for cowardice and its ammunition was confiscated and presented to Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. There was a late attempt, circa December 1861, to try to group the Missouri State Guard artillery together on a regimental or battalion level. This would have helped to compensate for the absence of an overall chief of artillery. Skilled field officers, however, were lacking and the plan was never fully realized. Organizational difficulties would continue to plague the Guard throughout its brief existence.\footnote{Organization and Status of Missouri Troops, 250-56; Peterson, 11-14, 19-20, 39, 78-81, 101-102, 107, 132-33, 136, 151-52, 154, 168-69, 172, 191-92, 209, 286-88, 290, 293; Shea and Hess, 233, 250-52.}

There is an unfortunate paucity of information on Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, especially prior to 1862. Because the men were from counties all across the state there is no single county newspaper from which to draw information about the unit’s history. There is only one known soldier memoir, a newspaper article written by Jo Wilson for the Missouri Republican. However, from a logical standpoint the men of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery would have faced many of the same problems as other batteries and units operating in the Trans-Mississippi, and later in the southern states east of the Mississippi River, especially when they were still part of the 1st Missouri Brigade. Therefore it is not unreasonable to draw conclusions from analogy, and to rely upon the recollections of men in other Missouri State Guard batteries, such as those of Bledsoe, Guibor, and Alexander Lessueur. Of necessity a fair amount of information has been drawn from these sources in the following discussion of additional problems faced by the Missouri State Guard artillery, both prior to and following their absorption into the Confederate States Army.
Yet another problem commanders of artillery companies faced was the lack of formal military training among the vast majority of newly enlisted recruits. Although Clark was educated at West Point, he faced the daunting task of producing trained artillerists from the young, lower-middle class farmers who comprised the bulk of his recruits. While the details of his specific actions have not survived, the records of other similar units testify to the sorts of problems that Clark must have encountered and solved, as he produced a battery with a first-rate reputation. With so little time to devote to training, and the degree of skill that was required for the artillery to be an effective force in battle, pessimism on the part of the officers was understandable. One of the impediments faced by new recruits was a “tendency to ‘over-shoot’ the mark,” due to the size differential between a cannon’s muzzle and breech. Failure to make adjustments for this disparity could result in a shot landing well off-target, and only experience could teach a gunner the proper elevation that his cannon required for accurate firing.

This problem plagued Captain William E. Woodruff’s Arkansas-based Pulaski Light Battery at Wilson’s Creek, but their over-shots were lucky. Though the Federal guns were not damaged, the lines of infantry and reserves behind them were. Henry Guibor’s Missouri battery at the Battle of Pea Ridge also provides evidence of this problem. However, in this particular instance, the captain was equal to the task before him. Guibor’s ability to identify and correct the inaccurate fire of his men produced horrifying results for the Federal troops opposing them. In the midst of this battle he discovered that his troops had been aiming high, at the puffs of smoke, which hovered

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52 Woodruff, 44.

53 Ibid., 44.
above the enemy’s guns. He ordered that the trajectory be adjusted downward and the result was immediate success. Two ammunition chests were hit dead-on, exploding in a spectacular burst, destroying the limber and caisson atop which they sat. The loud explosions also caused some of the Federal horses to bolt, carrying with them a second caisson, which fell to the bottom of a ravine. The disoriented Union artillerymen soon found themselves under a ceaseless barrage of fire from the batteries of Guibor, Clark, and Wade, and the casualties among their gunners soon grew so high as to prevent them from returning fire. When two additional State Guard batteries, commanded by Captain Emmett MacDonald and Lieutenant Charles W. Higgins, respectively, joined in the fray, the Federal position became “untenable” and they were forced to withdraw their forces from this “tempest of death,” as one soldier aptly described it.54

Despite this obvious display of skill, when Guibor and Barlow first took command of their batteries, they were more than a little intimidated at the daunting task before them. Guibor and Barlow were trained officers, whose recent tenure with a well drilled, fully equipped, combat-ready battery of artillery in Bowen’s Brigade underscored the ill preparedness of their new units. Accustomed to working with skilled and disciplined soldiers, Barlow’s first impression of the soldiers he commanded was less than favorable. He recalled, “The men, reasoning by analogy, could load a piece as they would a shotgun, and had a hazy notion of stopping vent with the bare thumb, and they knew that the call, “O yes, O yes, Capt. - 's company, parade here!” meant come out of the brush and bunch up in line if they felt like it.”55

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54 Shea and Hess, 163-64.
55 Patrick, 30.
Guibor’s and Barlow’s initial enthusiasm upon assuming command was quickly dampened when they paused to consider how this band of rag-tag recruits would fare against such formidable and well-drilled Federal opponents as Totten’s Battery. The gunners of the Missouri State Guard artillery, they feared, would be hopelessly outmatched.\footnote{Ibid.}

This was not the case. There were plenty of experienced officers in the State Guard. All they needed was the time and opportunity to produce efficient soldiers. In a letter to his aunt, written on January 25, 1862, during the recruitment and training phase of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, Clark confidently claimed that if his “brother-in-law” Robert S. Voorhis were to join his unit, he could “make a cannoneer out of him in six weeks.”\footnote{Robert S. Voorhis was actually the thirty-seven year-old husband of Samuel Churchill Clark’s cousin, Julia. Samuel Churchill Clark to My Beloved Aunt, January 25, 1862, William Clark Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St Louis; hereafter cited as Clark Papers; John Grady Clark, \textit{General William Clark’s Family} (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society, 1991), 1.} The superior skills of many of the artillery officers and their commitment to training their men while encamped at Cowskin Prairie and elsewhere, tended to produce the desired results quickly.\footnote{Samuel Churchill Clark to My Beloved Aunt, January 25, 1862, Clark Papers; Clark, 1; Peterson, 14-15.}

Demonstrations by skilled officers and drills of the new recruits were commenced at every spare opportunity. In order to maximize the proficiency of the Guibor’s battery in the shortest available time, each member of the gun crew was taught to memorize and be responsible for only one duty. Barlow saw the proficiency of his battery grow by leaps and bounds in mere days, and proudly related that inside of a week the recruits had
advanced in their instruction sufficiently to be able to fire the cannons on their own, and that the guns and the mule teams were being maneuvered with an astonishing degree of skill. 59

Barlow's praise for his boys was just as lavish regarding their commitment to self-discipline and their calm, collected performance under the harrowing fire of the enemy. The Missourians enthusiastically took to their duties, though the vast majority had no prior experience with artillery, many never even having seen a cannon before they joined the Guard. They committed themselves diligently to learning the tasks at hand and obeyed orders to a man, without hesitation. Moreover, the soldiers voluntarily imposed on themselves a strict brand of discipline, which the officers would have been hard-pressed to have coerced, since the collective mind-set of the men, none of whom had been "regularly mustered" into the army presumed that they enjoyed the freedom to return home if they felt so inclined. One soldier actually resigned in favor of a mining job that opened up in Joplin and left without controversy. 60

This composure and discipline was plainly evident in these green troops at the Battle of Wilson's Creek, one of the first sizeable engagements of the war. Barlow described one incident as follows:

Our line had been forced from the crest of a ridge, and the battery had just reached the bottom when a wheel horse of a gun was killed. The battery was ordered to ascend the hill in rear and open fire, leaving the gun and its detachment alone under the enemy's fire. The men removed the dead wheel-horse and put a lead horse in its place, which was also shot down before starting. This left but two live horses, hitched tandem, and the brave fellows then removed the wheel harness from the first horse killed, harnessed the sergeant's horse, pulled the gun by hand away from the two dead animals, hitched up again and rejoined the

59 Patrick, 30.

60 Ibid., 39-40.
battery, pulling up the hill with three horses, the men assisting at the wheels. I doubt if this feat was ever excelled - I never heard of its being equaled during the war.\textsuperscript{61}

Hiram Bledsoe was similarly committed to fashioning the most effective and proficient battery possible, and his success in this endeavor was noteworthy. Indeed, he trained the men of his battery so well that they became a favorite target of Union troops. At no less than seven battles, the Union forces made deliberate attempts to destroy or capture his pieces.\textsuperscript{62} Jo A. Wilson, a soldier in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, had the opportunity to observe the workings of Bledsoe's battery when it was deployed in close proximity to his own. Wilson praised Bledsoe as a "born soldier," who honed his skills by studying drill manuals. Although far from a disciplinarian, his decisive and confident manner commanded authority. Bledsoe was kind and courteous and was respected both by his subordinates and his superiors. Studious of history and the art of war, he had been trained by experienced officers and ably imparted the knowledge that he had gained to the men of his battery. Before long, each gun could discharge six precise rounds per minute.\textsuperscript{63}

This is an impressive statistic, given the fact that a battery was considered well drilled when it was able to shoot off two precise shots per minute from a smoothbore cannon, using fixed ammunition. Canister, of course, could be fired at double this rate of speed, if sponging the barrel were dispensed with, but failure to cool the gun by sponging

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{62}The battles were Dug Springs, Carthage, Drywood, Oak Hill, Lexington, Sugar Creek, and Pea Ridge. Wilson, "Bledsoe," 318.

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid., 320-21.
between shots, put the artillery pieces at greater risk of explosion. Use of rifled cannons made the loading process more intricate, and thus slowed the rate of fire that could be achieved. There are no statistics available on the rate of fire for Clark’s battery, but it seems likely that his men must have achieved something similar to Bledsoe’s, given the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery’s solid reputation and the fact that they were soon to be deployed permanently as horse artillery.\(^6\)

Training men in the workings of the artillery was, thus, a problem that could eventually be rectified internally, through repeated drill on the company level by skilled, loyalty-inspiring officers. Clark, for his part, must have succeeded admirably, given the immediate success of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery in their first engagement at Pea Ridge. However, inexperience was far from the only problem with which the Missouri State Guard artillery was faced.

During the course of the war, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery utilized a variety of types and sizes of guns, including 6-pound field pieces, 12-pound howitzers, 10-pound Parrots, and 3 inch rifled cannons. This was typical, as the Confederacy confronted a number of problems in keeping its artillery properly outfitted and supplied during the Civil War. Most of the guns in its possession were smoothbore, which did not have the same range and degree of accuracy as the rifled guns commonly supplied to Federal batteries. The effectiveness of the Northern naval blockade of Confederate ports and the lack of an industrial infrastructure hampered the South’s ability to procure guns from overseas, or to manufacture them internally. A general lack of foundries and of the iron and copper required to cast guns placed the production of light artillery pieces at a

\(^6\)Thomas, 4.
marked disadvantage in the early part of the war. Moreover, the first guns that were produced were occasionally of poor quality and flimsy construction. Some did not stand up under the strain of battle, occasionally exploding on site. Though the quality and reliability of the Southern cannons did improve near the end of the war, this problem was supplanted by a scarcity of horses and mules to carry the pieces and of artillery implements in general. Suitable grade gunpowder, nitre, friction primers, fuses, and ammunition were also at a premium throughout the war. Often the only way to keep a battery supplied was to capture as much as possible in battle from their well-equipped Northern counterparts. Impressments of horses, mules and other beasts of burden also became more common as the war continued, and Confederate currency deflated in value. The Southern forces were consistently outmatched by the Union.\footnote{Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb, 297-303; Wise, 2:111.}

What was true of the Confederacy was also true of the Missouri State Guard. As disadvantaged as the Confederacy was, shortages in the Guard were even more pronounced. From the time of their inception until they entered Confederate service during the winter and spring of 1861-1862 they received no aid from the Confederate Government, because they were not officially operating under its auspices. In fact, many of the soldiers who enlisted in the Guard were not full-fledged supporters of the Confederacy, but political moderates who had hoped to avoid war altogether. Polarized by Lincoln’s call for volunteers and by the actions of General Lyon, these men fought for the liberation of their home state. Their allegiance was to Missouri, rather that to the South, as a whole. Although there undoubtedly were plenty of secessionists in the ranks
of the Guard, the army as a whole was at best an incongruous mixture.\textsuperscript{66}

Clark’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was made up of “the best material Missouri could furnish, being mainly from the first volunteers.”\textsuperscript{67} Many of Clark’s men were very young. Indeed, some of the members of the “boy battery” did not even meet the age eligibility requirements for enlistment in the army. These facts may account in some way for their enthusiasm toward joining the Confederate service so early in the conflict, as well as the inordinate degree of loyalty and dedication, which they displayed and which carried them through to the end of the war.\textsuperscript{68}

Although Missouri’s Quartermaster General, James Harding, did his best to help equip the State Guard, he was working at a severe disadvantage. Missouri simply did not have the supplies at its disposal to properly, or even adequately, outfit an army and

\textsuperscript{66}Hatcher and Piston, 10; Edwin C. Bearss, The Battle of Wilson’s Creek (Bozeman: George Washington Carver Birthplace District Association, 1975), 20-23, 31, 34; Shea and Hess, 23; Peterson, 18-19; Tucker, The South’s Finest, xv-xvii; Piston and Sweeney, 12-16, 25-26.

\textsuperscript{67}Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.

provide for its sustenance. What the state did have was in a bad state of repair. Although he did manage to procure two 6-pound guns, this was a mere fraction of what was needed.\textsuperscript{69}

Artillery batteries during the Civil War usually consisted of between four and six guns.\textsuperscript{70} Due to weapon shortages, Confederate batteries rarely had more than four cannons, and those were seldom uniform in make and model. Each gun was mounted on a wooden carriage, which was attached to a wheeled limber. Ammunition chests, tar and water buckets would be carried on this limber, with additional matériel stored in the caisson, a cart that was attached to a second limber. Each cannon was assigned at least one caisson. A battery wagon carried miscellaneous items, including “carpenter’s and saddlers’ tools, oil, paint, spokes, harness, axes, spades, tarpaulins, spare gunner’s implements, and also forage for the horses in the rack on the back.”\textsuperscript{71} The number of tools utilized by an artillery crew numbered in excess of 125. A mobile forge was also desirable, in order to enable the performance of blacksmith duties, which were necessary to care for the horses. Ideally, each limber would be drawn by a team of six horses, but Confederate batteries often had to make due with only four animals.\textsuperscript{72}

A good idea of the varied types and large number of supplies necessary to

\textsuperscript{69}Peterson, 19-20, 308-310.

\textsuperscript{70}Wiley disputes the idea that the most common Confederate battery held four to six guns, stating that the range was from two to eight guns, most commonly six. However, he agrees that four became the most common number of cannons in a battery as the war progressed. Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb., 301-302.

\textsuperscript{71}Dean S. Thomas, Cannons: An Introduction to Civil War Artillery (Gettysburg: Thomas Publications, 1985), 13.

\textsuperscript{72}Thomas, 3-4, 10-13.
adequately outfit an artillery company can be gained by examining the list of the items
turned over to the Confederate States Army by Captain W. E. Woodruff when his Pulaski
artillery battery entered its service on September 2, 1861:

Two 12-pound Howitzers (bronze) and equipments [sic]; two 6-pound
guns and equipments; four caissons; one battery wagon. One forge wagon,
twenty-nine sets artillery harness, five sets wagon harness, nine saddles, nine
bridles, one set carpenter’s tools, one set blacksmith tools, one keg powder, one
lot iron and steel, assorted one grind stone and gearing, one lot buckles and nails,
one lot beef tallow, three sheepskins, one box black lead, nine picks, one dozen
bridle bits, one lot extra harness in battery wagon, nine spades, two forks, three
horse collars (extra), three Jack screws, eight axes, three sponge heads, one
rammer head, one box horse medicine, one box battery equipment, one box
currycombs and brushes, fifty-six horses.73

A regulation artillery battery of six cannons required eighty-four horses, though batteries
often operated at a deficit during the war, especially as draft animals grew scarce. If the
battery was to be used as horse artillery, the number of steeds required jumped to 149, not
including those teams needed to pull the forges and wagons. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light
Artillery, which did indeed operate as horse artillery for most of the war, was typical in
this respect, possessing 150 draught animals, both horses and mules, at the time of their
surrender in April 1865. The artillery companies which were organized under the
Missouri State Guard suffered from severe shortages in all manner of necessities, and it
was, to a large extent, self-reliance, which kept the Missouri State Guard artillery afloat
during the first year of the war.74

Cannons were utterly lacking when the Missouri State Guard was first called into
service, and they remained in extremely short supply throughout its existence. Twelve

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{73}Woodruff, 56n.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{74}Wise, 2:111; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.}
pound guns were never provided in any abundance, and this fact alone limited the
ultimate effectiveness of the artillery, which fought against Federal batteries that had 12-
pounders readily at their disposal. Rifled canons were also practically unheard of for the
Guard. This utter lack of rifled weapons and the dearth of 12-pounders forced their
batteries into line-of-sight deployment and compelled the gunners to endure long-range
counter-battery fire without being able to return it. The Guard’s cannons were adapted to
operate in essentially the same manner as a huge makeshift shotgun, loaded with canister,
or as “smoothbore muskets” that hurled solid shot or case shot. As indicated, two 6-
pound guns were eventually provided by Harding, but for the most part, field pieces,
horses, ammunition, powder and equipment of all kinds would have to be actively sought
out by the army, itself.75

One stroke of luck came when Pro-Southern forces captured the Liberty Arsenal
on April 20, 1861. Aside from a small portion of slow match, ammunition, and other
supplies, “four 6-pound cannons complete with limbers, were taken for use in the coming
conflict.”76 Three of these were 1841 bronze models, given to Henry Guibor. Hiram
Bledsoe was the captain of the other significant Missouri State Guard artillery company
in operation at that time. Bledsoe took it upon himself to equip his unit, taking one 6-
pounder, which had been manufactured in Lexington, and another 9-pound bronze piece,
a relic from the Mexican war. He took the latter to a machinist’s shop, where it was
hollowed out into a 12-pound smoothbore and mounted on a carriage obtained from the
quartermaster’s stores. Given the nickname “Old Sacramento,” this cannon with the

75Peterson, 19.

76Ibid., 308-309.

Most other guns obtained by the artillery were captured in combat. After their victory at Lexington, the State Guard collected “five pieces of artillery and two mortars.”\footnote{They also accumulated “over three thousand stands of infantry arms, a large number of sabres, about seven hundred and fifty horses, many sets of cavalry equipments, wagons, teams, some ammunition, more than one hundred thousand dollars’ worth of commissary stores, and a large amount of other property.” Bevier, 58.} From these, Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery received two 6-pounders, one iron and one brass. At the Battle of Wilson’s Creek, the 3rd Louisiana Infantry had captured the guns and equipment of Sigel’s battery, and passed them on to Guibor’s men, who had been advancing through the area. By coincidence, one of these was a cannon upon which Guibor and Barlow had trained under Bowen at Camp Jackson. Although this prized cannon was subsequently confiscated by Brigadier General Ben McCulloch, who took it with him to Arkansas despite Guibor’s protest, the battery retained captured horses, a brass-mounted harness, friction primers, and some desperately-needed small arms, all of which they denied having captured when further questioned by McCulloch.\footnote{United States War Department, War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, VIII, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883), 285, 306, 313, 315; hereafter cited as O.R.; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Patrick, 42-43.}

This story not only indicates the desperate need for guns, but it also reveals the dangerous shortages of equipment and ammunition under which the Guard was forced to operate. The fact that they were willing, effectively, to steal horses and supplies from under the nose of their commander is an indication of just how dire their situation
actually was.

Procuring ordnance seems to have been a constant problem for the artillerymen of the Missouri State Guard. Upon his initial assumption of command, Barlow complained of the battery’s lack of basic necessities. They were perpetually low on ammunition. Improper harness had to be used to secure their mules as horses were entirely lacking. They had only one sponge staff and one linstock, both of which had to be shared among a seven-gun crew. They had no friction primers and only a very limited amount of quick match.\textsuperscript{80} In fact, “the only way to discharge the guns was to build a fire of fence-rails and ‘touch them off’ with burning splinters after priming from a powderhorn. A pint of water applied to the pocket of the man who carried the matches would have effectively silenced the battery until the next farmhouse could be reached.”\textsuperscript{81} The severity of these problems was attested to by the fact that Guibor’s battery was forced to break off its assault midway through the Battle of Carthage for want of ammunition. At the Battle of Pea Ridge, William Wade’s battery suffered the same fate. At Lexington, Guibor’s battery was so desperate for ammunition that “On the second day [when] cannon-balls became scarce and valuable . . . each side commenced hunting up those received and sending them back. Many shot were sent back and forth three or four times each, as we

\textsuperscript{80}Woodruff of the Arkansas-based Pulaski Battery faced a different set of problems with supplies. He commented that “During . . . [training] exercises it was discovered that a large proportion of the old cup primers (we used Linstocks and portfires to fire the guns) were badly oxidized and corroded. (Friction primers had been invented, but we had only a handful from our volunteer store), many being worthless from their long storage in the Little Rock arsenal. At every drill in the firings many crumbled or broke, or stuck in the guns, spiking them. A thorough overhauling and examination of the entire stock was made, and all defective ones thrown out. Fortunately we had a surplus and not one “stuck” in our first fight.” The Missouri State Guard, by contrast, probably did not have the luxury of throwing out anything. Woodruff, 30.

\textsuperscript{81}Patrick, 23-30.
discovered by observing their polished sides, made by penetrating earth or brick walls.”

This practice of collecting and recycling the artillery shells and the solid shot which littered battlefields after an engagement was common. Another obvious solution for dealing with the lack of ordnance was for the soldiers to augment their existing supplies and replenish spent ammunition with unused stores captured from the enemy. These methods of dealing with shortages were certainly repeated on a regular basis, but relying on scavenged and pilfered supplies would never be enough to sustain these destitute batteries. Purchasing stores was also an option, but was apparently more difficult than one might expect. Barlow complained that, “money was absolutely no use. I had a good supply of gold and silver, but could purchase nothing. What people could spare they gave freely, and money would not be received.” Under these conditions, trying to obtain adequate supplies was a daunting task. Necessity was most assuredly the mother of invention, however, and artillery commanders devised innovative methods of dealing with these deficiencies.

Both Hiram Bledsoe and Henry Guibor designed the same solution to this problem, namely the manufacture of home made ammunition and supplies. Scrap metal from blacksmith shops and spent bullets scrounged from the battlefield provided the raw material, from which the manufacture of canister was improvised. Barlow, who soon became the ordnance officer for Parson’s Division, told a similar tale of the ingenuity of Guibor’s men, who fashioned makeshift sponge staves by splitting the dry wood from

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82Ibid., 47.
83Ibid., 34.
84Ibid., 34; Woodruff, 30; O.R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 310; Wilson, “Bledsoe,” 318.
fences, covering the pieces with sheepskins. They then soaked cotton ropes in turpentine to serve as friction primers. The Southern victory at the Battle of Carthage ensured that the nearby Granby lead mines remained in southern hands, a fact which allowed for further smelting of ammunition. The process gained momentum in the weeks and months ahead, as Guibor’s men established an “arsenal of construction.”\(^{85}\) They sewed their own cartridge bags, and manufactured canister and cartridges.\(^{86}\)

Immediately prior to the Battle of Wilson’s Creek, Guibor’s ordnance stores contained canisters of gunpowder, bars of lead, melting ladles and “G.D. caps.” The soldiers were equipped with hunting rifles. A small amount of shot gun ammunition and minie balls were available, but for the most part the soldiers molded their own bullets. Following the battle, Guibor’s men immediately turned their thoughts back to production. They cast a new supply of 6-pound solid shot in a Springfield foundry, and sliced up iron rods to form canister. In a few weeks, the battery had re-equipped itself.\(^{87}\)

The quartermaster and ordnance departments helped where they could, and voluntary aid from Southern sympathizers whose homes were located along the route of march or near the engagements was also a benefit. Nevertheless, it is apparent that to a large extent the basic continuance of the artillery as a viable arm of the Missouri State Guard was highly dependent upon the elbow grease of its own officers and enlistees. Even gunpowder, a precious commodity in the best of times, had to be repackaged before

\(^{85}\)Patrick, 32.

\(^{86}\)Ibid., 30, 32, 34, 42-43; Wilson, “Bledsoe,” 318; Hinze and Farnham, 213-214.

\(^{87}\)Patrick, 32, 34, 42-43.
it could be used in combat.\textsuperscript{88} Nothing came easily to the soldiers of the Missouri State Guard.\textsuperscript{89}

Horses were also lacking within the Missouri State Guard and the Confederacy. These beasts of burden were essential for pulling the heavy guns of the artillery, and were necessary mounts for sections of the horse artillery. They were, however, exceedingly difficult to come by. Over time, impressments became essential, especially as horses grew weak from hunger and diseases. In April of 1864, for example, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery “pressed a number of horses for the battery[,] [However,] many of them were fine carriage horses and being fat and not inured to hardships they were soon used up in the arduous service required on the Atlanta campaign.”\textsuperscript{90} Alexander Lessuer, an artillery captain in the Missouri State Guard who continued to operate in the Trans-Mississippi theatre throughout the war, spoke distastefully of having to impress ten horses in the winter of 1863. Nevertheless, he clearly recognized the necessity of doing so since without horses the artillery could not operate. Moreover, several of his own horses had been stricken with the potentially fatal foot disease, “grease heel.” Luck was not on his side, however, for the following morning he found that one of the soldiers of his company had deserted and taken two of the newly acquired steeds with him.\textsuperscript{91} Theft of horses was a source of anxiety for members of artillery batteries and cavalry.

\textsuperscript{88} Gunpowder was in short supply throughout the Confederacy. The Missouri State Guard relied on supplies obtained from a raid on the Liberty Arsenal. Hinze and Farnham, 75, 213.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.; Peterson, 18.

\textsuperscript{90} Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.

\textsuperscript{91} Alexander Lessuer, Diary of Alexander Lessueur, October 15, 1862, November 7-9, 1863, John K. Hulston Library, Wilson’s Creek National Battlefield; hereafter cited as Diary of Alexander Lessuer.
commands throughout the war, but especially in its latter stages. The frequency of the crime became so intolerable in 1864 that Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest issued a threat of ruthless and severe punishment for these criminals, going so far as to offer a $500 bounty as a reward for any man who helped to bring a horse thief to justice.  

Guibor’s battery was so short of horses in the early months of the war that it was forced to rely upon mules. Clark’s battery had also incorporated mules by the end of the war. These animals were hardier, more resistant to disease, cheaper to purchase, required less feed, and could go for longer periods of time without being re-shod, but they were also weaker than horses and indolent. Mules made for slow going. Not only were the guns themselves enormously heavy, but the attached limbers and accompanying caissons, when loaded to the brim with ammunition, constituted an added burden for the tired creatures. This problem was complicated immensely in 1861 by the wet Missouri spring. Atrocious road conditions were extremely hard on the animals. “[M]uddy and rutted roads” and “flooding and soggy ground” created monumental problems for Guibor’s gunners, who found drilling especially vexing. The artillery pieces routinely sank up to their axles in the thick, sticky Missouri mud, and the cannoneers spent hours pushing and pulling on ropes in attempts to free them.” Lessueur’s men faced similar problems with their own horses and equipment. On a number of occasions, when forced to traverse wet,

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92Forrest’s order was issued on May 16, 1864. O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. II, 603; Diary of Alexander Lessueur, October 15, 1862, November 7-9, 1863.

93Over time, Guibor’s men were able to replace the mules with horses. Patrick, 34.


95Hinze and Farnham, 119.
muddy paths in cold, rainy weather, the piteous animals sank stomach-deep into the sludge, powerless, while the guns themselves were quickly immobilized, their wheels submerged in the mire. Lessueur's own horse was lamed by one such experience traveling the muddy byways.  

Some idea as to the costs incurred by draft animals can be gathered from various receipts handed out by the Quartermaster's Department of the 1st Division of the Missouri State Guard. One wagon and four mules along with four sets of harness purchased on August 6, 1861, cost $600. Two horses were purchased on July 23, 1861, costing $160 and $140, respectively. In July and August of 1861, $62.40 worth of corn and hay was purchased. That October another horse was obtained for the price of $50. On August 22, 1861, the Quartermaster of the 4th Division of the Missouri State Guard purchased twelve horse collars in Springfield at $250 each, thus totaling $3,000. A bill addressed to the Missouri State Guard's Quartermaster James Harding, dated December 24, 1861, requested payment in the amount of $9.75 for blacksmithing services, provided in Springfield.  

Although the Pulaski Light Battery was an Arkansas unit and not part of the Missouri State Guard, it was nevertheless organized at the same time and fought in the Trans-Mississippi theatre of the war in 1861, often in the same engagements. As these  

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96Lessueur complains of terrible road conditions no less than 23 times in the course of his diary. Diary of Alexander Lessueur, December 14-15, 1862, June 24-25,1863, April 30, 1864, August 6, 1864; Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9; Patrick, 34; Meyer, 241.  

men faced many of the same problems as the Missouri batteries, examining their
difficulties can shed further light on others, which were undoubtedly faced by members
of the Missouri State Guard. Horses posed a particular problem for this battery. At first,
like Guibor’s battery, they initially had none, but eventually some locals began to offer
their own mounts to aid the Southern cause. Unfortunately, these animals were not
combat-ready, many being unbroken. None of the horses had ever been hitched to an
artillery piece before and they were not accustomed to artillery fire. Moreover, many of
the newly recruited drivers were inexperienced with managing teams. The practical
difficulties of this inexperience were made abundantly clear in the battery’s first attempt
to march in step with their advancing army. Owing to a lack of trained horses, the battery
became badly strung out along the road, and much of the following day had to be spent
restoring order, and rounding up the stray carriages.98

Battle readiness was a major concern for all commanders. Horses and mules that
have never been in the thick of battle were prone to bolt under the hail of gunfire. Guibor
experienced this problem with his team of mules at the Battle of Carthage. At the
commencement of firing, they immediately fled toward the Federal lines. The loss of
these mules would have created great difficulties for Guibor. Luckily, an astute officer
observed what was happening and was able to corral the frightened creatures, leading
them back to safety before they were shot, or fell into Union hands.99

Captain W. E. Woodruff intended that his own battery should never be placed in
this worrisome position, and almost immediately upon receipt of his horses he began to

98Woodruff, 26, 27.

99Hinze and Farnham, 131.
train both the animals and their handlers. It took approximately two months of twice-daily drills to get them trained efficiently, and for the horses to become accustomed to small arms and artillery fire.\textsuperscript{100}

The officers were charged with the care of the horses. This included finding food and forage for the animals, a daunting task, given that one horse "required daily fourteen pounds of hay and twelve pounds of grain (oats, corn or barley). Each mule required [fourteen] pounds of hay and nine pounds of grain" each day.\textsuperscript{101} One acre of fodder would sustain about fifty horses for one day. For an army containing 40,000 horses, this would translate into the consumption of around 800 acres of fodder each day.\textsuperscript{102}

Alexander Lessueur reported numerous instances of difficulty finding food for the horses of his battery, and over the course of the war their weakness from hunger, cold, and continual exertion during long marches on muddy, swampy, and barely passable roads became increasingly apparent. On December 15, 1862, Lessueur traveled seven miles with his horses down waterlogged roads in order to provide fodder.\textsuperscript{103} The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery also faced problems securing fodder throughout the war. In May 1864, near Marietta, Georgia, their horses subsisted on un-ripened wheat. In August of the same year, their horses were fed on green corn. Both were inappropriate fodder and in

\textsuperscript{100}Woodruff, 28-30.

\textsuperscript{101}Schrader, 269.


\textsuperscript{103}This was a mere jaunt compared to another instance. On January 7, 1864, Lessueur had to take the starving creatures sixty miles in order to feed them. Although an extreme example, this is indicative of how scarce fodder became. \textit{Diary of Alexander Lessueur}, November 18-21, 1862; December 15, 1862; December 29, 1862; July 2, 1863; July 8, 1863; September 13, 1863; January 7, 1864; January 24, 1864.
the case of the latter sickness became a problem.\textsuperscript{104}

There is a biological reason behind the need to secure appropriate food for horses. “Horses have a single stomach and a functional caecum, which means their digestive system is less efficient [than cows or sheep]. Therefore, horses have a greater requirement for higher-quality protein than cattle…”\textsuperscript{105} According to Hugh Aljoe, a forage specialist “For optimum results, horses need to be fed often and consistently with a forage that can be easily and rapidly digested. Sudden changes or large swings in diet quality or type can cause severe and potentially deadly digestive system disorders.”\textsuperscript{106}

A 1917 experiment involving horses from the United States Sixth Field Artillery underscores the importance of providing horses with the proper amount and type of feed, especially while they are performing the strenuous work that would be expected of them in a typical battery. These animals were fed diets of primarily corn, oats, prairie hay, timothy hay, and alfalfa hay in varying combinations and amounts, three times a day. The horses then performed “rapid light draft” work, which “consisted chiefly of marching and drilling . . . [while] hitched to heavy wagons and guns. A considerable portion of the work was done at a trot and no small amount at a gallop.”\textsuperscript{107} It was pointed out by the researchers that “While [an] artillery horse performing his regular duties [does] not work

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\textsuperscript{104} Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.
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\textsuperscript{105} Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation, Inc., <cblara@noble.org>, “Hay is for Horses, but Forage is Too,” [Internet Article]. <http://www.noble.org/Press_Release/Ag/ForageForHorses/>, March 2003.; hereafter cited as “Hay is for Horses.”
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so many hours a day as the farm horse [would] during the busy season . . . the work done [is] extremely fatiguing and more severe than the average work done by [a] farm horse throughout the year.\textsuperscript{108}

The researchers reached several conclusions about the types of food and forage that could be problematic for horses. A corn-based diet could be detrimental under certain conditions. Corn-fed horses whose diet was supplemented with prairie hay rather than oats did not seem to suffer during the winter. However, they became extremely stressed during the summer months when the temperatures increased and the work became more difficult. They began to lose weight, and had dropped an average of 29.3 pounds each by the end of the experiment. The researchers concluded that this occurred because the amount of heat that is produced during the digestion of carbohydrates is significant. Thus the horses tended to overheat in hot weather. Corn also packs more heavily inside the animal's stomach than oats, which, by contrast, add bulk to the diet and allow enzymes to better penetrate the food. A diet where corn and prairie hay are the main staples, therefore, hinders the process of digestion, and makes overfeeding dangerous. At the end of the experiment the corn-fed horses were not as healthy as those fed with a combination of corn and oats.\textsuperscript{109}

Prairie hay and timothy hay require a fair amount of effort to digest, and if either hay is left to mature for too long before being harvested, "the digestible nutrients become so strongly encased in cellulose that an excessive amount of energy is required to digest

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid., 4-6.
these hays.”

Alfalfa hay can also create problems when it is fed as roughage rather than as a small concentrated amount of matured hay. Immature alfalfa is often too “washy” for horses. When eaten in large quantities, as horses are prone to do if allowed, fresh alfalfa can cause “excessive urination and soft, ‘windy’ horses that are puffed in the hocks, stocked on the legs and unable to endure hard work.” Alfalfa hay must be in full bloom when it is harvested for horses, and then “thoroughly cured and stacked. Special care must be taken to prevent spoiling or molding, as moldy, musty or dusty hay of any kind is injurious to horses.” Overfeeding horses with alfalfa is also a serious problem, for doing so not only overworks the kidneys, but also causes irritation which may result in a pronounced chronic inflammatory condition of the kidneys. Another effect of over-feeding with alfalfa is a cloying of the whole system, resulting in impaired nutrition, filling of the legs and hocks, softness, excessive sweating, and impaired respiration. A part of the trouble with the wind comes from the fact that the overloaded digestive tract interferes with the proper functioning of the lungs. Heaves may develop, most cases of heaves resulting from indigestion. This disease is at first a functional disturbance, but later becomes structural in character and incurable.

Noting the problems created by these various feeds, when fully ripe, one can easily imagine the problems that green corn, and un-ripe grasses and hay caused for the horses in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. As previously mentioned, horses have extremely sensitive digestive systems. A mere bout of indigestion can kill a horse.

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110 Ibid., 7.
111 Ibid., 9-10.
112 Ibid., 10.
113 Ibid.
Heaves, colic, and enteritis are all potentially fatal horse diseases, which are derived from an imbalanced or improper diet. Dealing with the logistics of keeping their hungry animals properly fed was an especially trying task for the members of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, when one considers that they had 150 animals to feed. Moreover, the toll that long, exhausting marches took on the soldiers themselves, as well as the desperate shortages of rations under which these men operated, would have made it even more difficult to care for the horses properly.\footnote{Ibid., 1-16; “Hay is for Horses”; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.}

For the individual soldier, daily dietary requirements mandated that he consume approximately two pounds of bread per day. Thus, an army of 60,000 men would demand 90,000 bread rations on a daily basis, which would, in turn, require 600 tons of flour. The Union army’s prescribed marching ration, as of 1862, “consisted of one pound of . . . hard tack, three-quarters of a pound of salt pork, or one-quarter of a pound of fresh meat, one ounce of coffee, three ounces of sugar and salt,”\footnote{Schrader, 266.} with a weight requirement set at three pounds. The Confederate ration was similar, but provided “more sugar and less meat, coffee, vinegar and salt.”\footnote{Schrader, 267.} Molasses was also supplied on occasion. However, logistical problems often dictated that the amount received was usually less than the ideal standard, and many soldiers depended heavily upon foraged goods for their subsistence.\footnote{Van Creveld, 33-35; Schrader, 266-267.}

Food was in perpetually short supply for the members of the Missouri State
Guard. The Commissary of Subsistence did the best it could under the circumstances and the fact that the army was able to last as long as it did, given the scarcity of available provisions, is indicative of the effort that the Commissaries and Forage-Masters must have expended. A bill of sale dated Dec 5, 1861, for instance, shows that 7,028 lbs. of beef were purchased by the Commissary’s Department for the price of $351.40, while in 1862, 500 lbs. of beef was obtained for $25.00. Nevertheless, it was often left to individual combatants to find their own food, and the artillery was no exception. Soldiers were forced to scour the surrounding countryside for suitable rations, and sometimes for unsuitable ones. Alternately, they might rely on the kindness of southern sympathizers for sustenance. However, even when local farmers were willing to share their livestock and crops, there was only so much to go around and the sad alternative was for the famished troops to simply go hungry. Falling asleep on an empty stomach was not an uncommon occurrence. At Cowskin Prairie, the site where the Missouri State Guard gathered for training in July of 1861, both men and horses alike had to subsist on green corn, and whatever else the local farmers could donate, either willingly or unwillingly.118

After the Battle of Wilson’s Creek, the Federal prisoners also got a taste of what life was like in Sterling Price’s army. Presented with a load of green corn for their ration, they angrily balked at the idea of consuming horse food. Barlow’s men told them straightforwardly that this was all the food that they had in their stores, and that they had given them the best of it. Over time, the corn ripened and it was ground into meal. Fresh

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118Peterson, 18; “Quartermaster Requisition No. 251, “ “Quartermaster Requisition No. 671,” Millar Family Papers; Patrick, 33; Woodruff, 37.
beef was provided fairly regularly, potatoes occasionally. Salt, however, was scarce.\textsuperscript{119}

Following the same procedures in the antebellum U.S. Army, Confederate officers were not issued rations but had to purchase them out of their pay. Some idea of the rations procured for the officers of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery can be gleaned from a tally of receipts compiled by 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenant Henry S. Johnston over the months of February and March 1862. These receipts were for foodstuffs received from John S. Millar of the Commissary Brigade, Missouri Volunteers for Confederate Service. The types of rations were typical of what was normally provided for Confederate soldiers. On February 7, the officers were sold fifty-seven pounds of fresh pork for $3.42, twenty-four pounds of salt for $2.40 and one gallon of molasses for $0.35. On February 19, they received sixty pounds of flour for $3.30 and twenty pounds of ham for $3.00. On February 24, one and a half gallons of molasses was obtained for $0.53. On February 27, ten pounds of coffee was bought for $5.00 and 8 pounds of sugar for $1.00. The next day, 100 pounds of flour was purchased for $5.50. The total amount purchased for the officers that month was $24.50.\textsuperscript{120}

During the entire month of March the officers of Clark’s battery received one hundred pounds of flour for $6.00, one hundred eighty pounds of meal for $3.60, eighty-eight pounds of bacon for $17.80, one hundred three pounds of beef for $8.24, forty-two pounds of coffee for $29.40, fifty-six pounds of rice for $2.80, and two gallons of molasses for $0.70. They also procured one and one half pounds of soap for $0.45 and

\textsuperscript{119}Patrick, 43.

\textsuperscript{120}Henry S. Johnston, “Received of Jno S. Millar Commissary Brigade Mo. Vols for Confederate Service the Following Articles for Use of Officers in Captain Clark’s Battery,” June 22, 1862, William Clark Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.
two candles for $0.60. Thus, the total expenditure for that month was $75.09. The combined amount for the months of February and March 1862 was $99.59. Thus, the price of sugar had decreased, while the price of coffee and flour had increased. Meat was also slightly more expensive in March, although it was not the same variety as that purchased in February, and this fact could account for the difference. Overall, the officers spent $50.59 more in March for food and supplies than they had in February.\textsuperscript{121} Of course, food was not always available from the commissary and soldiers sometimes had to find other means of feeding themselves.

At Pea Ridge, Guibor’s men were among the minute few who were well fed. His battery was fortunate to be deployed near Elkhorn Tavern, and they made up for lost time by gorging themselves on the Federal supplies and sutler’s provisions that had been discovered in the vicinity. “They wolfed down oysters, sardines, cheese, pickles, wine, preserves, and other ‘delicacies long unknown to the State Guard,’”\textsuperscript{122} then finished off their revelry by smoking some purloined cigars. Sutlers’ stores were a common source of supplementary food for hungry soldiers. At Lexington, however, it was the locals who provided a measure of relief for the hungry artillerymen. Some of the soldiers were able to scavenge some wine, and once accustomed to the roar of gunfire the women of the town brought baskets of food each day.\textsuperscript{123} Nevertheless, one veteran recollected that in the two short weeks that Price’s army was “in the vicinity of Lexington, the army ate up

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{122}Shea and Hess, 213.

\textsuperscript{123}Ibid., 213-214; Schrader, 266; Patrick, 47.
nearly all the food in the country."\textsuperscript{124}

Life was hardly better for soldiers once they had joined the Confederate army and moved east of the Mississippi. Jo Wilson, of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, listed the following as their rations over the course of the war. After the fall of Vicksburg, soldiers were each given "two crackers, two ounces of bacon, one-half pint of sugar and all the blackberries that [they] could pick."\textsuperscript{125} For two weeks during January 1864, while in Mississippi and separated from their supplies, the soldiers ate "sweet potatoes, parched corn and fresh pork, which were found in great abundance."\textsuperscript{126} In May of 1864, near Marietta, Georgia, on the heels of the Atlanta Campaign, food was scarce. The men, received "small rations of 'pine top' whiskey," apparently a rarity.\textsuperscript{127} In July 1864 the men apparently had access to sorghum, but they traded it with some union soldiers for flat tobacco. In August of the same year soldiers and horses alike ate green corn. "Corn bread and boiled beef without salt [were also] cooked in camp and brought to [the artillerymen] in the trenches once a day."\textsuperscript{128} In mid-September of 1864, "below Atlanta [they] found a good foraging country; lived on sweet-taters, flour bread, fresh pork and honey. The last [was] abundant and easily procured, but the bees sometimes [made] it very warm for the forager."\textsuperscript{129} In January of 1865, once again in Mississippi, the rations

\textsuperscript{124} Winter, 10.
\textsuperscript{125} Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
consisted of "[h]ard tack, [and] peanuts (in the southern vernacular ‘goober peas’), with sugar and bacon on alternate days. [They] sigh[ed] for the ‘fresh pig’s grease and honey’ of Middle Georgia, on which some of [the men] foun[dered] last October."\textsuperscript{130} Thus most of their food was procured through foraging, and through the generosity of the locals, who were found to be especially charitable in Mississippi.\textsuperscript{131}

Shelter was also hard to come by for the men of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery. Jo Wilson commented in 1864, "For the past two years, we have hardly known the shelter of a tent. Sometimes we have ‘dog tents’ or shelters made of oilcloths or wagon-sheets, captured from the enemy. This is the height of luxury, and causes the fortunate possessor to put on airs."\textsuperscript{132}

All told, deprivation, ingenuity, and determination were the three key axioms of life and soldiering in the Missouri State Guard. These soldiers were taxed by severe deficiencies in every necessity throughout their army’s infancy, yet time and again, they found means to overcome even the most daunting of obstacles.

In the early months of 1862 the majority of the Missouri State Guard transferred to the Confederate Army. The Guard was not a cohesive unit of supporters loyal to the Confederacy. Many of them simply wanted to liberate Missouri from the conflict altogether, and would have fought against any invasion force with equal ardor.

Enlistment in the Guard had peaked somewhere in the region of 25,000-30,000 troops. When transfers began in December 1861 their numbers were around 7,000 men. Many of

\textsuperscript{130}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{131}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{132}\textit{Ibid.}

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these enlisted in Sterling Price's two Confederate Missouri Brigades. Many others returned to their Missouri homes. For those who remained in the army, deprivation lay ahead. The shortages faced by the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery while operating under the Missouri State Guard were not alleviated by joining the Confederate service. In most cases, their situations deteriorated over time, particularly near the end of the war.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{133}Piston and Sweeney, 19, 25-26; Winter, 10; Peterson, 151-152; Sifakis, 72-73.
CHAPTER 4

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SOLDIERS OF THE 2ND MISSOURI LIGHT ARTILLERY

Samuel Churchill Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, originally of the Missouri State Guard, enlisted in the Confederate Army in the winter of 1861-1862, and served out the remainder of the war fighting for the Southern cause under three different captains. Clark commanded until he was killed in action at the Battle of Pea Ridge, whereupon the captaincy transferred to Houston King. King left the battery in 1864 when he received a promotion to the rank of a colonel. Command thereupon fell to Lieutenant James L. Farris, who served as the battery’s captain for the remainder of the war. An attempt will be made to shed light upon the enlisted men who served in this under-studied branch of the Guard, through a statistical analysis of the information that was gathered on the unit. Since one cannot rely heavily on memoirs and letters to understand the battery, or draw upon a hometown newspaper (the geographical makeup of the battery was too diverse), census and voting data can provide insights.

The strength of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, as found in the muster roll and compiled service records, stood at 143 men (thirty officers, one artificer, one guidon, and 111 privates). This number corresponds very closely with an estimate in an 1881 Lafayette County history, as well as an article written by Jo Wilson. Both sources placed
its peak number at 150. However, R. S. Bevier’s list of survivors of the war gives the names of 110 men, eighteen of whom do not appear in these sources. Of these eighteen soldiers, four were officers, one was an artificer, one was a musician, and twelve were privates. An additional fifty-one men not appearing in previously listed sources were found on the Civil War Soldiers and Sailors Database maintained by the National Archives. The ranks of these soldiers included eight officers, forty-two privates, and one soldier of unknown rank. Finally, one soldier who was named in both the 1881 history of Lafayette County and in Wilson’s article on Clark’s Battery, and who is known only as Sergeant Tucker, rounds out the tally of soldiers in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. Assuming, therefore, that the information gleaned from Bevier’s list, the Civil War Soldiers and Sailors Database\textsuperscript{134} and the 1881 History of Lafayette County are substantially accurate, the total unit strength of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, including all transfers, was 213 men, including forty-three officers, two artificers, one guidon, one musician, 165 privates, and one soldier of unknown rank.\textsuperscript{135}

It is important to note that some of the soldiers listed by Bevier and the Civil War Soldiers and Sailors Database who do not appear on the Muster Roll or in the compiled service records were undoubtedly transfers from a section of the 1st Field Battery.

\textsuperscript{134}Note: The Civil War Soldiers and Sailors System database contains errors such as multiple listings and spellings of a single soldier’s name. This paper takes obvious inaccuracies into account and the results represent the author’s best estimation.


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Arkansas Artillery (McNalley’s Battery), which was attached to the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery in the autumn of 1863. The original strength of McNalley’s battery was ninety-four men. However, only twenty members of this unit joined the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, as the remainder of the battery had either been killed or captured at Vicksburg. Of these, eight men have been located on both McNalley’s and Farris’s rosters. These men are: Joseph Blanton, Charles Combs, Joseph V. Bogy, Louis Bogy, John W. Koone, Ira W. McPherson, J. W. McPherson, and N.C. Reynolds. However, Edward S. Violett, who was also from McNalley’s battery, was not identified as such on their roster. The total number of positively identified men who transferred to the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery from McNalley’s battery is thus nine. It is also probable that Sergeant Tucker was from this battery, since he was, according to Wilson, the “chief” of the parrot gun. This cannot be definitively confirmed, because he was not listed on the original roster of McNally’s battery. The fact that some of these soldiers originally enlisted in and served with Arkansas batteries might help to account for their absence on the original muster roll for King’s battery and in the compiled service records.\footnote{The roster strength of ninety-four for McNally’s Battery includes the ninety-three men listed on the CWSS, plus Edward S. Violett. Sergeant Tucker was possibly also from McNally’s battery, but he has not been included in this figure since his original unit can only be surmised. Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; History of Lafayette County, 371-73; Bevier, “Appendix,” 1-27; Entry for Edward S. Violett in Military Service Records: King/Clark’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battery Light Artillery, C.S.A.; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4.}

The statistical analysis of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery is based primarily upon information garnered from the above named sources, as well as from the 1860 Federal Population Census for Missouri, the 1860 Slave Census for Missouri, and the 1860 Missouri Agricultural Census. In each case, the economic and social status of privates and officers has been examined separately and together. Where applicable, the mean,
median, and mode for these statistics have also been determined. Comparisons have been made to information provided in Bell Wiley’s Life Of Johnny Reb, and to patterns found within the state of Missouri as a whole. An effort has been to provide an accurate picture of the soldiers in the battery.

The following statistical analysis commences with a breakdown of the occupations and the ages of the soldiers within the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. Next, pre-war counties of residence for the soldiers are examined, along with the voting returns for the 1860 Presidential election within said counties. This section of the chapter includes some speculation as to the mindset and possible motivations of the soldiers during the early, middle, and late stages of the war, and a discussion of some factors, which may have influenced those views. The rate of desertion within the battery has also been scrutinized in some detail, and theories as to the possible motives of the deserters have been presented. Additional data analysis is then carried out in relation to nativity, slave ownership, wealth, marital status, family size, and, among the younger soldiers, schooling.\footnote{The data and the statistical in this paper are based upon information from “King’s Historic Roll,” I-4; Military Service Records: King/Clark’s 2nd Battery Light Artillery, C.S.A.; Bevier, “Appendix,” 1-27; Loeb and Shoemaker, 84; History of Lafayette County Missouri (1881), 371-373; Winter, 1-17; Tucker, “Clark,” 14-20; Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census, Free Schedules; Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census, Slave Schedules; Missouri 1860 Census, Agricultural Schedules.}

Following the war, Jo Wilson provided a rough statistical appraisal of the makeup of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery:

From first to last we had on our roles [sic] about 150 men; the average belonging to the company at any one time was from eighty to 100. About 50 per cent. were under 21 at time of enlistment, several being boys of 16 or 17 years old. The rest were all under 40, except two or three, who were men of 60. Five or 6 per cent. were from the “learned professions” (two being preachers), 10 to 15 per cent. from commercial life, 25 to 30 per cent. were mechanics, the balance were farmer
boys, apprentices and students. There were but five men in the company who were married when the war broke out - four or five married in the South, during the war. The company was composed of the best material Missouri could furnish, being mainly from the first volunteers.\textsuperscript{138} Wilson’s recollections concerning the ages and occupations of the soldiers in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery are remarkably similar to those uncovered by this study.

Information on the pre-war occupations of the soldiers in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery is also revealing.\textsuperscript{139} Data was found for 103 men, including seventy-five privates and twenty-eight officers. Of the privates, 70.67\% were farmers.\textsuperscript{140} Mechanics made up 8\% of the battery and students 4\%. Clerks and painters each accounted for 2.67\% of the total. The professions of blacksmith, carpenter, civil engineer, laborer, man of letters, merchant, physician, preacher, ship’s carpenter, stage driver, and wagon maker round out the occupations, each of which stood at 1.33\%.

While the regular army trained anyone, to work the guns, even Irish immigrant laborers, the officers of an artillery battery were considered to be elite, and mounted artillery, such as the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light artillery, were considered elite among artillery units. It might be expected, therefore, that the occupations of the officers in the 2\textsuperscript{nd}

\textsuperscript{138}Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.

\textsuperscript{139}There are discrepancies between the census and the muster roll. In all but one instance, where additional information was found to corroborate the census (James Farris), I have assumed that the muster roll is correct, since its information was more recent, and the men’s occupations might have changed between the 1860 census and their enlistment. The soldiers affected are (I have indicated the occupation listed on the census, followed by that found on the muster roll, and I have bolded the occupation which I used in the study): Houston King overseer/farmer; James Farris schoolteacher/lawyer; Caleb Ayers laborer/farmer; Stephen A. Hall laborer/mechanic; Jacob Hicks tinner/farmer; Henry Clay King farm laborer/mechanic; Joseph Duncan Marquis miller/mechanic; John J. Layton farm laborer/stage driver. Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census, Free Schedules; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4.

\textsuperscript{140}The professions of farmer (49), farmhand (2), farm laborer (1) and farming (1) have been considered to be identical, thus the total number of privates in the battery who were farmers was 53 (70.67\%). Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census, Free Schedules; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4.
Missouri Light Artillery would reflect this distinction. Among the officers, 42.86% were farmers. Mechanics and merchants each accounted for 7.14% of the occupations. All other occupations were equally represented, each of these accounting for 3.57% of the total. These occupations were blacksmith, carpenter, clerk, laborer, lawyer, painter, river pilot, schoolteacher, student, surgeon, and U.S. Military Academy cadet.

The combined totals for officers and privates translate into the following percentages: 63.11% of the men in the battery were farmers, 7.77% mechanics, and 3.88% students. Clerks, merchants, and painters each stood at 2.91%, while blacksmiths and carpenters were at 1.94%. The professions of civil engineer, laborer, lawyer, man of letters, physician, preacher, river pilot, schoolteacher, ship’s carpenter, stage driver, surgeon, U.S. Military Academy cadet, and wagon maker each comprised 0.97% of the battery’s total.

When these findings are compared with Wilson’s recollections there is reasonably close correlation. Wilson estimated that 10-15% of the battery were employed in “commercial life” (if one includes the clerks, merchants, painters, blacksmiths, carpenters, ship’s carpenter, stage driver, wagon maker, river pilot, this study totals them at 16.50%), Another 5-6% were employed in the “learned professions” (if one includes the professions of civil engineer lawyer, man of letters, physician, preacher, schoolteacher, and surgeon, this study provides a total of 6.80%). Between 49 and 60% were “farmer boys, apprentices or students” (farmers, students and the U.S. Military Academy cadet stood at a combined 67.96% in this study). Only the number of mechanics is significantly different. Wilson estimated them at between 25 and 30%, while the findings of this study placed that number at 7.77%. Perhaps the men who were not located on the 1860 census
might account for some the differences. Nevertheless, all in all, there is a remarkably close correlation between the findings of this study and Wilson.\textsuperscript{141}

Many of the numbers found in this study also correspond fairly well with those found in Bell Wiley’s statistical survey of 11,000 Confederate soldiers. Wiley’s findings showed that 62.22\% of the men listed themselves as farmers. The next highest increment was students at 5.26\%, followed by laborers at 5.24\%. Clerks accounted for 3.57\% of the occupations listed and mechanics for 3.53\%. Carpenters were at 2.47\%, merchants at 1.53\% and blacksmiths at 1.29\%. All other occupations fell at less than 1.00\% of the total. Of those occupations that were also found in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, Wiley found that doctors made up 0.83\%, painters 0.77\%, teachers 0.76\%, lawyers 0.57\%, painters 0.43\%, and engineers 0.34\%. Some of the other occupations found were shoemakers, overseers, masons, tailors, millers, coopers, and bankers.\textsuperscript{142}

Statistics for occupations in Missouri as a whole also reveal interesting information about what one might expect to find in a battery raised there. Of the occupations found in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, similar figures have been derived for the state of Missouri, as a whole. Of the 299,701 Missourians whose occupations were listed in 1860, farmers made up 41.70\%, with farm laborers at 13.15 \%. Combining these professions, as was done in the survey of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, places the overall percentage at 54.85\% of the total. Laborers made up 10.23\% of Missouri’s occupations, while carpenters accounted for 3.11\%. Clerks numbered 1.79\%, blacksmiths 1.45\%, merchants 1.42\%, and physicians 0.85\%. Schoolteachers stood at an even 1\%.

\textsuperscript{141}Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.

\textsuperscript{142}Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb, 330.
painters at 0.49%, and students at 0.46%, with lawyers at 0.40%, members of the clergy at 0.43% and civil engineers at 0.35%. Drivers made up 0.26% of the occupations within Missouri, and mechanics 0.15%. There were only thirty-five men who were listed as wagon makers on the census, and only five surgeons. The percentage for both of these professions was therefore less than 0.01%. There was no information concerning ship’s carpenters, men of letters, or West Point cadets, though this last omission is not surprising.\textsuperscript{143} As evidenced, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery contained a similar range of occupations, in fairly similar proportions, save for a slightly higher number of students, which is to be expected, given the general youth of the battery. There is a higher representation of mechanics, who were perhaps more inclined toward the intricacy of the artillery service, and the inclusion of a surgeon, which appears, based on the census data, to have been a rare commodity. Laborers were under-represented in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery.

By observing the occupational statistics, it becomes quite clear that Clark’s was a highly educated battery. A full 14.56% of Clark’s men were of the “educated” professions.\textsuperscript{144} How does this statistic compare with the state as a whole? Within Missouri, the “educated professions” accounted for only 3.21% of the total occupations in


\textsuperscript{144}The educated professions are those that require formal schooling. This figure is derived from the fact that 3.88% of Clark’s men were students, 2.91% were clerks, and 7.77% encompassed the professions of civil engineer, lawyer, man of letters, physician, preacher, schoolteacher, surgeon, U.S. army cadet.
1860.\textsuperscript{145} Although there are no specific statistics on education for the year 1860, in 1870 we find that two percent of the nation’s young people had graduated from high school.\textsuperscript{146} This would imply that formal education was even more rare in the previous decade within the United States. Thus, Clark’s artillery would indeed appear to be elite in its makeup.

The question of why there were so many well-educated men in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light artillery may be answered in the work of Bell Wiley. In his statistical study of the makeup of the Confederate States Army, Wiley noted that there was a wide degree of variation in the type of men who formed up the rank and file, but that highly educated and cultured individuals could be found in many units, especially during the first year of the war. These men were particularly well represented in the cavalry and artillery because these were considered to be the most desirous branches of the service. Commissions were limited and transfers into these services from the infantry were difficult to arrange. When faced with the choice of being an officer in the infantry, or a private in the artillery, many men chose the prestige of the latter option.\textsuperscript{147} In the aforementioned letter to his aunt, Samuel Churchill Clark lent some credence to this notion, stating that “Aaron Levering, brother of Mrs. Whittimore is a Sergeant in my battery, he is well and

\textsuperscript{145}This information is derived from the following statistics: The total number of occupations in Missouri in 1860 was 299,701. The following numbers were given for “educated” professions: Judges 12, lawyers 1187, physicians 2538, professors 82, surgeons 5, clergymen 1280, dentists 140, geologists 3, students 1370, teachers 3008, translators 2, veterinarians 12. Doctors and lawyers were likely to have had extra education. Therefore, the educated professions, including students, account for 9639 of 299,701 occupations. This equals 3.21% of the total occupations within Missouri. Kennedy, \textit{Population}, 302-303.


\textsuperscript{147}Wiley, \textit{The Life of Johnny Reb}, 335-36.
contented, he used to be a Lieutenant."^{148}

Putting education aside, it also seems noteworthy that several of Clark’s men were employed in professions that would have been very useful for the operation and maintenance of an artillery battery. This may imply that certain soldiers were added to the battery, in part because of their skills. It may also be an indication that tradesmen were drawn to the artillery service above other branches, perhaps because they would be afforded the opportunity to ply their skills, with greater regularity. There were a fair number of tradesmen included in this particular unit. Blacksmiths and general carpenters, as well as a ship’s carpenter and a wagon maker, were present in the battery. The blacksmiths were necessary for shoeing horses, and would also have had the ability to repair cannons, create metal implements, such as gunworms, and repair fittings and the metal parts of equipment. The general carpenters, ship’s carpenter, and wagon maker would have well equipped to repairing wheels, caissons, artillery carriages and limbers. One soldier, Gustavus Dyes, had been a civil engineer prior to the war. His experience would have been useful in any branch of military service.\textsuperscript{149} In the artillery, one would assume that his knowledge of mathematics and geometry would have helped in the placement and angling of the guns. Presumably his knowledge would have been valuable in determining the proper trajectories of fire. He would also have had some skill in erecting temporary bridge crossings and fortifications, as well as estimating the strength and stability of preexisting structures. A high proportion of mechanics, as existed in the

\textsuperscript{148}Samuel Churchill Clark to My Beloved Aunt, January 25, 1862, William Clark Papers.

\textsuperscript{149}Upon graduation at West Point only students achieving top grades were assigned to the engineers. Gustavus Dyes was eventually transferred out of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery to the Engineer Corps, whereupon he was promoted to first lieutenant.
2nd Missouri Light Artillery, would have been seen as a boon to any such unit, due to their ability to effect repairs to machinery. Even the large percentage of farmers would have been helpful to a battery, in which the care and feeding of livestock was extremely important. Expertise of this sort would be especially necessary for a mounted artillery unit. In addition, the surgeon and physician would have provided obvious medical care and possibly some knowledge of apothecary treatments. The stage driver would presumably have been skilled at handling horses and driving a limber. He, along with the river pilot, may also have possessed some awareness of local geography, terrain, and rivers. The river pilot's knowledge would probably have been useful when attempting to ford streams and determine where the shallows lay for crossings. In certain respects, then, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery seems almost tailor-made in its occupational makeup. Whether this was by design, or whether it was purely due to chance, can not be absolutely verified, but it does seem to be very telling that the unit contained men whose various abilities would have certainly been a necessity for its successful and sustained operation.

Statistics for age were available for 108 soldiers in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, including eighty privates and twenty-eight officers. Of the privates, the youngest men were sixteen years old when they enlisted, while the oldest was forty-nine. The mean age stood at 23.08 years, with the median at twenty and the mode seventeen. Within the officer corps, the youngest man was fourteen years old, and the oldest, forty-one. The mean age was 28.46 years old, with the median and the mode standing at twenty-three and twenty-one, respectively. Combined, the mean age for the battery was 24.47 years old, with the median set at 20 and the mode seventeen. It is interesting to note that two privates in this battery, Minoah Beamer and Richard Cunningham, were both
discharged for being over age.\textsuperscript{150} It is also noteworthy that most of the soldiers in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery were unable to vote in the 1860 presidential election.

Wiley’s survey of ages in Confederate organizations shows the following data. The youngest soldier found was thirteen years of age, with the oldest being seventy-three. Of the ages that were statistically meaningful, 0.28\% were age fifteen, 1.81\% age sixteen, 3.33\% age seventeen, and 8.82\% age eighteen, which was also the mode. The group ranging from ages thirteen to seventeen accounted for 5.49\% of the total surveyed. Those from ages eighteen to twenty-five constituted 33.33\% of the soldiers, while the age group ranging from ages eighteen to twenty-nine accounted for 80.00\% of the total. Those men in their thirties formed 16.67\% of the total, those in their forties, 4.00\%. Soldiers in their fifties factored in at 0.78\%, soldiers in their sixties, at 0.11\%. There were only two soldiers found to be in their seventies, a fact which places them at less than 0.01\%.\textsuperscript{151} The above figures take into account that “the ratio of men above 45 and of boys below 18 was probably higher in 1861 and early 1862 than at any other time.”\textsuperscript{152} Wiley goes on to conclude that “The overwhelming bulk of the southern army from beginning to end appears to have been made up of persons ranging in age from 18 to 35.”\textsuperscript{153}

It appears, then, that Clark’s was a particularly young battery, with the vast majority of its members in their teens and twenties. Almost one-fifth of the men in the

\textsuperscript{150}Minoah Beamer was a wealthy livestock farmer originally from Virginia. He lived in Lafayette County prior to the war and was 44 years old. Richard Cunningham was a carpenter, originally from Ireland. He lived in Lafayette County prior to the war and was 48 years old.


\textsuperscript{152}Ibid, 331.

\textsuperscript{153}Ibid.
battery were under military age (18.52%) upon enlistment. One-fourth of the battery was eighteen or younger, one-third were aged from fourteen to nineteen, one-half were aged from fourteen to twenty-one, two-thirds aged from fourteen to twenty-three, and three-quarters of the unit's soldiers were aged twenty-six, or younger. Thus, one-fourth of the men surveyed were aged twenty-six or older. This fact is reflected in the statistics on marital status, family size and schooling, which are to follow.

The youth of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was probably somewhat anomalous. It was occasionally referred to as "the boy battery" by its contemporaries, due to the obvious youth of the majority of its gunners and its commander. The implication would therefore be that this glut of young men was in some way unusual. It is, in any case, particularly interesting, given the geographic diversity of the recruits. Some of this diversity can be accounted for by the fact that five of these underage men were transferred into the battery from the 6th Missouri Infantry, one from Wade's battery, and one from the 1st Missouri Artillery, respectively. Three of these men were from Saline County, one from Lafayette County, one from Bates County, one from Livingston County, and one from an unknown county. That leaves twelve other underage soldiers who joined Clark's battery at the outset, and certainly at their own volition. Five of these men were from Livingston County. In addition, Howard, Marion, Texas, Johnson, Lafayette, and Randolph counties each contributed one soldier. The last man was from an unknown county. There exists the possibility that some of these men, who were legally too young to enlist in community-raised units, might have run away to enlist with a unit whose recruitment officers would not recognize them, nor deny them entry into the army.

on the basis of being underage. Community-based units would almost certainly have asked for the required letters of permission from the parents of would-be soldiers under the age of eighteen. By enlisting elsewhere the men in question may have been able to successfully misrepresent their age. But why were so many young men, be they of legal enlistment age, or not, to be found in Clark’s battery, in particular? Perhaps the youthfulness and charisma of Captain Clark appealed to the enlistees, and this might, in some way account for their high representation in the battery. It may also account for some of the transfers of underage soldiers, assuming that the young men in question requested them. It is impossible to say whether this may be the case, but intriguing to speculate on the reasons behind this statistical anomaly.

It is interesting to assess the performance of these young soldiers over the course of the war and to compare it with other fighting men of their age. In Wiley’s sampling of soldiers, he noted, “the boy soldiers made a good record. There were a number of incidents of teen-age Rebs receiving mention for bravery in official reports and orders.”155 By comparison, the men of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery did not fare quite as well. Among the fourteen to seventeen year-olds, one man, George Lindsay, was commissioned as an officer, the remaining nineteen men being privates. Lindsay, oddly enough, was the youngest man in the battery, aged fourteen. He executed his duties admirably, as did Private George Thomas Marten, and both men were cited for their distinguished service. Thus the percentage of men in this age group who received positive mentions was 10%. However, there were also six deserters to be found among this age group. This means that 30% of the underage soldiers who enlisted in Clark’s battery also

deserted before the end of the war. In addition, this age group accounted for 30% of all deserters from the battery. In terms of casualties, one man was captured (5%), and one was discharged due to his wounds (5%).

Among the eighteen to twenty year olds, there were four commissioned officers, and twenty-six privates. One of these officers (3.33%), John Russell Daugherty, was demoted from corporal to private, for unknown reasons. However, two other officers (6.67%) received promotions. William B. Jennings was promoted from corporal to sergeant, while Hiram Craigg Wallace was promoted from sergeant to second lieutenant. The number of positive reports of bravery was again two (6.67%). The first concerned Jennings’ meritorious conduct and accuracy at the guns. The second man was none other than Captain Clark, whose gallantry and valor was commented upon time and time again in the collective reports of his superiors. The number of desertions for this age group numbered three, or 10%. Thus eighteen to twenty-year-olds accounted for 15% of all desertions from the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. Casualties included two men captured (6.67%), one killed (3.33%), and two men sick or wounded (6.67%).

Together, the men aged from fourteen to twenty, produced the following statistics. There were five commissioned officers, and forty-five privates. One officer received a demotion, while two officers received promotions. There were nine deserters from this group, which accounts for just under half of all desertions from the battery. Thus a staggering 45% of all desertions were from men under the age of twenty-one. There were four specific mentions of distinguished service or bravery, which equates to 8% of these men. Total casualties among this age group were three captured (6%), one killed (2%), two sick/wounded (4%) and one discharged for wounds suffered (2%).
Thus, while some of the young men in the battery certainly carried themselves with honor, others were unable to endure the entire length of the conflict. Possible reasons behind their desertions will be discussed later in this chapter, but certainly immaturity, homesickness, and a psychological inability to withstand the war, were all factors that may have impacted their ultimate commitment to the cause.

An examination of residency is significant to this study because civil war soldiers were usually raised at the county level and recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of the county in sustaining soldiers during the war. The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, however, flies in the face of this rule and leads one to question whether previous studies have been over-emphasizing this aspect of the research. More scholarship is certainly needed, before any definitive conclusions can be reached on this matter.\textsuperscript{156}

Information on residency was available for 101 soldiers. It should be noted, however, that twenty-five privates, ten officers, and one musician in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery are known to have transferred into it from other units. Of these transfers, eighteen privates and five officers provided information on their counties of residence prior to the war. Calculations for residency percentages have, therefore, been undertaken twice, once including these transferred soldiers, and once without them. In both cases, residency was scattered throughout the state but the majority of soldiers lived in counties that stretched alongside the Missouri river, in the Boonslick region, which was a major

slaveholding area and a stronghold of support for the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{157}

When the transferred soldiers are included in the calculations of residency, statistics are available on 101 soldiers, including seventy-six privates and twenty-five officers. Of the privates, the majority came from Lafayette and Livingston counties, each of which contributed 15.79%. Carroll and Ray counties each provided 6.58%, while Gentry County provided the next highest distribution with 5.26%. Howard and Saline counties each provided 3.95%, while Clay, Greene, Jackson, Johnson, Marion, Osage, Randolph, and St. Louis counties were tied at 2.63%. Audrain, Barry, Bates, Callaway, Dent, Laclede, McDonald, Monroe, Platte, Phelps, Pike, St. Charles, St. Francois, Stone, Taney, and Texas counties round out the list, each contributing 1.32% of the soldiers.

The twenty-five officers were overwhelmingly from Lafayette and Ray counties, with Lafayette providing 40% and Ray 16% of the men. Marion, Livingston, and St. Charles counties each accounted for 8%. Grundy, Jackson, Phelps, Saline, and St. Louis Counties provided 4% each.

When the entire battery is examined the figures stand at 21.78% from Lafayette County, 13.86% from Livingston County, 8.91% from Ray County, 4.95% from Carroll County, 3.96% from Gentry, Marion, and Saline counties, and 2.97% from Howard, Jackson, St. Charles, and St. Louis counties. Clay, Greene, Johnson, Osage, Phelps, and Randolph each contributed 1.98% of the soldiers. The remaining counties, including Audrain, Barry, Bates, Callaway, Dent, Grundy, Laclede, McDonald, Monroe, Pike, Platte, St. Francois, Stone, Taney, and Texas, each accounted for 0.99%. Thus, when the

\textsuperscript{157}Only soldiers whose county of residence is known have been included in these calculations. As with Brooks’ Study of Hood’s Texas Brigade, if a soldier “was a member of a slaveholding family . . . the number of slaves owned by the head of the household” was tallied. Brooks, 539, 13n.
transferred soldiers are included in the calculations, the residency of the 101 soldiers spreads across thirty-two counties.

When the transferred soldiers are omitted from the calculations, there are seventy-eight soldiers with available information on residency, including fifty-eight privates and twenty officers. The result is as follows. Among fifty-eight privates, the majority, 17.24%, hailed from Livingston County, while Lafayette County was ranked second with eight men or 13.79%. Ray County provided 8.62%, while Carroll and Gentry each provided 6.90%. Howard County contributed 5.17%, and Marion, Phelps, Randolph, and Saint Charles Counties each contributed 3.45%. All remaining represented counties, namely Audrain, Barry, Callaway, Clay, Greene, Jackson, Johnson, McDonald, Monroe, Osage, Pike, Platte, St. Francois, St. Louis, Stone, and Texas, provided 1.72% each.

Removing the transferred soldiers from these calculations also removes Bates, Dent, Grundy, Laclede, Saline, and Taney counties from the list.

Among the twenty officers, Lafayette County was the residence of 45%. Livingston, Marion, and Ray counties were tied for second place at 10% each. The remaining counties of residence, Grundy, Jackson, Phelps, St. Charles, and St. Louis counties were also tied at 5% each. Omitting the officers who transferred into the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery from other units causes Saline County to be removed from the list of counties of residency completely.

When the entire battery is examined, the figures encompass a total of seventy-eight men from twenty-seven counties. The figures stand as follows: 21.79% of the battery was from Lafayette County, 15.38% from Livingston County, and 8.97% from Ray County. Carroll, Gentry, and Marion Counties each contributed 5.13%, while
Howard, Phelps, and St. Charles counties each provided 3.85%. Jackson, Randolph, and St. Louis counties were tied at 2.56% each. The rest of the represented counties, including Audrain, Barry, Callaway, Clay, Greene, Grundy, Johnson, McDonald, Monroe, Osage, Pike, Platte, St. Francois, Stone, and Texas, each contributed 1.28%. With the transferred soldiers eliminated from the calculations, the counties of Bates, Dent, Laclede, Saline, and Taney were no longer represented.

Thirty-six soldiers transferred into the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, including twenty-five privates, ten officers and one musician. However, information on residency was only available for eighteen privates and five officers. Of the transferred privates, the majority, 22.22%, were from Lafayette County. Saline County fell second with 16.67%, while Carroll and Livingston counties contributed 11.11% each. Bates, Clay, Dent, Johnson, Laclede, St. Louis, and Taney counties round out the list at 5.56% each.

Among the transferred officers, the breakdown was as follows. Ray County contributed the most men at 40%. The remaining counties of Lafayette, St. Charles, and Saline were tied at 20% each.

When the totals for transferred officers and privates were combined, Lafayette County was found to have contributed the majority of the soldiers, with 21.74%. Saline County was second, with 17.39%. Carroll, Livingston, and Ray counties were tied with 8.70% each. The remaining counties of Bates, Clay, Dent, Johnson, Laclede, St. Charles, St. Louis, and Taney were also tied at 4.35% each.

Though its genesis was in Lafayette County, located within the confines of division eight, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery apparently did not stringently follow the traditional geographic guidelines assigned to most units of the Missouri State Guard.
Although the unit was initially assigned to service under Rains' Eighth Division, it was transferred to Slack's Fourth Division not long after the Battle of Lexington. This accounts for some of the unit's diversity, as the battery's recruitment area spanned two geographical divisions: Division Four and Division Eight. These divisions would have included, among others, the counties of Carroll, Gentry, Grundy, Livingston, and Ray, in Division Four, and the counties of Bates, Jackson, Johnson, McDonald, and Lafayette, in Division Eight. Some of the original members of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were drawn from these areas.

In 1861 the battery was housed in winter quarters at the city of Springfield in Greene County. It is logical to assume that men from nearby counties in Division Seven, such as those from Dent, Laclede, Stone, Taney, and Texas, might have joined or been transferred into the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery from other units at this time, thus explaining the presence of at least some of those members. However, even these allowances do not fully account for the staggering diversity among the members of this battery with regards to their counties of habitation.

The soldiers of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were, in fact, drawn from counties all across the state. For example, St. Francois County was located in Division One. Audrain, Callaway, Marion, Monroe, Pike, and St. Charles counties were in Division Two. Randolph and Howard counties were inside Division Three. Clay and Platte counties were in Division Five. Osage, Phelps, and Saline counties were in Division Six, and St. Louis County fell inside the boundaries of Division Nine. Thus, the 2nd Missouri

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158 Bevier states that the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was formed under Parsons' Sixth Division. Bevier, 110-111. By contrast, Peterson places it in the Fourth Division from the outset. Peterson, 136, 151-152; Piston and Sweeney, 14-15.
Light Artillery contained men from each of the nine geographical divisions within the state.\textsuperscript{159}

The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery does not, therefore, fit the pattern detected by past scholars. Whether this means that the battery was an exception to the norm, or whether researchers are guilty of focusing too exclusively on infantry and cavalry for their examples, is difficult to say. If the scholars are right about the significance of community ties, one might expect to find low morale, poor performance and particularly high desertion rates in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery. But as will be revealed later, this was not the case. Perhaps then, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery should serve as a reminder that the community link should not be overemphasized in explaining the behavior of Civil War soldiers.

Since the members of this battery were dispersed among so many counties, it is impossible to draw upon a single hometown newspaper to provide insights into their motivations and attitudes. Memoirs are similarly lacking, since it appears that only one soldier in the battery, Jo Wilson, wrote of his experiences. One must therefore turn to other sources, such as census data and election returns, to gain a greater understanding of the men of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery.

A soldier’s point of origin would undeniably have influenced how his opinions, beliefs, and values were shaped. Many people in the 18\textsuperscript{th} Century never moved from their birthplaces. Regular long-distance travel was relatively unusual, since they would have generally journeyed by stagecoach or rail, both of which could be prohibitively expensive. For these reasons, the community did tend to influence the thinking of its

\textsuperscript{159}Piston and Sweeney, 14-15; Winter, 10-12; Peterson, 23.
citizens. For instance, the majority of youngsters coming from areas with conservative beliefs or viewpoints would have tended to assimilate these same views, at least partially, during their adolescence. It is therefore worthy of note that prior to enlistment the vast majority of Clark’s soldiers were residing along the Missouri River in the Boonslick region, the area of the state that contained the highest proportion of slave ownership.\footnote{Meyer, 317.}

Equally compelling is the information that is revealed by an examination of the voting patterns in the counties where the men of the battery resided. Voting patterns within the thirty-two Missouri counties mentioned above demonstrate that the majority of soldiers who served in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, and their families very likely voted for moderate candidates in 1860. Ownership of slaves or residence in a county with a large percentage of slaves did not necessarily translate into a “fire-eater” mentality at the polls.

Specific information on political party affiliation is unfortunately only known for one soldier. James L. Farris, the third and final officer to captain the battery, was a politically active Democrat, who successfully ran for office on the party ticket following the termination of the war. He served on the Constitutional Committee of 1875 and was elected to the state legislature four times. Farris was characterized by his contemporaries as “a staunch Democrat in his political opinions, and . . . one of the prominent men of the party in this part of the state [Ray County].”\footnote{Portrait and Biographical Record of Clay, Ray, Carroll, Chariton and Linn Counties, Missouri Containing Biographical Sketches of Prominent and Representative Citizens, Together with Biographies} It is logical to assume that this description also reflected his political bent both prior to and during the war.
Although it is clear that Farris was a Democrat, it is not clear which branch of the party he supported in the election of 1860. The Southern Democrats favored Breckinridge and outright secession. The Northern Democrats favored Stephen Douglas and a more restrained political ideology. Within Ray County, 881 votes were returned for Douglas as opposed to 233 votes for Breckinridge. This makes it more likely, but not indisputable, that Farris favored Stephen Douglas and the Northern Democrats.\(^{162}\) If this were the case, since Douglas tended to be more inclined toward moderate views on secession, it may be that Farris was also somewhat restrained in his opinions on this matter.

But what can be concluded from the fact that Farris enlisted in the military on December 7, 1861? Was this a delayed reaction to Lincoln’s call for volunteers and to the belligerent actions of General Nathaniel Lyon? Perhaps, although it seems likely that Farris would have enlisted in the Guard earlier if that had been the case. Did he instead join in response to the Frémont declaration of August 30, 1861, which proclaimed martial law inside Missouri’s borders and advocated the seizure of secessionist property and the emancipation of their slaves? This is certainly a possibility, although Lincoln had removed Fremont from his post by November of that same year and rescinded the order. Could Farris simply have been one of the minority hard-line Southern Democrat, who had supported Breckinridge for President, favored secession, and who eventually pledged his allegiance to the Confederacy? Although it is incontestable that Farris was

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sympathetic to the South, his specific political bent, and his particular motives for enlisting can only be postulated.

Samuel Churchill Clark's family were Democrats of the Northern strain, and his father, Meriwether Lewis Clark, tended to favor a politically moderate viewpoint similar to that of Stephen Douglas. However, the boy's particular loyalties were somewhat nonspecific. Samuel Churchill Clark would have been satisfied with any candidate who won the presidency in 1860 so long as it was not Abraham Lincoln. He professed disgust over Lincoln's actions at Fort Sumter and clearly felt that South Carolina had been backed into a corner. In these opinions and in his headstrong exuberance to take up arms against the North, he was ostensibly more passionate about the Southern cause than his deliberative father.163

An examination of the 1860 election returns for the main counties of residence for the other soldiers of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery confirms the idea that most of their families probably supported one of the moderate candidates, either Douglas or Bell. The majority of voters in Lafayette, Livingston, Ray, Jackson, Johnson, Randolph, Marion, and Saline counties opted for Bell and the Constitutional Union Party, as did those in the lesser-represented Audrain, Barry, Callaway, Clay, Greene, Grundy, Jackson, Johnson, Laclede, Monroe, Pike, and Platte counties. In most cases, the second place candidate was Douglas, followed by Breckinridge and Lincoln. Exceptions were found in six of the nineteen aforementioned counties, namely Barry, Greene, Laclede, Livingston, Platte, and Randolph, where Breckinridge came in second, followed by Bell and Lincoln. The majority of voters in Bates, Carroll, Gentry, Howard, and St. Francois counties preferred

163 Winter, 6.
Stephen A. Douglas, followed by Bell and Breckinridge. Voters in McDonald and St. Charles counties also cast the majority of their votes for Douglas, but placed Breckinridge in second place, and Bell third, followed by Lincoln. St. Louis County was the only one that posted a majority vote for Lincoln. Five counties returned no votes at all for Lincoln, while eleven more showed totals of less than ten for the Republicans. Nine other counties posted returns of fewer than forty-five votes for the beleaguered Republican. Only in the counties of Gentry, Grundy, Osage, St. Charles, and St. Louis did he receive a total equal to, or greater than, 10% of the vote, and only a small number of Clark’s men resided in these areas. By a similar measure, those counties that witnessed a majority vote for Breckenridge, namely Dent, Osage, Phelps, Stone, Taney, and Texas, were not widely represented in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery.  

Most of the families living in these counties in 1860 were, thus, typical Missourians, reluctant to support extremism on either side. Most people chose to vote for the moderates even in the slaveholding Boonslick region. It is interesting to note the views of Meriwether Lewis Clark, Samuel’s father, on the subject of the strife between the states. Just after the election of 1860, in a letter to his eldest son, William, a cadet in the navy, Meriwether Clark expressed his fears that “War & its miseries” were imminent, though he was prepared to join in the fray and do his duty, if it came to that. He then noted:

My own feeling is that both the South and the North are wrong & have gone too

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164Burnham, 570-56.

165Piston and Sweeney, 12; Hatcher and Piston, 9.

far in their abuse of each other & should retract[,] & if not the Great West . . . should consider the South & North as two very naughty boys quarrelling & while she wishes to be in quietude who after warning them to desist & they dont [sic], to take the youngsters by the nape of their necks, & after chucking their heads together, set them down for better behaviour, otherwise to thrash them until they do, & we of the west can do it if we will but eschew the everlasting nigger question.\textsuperscript{167}

These words seem to typify much of the sentiment of the times within the state of Missouri, and it is certainly possible that James Farris would have agreed with Clark’s father. The older men in the battery (i.e. those who had reached the age of majority) may also have been more temperate in their views, and somewhat reflective of the electoral results in their home counties. However, most of Clark’s men were not yet of voting age. Can one assume that the young men in this battery were likely to be of a similar mind-set to their fathers? The example of Samuel Clark and his father might be an indicator that the soldiers within the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery held more fervent political views than their parents. There does exist the possibility that some of the underage men who joined the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery may have run away from home to enlist in the unit, which was raised outside of their respective counties of residence, so that questions of parental permission would not be pressed. If this were proven to be the case, one could certainly speculate that the boys’ parents would not have shared the same enthusiasm for the war, which influenced their sons. It might also be significant that Houston King, the man who succeeded Clark in the captaincy, had once been employed as an overseer.\textsuperscript{168} This might also be indicative of a more extremist bent among the soldiers who served beneath him, since he was elected to that position by the men within the battery.

\textsuperscript{167}Ibid., 258.

\textsuperscript{168}Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census, Free Schedules.
On the other hand, it may be significant that the men of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery initially enlisted not in the Confederate Army, but in the Missouri State Guard, an organization dedicated on principal to the defense of their home state. This fact would suggest that, at least to begin with, their true devotion might have been to the state of Missouri, itself and that it did not necessarily extend to the Confederacy. Most recruits tended to join regiments which were being raised in their home county, and traveling into the Deep South in order to join an unknown unit would have been impractical for many would-be soldiers, especially those who were young and had little money. However, in the case of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, one finds that its ranks contained men from counties scattered all across the state. Thus, if they had been ardent secessionists, long distance travel, presumably, would not have hindered their efforts to support the cause. Is it safe to assume, then, that in the majority of cases the political views of Clark’s men at the time of their initial enlistment reflected those of their families?

To further complicate the issue, the majority of the men in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery reenlisted voluntarily in December of 1861, after their initial three-month terms of service had expired. This time they joined the Confederate States Army for a period of three years or the remainder of the war. They did this knowing full well that they might be leaving the Trans-Mississippi region to fight in the states east of the Mississippi River. Whether this indicates a more deep-seated devotion to the South, than was usual among Missouri State Guard troops, is impossible to determine without more research. It is impossible to either confirm or deny these suppositions definitively, due to the paucity of soldiers’ journals and other such first hand documentary evidence. However,

regardless of their initial motives in joining the Missouri State Guard, it seems that the soldiers’ opinions toward the Southern cause must have become more impassioned as the war progressed. Part of this may have been a result of fighting against black Union soldiers. Serving under commanders such as Brigadier General Lawrence Sullivan Ross and Nathan Bedford Forrest, both of whom were opposed to the notion of black equality and decidedly pro-Southern in their outlook,\textsuperscript{170} as well as their own Houston King, who was a former overseer and therefore very likely to hold similar views, may also have influenced the attitudes and beliefs of the young and impressionable soldiers who made up the majority of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery.

Ross’s attitude toward blacks becomes clear in a series of communiqués with James Coates, the commander of the Union forces in Yazoo City, on March 4, 1864, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and of black soldiers in particular. Ross charged that Union soldiers under Coates’ command had summarily executed two men of the 6\textsuperscript{th} Texas Cavalry taken prisoner during a skirmish on February 4, 1864.\textsuperscript{171} The skirmish in question, was described by Jo Wilson as follows:


\textsuperscript{171}L. S. Ross describes the skirmish as follows: “They had one brigade of infantry on the fleet and two regiments of infantry and Osband’s negro cavalry on land at Mechanicsburg yesterday. Two of my regiments whipped the brigade and fleet, and the Third Texas kept the force advancing via Mechanicsburg in check and compelled them to retire late in the evening.

The infantry brigade attempted to drive the Sixth and Ninth Texas from a high hill on top of which there was a depression forming natural breast-works. They were driven back twice. The Nineteenth [One hundred and ninth] and Eleventh Illinois Infantry came to the base of the hill, within 25 yards, when my men used their pistols and drove them back in great confusion, many of them throwing down their arms in their hasty retreat. Night and a gun-boat which lay in short range and watching and shelling us until dark prevented us from getting all the arms left on the field. Many, however, were saved. The Legion was engaged for a short time with the force that attempted to flank the portion of the Sixth and Ninth Texas, and behaved very creditably.” \textit{O.R.}, Series I, Vol. XXXII, pt. II, 830.
In March 1864 (exact date forgotten), while Ross' brigade and the left section of our battery were going into camp on Benton Plank Road, near Yazoo city, they were charged by a force of negro cavalry being supported by white troops from gunboats on the Yazoo river. After two or three rounds of canisters were fired from one of the howitzers, which threw the negroes into confusion, the Sixth Texas and the "Legion" charged with sabres and pistols, turning the retreat into a rout.

It was presumably at some unspecified point either during or after this engagement that the two men in question were captured and killed.

Coates replied that he had no prior knowledge of the incident, but that he decried any such treatment of prisoners. He then went on to bring Ross's attention to a retaliatory incident, which occurred later that month:

[In a skirmish with a portion of your command on the 28th ultimo 19 of my command (colored) were missing; since then 6 of the number have been found, presenting every appearance of having been brutally used, and compelling me to arrive at the conclusion that they had been murdered after having been taken prisoners.

Coates was referring primarily to the members of the 1st Mississippi Cavalry, African Descent, although some members of the 8th Louisiana Infantry, African Descent, may

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172 Wilson errs about this date. This part of Wilson's description of events refers to a skirmish which occurred on February 4, 1864. Wilson's description closely matches that of the Official Records. The rest of the description, which will be discussed later, refers to a similar skirmish occurring on February 28, 1864. On that date the 6th and 9th Regiments Cavalry who repulsed the Union charge, which was this time made by a different unit of black soldiers, the First Mississippi Cavalry, African Descent. The 6th and 9th Regiments Cavalry slaughtered the retreating blacks, undoubtedly in a retaliatory measure for the murder of their own men on the 4th of February. This study assumes Wilson conflated these two events in his memory.

173 The battery was at the Benton Plank Road on February 28, 1864. However, as stated above, the description itself matches the earlier skirmish on February 4. This is further evidence that the last part of Wilson's description does in fact describe the events of the 28th, and he combined the two incidents in his recollections. This is not surprising, since the skirmishes were fought only weeks apart, and both events both involved a charge by black cavalry units, and their repulse by Texas cavalry.


also have been involved, as they were operating in the same area. Coates made specific mention of the unusually high losses for the black cavalry regiment, "considering the numbers engaged," in a report to his superior.\footnote{Ibid., 323.}

The substance of this report was confirmed by both Major General S. D. Lee and by Ross, himself. "The negroes after the first fire broke in wild disorder, each seeming intent upon nothing but making his escape. Being mounted on mules, however, but few of them got away."\footnote{Ibid., 390.} The 6th and 9th Texas Cavalry chased down the retreating black soldiers, most of whom were on mules, and killed approximately seventy-five of the eighty men who comprised the unit. Ross boasts in his report that their lifeless bodies were strewn all the way along the ten-mile stretch of road leading to Yazoo City.\footnote{Ibid., 367, 390.}

Presumably, then, at some point during these events several of these black soldiers were taken prisoner by members of the 6th and 9th Texas and were subsequently tortured and killed.

Ross made no apology for the mistreatment of the black prisoners following this clash. Furthermore, in negotiations over terms of surrender for the Union troops at Yazoo City, Ross intimated that he would not be able to keep the emotions of his men in check, \textit{vis a vis} the black soldiers. According to Colonel Coates:

The first demand was for the unconditional surrender of my retrenchments and the forces under my command. The officer who bore the flag of truce (Lieutenant Rogers, of General Ross' staff) stated that he was also instructed to say to the commander of the redoubt, "That in case of having to storm the works, General Ross said he would be unable to restrain his men." I answered. "That means he
will murder the prisoners if he is successful." Lieutenant Rogers said, "No, not exactly, but you know how it will be." I then refused to receive the communication and told Lieutenant Rogers to say to General Ross to put all of his communications into writing, for if he attacked me with the present understanding, I would kill every man that fell into my hands."\(^{179}\)

In his own report concerning the failure of these negotiations, Ross voiced his personal refusal to recognize blacks as soldiers or to extend to them or their white officers any kind of protection as prisoners of war. As a result of Ross's veiled threats, Coates declined to surrender his position. The city was attacked by Ross' brigade over the course of the following two days, and on March 6, the Union army evacuated the position. The Union side admitted casualties of 300 blacks and eighty whites in the loss of Yazoo City.\(^{180}\) During the entire campaign, Brigadier General W. H. Jackson estimated a total of 225 Confederates killed, wounded, or missing, versus 400 Union soldiers captured, and an additional 400 Union soldiers killed. The Union further admitted to 3000 missing troops. Jackson commented that "the number of their killed will never be known as a great many were killed whole out from the main body plundering and burning houses."\(^{181}\)

The aforementioned incidents are significant, in terms of discussing the mentality and motivation of the 2\(^{nd}\) Missouri Light Artillery because Jo Wilson made a veiled reference to them, in his reminiscences about the battery. Wilson not only acknowledges

\(^{179}\)Ibid., 327-328.


the skirmishes that occurred on February 4 and February 28. He also defended the actions of his comrades in offering no quarter to the defeated black soldiers. He offered little sympathy for the men of the 1st Mississippi Cavalry, African Descent. Whether this was due to the murder of the two members of the 6th Texas, or due to the total war that was being visited on the civilians of the area, is not entirely clear. What is clear is that Wilson believed that the black soldiers deserved their harsh fate. In reference to the February 28 carnage, Wilson stated, "The 'colored troops' did not 'fight nobly' and in the slaughter which ensued it is to be feared that their 'rights' as belligerents were not treated with that respect which is normally accorded in modern warfare." Wilson's comments would certainly suggest that an extremist mentality had been reached, by at least some members of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, by this point in the conflict.

Wilson went on to discuss the battery's commitment to the notion of winning the war. In addressing their enthusiasm for the cause, Wilson states that even when it became clear that the Confederacy would fall "some of the stout hearted still clung to the idea with which we started out that success must ultimately crown our efforts." As further proof of their dedication, Wilson draws attention to an attempted mutiny at the very close of the war, at which time the men of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery refused to accept the surrender arranged by Forrest:

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182 The first part of Wilson's description of events, quoted earlier, referred to the skirmish of February 4, 1864. However, the following description of the slaughter of Negroes is undoubtedly in reference to the events of February 28, 1864. As mentioned earlier, Wilson conflated these two events in his memory.


184 Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.

185 Ibid.
Our company at first showed signs of mutiny, attempting to seize the guns and start for Mexico. This plot failing, they run [sic] their guns out on the bank of the Alabama river, with the intention of throwing them in; in fact, the ammunition was nearly all thrown in the river, when Forrest placed a guard around the camp and quieted the malcontents. This incident shows the spirit[,] which animated the men, even at the closing hour of the great drama in which we were all actors . . . The breaking up of our little band was like the parting of a family. The collapse of the confederacy was a stunning blow, and with heavy hearts and some tearful eyes we...took various routes homeward.\textsuperscript{186}

This would seem to indicate that the men of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery were still stubbornly dedicated to winning the war, even after the South’s position had become hopelessly untenable. Certainly the tendency toward zealfulness in one’s youth might have played a role in the artillerists’ fastidiousness. Nevertheless, this kind of stanch devotion was not typical of most soldiers in the Confederate army that late in the war, and seems to imply that the men of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery were of firmer mindset than was usually the case. Wiley points out that morale tended to be higher among middle and upper class soldiers,\textsuperscript{187} but, as will be seen later in this chapter, the vast majority of men in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery were positioned squarely in the lower end of the economic spectrum.

Before launching into a discussion of why this particular group of Missourians seemed so willing to continue the fight at a time when so many other Confederate units were suffering from desertions on a mass scale, it seems appropriate to examine the desertions that did occur within the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, in order to determine whether Wilson’s claims of loyalty within the battery are in any way verifiable.

Confirmed desertions within the battery numbered twenty out of 213 men. The

\textsuperscript{186}Ibid.

percentage of desertion was therefore 9.39% during the entire war. How does this compare to the Confederacy, as a whole? There is some disagreement as to the desertion rate within the Confederate Army, as a whole. According to James Robertson, the average desertion rate within the Confederate army was one in seven (14.2%).\textsuperscript{188} This rate may be somewhat misleading, since a statistical average of this sort does not reflect yearly variations. Some specific numbers on desertions within the C.S.A., many of which occurred in similar areas of operations as the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, can be found.

At the battle of Chickamauga in 1863, 110,000 soldiers were on the Confederate roster. Despite this, Braxton Bragg fought the battle with under 40,000 men, a fact which led the exasperated editor of the Richmond \textit{Daily Dispatch} to ask, “Where are the stragglers and deserters who swarm in the mountains and infest the lower country like locusts?”\textsuperscript{189} He had reason to be concerned, for these figures translate into a 63.63% desertion rate for his army, in that battle, alone. Losing about forty men daily, Bragg was hard pressed to match these losses, despite Confederate recruitment efforts. “After 1863, the number of Confederate soldiers evading service by devious means, but chiefly through absence, reached 50,000 to 100,000,”\textsuperscript{190} On a single day in February 1864, 400 soldiers deserted from General Price’s army. In October of the same year, Jefferson Davis estimated that approximately two thirds of the soldiers in the army were unaccounted for. In December, following the battle of Nashville, hundreds of soldiers from Hood’s army deserted along the path of retreat. In the months leading up to

\textsuperscript{188} Robertson, 135.

\textsuperscript{189} Wiley, \textit{The Life of Johnny Reb}, 378, ft. 76.

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 144-45.
Appomattox, the problem grew exponentially. By 1865, entire “companies, garrisons, and even regiments decamped at [one] time.”¹⁹¹ Two Kentucky regiments deserted in February, rather than leave their home state, and an entire brigade deserted in March. In August 1865, Grant noted that one regiment of soldiers per day was fleeing the Confederate lines.¹⁹²

Gerald Linderman estimates that the total number of deserters within the C.S.A. reached 104,000,¹⁹³ and confirms that they had reached disastrous proportions by the early part of 1865. The recapture rate for deserted soldiers was approximately 20.19%.¹⁹⁴ Bell Wiley agrees, quoting “John S. Preston, Superintendent of the Bureau of Conscription, [who] stated in February 1865 that there were over 100,000 deserters scattered throughout the Confederacy, and compilations from other sources indicate his estimate is conservative.”¹⁹⁵ Wiley goes on to state that,

a composite tabulation prepared by the War Department from the last returns sent in by the various armies...shows 198,494 officers and men absent and only 160,198 present in the armies of the Confederacy on the eve of surrender. The figure for absentees includes, of course, those excused for wounds, sickness and other legitimate purposes, but even so, it is shamefully large.¹⁹⁶

These figures translate into a desertion rate of 55.34% for the Confederate States Army

¹⁹¹Ella Lonn, Desertion during the Civil War (Reprint, Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1966), 23.


¹⁹³Linderman, 176-77.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.


¹⁹⁶This statistic is taken from the final returns sent in to the War Department by different armies of the Confederacy, December 31, 1864, to April 17, 1865. Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb, 145, 378n 83.
on the eve of surrender.

There does exist the possibility that desertion rates were higher in infantry units, than they were in the Cavalry or the Artillery. This fact, if verified, would certainly inflate the rates of desertion for the Confederate army, entire. Perhaps the rate of desertion in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery would not be as striking if it were compared to other artillery units, alone. Unfortunately, statistics of this sort are lacking in the scholarship, so the comparison between the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery and the rest of the Confederate army, of necessity, can only be made in general terms.

When a straight comparison is made, not only is the rate of desertion in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery substantially lower than average for a unit in the Confederate Army, but when the overall rate is broken down into a yearly basis, an interesting pattern emerges. Out of the total number of desertions, the most desertions, nine (45%), occurred in 1862. In 1863, there were seven desertions (35%). In 1864, there were three (15%), and in 1865, there was only one desertion (5%). Astonishingly, the rate of desertion for this unit actually decreased as the war went on. The numbers were staggeringly low in 1865, when desertions skyrocketed across the confederacy. This might imply that there was an intense degree of unit pride on the part of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, and a higher than average devotion to the Southern cause. Conversely, it may simply be reflective of the fact that the unit was so far from home late in the war, that the prospect of sneaking back that long distance was so daunting that very few men considered desertion to be a viable option. Other events in the unit’s history may provide some clues as to which of these is the likelier possibility, but definitive proof is not available.
A series of events that coincided with the aforementioned campaign against Yazoo City provide an interesting contrast between the men of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery and another elite unit, which fought alongside them during this time, and which might have been expected to display a low desertion rate, namely the 6th Texas Cavalry. In contrast to the artillerymen, it seems that soldiers within the 6th Texas deserted in sufficiently large numbers during February and March of 1864 to become the subject of several official communications between Brigadier General W. H. Jackson, who was the overall commander during the assault on Yazoo City, and Brigadier General L.S. Ross, commanding officer of the Texas Brigade. Part of the reason behind this behavior was an apparent dissatisfaction with their commander, Colonel John A. Wharton. In fact, Wharton was essentially browbeaten into resigning his commission on March 12, 1864, due, in part, to intimidation tactics undertaken by the men under his command. The specific actions by Wharton that led to his soldiers’ mutinous behavior are not stated in the records, but serious charges were being leveled at the colonel, prior to his resignation.197

Nevertheless, Jackson, who was in full communication with the other commanders regarding the incidents of desertion involving the 6th Texas, as well the controversy surrounding Wharton, seems to have harshly censured Ross for his failure to punish the offenders, as ordered. The reaction of Assistant Adjutant General D. R. Gurley

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197 Two of the deserters in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery also left during this time period. Both men deserted on February 18, 1864. However, it seems that there must have been many more deserters in the 6th Texas, in order for General Ross to directly comment upon it. The exact number of men who deserted from the 6th Texas during this time period is not known. O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXII/III, 876-79.
to these events was even more severe. He lambasted the behavior of the soldiers of the 6th Texas in General Orders Number Eight:

The brigadier-general is aware that there exists among the men and officers of this command and erroneous idea that by mutinous conduct and threats of desertion they can establish their ideas of military discipline and rid themselves of officers with whom they happen to be displeased, and save themselves from deserved punishment by threats of breaking up the regiment by cowardly sneaking to their homes or other fields, bearing with them the lasting stigma of deserters. . . . The disgraceful and unmilitary conduct of some members of the Sixth Regiment Texas Cavalry has brought upon the command a lasting disgrace and a stain that will forever darken the heretofore fair fame of this truly noble and gallant regiment. 198

In direct contrast to this harsh denunciation, Jackson lionized the men of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery in a parting address to the battery, given in February 1865. He spoke in glowing terms of their conduct and demeanor. Jackson commented directly that the men of the battery displayed the "hearty cooperation and support so essential to discipline and good order," and praised their enthusiasm, exuberance, courtesy, bravery and endurance under harsh conditions. In closing, Jackson called them "one of the best companies in the service." 199 The opposing reactions to the service offered by the 6th Texas and the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery provide a remarkable contrast, considering the fact that they fought together under Jackson's command for an extended period of time; perhaps even more so, given the fact that the cavalry was considered to be the most desirous and honorable branch of the service. 200

Although the rate of desertion was low in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery,

obviously, some men did choose to abandon the fight. Hatred of the enemy may tend to intensify when a soldier has to go hungry, sleep on the ground, and watch as his friends are killed before his eyes, but so, too, may war-weariness, fatigue, and disillusionment. One might logically speculate that hunger and deprivation was a prime motive behind the desertions. However that appears not to have been the case. The battery was at their most deprived in May 1864, when they were reduced to half rations, and then again in August of the same year. Yet not a single man deserted during these intervals. Starvation, therefore, seems not to have been the major factor behind the desertions.\textsuperscript{201}

One might also speculate that the fate of relatives back in Missouri might have been an influence upon their lasting commitment to the Southern cause. Missouri experienced the worst guerilla conflict of any state during the Civil War. Could it be that members of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery became demoralized by the thought of Federal troops occupying their homes, and possibly brutalizing their kin back home? Upon reflection, the question of the motivation of the deserters becomes twofold: firstly, would the men of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery have had the means to find out, through the proverbial grapevine, just how bad things were back in Missouri, and secondly, were the residences of the majority of deserters located inside the hardest hit areas?\textsuperscript{202}

In answer to the first question one can only speculate. However, according to Jo Wilson most of the men in the battery had never received any word from home during the entire war. The battery fought the majority of the Civil War in Tennessee, Alabama,

\textsuperscript{201}Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Linderman, 240-65.

\textsuperscript{202}Fellman, xv-xvi.
Georgia, and Mississippi — states located east of the Mississippi River and far away from home. They were in essence an “exiled” battery and they would not necessarily have known if their families had been hurt back in Missouri until they returned, especially in cases where soldiers had run away from home in order to join up in a county where they would not be recognized as being under-age.\textsuperscript{203}

The counties around the Kansas City area, along the Kansas-Missouri border, and in the bootheel of Missouri were hardest hit by guerilla warfare. As far as residency is concerned, the deserters were from several counties within Missouri. Two men provided no information as to their pre-war residences. A further nine men did not provide specific counties of residence, but their places of enlistment are known. Eight men enlisted in Greene County, while one enlisted in St. Clair County. Of those men who did provide residency information, one was from the Choctaw Nation, one was from Phelps County, one was from Platte County, one was from Monroe County, three were from Livingston County, one was from Lafayette County, where the battery was originally formed, and one was from Johnson County. Thus, a few of the men of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery may have been from areas within Missouri that were fully enmeshed in the bushwhacker war. Yet, these men were clearly in the minority. It is not known, specifically, whether any of their families had been burned out by the Federal troops in retaliation for the Confederate bushwhacker raids and depredations, which were occurring. It is therefore not possible to know whether any of the members of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery were impacted by news from home, as there is no clear correlation between their places of enlistment and the ravages of the guerilla war. It is probably safe to assume, however,

\textsuperscript{203}Wilson, "Clark’s Battery," 9.
that the guerilla war was unlikely to have been a major factor in the desertions.\footnote{For a discussion of the guerrilla war in Missouri, see pages 252-351 of Jay Monaghan, \textit{Civil War on the Western Border, 1854-1865} (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955).}

What, then, could have motivated the men who deserted the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery? Who were they and why did they choose this course of action? The latter question is, of course, open to debate, since there is no way of knowing definitively what particular factors combined to provoke each man's desertion. However, speculation about possible triggers, based upon patterns of age among the deserters, as well as the concurrent actions of, and events surrounding, the battery's operations is certainly possible.

The age of the men who deserted seems to have been a factor. As stated earlier in this chapter, a striking number of deserters in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery were underage upon enlistment. Among the fourteen to seventeen year-olds, there were six deserters to be found. This means that 30\% of the underage soldiers who enlisted in Clark's battery also deserted before the end of the war. Thus, one-third of all deserters were underage when they enlisted. In addition, this age group comprised 30\% of all deserters from the battery. Among the eighteen to twenty year olds, the number of desertions for this age group numbered three, or 10\%. Thus eighteen to twenty-year-olds accounted for 15\% of all desertions from the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery. Together, the men aged from fourteen to twenty produced the following statistics. There were nine deserters from this group, which accounts for just under half of all desertions from the battery. Thus, a staggering 45\% of all desertions were from men under the age of twenty-one. The data are too small to warrant hard and fast conclusions, since a number of
underage soldiers did serve out the entire war. Thus, while some of the underage soldiers in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery may have been more zealous than usual in their devotion to the war, the aforementioned pattern of desertion suggests that others may have been unable to handle the rigors and strains of combat, be they physical, emotional, or mental.  

Examining the exact time and place of these desertions provides some additional clues as to possible motivations. It must be borne in mind that the following ideas consist purely of speculation, because for the most part the evidence simply is not clear. Certainly, different interpretations of the evidence would also be valid. Nevertheless, some interesting postulation can be conducted by cross-referencing the desertions with what is known of the battery’s history. Several of the desertions within the battery corresponded with notable events. The following is a roughly chronological discussion of possible reasons behind the desertions.

The first desertion occurred in February 1862 on the retreat from Springfield. The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was acting as the rear guard to Price’s lines, and this presumably would have offered up the chance for George C. Boothe’s desertion. This was the battery’s first real engagement following its recruitment phase, and perhaps the throes of battle were too much for him. Owen J. Owens deserted at Cover Creek Arkansas, on March 2, 1862, just prior to the battle of Pea Ridge. It is possible that knowledge of the impending battle could have sparked his decision.  

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Violently traumatic events may have been at least partially responsible for some attempts to flee the battery. Over the course of the war three men deserted in the presence of enemy. The first of these desertions occurred on March 8, 1862, the very day when Samuel Churchill Clark was killed in action at the battle of Pea Ridge. Clark’s death appears to have had a direct impact on the decision of at least one deserter, Peter King, to leave. King was a Choctaw, who had for unknown reasons become an outcast from his tribe. He came to Missouri seeking William Clark, because of the explorer’s favorable reputation with regard to his treatment of Native Americans. When King reached Missouri he found out that William Clark was dead. Instead, he made the acquaintance of the man’s grandson, namely Samuel Churchill Clark. The two struck up an immediate friendship and the Indian became personally loyal to Clark. He served faithfully in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery until the battle of Pea Ridge, when upon his captain was violently killed by an artillery shell. N. P. Minor, the author of an article about “Clark’s Indian,” did not know what had become of the man, but according to his military records King deserted on that same day. If the substance of Minor’s newspaper article is taken to be accurate, the desertion would presumably have occurred some time after Clark had been killed. The demoralization of watching his beloved Captain’s head blown to pieces by an enemy artillery shell very likely factored into this man’s decision to desert.\footnote{King was from the Choctaw Nation, and is the only man who fits the description given by N.P. Minor, one of Clark’s contemporaries. Minor describes the Indian’s reaction to Clark’s death: “The Indian was one of the stricken in heart that saved the guns and the corpse of this beloved leader. Three times during the eventful day did those devoted battery men move the mangled remains of Churchill Clark to save it from capture. In all the sad scenes that preceded the fall of the confederacy none excelled in sadness the sight of those devoted men as they followed the body of their leader to his last resting-place upon the banks of the Arkansas river at Fort Smith and with tearful eyes and leaving the young soldier to sleep until the morning of the resurrection in his narrow home with no sounding requiem but the flow of the river to the ocean. The Indian lingered longest at the grave of his last friend. His after-career is a mystery. Whether he perished or survived the war, or whether he followed or abandoned the confederate cause after the death.}
Rankin W. Shockley also deserted in August 1862, after being detailed as wagon master for Greene's Brigade at Saltillo, Mississippi. Although the exact date of his desertion is not known, it did occur after the death of Clark. Thus, it is not inconceivable that Clark's demise might have impacted Shockley's morale to some extent. It is also possible that once he was separated from his companions in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, his commitment to the war might have vanished accordingly.\(^{208}\)

The two remaining heat-of-battle desertions occurred in August 1862, at the Battle of Iuka. During this engagement another high-ranking officer, Brigadier General Little, was killed by a minie ball just yards from where the battery was in operation. Two non-commissioned officers, Sergeant Benjamin B. Hengus and Corporal P. M. Shoemate, deserted at some point during the battle. Again, it is possible that witnessing the spectacle of a well-liked general being killed before their eyes may have instilled a sufficient amount of fear and revulsion to spawn desertion.\(^{209}\)

Three men were said to have deserted the battery in November 1862, although one of these desertions probably occurred in December of that year. W.P. Cole deserted of Clark . . . will perhaps remain a secret forever." However, Wilson states that due to the "rapid advance" of the Federal troops, Clark's body was left on the battlefield and "buried with the dead of both armies." Meriwether Lewis Clark concurs. (See below: footnote # 338) Since what happened directly after Clark was killed is not known however, it is possible that the body was moved by "Clark's Indian" at some point. It does seem credible that the soldier deserted at some point after his captain's death. N.P. Minor, "Clark's Indian." The Missouri Daily Republican, Saturday Morning Supplement, May 8, 1866, 9; hereafter cited as Minor, "Clark's Indian"; Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9; "King's Historic Roll," 1-4; Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census, Free Schedules: Meriwether Lewis Clark, "Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark, Monday 12 September 1842 to 9 March 1862," William Clark Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis; hereafter cited as Meriwether Lewis Clark, "Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark."

\(^{208}\)King's Historic Roll," 1-4; Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census, Free Schedules; Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.

at Coffeeville, Mississippi, on the retreat toward Grenada after the battle of Corinth. The battery served on outpost duty on the Yallabusha River, near Grenada, until February 1863. Sergeant Richard Inge deserted at this time, although the exact date is not known. Inge did not head back to Missouri, but instead remained in Mississippi for the duration of the war, and was living there in 1880. Robert E. Davis deserted on the retreat from Holly Springs, presumably following Van Dorn’s raid. This last desertion could not have occurred prior to December, as the raid proper was not begun until the morning of December 20, 1863. There are no logical details, which would suggest possible reasons behind these desertions.\textsuperscript{210}

The largest group desertion within the battery occurred in September 1863. Five men left while the battery was stationed at Vernon, Mississippi. Two of these soldiers, Nicholas Ficklin and Henry C. McQueen, were underage. James McLaughlin, Andrew S. Read, and Virgil C. Darr also left. Darr was believed to have “gone to the enemy.” The reason behind this mass desertion is unclear, although it appears to have vaguely coincided with the bolstering of the unit by a portion of McNally’s battery. Again, there does not appear to have been any obvious determining factor.\textsuperscript{211}

November 1863 saw two desertions. Franklin Smith deserted in order to escape punishment for an unspecified crime. He had been sentenced, but the judgment is not


\textsuperscript{211}“King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4; Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census, Free Schedules; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.
known, nor is it clear whether it was a military tribunal or a civil court that tried him. On November 10, 1863, James Wright also deserted, for reasons unknown.\footnote{Ibid.}

From this point on, all of the deserters from the battery were underage. It is interesting that most of the underage soldiers had actually lasted until very near the end of the war. None deserted prior to 1863, and four of six lasted until 1864 or 1865. Whether their staying power up until that point might indicate a certain degree of zealousness that sustained them until the Confederacy’s hopes seemed doomed to all objective observers, is open to debate. Regardless of the twenty men who were underage upon enlistment, six other men deserted, while fourteen underage soldiers stayed for the duration of the war. Thus, while age may have been a contributing determinant, it was surely not the only factor that spawned desertions.\footnote{Ibid.}

On February 18, 1864, two men left the battery, namely William Slack (no.1) and George Augustus Williams, the latter doing so forty miles below Macon, Mississippi. These two desertions coincided with those of the 6th Texas Cavalry, and it may be more than mere coincidence that Slack and Williams chose this particular moment to leave.\footnote{Ibid. There were men listed as William Slack in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. Since the dates of transfer and the places of enlistment (which occur on the same date – December 6, 1861) for William Slack No. 1 and William Slack No. 2 are different, it must be assumed that these men are not the same individual. The soldier referred to above was a seventeen years old private born in Linn County, Missouri. A farmer who enlisted on December 6, 1861, he resided in Chillicothe, Livingston County, at the time. He transferred to the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery from the 1st Missouri Artillery on August 4, 1862. He deserted on February 18, 1864.}

On November 5, 1864, Andrew Yokely deserted near Rome, Georgia. He was thought to have gone to the Trans-Mississippi Department. This desertion coincided with
the promotion of Houston King to the position of colonel, and his transfer back to the Trans-Mississippi Department. The departure of the battery’s second captain may have had an impact upon Yokely’s desertion. This is a particularly interesting case, because Yokely and King were both from Lafayette County. Could Yokely have deserted simply because his familiar commander left, and Yokely’s loyalty was connected to King, rather than the Southern cause? A possible alternative might be that Yokely had been planning to desert, and that the pivotal determinant was the fact that King, himself, was no longer present to witness the act. Was Yokely concerned that his commander would think less of him? Was he worried that his reputation in his home county would become besmirched, if King, now a prominent man from that area, witnessed it? These are intriguing questions.  

The final desertion occurred on the night of January 10, 1865, at Columbus, Mississippi. James Henry, Pritchard, from Johnson County, deserted. This final desertion may have been tied to the battle of Franklin. According to Wilson, Lieutenant Johnston, Sergeants Black and Francisco, and about five or six other men had, at their own request, gone to Tennessee as aides, scouts, and the like, and took part in the Battle of Franklin, among others. On January 12, 1865, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was encamped at Columbus, Mississippi, "where the remnants of Hood's army seem[ed] to be collecting after the disastrous Tennessee campaign [Franklin-Nashville Campaign Sep-Dec 1864]. The men look[ed] worn and ragged. Some of them ha[d] marched barefoot from Franklin."  

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215 Ibid.

own comrades, but the fact remains that the army was in bad shape. It is entirely possible that Pritchard had been at Franklin with the others, or alternately that he had seen the effects that it had had on the army as a whole. Demoralization was often contagious this late in the war.²¹⁷

What conclusions can be drawn from the aforementioned facts regarding the sustained devotion of the battery to the Southern cause and the extremely low incidence of desertion within the battery? Why was this particular group of Missourians so willing to continue the fight, at a time when so many other Confederate units were suffering from desertions on a mass scale? There were, of course, many factors that impacted the members of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery and therefore produced their loyalty to the cause and their ultimate defiance at the end of the war. Certainly by 1865 the members of the battery had developed some sense of Confederate nationalism. It is also not beyond the scope of possibility that the racial attitudes of Ross and Forrest, and even some of their comrades in the 6th and 9th Texas Cavalry, may have helped to shape these attitudes; the fact that the second captain of the battery, Houston King was formerly employed as an overseer may also have held sway. Although his personal attitudes toward blacks can only be guessed at, it is quite likely that King did not favor the notion of their equality. Having to face black troops in combat during the Meridian campaign may have solidified some of these views. It is likely that a commitment to white supremacy made a postwar South where blacks were not held in bondage anathema to the soldiers of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. A third factor may have been the cumulative impact of their experiences. They were an “exiled” unit that had seen long service, and therefore, many

²¹⁷Ibid.; King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4.
reverses and defeats along the way.

Another feasible impetus, which may help to explain the astonishing loyalty of the men of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, is to be found in the possibility that his soldiers could have consciously vowed a sustained commitment to fighting the remainder of the war for “Churchy’s” sake, and in his honor. Individuals have been known to fight with redoubled vigor on behalf of a fallen comrade, and witnessing such a terrible death as Clark’s could easily have had a long lasting affect on the entire battery. The fact that Churchill was widely considered to be an especially brave, gallant, charismatic, honorable, enthusiastic, and eminently likeable young man would certainly have amplified the palpable sense of bereavement that was surely felt among his men. The sense of “gloom” that descended over the men, after Clark’s death, was remarked upon by Jo Wilson. Losses of this sort can increase a soldier’s hatred for the enemy as well as his commitment to a cause. From a psychological standpoint, then, it is not inconceivable that the soldiers’ attachment to their beloved captain might ultimately have influenced their strength of will, after falling witness to Clark’s premature and violent demise on the battlefield. The sustainability of these feelings over the long term can only be speculated upon, but it is not outside the realm of possibility that Churchill’s personal devotion to the cause might naturally have been transferred to those who knew him and served beneath him. Could Clark’s name have become synonymous with the war effort itself? Did the young Captain become a symbol of their cause, the very personification of their rationale for steadfastly continuing to sponsor a hopeless cause, beyond its natural terminus? The absolute truth of the matter can never be known, but the notion is certainly
Nativity is another factor of some significance, in analyzing the men of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery. As with residency, a soldier's original place of birth would also tend to influence the development of their values and belief systems to some extent. Thus a soldier whose birthplace was Kentucky, or Tennessee might be expected to be pro-Southern, while soldiers from the northeastern states, such as Ohio, or those in New England, might be expected to be less represented in a battery which was in any way sympathetic to the Confederate cause. Moreover, within Missouri the prewar ethnic tensions surrounding the German population, who tended to be of a more liberal political bent, might suggest that there would be a paucity of Germans represented in such a unit.\textsuperscript{219}

Information on the nativity of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was found for 105 soldiers, consisting of seventy-seven privates and twenty-eight officers. Of the privates, 32.47\% were from Missouri. The next highest percentages were Kentucky at 20.78\% and Tennessee at 15.58\%. North Carolina made up 7.79\% of the total, with Illinois and Virginia at 3.90\% each, and Pennsylvania at 2.60\% each. Georgia, New York, and the Choctaw Nation found an equal representation at 1.30\%. Foreign-born men were also present. Of the privates, 5.19\% were from Ireland, while Canada provided 2.60\%, and

\textsuperscript{218}Wilson, "Clark’s Battery," 9.

\textsuperscript{219}Germans tended to be strongly anti-slavery and pro-Union. A significant number in St. Louis were members of ante-bellum paramilitary groups such as the Turnverein. They supported Nathaniel Lyon when hostilities commenced. William Garrett Piston and Richard Hatcher III, \textit{Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 24-37 passim, 188; William E. Parrish, Charles T. Jones, Jr., and Lawrence O. Christenson, \textit{Missouri the Heart of the Nation} (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1992), 148-51, 188 hereafter cited as Parrish, Jones, and Christenson.
Germany provided 1.30%. Foreigners made up a total of 9.09% of the privates, while those born inside America stood at 90.91%.

Among the twenty-seven officers, Missouri was first among birthplaces at 28.57%, followed by Kentucky at 21.43%. These two states contributed just over half of the total officer corps. North Carolina and Ohio were tied for third place, at 7.14% each. Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia each produced 3.57% of the officers. The two foreign-born officers were from Canada and England, respectively. These countries provided 3.57% of the officers, each. The percentage of foreigners in the officer corps was therefore 7.14%, while those of American ancestry totaled 92.86%.

When these statistics are combined, Missouri again figures as the most common birthplace with 31.43% of the battery being native to that state. Kentucky claimed second place, with 20.95% of the soldiers, while Tennessee was third with 11.43%. North Carolina provided 7.62% of the men. Illinois and Virginia each provided 3.81% of the soldiers, while New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania provided 1.90% each. Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and the Choctaw Nation claimed 0.95% of the soldiers. Of the foreign-born soldiers in the battery, 3.81% were from Ireland, and 2.91% were from Canada. England and Germany contributed 0.95% each. Thus, foreigners accounted for 9.52% of the battery, while 91.43% were born in the United States.

Of the nativities represented in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, the following statistics were found for Missouri, as a whole. Native-born Missourians comprised 44.54% of the population. Another 9.35% were from Kentucky, with 6.90% from
Tennessee, 5.06% from Virginia, 3.32% from Ohio, 2.82% from Illinois, 1.90% from North Carolina, 1.68% from Pennsylvania, and 1.37% from New York. Iowa accounted for 0.94% of the total, while Maryland stood at 0.56%, Massachusetts at 0.25%, and Georgia and New Jersey at 0.24% each. Delaware was statistically placed at <0.00%. Missouri was 8.29% German, 4.07% Irish, 0.94% English, and 0.26% Canadian. The Choctaw Nation was not represented in the state. The overall percentage of foreign-born residents of Missouri in 1860 was 15.0%, while those born within the United States numbered 85%.²²⁰

The nativity of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was thus quite diverse, representing a mixture of backgrounds. This fact is reflective of Missouri’s status as a frontier state and a major route of exodus for Americans living west of the Mississippi. The main migratory paths during the four decades prior to the Civil War were along the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee Rivers. Americans on the move tended to cross similar lines of latitude, a fact that is demonstrated in the influx of Kentuckians in to Missouri, and of Tennesseans into Arkansas. These two states, along with Virginia, and to a lesser extent, North Carolina, were the most dominant sources of origin for the new settlers entering Missouri. In many cases these emigrants were slaveholders and there was some tendency for them to settle in the Boonslick region, alongside the Missouri River region from whence the majority of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery is derived. Europe also provided a large number of immigrants in these years, due to economic, political, and social strife that existed in many countries. Germans were a particularly large source of immigrants to Missouri. Ireland and England were also well-established sources of

²²⁰Kennedy, Population, 301.
immigrants by the 1860s. The aforementioned American and foreign nationalities are each represented in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, with the proportions being fairly well in-tune with those found in Missouri as a whole.\textsuperscript{221}

Some similarities to the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were reflected in Bell Wiley's wide sampling of the nativities of Confederate soldiers. In Wiley's findings, of the eighty-six men who were born in Northern states, thirty-seven of these (43.02\%) were from New York, ten (11.63\%) from Illinois, nine (10.47\%) from Pennsylvania, and seven each from Indiana, Maryland and Ohio (8.14\% each), regions which also appeared in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. The remainder of Wiley's sample (nine men) hailed from Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, Vermont, and Michigan (these remaining counties account for 10.47\% of the total).\textsuperscript{222}

Wiley postulated that thousands of Northern-born soldiers must have served in the Confederate army. Native Americans also fought on behalf of the South, particularly in the Trans-Mississippi, where they comprised four regiments and two battalions. The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, formed in this region, does contain one man who listed the Choctaw Nation as his place of birth. Foreign-born Americans figured prominently in Civil War units, some of which were manned entirely by foreigners. Wiley points particularly to the Irish, German, French, Mexican, Polish, and Scottish soldiers found in units raised in Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, and Alabama, the four states with the highest proportions of foreign-born soldiers. Troops also hailed from Great Britain, Canada, the

\textsuperscript{221}Meyer, 235, 343; Russel L.Gerlach, Immigrants in the Ozarks: A Study in Ethnic Geography (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1976), 29-33, 43.

\textsuperscript{222}Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb, 322.
Netherlands, and Austria. Irish soldiers were the most numerous, followed by men of German descent. As indicated, foreigners were also to be found in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, from Ireland, England, Canada, and Germany.

Missouri, as indicated previously, was a state characterized by divided loyalties. Its residents actually owned a low number of slaves when compared to the states that comprised the Deep South, such as South Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia. Most of Missouri’s slaves were to be found along the Missouri River or in the southeast corner of the state. In Douglas Hale’s study of the 3rd Texas Cavalry, slaveholders were over-represented in the unit. He suggests that this was because they had a disproportionate stake in the outcome of the war. If this were true on a national level, one might expect to see a similar over-representation of slaveholders in the 2nd Missouri Light artillery, since the majority of its members were primarily from counties that stretched along the Missouri river valley.

Specific information on slave ownership was found for sixty soldiers, including

\[223\] Ibid., 322-327.

\[224\] Samuel Churchill Clark’s family owned slaves, which would have brought the total to 61. However, his father could not be located on the census. Thus, the exact number of slaves could not be determined. Clark has therefore been excluded from calculations that required an exact number of slaves to be identified. James Farris has been excluded from all calculations, as he could not be located on the census, and whether or not he owned slaves, is unknown. Information on slaveholding was listed on the slave census for soldiers who were the head of their own household. In cases where soldiers were not the head of their household, familial connections with the person listed as head were assumed to have existed under two circumstances: 1) when the soldier and the head of the household shared the same surname, and 2) when the surname of the head of household differed from that of the soldiers, but there were two soldiers/brothers found to be living under that person’s roof (this implied that that person may have been an uncle or other relative). In both instances, the number of slaves possessed by the head of the household was assigned to the soldier(s) for the purpose of statistical calculations of slave ownership. When two soldiers/brothers shared a single household, the total number of slaves possessed by the head of the household was divided equally between the sons, for the purpose of statistical calculations. In cases where the census only provided the number of slaves owned by the head of the household, but where familial connections were not apparent, soldiers were assigned values of zero in regards to the number of slaves possessed.
forty-four privates and sixteen officers. Of the privates surveyed, the minimum number of slaves per household was zero, while the maximum number was seventeen. The mean was 1.78 slaves, but the median and mode both stood at zero. The percentage of privates who owned slaves was 36.36%, compared with 63.64% who did not.

Among officers, the minimum number of slaves per household was again zero and the maximum seven. The mean was lower, at 0.53, with the median and mode both at zero. Of the officers, 23.53% owned slaves, while 76.47% did not. The battery as a whole had a mean of 1.45 slaves per household, with a median of zero and a mode of zero. Slave ownership was at 32.79%. The percentage of those who did not own slaves was 67.21%.²²⁵

There were twenty soldiers in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, out of sixty-one²²⁶ located on the 1860 Federal Population Census or in other relevant sources, whose households were found to possess slaves. These soldiers were from ten different counties, most of which were in the Boonslick region along the Mississippi or Missouri Rivers. The highest number of slaveholding soldiers, six, resided in Lafayette County. There were four living in Saline County, three in Livingston County, and two each in Callaway and Carroll Counties. Johnson, Marion, and St. Louis Counties each contributed one soldier. No soldier owned more than seventeen slaves, and thus by the standards outlined in Douglas Hale’s study of the 3rd Texas Cavalry none could be considered to a large

²²⁵Samuel Churchill Clark’s family, in St. Louis County, owned slaves, and has therefore been included in the calculation of the percentage of officers, and the percentage of total soldiers, who owned slaves. However, his father could not be located on the census, and the number of slaves could not be determined. He has therefore been left out of all previous calculations, where these figures were required.

²²⁶This figure includes Samuel Churchill Clark.
These statistics demonstrate that most of the soldiers in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery did not own slaves and with a few notable exceptions those that did own them did not tend to do so in great numbers, this despite the fact that the majority of the men resided in counties astride the Missouri River, the area with the highest population of slaves in the state. The privates exceeded the officers, in terms of slave ownership. However, the average number of slaves owned was fairly close and those numbers were low. The fact that the majority of men in the battery did not own slaves is in keeping with the overall trend in Missouri at that time, but the percentage of men in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery who did own slaves is noticeably higher than the average for the state.

There were a total of 114,931 slaves in Missouri. These comprised only 9.72% of the entire population of the state. Moreover, these slaves were owned by a mere 2.28% of Missourians (24,320 people), and ownership was concentrated in the hands of a few. Over half of the slave population of Missouri was to be found in eleven counties, mostly along the Missouri River where hemp and tobacco were cultivated. Included among these

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227 Hale designates ownership of twenty or more slaves as the prerequisite for inclusion in this class. Hale, 33-39.

228 Meyer, 317.

229 Parrish, Jones, and Christensen, 108; Piston and Sweeney, 12; Joseph C. G. Kennedy, Agriculture of the United States in 1860; Compiled From the Original Census Returns of the Eighth Census, Under the Direction of the Secretary of the Interior. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 286-87; hereafter cited as Kennedy, Agriculture. According to Kennedy, as of 1860 there were 114,931 slaves and 3,572 free blacks and mulattoes in Missouri. The aggregate African American population was 118,503, while the total white population was 1,063,509. The free population of Missouri, white and colored, was 1,067,081, while the total population of Missouri stood at 1,182,012. Thus, 10.0% of Missourians were black or mulatto. Of the black and mulatto population, 3.0% were free and 97.0% were slaves. Piston and Sweeney state that 11% of Missourians owned slaves, but this is contradicted by the returns of the Agricultural Census, as reported by Kennedy, which places the percentage at 2.28%. This study accepts the latter percentage as accurate.
eleven counties, all of which contained a slave population over 25%, were Howard at 59%, Saline at 50%, Lafayette at 47%, Clay at 36%, Callaway at 36%, Randolph at 30% and Pike at 28%. All of these areas, particularly Lafayette County, produced soldiers for the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. Of the remaining twenty-four counties represented by Clark’s men, nine had slave populations at above 15%. These include Marion at 26%, Jackson at 21%, Ray and Audrain at 17% each, St. Charles, Johnson, and Greene at 15% each, St. Francois at 14%, and Carroll at 12%. The statistics for slave population in the remaining counties place Livingston at 9%, Bates 7%, Laclede at 6%, Dent 5%, Grundy at 4%, Barry and Osage at 3% each, St. Louis, Taney, and McDonald at 2% each, and Gentry, Phelps, Stone, and Texas at 1% each.\(^{230}\)

One must also look to the number of slaveholders within each county, in order to verify whether or not the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery contained a disproportionate number of slaveholders. There were thirty-four counties within Missouri wherein the percentage of free residents who owned slaves was 2.28 % or higher. These counties and the relative percentages of slave ownership were as follows: Audrain (4.73%), Boone (6.12%), Callaway (6.61%), Carroll (3.01%), Cass (3.49%), Chariton (4.22%), Clay (6.81%), Clinton (4.22%), Cooper (5.40%), Greene (2.93%), Henry (3.46%), Howard (7.96%), Jackson (4.73%), Johnson (3.65%), Lafayette (6.62%), Lewis (3.18%), Lincoln (5.04%), Marion (5.16%), Mississippi (4.16%), Monroe (6.23%), Montgomery (4.62%), New Madrid (6.09%), Pemiscott (2.75%), Pettis (5.23%), Pike (6.06%), Platte (4.48%), Ralls (3.94%), Randolph (5.74%), Ray (3.94%), St. Charles (2.64%), St. Francois (3.06%), Saline (7.05%), Shelby (3.56%), and Warren (2.93%). The largest percentage of

\(^{230}\)Meyer, 317.
slaveholders was to be found in Howard County, where 7.96% of the free residents owned at least one slave.\textsuperscript{231} By comparison, over 30% of the men in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, whose data was accessible, owned slaves. This is three times higher than the figure found within the individual counties. Thus, it is clear that the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery did contain a significant number of slaveholders within its ranks.

What, then, can be concluded about the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, in regards to slaveholding? More men in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery owned slaves than was the average for the state of Missouri, but is this a relevant statistic? The percentage of white slaveholders on a per-county basis reveals numbers which are, at their peak, three times lower than those found for the battery itself. Does the makeup of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery then suggest that slaveholders rushed to arms in disproportionate numbers? By comparison with Missouri as a whole, the answer is a qualified “yes.” The men of the battery were more than ten times as likely to own slaves as most men in Missouri. Does this necessarily mean that the majority of men in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery joined the C.S.A. because they had a vested interest in guaranteeing the continuation of slavery within the United States? Moreover, is the statistical representation of slaveholding in this unit typical of all State Guard units, or is it merely a reflection of the makeup of one single battery? It is impossible to say.

Douglas Hale found in his study of the 3rd Texas Cavalry that the majority of the soldiers in that unit were wealthy slave owners. Judged against Brooks' study, at least half of the unit would have qualified as members of the planter class. This suggests that slaveholders rushed to arms disproportionately, and that the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Texans saw slavery as

\textsuperscript{231}Kennedy, \textit{Agriculture}, 233-34, 247-48.
something to be defended. By contrast, findings for the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery indicate that slaveholders were over represented in the battery, but not overwhelmingly. This suggests that while some members of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery might have been overtly motivated to defend the institution of slavery. It is likely, however, that slavery was only one of many issues that motivated the men. Further study of other Missouri State Guard units is needed for comparative purposes.  

An examination of property holdings is important in a study of this nature, due to the late war claim that the Civil War was a “rich man’s war but a poor man’s fight.” Thus the question of whether or not the lower and middle classes bore an undue burden in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, and whether their economic interests were being represented, is relevant to the discussion, since these numbers may help to provide a clearer picture of the soldiers’ possible motivations.

Statistics for wealth in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery have been derived from the Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census. Values of real property and personal


233 Note: The wealth of soldiers who were the head of their own household was taken from the census. In cases where soldiers were not the head of their household, familial connections with the person listed as head were assumed to have existed under two circumstances: 1) when the soldier and the head of the household shared the same surname, and 2) when the surname of the head of household differed from that of the soldiers, but there were two soldiers/brothers found to be living under that person's roof (this implied that that person may have been an uncle or other relative). In both instances, the real property and personal property possessed by the head of the household were assigned to the soldier(s) for the purpose of statistical calculations of wealth. When two soldiers/brothers shared a single household, the total wealth possessed by the head of the household was divided equally between the sons, for the purpose of statistical calculations. In cases where the census only provided the income of the head of the household, but where familial connections are not apparent, soldiers were assigned values of zero for both personal and real property.

234 As with Brooks' study of Hood's Texas Brigade, if a soldier “was not the head of a household and was propertyless” the father's wealth was assigned to the soldier. The scale used by Brooks for determining whether a soldier was poor, middle class or wealthy has also been applied to this study. The scale is based on total wealth derived from a soldier's real and personal estate. That scale's monetary value for assigning a soldier to the middle class has been subdivided, into thirds, in order to provide an estimation
property have first been analyzed separately, then together. Information on property values was located for forty-four privates and sixteen officers, for a total of sixty soldiers. Among the privates, the minimum value of real property was $0.00, while the maximum was $15,600. The mean was $2,056.86, the median $525 and the mode $0.00. Among officers, the minimum value of real property was again $0.00, with a maximum value of $15,000. The mean of $3043.75 was higher than that of the privates, as was the median of $712. The mode, however, was $0.00. As a whole, the mean value of the battery’s real property was $2320.03, while the median was $525, and the mode $0.00.

The value of personal estate among privates saw a minimum value of $0.00, with a maximum of $16,900. The mean was $1908.45, with the median set at $769.50, and the mode at $0.00. Among officers, the minimum value was also $0.00, while the maximum, slightly less that the privates, was $15,000. The mean was $2337.50, the median was $312.50 and the mode $0.00. Taken together, the battery’s mean was $2022.87, the median $700, and the mode $0.00.

Total wealth on an individual basis is derived from adding the values of real and personal property owned by the individual soldier, or by his father. Statistics for total wealth among the forty-four privates in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery displayed a minimum value of $0.00, and a maximum of $32,500. The mean was $4,042.02, the median $1912.50 and the mode $0.00. Fourteen privates had a total wealth of $499.99 or less, twenty-eight had a total wealth of between $500 and $19,999.99, and only two had a total wealth of $20,000.00 or above. Thus, by Brooks’ scale, 31.82% were poor, 63.64%
were middle class and 4.55% were wealthy. Of those twenty-eight privates that fell within the middle class, twenty-two (78.57%) were lower middle class, four (14.29%) were middle middle class and two (7.14%) were upper middle class.\textsuperscript{235} Thus, as percentages of the whole, 50% of the privates in the battery were lower middle class, 9.09% were middle middle class and 4.55% were upper middle class.

Among the thirteen officers of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, the minimum value of total wealth was $0.00, and the maximum $30,000. The mean was $5,381, the median $975.00 and the mode $0.00. Of the officers, six had a total wealth of equal to or less than $499.99, nine possessed a total wealth of between $500.00 and $19,999.99 and only one had a total wealth of $20,000 or above. Again, according to Brooks’ scale, 37.50% were poor, 56.24% were middle class and 16.67% were wealthy. Of those soldiers that fell in the middle class, five (55.56%) were lower middle class, three (33.33%) were middle middle class and one (11.11%) was upper middle class. As percentages of the whole, 31.25% of officers were lower middle class, 18.75% were middle middle class and 6.25% were upper middle class.

When statistics for privates and officers are combined, the mean value of total wealth in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was $4,399.15, the median $1,550, and the mode $0.00. Of the sixty soldiers, twenty had a total wealth of $499.99 or less, while thirty-seven had a total wealth of between $500.00 and $19,999.99. Only three soldiers had a total wealth of 20,000.00 or above. By Brooks’ scale, 33.33% were poor, 61.67% were middle class, and 5% were wealthy. Of those thirty-two soldiers in the middle class,

\textsuperscript{235}These values are based on the idea that the bottom third of those soldiers in the middle class can be classified as lower middle class, while the top third can be classified as upper middle class.
twenty-seven (72.97%) were lower middle class, seven (18.92%) were middle middle class and three (8.11%) were upper middle class. As percentages of the whole, 45% of all of the soldiers in the battery were lower middle class, 11.67% were middle middle class and 5% were upper middle class. Thus, in the classification of soldiers into categories of wealth, one finds that the vast majority of soldiers were poor to lower middle class (78.33%). Middle middle class to wealthy soldiers made up only 21.67% of the men in the battery.

Wealthy planters with large slave and landholdings were noticeably absent from the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. Indeed, wealth seems not to have had much of an influence on rank. Although famous, Samuel Clark's own father, Meriwether Lewis Clark, was in deep financial straits at the time of his child's enlistment in the army. Houston King had no discernible wealth at all. James Farris was merely a schoolteacher, and in all probability not a particularly rich man when he joined the army. It seems instead that skill was the most important factor, which dictated the election of officers. This is lent credence by the fact that some of the richest men in the battery remained privates throughout the war. One of these, Minoah Beamer, was discharged in 1863 for being over age. 236

Of the sixty soldiers located on the 1860 Federal Population Census for Missouri, twenty-four 237 were located on the 1860 Missouri Agricultural Census. Information was

236 "King's Historic Roll," 1-4; Stadler, 241-44, 250.

237 Although thirty-four soldiers were also located on the 1860 Missouri Agricultural Census, for statistical purposes only twenty-four of these men could be analyzed. The remainder were not the heads of their respective households, and familial connections to the heads of household could not be established. In cases where two brothers were located in the same household, with a relative as the head, the holdings of the head of household has been divided equally, between the two soldiers, for statistical purposes. Rufus and William Barrow, and Andrew and Henry C. Francisco, have been handled in this manner. Once again,
found for twenty-four soldiers, living on twenty-two farms. The soldiers included
nineteen privates and five officers. A statistical analysis has been done of the acreage
possessed by each household and the cash value of the farms. The amount of dew-rotted hemp and tobacco produced in the year 1860 is then examined. These were the main cash crops in the region and their large-scale production predisposed farmers to utilize slavery as a means of labor. The varieties and quantities of general produce cultivated and foodstuffs prepared is examined in detail, as is the monetary values assigned to orchard products, the produce of market gardens, home made manufactures, slaughtered animals, various types of livestock, and farm implements.

Among the privates, sixteen owned improved land. The minimum acreage owned was 0.00 acres and the maximum, owned by Thomas Marten, of Saline County, was 440 acres. The mean was 83.61 acres, the median was 40 acres, and the mode was 0.00 acres. Among the officers, four of five owned improved land. The minimum acreage was 0.00 acres and the maximum was 170 acres, owned by Hiram Craigg Wallace, of Livingston County. The mean was 51.90 acres, and the median was 27.50 acres. The mode for the officers was not statistically significant. When the privates and officers were tallied together, the minimum number of acres of improved land, per soldier, was 0.00, and the maximum was 440 acres. The mean was 77, the median 40, and the mode 0.00 acres.

As for acres of unimproved land, among the privates, fifteen men possessed some

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property-less soldiers who were not the heads of their household have had their father’s wealth is assigned to them. Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census, Free Schedules; Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census, Slave Schedules; Missouri 1860 Census, Agricultural Schedules.

238 Other large cash crops, including other forms of hemp, cotton, and rice were not cultivated by any of the households in question.

239 Meyer, 316-17.
amount. The minimum acreage owned was 0.00 acres and the maximum was 260 acres, owned by Lemuel Stephenson, of Saline County. The mean was 93.37 acres, the median was 67.50 acres, and the mode was 0.00 acres. Among the officers, four owned unimproved land. The minimum amount owned was 0.00 acres and the maximum was 170 acres, once again owned by Hiram Craigg Wallace. The mean was 68.60 acres, and the median was 55 acres. The mode for the officers, once again, was not statistically significant. When these numbers are combined, the minimum was again 0.00 acres, and the maximum was 260 acres. The mean stood at 88.21, the median at 74, and the mode at 0.00 acres.

In a monetary sense, the total cash value of these farms ranged greatly among the soldiers of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. Among the nineteen privates, sixteen lived on farms of monetary value. Thus the minimum cash value of the farms was $0.00 and the maximum was $15,600, owned by Thomas Marten. The mean was $3284.21, the median was $2500, and the mode was $3500. Among the officers, four men owned farms of monetary value. The minimum cash value of those farms was $0.00 and the maximum was $4000, owned by Hiram Craigg Wallace. The mean was $1480, and the median was $1000. The mode was not statistically significant. Among all twenty-four soldiers, the values ranged from a minimum of $0.00, to a maximum of $15,600. The mean was $2908.33, the median $1500 and the mode $0.00.

Among the privates, two men, Minoah Beamer and Henry C. Francisco, lived on farms where dew-rotted hemp was prepared. The minimum amount of hemp produced was 0.00 tons, while the maximum was 4 tons. The mean stood at 0.32 tons, while the median and mode were both 0.00 tons. Among the officers, one man, Andrew Francisco,
lived on a farm that produced dew-rotted hemp. Andrew was the brother of Henry C.
Francisco, and lived in the same household with their father. The minimum amount of
hemp produced by the officers was 0.00 tons, while the maximum was 2 tons. The mean
stood at 0.40 tons, while the median and mode were both 0.00 tons.

When all twenty-four soldiers on the Agricultural Census are examined together,
three soldiers (two farms) produced dew-rotted hemp in the year 1860. The
aforementioned Minoa Beamer, one of the richest men in the battery, resided in
Lafayette County. As indicated, the other two soldiers, Henry C. Francisco and Andrew
Francisco were brothers who lived under the same roof.\textsuperscript{240} One of the Francisco brothers
was an officer and the other was a private in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery. The
Francisco farm was located in Saline County. The number of slaves in the Beamer
household was two. The same number of slaves was found in the Francisco household
(two slaves total, which would equate to one each for the brothers, for statistical
purposes). Beamer, however, was wealthy, the total value of his real and personal estate
being $20,000, while the Francisco household fell into the upper range of the middle
class, its combined personal and real estate being valued at $16,700, or $8350 for each of
the Francisco brothers. Both households, similarly, produced a total of 4 tons of dew-
rotted hemp. This translates into 2 tons for Henry Francisco and 2 tons for Andrew
Francisco, statistically. The minimum amount of hemp produced among all soldiers in the
battery was, therefore, 0.00 tons, while the maximum was 4 tons. The mean stood at 0.33
tons, while the median and mode were both 0.00 tons.

\textsuperscript{240} Andrew and Henry Francisco were brothers living in the same household. Nevertheless, they
are each treated individually for the purposes of these calculations.
Tobacco was a similarly scarce commodity among the farmers of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. Only two soldiers out of twenty-four lived on farms that had grown tobacco in 1860. James McVey lived in a household in Gentry County, which was absent of slaves. The total wealth of the household was valued at $1085. His farm produced 600 pounds of tobacco in 1860. Thomas Edington, by contrast, resided in Livingston County, in a middle-class household, whose total wealth was valued at $11,000. His household possessed eight slaves, and produced 10,000 pounds of tobacco in 1860. When separated out by rank, two privates were found to have produced a minimum of 0.00 tons of tobacco, and a maximum of 10,000 tons. The mean was 557.89 tons, the median was 0.00 and the mode was 0.00 tons. None of the officers grew tobacco, thus the minimum, maximum, mean, median and mode were all 0.00 tons. Among all twenty-four soldiers, therefore, the minimum tonnage of tobacco produced was 0.00, while the maximum was 10,000 tons. The mean fell at 441.67 tons, and the median and mode were tied at 0.00 tons, each.

A wide variety of general produce was cultivated, and several types of foodstuffs made, on the farms, which seem to have been mostly subsistence-oriented. The census indicates that none of the farms produced any barley, flax, flax seed, clover seed, silk cocoons, maple sugar, cane sugar, or hops. Neither was wine fermented. However, molasses, honey, beeswax, wheat, rye, oats, peas and beans, Irish potatoes, sweet potatoes, buckwheat, Indian corn, hay, grass seed, and wool were harvested. Root vegetables, such as Irish potatoes and sweet potatoes, molasses, and milk or whey could all be used as component ingredients in creating feed for livestock. Certainly, the need to provide animal feed would also have been the primary reason for cultivating hay, oats
and Indian corn. Butter was also produced by all but four of the farms, and cheese was made occasionally, although it was a fairly rare commodity, in quantity.

Among the privates, eight men made molasses. The minimum amount was 0.00 gallons, while the maximum was 140 gallons, produced by John McVey. The mean, median, and mode were all 0.00 gallons. Among the officers, only one man, William Barrow of Ray County, lived on a farm that produced molasses. Thus, the minimum was 0.00 gallons, the maximum was 15 gallons, the mean was 3 gallons, and the median and mode were both 0.00 gallons. Molasses was produced by a total of nine soldiers, residing on eight farms. Taken together, the minimum amount was 0.00 gallons, and the maximum was 140 gallons. The mean was 26.04 gallons, and the median and mode were both 0.00 gallons.

Among the privates, honey was produced by three men, James Ficklin of Callaway County, Morgan Smith of Gentry County, and the aforementioned Thomas Marten. The minimum amount produced was 0.00 pounds, the maximum was 110 pounds, the mean was 9.47 pounds, and the median and mode were both 0.00 pounds. Among the officers, one man, Hiram Craigg Wallace, produced honey. The minimum amount was therefore 0.00 pounds, the maximum was 240 pounds, the mean was 3 pounds, and the median and mode were both 0.00 pounds. When the totals for privates and officers are combined, there are four soldiers producing honey. The minimum amount was 0.00 pounds, and the maximum was 240 pounds. The mean was 17.50 pounds, and the median and mode were both 0.00 pounds.

Beeswax is a by-product of honey production. Thus, it is not surprising that the number of men harvesting beeswax roughly corresponds with the number of men
extracting honey. Among the privates, only Morgan Smith and Thomas Marten produced beeswax. The minimum amount produced was 0.00 pounds, the maximum was 0.00 pounds, the mean was 0.00 pounds, the median was 0.00 pounds, and the mode was 0.00 pounds. Among the officers, only Hiram Craigg Wallace produced beeswax. Thus, the minimum was 0.00, the maximum was 25 pounds, the median was 5 pounds, and the median and mode were 0.00 pounds. Altogether, beeswax was manufactured on three farms. The minimum amount was eight pounds, and the maximum was twenty-five pounds. The mean was 1.79 pounds, and the median and mode were both 0.00 pounds.

Among the privates, ten soldiers grew wheat. The minimum amount produced was 0.00 bushels, while the maximum was 300 bushels, grown by Thomas Marten. The mean was 69.95 bushels, the median was 15 bushels, and the mode was 0.00 bushels. Among the officers, wheat was grown on only one farm, that of Andrew Francisco of Saline County. Thus the minimum was 0.00 bushels, the maximum was 30 bushels, the mean was 6 bushels, and the median and mode were both 0.00 bushels. In total, wheat was produced by eleven soldiers, living on ten farms. The minimum amount harvested was 0.00 bushels, and the maximum was 300 bushels. The mean fell at 56.63 bushels, while the median and mode were both 0.00 bushels.

Among the privates, one man, Morgan Smith, of Gentry County, produced rye. Thus, the minimum amount was 0.00 bushels, and the maximum was 15 bushels. The mean was 0.79 bushels, and the median and mode were 0.00 bushels. Among the officers, rye was also grown on only one farm, that of Hiram Craigg Wallace of Livingston County. Thus, the minimum amount produced was 0.00 bushels, and the maximum was 40 bushels. The mean was 8.00 bushels, and the median and mode were 0.00 bushels.
When these numbers are combined, rye was produced on two farms. The minimum amount was 0.00 bushels, and the maximum was 40.00 bushels. The mean was 2.29 bushels, and the median and mode were 0.00 bushels.

Among the privates, seven men grew oats. The minimum amount was 0.00 bushels, and the maximum, 150 bushels, was grown by Edward S. Violet. The mean 23.42 bushels, and the median and mode were both 0.00 bushels. Among the officers, oats were grown on only one farm, that of Andrew Francisco. The minimum amount was, therefore, 0.00 bushels, the maximum was 25 bushels, the mean was 5 bushels, and the median and mode were tied at 0.00 bushels, each. The mode was not statistically significant. Taken together, oats were produced on seven farms (eight soldiers). The minimum amount was 0.00 bushels, the maximum was 150 bushels, the mean was 19.58 bushels, and the median and mode were both 0.00 bushels.

Among the privates, ten men produced peas and beans. The minimum amount of peas and beans grown was 0.00 bushels, while the maximum was 8.00 bushels, grown by Simeon Shrewsberry of Bates County. The mean was 1.84 bushels, the median was 0.5 bushels and the mode was 0.00 bushels. Among the officers, only two men, William Barrow, of Ray County, and Andrew Francisco, of Saline County, grew peas and beans. The minimum amount produced was 0.00 bushels, the maximum was 2 bushels, the mean was 0.60 bushels, and the median and mode were both 0.00 bushels. When the numbers are combined, peas and beans were cultivated by twelve soldiers, living on ten farms. The minimum quantity harvested was 0.00 bushels, the maximum was 8 bushels, the mean was 1.58 bushels, the median was 0.00, and the mode was 0.50 bushels.

As mentioned, both Irish and Sweet potatoes could be used as feed for livestock,
especially swine. Among the privates, fifteen men grew Irish potatoes. The minimum amount produced was 0.00, while the maximum was 60 bushels, produced by Thomas Marten. The mean was 19.34 bushels, the median was 15 bushels and the mode was 30 bushels. Among the officers, four grew Irish potatoes. The minimum amount was 0.00, while the maximum was 15 bushels, produced by William Barrow. The mean was 6.90 bushels, and the median was 7.50 bushels. The mode was statistically insignificant for the officers. In total, Irish potatoes were produced by twenty soldiers, residing on nineteen farms. The minimum amount was 0.00, the maximum was 60 bushels, the mean was 16.33 bushels, the median was 15 bushels, and the mode was 0.00 bushels.

Among the privates, three men grew sweet potatoes. The minimum amount was 0.00, while the maximum was 30 bushels, grown by James Ficklin. The mean was 3.16 bushels, and the median was 0.00 bushels and the mode was 0.00 bushels. None of the officers cultivated sweet potatoes. Thus, the minimum, maximum, mean, median and mode were all 0.00 bushels. In total, sweet potatoes were produced on three farms. The minimum amount grown was 0.00 bushels, the maximum was 30 bushels, the mean was 2.50 bushels, the median was 0.00 bushels, and the mode was 0.00 bushels.

Buckwheat was produced by only one man, Private Robert Elliot, of Ray County. Thus, among the privates, the minimum amount produced was 0.00, the maximum was 15.00 bushels, and the mean, median, and mode were all 0.00 bushels. As indicated, none of the officers cultivated buckwheat. Thus, the minimum, maximum, mean, median and mode were universally 0.00 bushels. Altogether, the totals ranged from a minimum amount of 0.00 bushels to a maximum of 15 bushels. The mean was 0.63 bushels, while the median and the mode stood at 0.00 bushels, each.
Among the privates, hay was produced by eleven men. The minimum amount produced was 0.00 tons, and the maximum was 40 tons, grown by Minoah Beamer. The mean was 4.13 tons, the median 1 ton, and the mode 0.00 tons. Among the officers, four men also grew hay. The minimum amount produced was, therefore, 0.00 tons, while the maximum was 4 tons, grown by Hiram Craigg Wallace. The mean was 2.10 tons, and the median and mode were 2 tons, each. In total, hay was produced by fifteen soldiers, living on thirteen farms. The minimum amount produced was 0.00 tons, the maximum was 40 tons, the mean was 3.71 tons, the median was 2 tons, and the mode was 0.00 tons.

Indian corn was most often used as feed for livestock, and was therefore a necessity. Eighteen of nineteen privates grew Indian corn. The minimum amount produced was 0.00 bushels, while the maximum was 2500 bushels, produced, not surprisingly by Minoah Beamer, whose wealth was centered on breeding livestock. The mean was 1071.05 bushels, and the median and mode were both 1000 bushels. Among the officers, four men produced Indian corn. The minimum amount produced was 0.00 bushels, while the maximum was 1500 bushels, grown by Hiram Craigg Wallace. The mean was 595 and the median was 400 bushels. The mode in this instance was not statistically significant. Altogether, twenty-two soldiers on twenty farms produced Indian corn. Only two men, William B. Jennings, of Livingston County, and R.W. Shockley, of Platte County, did not grow corn. Jennings, whose father was a clerk rather than a farmer, had only two horses, two milch cows and four other cattle. In Shockley’s case, the number of livestock owned was higher, but not overwhelmingly so. He owned one mule, two milch cows, three oxen, one other cow and nine swine. These numbers suggest that he probably purchased feed from neighboring areas, as necessary. When the privates and
officers are combined, the minimum amount of Indian corn cultivated was 0.00 bushels, the maximum was 2500.00 bushels, the mean was 971.88 bushels, the median was 875, and the mode was 1000 bushels.

Among the privates, two men produced grass seed, Alexander McMurtry, of Livingston County, and James H. Woods, of Ralls County. The minimum amount produced by the privates was therefore 0.00 bushels, while the maximum was 3 bushels, the mean was 0.32 bushels, the median was 0.00 bushels, and the mode was 0.00 bushels. Among the officers, grass seed was produced on one farm, that of Hiram Craig Wallace, in Livingston County. The minimum amount was 0.00 bushels, the maximum was 9 bushels, the mean was 1.80 bushels, and the median and mode were both 0.00 bushels. When privates and officers are combined, grass seed was produced by three soldiers. The minimum amount was 0.00 bushels, the maximum was 9 bushels, the mean was 0.63 bushels, and the median and mode were both 0.00 bushels.

Among the privates, six produced wool. The minimum amount was 0.00 pounds, while the maximum was 95 pounds, produced by James Ficklin. The mean, median, and mode were all 0.00 pounds. Among the officers, wool was produced on four farms. The minimum amount was 0.00 pounds, while the maximum was 22.50 pounds, produced by Hiram Craig Wallace. The mean was 13.60 pounds, and the median was 8.00 pounds. The mode was not statistically significant. In total, wool was produced by ten soldiers, living on eight farms. The minimum amount produced was 0.00 pounds, the maximum 95.00 pounds, the mean 14.6 pounds, and the median and mode, 0.00 pounds.\textsuperscript{241}

\textsuperscript{241}Strangely, there were no sheep listed for the Ficklin farm on the agricultural census. Whether this was an error or whether his sheep had been culled or sold is not known. However, the value of slaughtered animals for Ficklin was $250; this suggests that he had probably butchered his sheep for sale.
Butter was an almost universal commodity. Among the privates, butter was churned on sixteen of the nineteen farms. The minimum amount produced was 0.00 pounds, while the maximum was 500 pounds, produced by Thomas Edington. The mean was 150.53 pounds, and the median and mode were both 150 pounds. Four of the five officers also made butter. The minimum amount produced was 0.00 pounds. The maximum amount, 100 pounds, was produced by three officers. The mean was 75 pounds, and the median and mode were both 100 pounds. In total, butter was made by twenty soldiers, living on eighteen farms. The minimum amount produced was 0.00 pounds, and the maximum was 500. The mean was 134.79 pounds, and the median and mode were each 100 pounds.

Cheese was produced by only two men, Private John McVey and Private Morgan Smith, both of whom lived in Gentry County. Thus, among the privates, the minimum amount produced was 0.00 pounds, while the maximum amount was 50 pounds. The mean was 5.26 pounds, and the median and mode were both 0.00 pounds. Among the officers, no cheese was produced at all. Thus, the minimum, maximum, mean, median and mode were all 0.00 pounds. Combined, the minimum amount of cheese produced was 0.00 pounds, while the maximum amount was 50 pounds. The mean was 4.16 pounds, and the median and mode were both 0.00 pounds.

Orchard products were scarce among both privates and officers. Among the privates, two men, Simeon Shrewsberry, of Bates County, and John Layton, of Greene County, grew orchard products. The minimum value among the privates was $0.00, the maximum was $125, the mean was $10.53, and the median and mode were both $0.00. Among the officers, only one farm, that of Alex Lindsay, of Marion County, grew
orchard products. The minimum value of orchard products was $0.00, and the maximum was $10. The mean was $2, and the median and mode were both $0.00. When taken together, three men produced orchard produce. The minimum value was $0.00 while the maximum was $125. The mean was $8.75, with the median and mode standing at $0.00, each.

Market produce was also minimally cultivated. Among the privates, only two men, Simeon Shrewsberry and Alexander McMurry, grew market produce. The minimum value was, thus, $0.00, the maximum was $40, the mean was $2.89, and the median and mode were both $0.00. The officers did not grow any market produce. Therefore, the minimum and maximum values, as well as the mean, median and mode, all stood at $0.00. When the officers and privates are combined, the number of men who grew market produce remains at two. The minimum value of market produce was $0.00, while the maximum was $40.00. The mean value was $2.29, the median was $0.00 and the mode was $0.00.

Among the privates, nine men produced home made manufactured goods. The minimum value of these was $0.00, and the maximum was $100, produced by James Ficklin. The mean was $23.05, and the median and mode were both $0.00. Among the officers, three men produced home made manufactured goods. The minimum value was $0.00, and the maximum was $50, produced by William Barrow. The mean was $19.00, the median was $15, and the mode was $0.00. The total value of home made manufactures ranged from a minimum of $0.00 to a maximum of $100.00. The mean was $22.21, the median was $7.50, and the mode was $0.00.

Setting aside the value of the land itself, most of the soldiers surveyed had the
majority of their wealth concentrated in the value of their livestock, which included horses, asses and mules, milch cows, working oxen, other cattle, sheep, and swine. This seems logical, due to the general need for beasts of burden, as well as meat consumption. All of the soldiers owned at least one type of livestock.

Almost every farm had horses, as these animals were essential for both travel and work. Seventeen privates owned horses. The minimum number was 0.00, and the maximum was 36, owned by Minoah Beamer. The mean was 5, the median was 2.50, and the mode was 2. Horses were owned by all five officers. The minimum number was 1, and the maximum was 5, owned by Hiram Craig Wallace. The mean was 2.60, and the median and mode were both 2. When these numbers are combined, twenty-two soldiers residing on twenty farms owned horses. The minimum number owned was 0.00, the maximum was 36, the mean was 4.50, the median was 2.50 and the mode was 2.

Asses and mules were also useful beasts of burden. Six privates owned asses and mules. The minimum number was 0.00, and the maximum was 21, again owned by Minoah Beamer. The mean was 1.61, and the median and mode were both 0.00. Asses and mules were owned by two officers, Hiram Craigg Wallace and Andrew Francisco. The minimum number owned was 0.00, while the maximum was 22, owned by Wallace. The mean was 4.50, and the median and mode were both 0.00. When these numbers are combined, eight soldiers, living on seven farms, owned asses and mules. The minimum number owned was 0.00, the maximum was 22, the mean was 2.21, and the median and mode were both 0.00.

Milch cows were invaluable animals for subsistence farmers, being the most productive source for dairy products. Milk or whey could be used as a component
ingredient in feeding livestock, especially pigs, as well as for human consumption. Milch cows could also be used as an ongoing source of veal, and beef. Milch cows were owned by eighteen privates. The minimum number was 0.00. The maximum number, 8, was once more owned by Minoah Beamer. The mean was 3.11, the median was 2.50, and the mode was 2. Milch cows were owned by all five officers. The minimum number was 2, and the maximum was 5. Hiram Craig Wallace and William Barrow both owned five horses. The mean was 2.80, and the median and mode were both 2. When these numbers are combined, twenty-three soldiers, on twenty-one farms, owned milch cows. The minimum number was 0.00, the maximum was 8, the mean was 3.04, the median was 2.50, and the mode was 2.

Working oxen were valuable as beasts of burden. Working oxen were owned by fourteen privates. The minimum number owned was 0.00. The maximum number, 8, were owned by Thomas Edington. The mean was 2.50, and the median and the mode were both 2. Working oxen were owned by two officers, William Barrow and Andrew Francisco. The minimum number owned was 0.00, and the maximum was 5, owned by William Barrow. The mean was 1.30, and the median and mode were both 0.00. When these numbers are combined, sixteen soldiers, on fourteen farms, owned working oxen. The minimum number was 0.00, the maximum was 8, the mean was 2.25, the median was 2, and the mode was 2.

Cattle, other than milch cows, and oxen, were also needed, again, as a source of veal and beef, and also as bulls for breeding purposes. Other types of cattle were owned by fifteen privates. The minimum number owned was 0.00, while the maximum, 20 cattle, were owned by Minoah Beamer. The mean was 6.39, the median was 3.50 and the
mode was 0.00. Other types of cattle were owned by four officers. The minimum number owned was 0.00, and the maximum was 12, owned by Hiram Craigg Wallace. The mean was 4.50, and the median was 4. The mode was not statistically significant. When these numbers are combined, nineteen soldiers, living on seventeen farms, owned other types of cattle. The minimum number owned was 0.00, the maximum was 20, the mean was 6, the median was 4 and the mode was 0.00.

Sheep were primarily used to produce wool and meat. Sheep were owned by seven privates. The minimum number owned was 0.00, while the maximum was 30.00, owned by Edward S. Violet, of Johnson County. The mean was 5.24, and the median and mode were both 0.00. Sheep were owned by three officers. The minimum number was 0.00, and the maximum was 7.5, owned by Andrew Francisco. The mean was 3.70, the median was 4, and the mode was 0.00. In total, ten soldiers, living on eight farms, owned sheep. The minimum number owned was 0.00, the maximum was 30.00, the mean was 4.92, and the median and mode were both 0.00.

Swine were bred as a source of meat. Swine were owned by seventeen privates. The minimum number owned was 0.00, and the maximum was 200, owned by Thomas Marten. The mean was 27.61, the median was 15.50, and the mode was 50. Swine were owned by four officers. The minimum number was 0.00, and the maximum was 50, owned by Hiram Craigg Wallace. The mean was 17.10, and the median was 12.20. The mode was not statistically significant. When these numbers are combined, twenty-one soldiers, living on nineteen farms, owned swine. The minimum number was 0.00, the maximum was 200, the mean was 25.42, the median was 13.75, and the mode was 50.

The value of the livestock owned reveals another aspect of the soldiers' wealth.
Among the privates, all nineteen men owned valuable livestock. The minimum value of the animals was $100, while the maximum was $6500, belonging to Minoah Beamer. The mean was $831.47, the median was $500, and the mode was $600. All five officers also owned valuable livestock. The minimum value was found to be $150, and the maximum value was $2000, belonging to Hiram Craigg Wallace. The mean was $634, and the median was $300. The mode for the officers was not statistically significant. When combined, the following figures are found: The minimum value of livestock was $100, with a maximum $6500. The mean was $790.33, the median $500 and the mode $600.

Among the privates, sixteen men had sold animals for slaughter. The minimum monetary value received for slaughtered animals was $0.00, and the maximum was $280, belonging to John Layton. The mean was $111.84, the median was $100, and the mode was $0.00. Four of the five officers had some income from slaughtered animals. The minimum value was found to be $0.00, and the maximum was $280, belonging to Hiram Craigg Wallace. The mean was $79, and the median was $35. The mode for the officers was not statistically significant. Taken together, twenty men, residing on eighteen farms, had animals slaughtered. The monetary results saw a minimum value of $0.00 and a maximum of $280. The mean was $105.00, the median $90, and the mode $0.00.

Among the privates eighteen men owned farming implements and machinery. The value of these tools revealed a minimum value of $0.00, and a maximum of $300, belonging to Minoah Beamer. The mean was $113.42, the median was $100, and the mode was $150. Among officers, four men owned farm implements and machinery of some value. The minimum value of these implements and machinery was $0.00, while the maximum was $150, belonging to Hiram Craigg Wallace. The mean was $53, and the
median was $30. The mode for the officers was not statistically significant. Taken as a whole, men owned twenty-two soldiers, living on twenty farms, owned farming equipment of some worth. The values ranged from $0.00 to $300, with a mean of $100.42, a median of $100 and a mode $150.

What do the above figures reveal? The rearing of livestock seems to have been the most common thread linking these farmers. While some operations were quite obviously geared towards raising one particular stock of animal (e.g. swine, sheep) or crop, most farms appear to have been primarily directed towards raising a few types of each animal, as was best suited for subsistence agriculture. Cash crops are noticeably absent from most farms, and rarely was the entire crop specialized towards only a single, highly valued use, as would have generally been the case for planters. Instead, these men for the most part farmed a variety of crops, many of which could have partially formed the basis of feed for their animals (e.g. potatoes, corn, oats), as well as for their own consumption. Generally, these men were poor to middle class, with a few notable exceptions, like hemp farmers, Minoah Beamer and the Francisco brothers, and tobacco farmer Thomas Edington, Thomas Marten and Hiram Craigg Wallace, who both owned large tracts of valuable land and specialized in pork production, and Lemuel Stephenson, who owned land worth $10,000. These men were the exception, rather than the rule.

So, did the lower classes make up the majority of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery? Was this indeed a "rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight?" At least on some level, it would seem so. Although there were more slaveholders than average in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, a full 67.21 percent of the men did not own any slaves. Furthermore, the majority of those who did own slaves owned them in very small numbers. Neither did the
men tend to own huge tracts of arable land, or benefit from the cultivation of cash crops, on a large scale. By examining the average wealth of the men, it becomes abundantly clear that, unlike Hale’s soldiers, the vast majority of men in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were not planters.

Indeed, there were only three men in the battery whose real and personal estate were valued high enough to define them as wealthy, and none of these men owned sufficient slaves to be considered “planters.” Minoah Beamer, whose estate was worth $20,000, had his wealth primarily tied up in livestock, owning thirty-six horses, twenty-one asses and mules, eight milch cows, twenty other cattle, eighteen sheep and twenty-three swine. He was also a hemp farmer. He owned only two slaves. William B. Jennings’ family estate was valued higher at $30,000. Oddly enough, however, although the family did own seven slaves, their farm does not seem to have been the primary source of their income. Jennings’ father was employed as a clerk, not a farmer. Thomas Marten, a pig farmer, and the wealthiest man in the battery with an estate valued at $32,500, owned seventeen slaves. But again, he was not involved in the cultivation of cash crops, and fell just under the requirements that defined one as a planter.

So, the late war claim that rich men did not make up the majority of the fighting force of the Confederacy does, to some extent, hold true in the case of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. Instead, the vast majority of these men were poor white farmers, who made their living on subsistence level farming.

Information on school attendance was available for sixty-two soldiers, including forty-four privates and nineteen officers. Of the privates surveyed, sixteen had attended school in the year 1860. This translates into 36.36% attending school, and 63.64% not
attending. Of the officers, 27.78% had attended school in 1860, including Clark, who was then enrolled in his second year at West Point, and was the only officer in his battery with military training of this kind. The percentage of officers who did not attend school in 1860 was 72.22%. Combined, the number of men attending school stood at 33.87%, just over one third of the men in the battery, while 66.13% did not attend.

Family sizes in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were small, both in terms of children, and in the case of unwed soldiers still living with their parents, siblings. Statistics on the number of children per soldier were gleaned from sixty-one soldiers. Of the forty-four privates, the minimum number of children was zero and the maximum was seven. The mean was 0.48, the median zero and the mode zero. Only 11.36% of the privates had children, compared with 88.63% who did not. Of the thirteen officers, the minimum number of children was 0.00, and the maximum was 2. The mean was 0.29, with the median and mode both at zero. The percentage of officers who had children was 23.53%, while those without numbered 76.47%. In combination, the mean number of children among those surveyed was 0.43, with the median and mode at zero. Only 14.75% had children. The vast majority, 85.25%, did not.

Most of the soldiers in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were unmarried. Statistics were available on sixty-two soldiers. Of the forty-four privates, 86.36% were still single, 9.09% were married, and a further 4.55% were either widowed or divorced. Among the eighteen officers, 77.78% were single and the remaining 22.22% were married. There were no widowed or divorced soldiers among the officer corps. Taken as a whole, 83.87% of the soldiers were single, 12.90% were married, and 3.23% were either widowed or divorced.

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The statistical sampling involving numbers of siblings was based on sixty-one soldiers. Of the forty-four privates, the minimum number of siblings was 0.00, while the maximum was 9.00. The mean was 2.73, the median 2.00, and the mode 0.00. The percentage of privates who had siblings living in the same household was 59.09%, versus 40.91% who did not. Among the seventeen officers, the minimum number of siblings was 0.00, and the maximum was 8. The mean was 1.88, the median 0.00 and the mode 0.00. The percentage of officers who had siblings living in the same household was 35.29%, as compared with 64.71%, who did not. Taken together, the mean number of siblings was 2.49, with a median of 1, and a mode of 0.00. The percentage of soldiers with siblings was 52.46%, compared to 47.54% without.

These numbers would seem to reinforce the concept that Clark’s was a particularly young battery. Over half of the soldiers in the battery were still living at home with their parents and siblings, unwed and childless. Just over one third of the battery was still attending school, and almost one-fifth of the soldiers, both officers and privates, had not yet reached “military age,” and were too young to have voted in the 1860 election. Nevertheless, the regions in which they lived had overwhelmingly supported Bell and Douglas. In the absence of more specific data, one can only assume that many of these soldiers would likely have shared the views of their fathers, at least when the war began. However, it seems very clear that opinions within the battery had polarized by the end of the conflict.

The vast majority of families in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were poor or

243Military age was 18-45 according to Kennedy, Population, xvii. Piston and Sweeney point out that “volunteers under the age of 21 had to have the written permission of their parents or guardians” in order to join the Guard. Piston and Sweeney, 16.
lower middle class. Slave ownership was higher than average, when compared to slave ownership in the state, as a whole, most likely due to the residency of most of the soldiers being centered along the Missouri River in the prime agricultural Boonslick region, where hemp and tobacco were farmed. The rate also exceeded the peak numbers for slaveholding within individual counties. However, most of the soldiers in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery lived in households that did not own slaves, and they did not make enormous amounts of money off of cash crops. Indeed, the majority of the men located on the Agricultural Census appear to have lived on farms that were relatively small and probably subsistence oriented. This would seem to lend some credence to the notion that the poor and middle classes did perform much of the fighting during the Civil War.

Oddly enough, however, the fact that these men were generally poor to middle class appears not to have negatively affected their devotion to the cause. The desertion rate in the battery was staggeringly low, especially in the last two years of the war. Battlefield trauma may also have affected some of the deserters, although this cannot be verified absolutely. Most of the deserters were under the age of twenty, however, and the concomitant lack of maturity, which tends to accompany youth, may be partially to blame for their eventual desertion. Despite this pattern, many other young soldiers in the battery remained devoted to the cause until the very end of the war.

This uncommon degree of devotion to the cause may have been partially a result of the influence of their commanders. Serving under the zealous and charismatic Samuel Churchill Clark may have inspired an inordinate degree of loyalty among these soldiers, many of whom were similar in age to their captain and therefore impressionable.
Alternately, their opinions may have hardened while serving beneath firebrand commanders such as Ross and Forrest, whose racist attitudes could easily have melded with the men's own negative battlefield experiences in fighting black soldiers to strengthen their resolve against the notion of post-war black emancipation.

The simple fact that the men of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery had suffered through so many trials and tribulations together may also have helped to invest them, more closely, in working towards a positive outcome to the war. Certainly they had developed a sense of Confederate nationalism by late in the war. Conversely, the fact that this unit was so far removed from its home state may have dissuaded mass desertions. Perhaps the men perceived the odds of returning to Missouri successfully, to be unfavorable, given the long distances involved. Finally, a sense of devotion to their fallen commander, Clark, might have hardened their commitment to the cause. No steadfast conclusions in either direction can be made, due to the paucity of evidence, but speculation poses some intriguing suggestions.

All told, the composite soldier who enlisted in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was in some ways typical of what one might expect of a southern unit, but in other ways quite different. Further in-depth statistical investigations of artillery batteries which served within the Missouri State Guard, the Army of Tennessee, and other component forces of the Confederate States Army, is needed in order to further the knowledge base regarding such soldiers, and in order to provide a reliable means of comparison.
CHAPTER 5

UNIT HISTORY OF THE 2ND MISSOURI LIGHT ARTILLERY

The history of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery must begin with its first commander. Samuel Churchill Clark, the original captain of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, was born on September 12, 1842. Known as “Churchy” or Churchill to his friends and family, he was descended from a prominent family, being the grandson of the renowned explorer William Clark, the grand-nephew of Rogers Clark, a general in the Revolutionary War, and the nephew and namesake of Samuel B. Churchill, a Missouri state senator.  

Samuel Churchill Clark’s father, Major Meriwether Lewis Clark, was an alumnus of West Point’s class of 1830, graduating twenty-third out of forty-two students. He went on to a brief, but illustrious military career, significantly commanding a battalion of artillery under Alexander Doniphan in the Mexican War. His military training helped Meriwether Clark to instill efficiency, discipline and unit cohesion into the raw Missouri recruits, a fact that was supremely evident given their effectiveness at the Battles of

Sacramento and Chihuahua. Samuel Churchill Clark was to follow in his father’s footsteps in more ways than one.

Despite the family’s distinguished reputation, in the years leading up to the Civil War Meriwether Clark had fallen upon hard times. Lack of money was a desperate concern for the elder Clark. By May of 1860, he was living in the Planters’ House Hotel in St. Louis, and could not afford the fare for a buggy ride. In order to make ends meet, he had been forced to pawn his late wife’s jewelry and was preparing to liquidate his own library of books as well as his furniture. He had already been obliged to send his younger children to live with relatives.

These financial difficulties led Meriwether Clark to seek a scholarship to West Point for Samuel, who was eager to pursue a military career. Meriwether Clark imposed upon several of his influential friends to appeal to President James Buchanan for an “at large” appointment for his son. Samuel was, in his father’s estimation, “already well qualified for admission into the military academy, indeed he is far advanced in the studies there taught.” The letters of recommendation written on Samuel’s behalf paid heed to his lineage, and described the young man as one who “manifested a great taste for military affairs” and “[had] his heart set on the profession, to which the military school


245 Stadler, 241-44.

246 Meriwether Clark goes on to state “I have six sons, and am myself poor, and therefore unable to educate them all as I could wish, and therefore ask the Government to permit me to devote at least one of them to the service of my country.” Meriwether Lewis Clark to the Honorable John B. Floyd, December 7, 1858, U.S. Military Academy Cadet Admission Papers, 1805-1866.
[was] an introduction.  Clark was portrayed variously as “an estimable young gentleman,” a “youth of great promise” and an all-around worthy candidate for admission, due to his “good deportment, assiduity to his studies and proficiency.”  

Clark was accepted into West Point, entering the academy on July 1, 1859, at the age of sixteen years and nine months. By all accounts he was a very popular fellow among peers and adults alike. He was witty, charming, and gallant. Clark was also devoutly religious, and through his influence several of his fellow cadets were converted. Clark performed fairly well in his studies during his two years at West Point, considering his youthful age. In his first year, out of a class of thirty-five he placed twenty-fourth overall, being twenty-third in math and twenty-second in English. The cadets had also learned infantry drill, marksmanship, history, geography, and fencing. Clark carried forty-four demerits for the year, fourteen of which were handed down from January to June of 1860. In his second year, Clark placed nineteenth out of twenty-nine students. He was twenty-fourth in math, eleventh in English, and fifteenth in French. He received ninety-nine demerits for that year, with thirty-three of those falling in the last six months, ending on June 1, 1861. Although he improved academically the second year, Samuel

247 J.[?] R. Barret, to the Honorable James Buchanan, October 25, 1858; Trustan Polk to the Honorable James Buchanan, December 9, 1858, all in ibid.

248 Trustan Polk to the Honorable James Buchanan, December 9, 1858, February 28, 1859; J.[?] R. Barret to the Honorable James Buchanan, October 25, 1858, all in ibid.

249 The date ascribed to Clark’s entry at West Point by the 1861 by the academy’s official register conflicts with given by his father, who states that his son left St. Louis on June 15, 1859, arrived at West Point on June 18, 1859, and entered as a cadet on June 20, 1859. The official register lists Clark as entering the academy on July 1, 1859. Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark”; Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York 1860 (New York: U.S. Military Academy, n.d.), 15; hereafter cited as Official Register 1860; Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York 1861 (New York: U.S. Military Academy, n.d.), 14; hereafter cited as Official Register 1861.
was at the last moment denied a promotion to a leadership position, due to his involvement in hazing several of the newer students. Clark took this news in stride, however, since it freed him from the duty of policing the grounds on behalf of the new cadets, during the summer months.250

Clark's sympathies were clearly aligned with the Southern states. The election of a "Black Republican" president appalled him, and South Carolina's secession fueled the fire. Clark was still at West Point when Fort Sumter fell, but he grew increasingly determined to join the Southern cause. When Clark and twenty-three of his fellow cadets were granted a furlough on June 29, 1861, Samuel took it as an opportunity to court a position in the Confederate army. He traveled to St. Louis in July to seek his father's permission. Worried for the boy's future prospects, Meriwether Clark initially refused his son's request to quit the academy, but after some persuasion by Samuel, he relented. Samuel Clark sent a formal letter of resignation to West Point on August 13, 1861. He was dropped from the Academy's rolls for being absent without leave on August 28, 1861.251

In August 1861 Clark traveled from St. Louis to Richmond, with the hope that he would be granted an officer's commission in the Confederate army. He was disappointed in his efforts, but was sent to Memphis with dispatches, and from there he headed toward

250 The position was likely corporal, since Meriwether Lewis Clark lists a promotion to this rank in his memorandum. He did not mention the fact that the rank, in the end, was not conferred. Meriwether Lewis Clark, "Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark"; Official Register 1860, 15; Official Register 1861, 14; Winter, 2-5, 9-10, 14-16.

251 Meriwether Lewis Clark, "Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark"; Winter, 6-9; Tucker, "Clark," 15; Special Orders No. 98, Headquarters, Military Academy, June 29, 1861; Churchill Clark, "To the Honorable Simon Cameron, Secretary of War," August 13, 1861, both in Engineer Department Letters Received Relating to the U.S. Military Academy, 1879-1866, National Archives Microfilm Publication 2047, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York.
Lexington, with orders addressed to Major General Sterling Price from Major General Leonidas Polk. En route, Clark met up with Governor Jackson, who, being impressed with the youngster, “appointed him to the important position of instructor of Tactics with the rank of Captain” in the Missouri State Guard.252 Ironically, at some point after his departure from Memphis, Clark was arrested as a spy, but it is not entirely clear whether this occurred prior to his reaching Lexington, or just after he intersected with Price’s army. Whatever the case, he was taken to Price’s headquarters upon arrival, where any doubt of his identity would have been immediately erased since the General was a family friend.253

Clark turned up at Lexington, on September 13, 1861, the day after his nineteenth birthday. There he found that Price’s forces had surrounded a Federal garrison of 3,500 men. Clark was so anxious to fight that, despite his promotion en route, he immediately enlisted as a private in the State Guard. He did not remain in this rank for long. Clark’s friends circulated knowledge of his West Point training, and after presenting Price with the dispatches from Polk and Jefferson Davis he was quickly given command of an iron 6-pound cannon, part of General Parson’s artillery. Clark first commanded this gun on September 16, 1861. The following day, he received a brass 6-pounder. On September 18, Clark took the liberty of temporarily procuring for himself three brass 6-pounders in place of the aforementioned pieces. He commanded these three guns for the remainder of


253Winter, 9-10; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,”9; Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark”; Samuel Churchill Clark to My Beloved Father, November 5, 1861, William Clark Papers; Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Guns.”
the battle. Thus, began the history of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery.\textsuperscript{254}

Artillery drill was complex and difficult to learn, but Clark had relished it above all other branches of the service and felt confident in his own abilities. Writing to his brother from West Point on August 22, 1860, Clark had stated “I know all about the drill now, and know all the duties of the cannoneers perfectly and could even teach them to anybody if I was required to.”\textsuperscript{255} Clark did not exaggerate, and it speaks to his skill that, as mentioned, his fledgling battery was quickly augmented from one 6-pound iron cannon to three 6-pound brass cannons, in the span of only three days. On September 18, 1861, when the Battle of Lexington was reaching a crescendo, Clark was made an “acting captain” on the field.\textsuperscript{256} In fact that very morning, one of Clark’s brass 6-pound cannons demolished the Federal flag, which had billowed above the southeast corner of their fortifications. His efforts won him a gold medal from Brigadier General James Rains, and the admiration of all who had observed the feat, including Rains, who commended Clark’s “gallantry and efficiency” in his report.\textsuperscript{257} A fellow soldier who witnessed the event wrote that he would:

never forget [Captain Clark’s] appearance . . . . the young boy stood by his gun, his light and agile form, his jaunty artillery cap with its all meaning colors, his boyish face, all blackened and begrimed with the powder; his intrepid manner as gun after gun was discharged impressed me with the profoundest respect for the youthful warrior. The army had witnessed his feats and appreciated them.\textsuperscript{258}

\textsuperscript{254}Winter, 9-10; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark”; Samuel Churchill Clark to My Beloved Father,” November 5, 1861, Clark Papers; Clark, “Memorandum of Guns.”

\textsuperscript{255}Winter, 9; Samuel Churchill Clark to My Beloved Father, November 5, 1861, Clark Papers.

\textsuperscript{256}Winter, 9-10; Samuel Churchill Clark to My Beloved Father. November 5, 1861, Clark Papers.

\textsuperscript{257}O.R., Series I, Vol. III, 189; Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Guns.”

\textsuperscript{258}Tucker, “Clark,” 16.
Clark’s guns proceeded, for the remainder of the day, to wreak havoc on the Masonic College, which formed part of the Federal fortifications. Clark had secured some undersized 6-pound solid shot from Captain Hiram Bledsoe. Clark’s intention was to heat the ammunition in a makeshift forge, with the aim of setting fire to the roof of the Federal structure. Clark’s men used the Masonic emblem as their target, and met with some measure of success. Clark gleefully wrote of the success of the venture, stating: “The way I made the Federals scatter in their trenches was amusing. I did more execution than anyone else [for] my battery had a good position and tore the college nearly to pieces.”

To his father, he wrote,

I . . . was in the fight, in command of a battery of three brass 6pdr field pieces, I was on the left and front of the college and had one piece also in front of the college, I kept the rascals from appearing in three of their entrenchments and also from going in and out of the college. I had my seabbard shot from my side, but was not injured at all. I fired hot shot at them and set them on fire twice, both times they put it out with engines[.,] which they had inside their fortifications.

With such skill and daring, Clark was quickly becoming the darling of the Missouri State Guard artillery.

September 19 saw intermittent skirmishes and periodic cannonading of the Federal troops. Near evening, some of Price’s troops situated on the western side of the Federal position began to employ wet hemp bales as portable breastworks, which absorbed the enemy’s bullets, allowing Price’s infantry to advance toward the Federal lines unharmed. The following day, the success of this strategy compelled Colonel James

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259Ibid.; Winter, 9-10.


261Samuel Churchill Clark to My Beloved Father, November 5, 1861, Clark Papers.
A. Mulligan’s surrender. Lexington fell to Price’s army.262

Clark’s harassing cannon fire had contributed, in no small measure, to the surrender of the demoralized Federal troops, and he received two of his opponent’s 12-pound brass howitzers, as well as one brass 6-pound cannon, which became his favorite gun, as spoils of war. To these three captured guns was added an iron 6-pounder. Clark was also given official leave to recruit a company of artillerymen, to be placed under his command.263

Unfortunately for Price, the victory at Lexington was pyrrhic. Price’s forces, which had peaked at around 20,000 men, dropped sharply as he marched them southward toward the Osage River. This was due in part to Missourians’ general lack of enthusiasm for any cause wider than keeping their own state free of invaders. Many people did not want to involve themselves in anything having to do with outright secession.264

The problem was exacerbated by the Price’s inability to keep the men adequately supplied with food, arms, ammunition, clothing, and other necessities.265 That November, Clark wrote to his father, now a commander of the State Guard in his own right,266 with the following advice: “If you go to Richmond and the President wishes to give you tents

262 Winter, 10; Tucker, “Clark,” 17; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.

263 Tucker states that one of the 12-pound howitzers was iron, but this is contradicted by the “Memorandum of Guns,” which lists both as being brass. One other brass 6-pounder, captured from the Federals at Lexington, would later be added to Clark’s battery. Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Guns”; Wilson “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Tucker, “Clark,” 17; Samuel Churchill Clark to My Beloved Father, November 5, 1861, Clark Papers; Kennerly, 242; Castel, 56-65; Bevier, 87-93.

264 Albert Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West (Reprint, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993), 57, 63.


266 By this juncture, Meriwether Clark had accepted the position of Brigadier General of the Ninth Division, which was centered in St. Louis.
and wagons as he did Gen John B. Clark, do not, for goodness sake as he did refuse them, you will find that they are hard to get here bring everything you need with you. You will be able to get but few things here." Clark then requested,

[If you can, will you on your way back to this army go to the store of Speed Donohoe and Strange and ask of the clerk (I forgot his name) for my trunk and carpet bag and bring them up with you, and if you have time and can get them, get me a pair of warm blankets, a good pair of boots ... and a pair of pants ... and some overshirts and a cap.]

By this time, Clark and his guns were situated in Brigadier General William Yarnell Slack’s Fourth Division as the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, to which he had been transferred on October 9, 1861. His rank of “acting captain” was soon made a permanent position. He was officially elected to the captaincy of his battery nine days later, whereupon he was formally commissioned as a captain of artillery in the Missouri State Guard. As stated earlier, Clark commanded “two 12-pound howitzers, one brass 6 pound field piece and one iron 6 pound field piece, two caissons, two ammunition wagons and four company wagons.” Happy in his new role as artillery captain, he declined his father’s offer of a staff position, and boasted of his intention “to give the

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267 Samuel Churchill Clark to My Beloved Father, November 5, 1861, Clark Papers.

268 Ibid.

269 Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark.”

270 Samuel Churchill Clark to My Beloved Father, November 5, 1861, Clark Papers; Note: In “Memorandum of Guns” the armament on October 9, 1861, is listed as “2 Brass 12 lb howitzers – 1 Brass 6 pdr gun & 1 Iron 6 pdr gun, also 3 caissons, a forge & 4 horses to each carriage.” This memorandum also states that, while at Cassville on November 3, 1861, Clark received from Captain William Wade’s battery a brass 12-pound howitzer. The number of guns in the battery remained the same, however, including: two brass 12-pounders, one brass 6-pounder and one iron 6-pounder. Jo Wilson merely confirms that the battery had one 6-pound brass gun, one 6-pound iron gun, and two 12-pound howitzers. Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Guns.”
Feds 200 rounds at a moment’s notice.”\textsuperscript{271} In another letter he confidently proclaimed, “my motto is Conquer or die, and die I will before they shall take me.”\textsuperscript{272} Clark’s main worry was how to procure better harnesses for his teams and whether he would gather enough men to fill the needs of his battery. This latter concern would eventually be rectified.\textsuperscript{273}

On October 28, 1861, at Neosho, the Missouri General Assembly approved an ordinance of secession, at the urging of Governor Jackson. Three days later, Missouri officially entered into a military and political alliance with the Confederacy, becoming the twelfth Confederate state.\textsuperscript{274} Price’s State Guard units, in the meantime, had moved into southwest Missouri, and were encamped along the Sac River in December of 1861, when the soldiers’ terms of enlistment began to expire. Price soon received authorization from Richmond to begin the recruitment of organizations into service of the regular Confederate army. Price moved north to Springfield to begin this recruitment.

The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery gained the majority of its recruits during these months at Sac River, Osceola, and in the vicinity of Springfield, and later that coming February, at Cove Creek, Arkansas. The Missouri units raised for the Confederacy during this time were organized as the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Confederate Brigades, under the command of brigadier generals Henry Little and William Slack, respectively. Clark’s

\textsuperscript{271}Winter, 12; Tucker, “Clark,” 17.

\textsuperscript{272}Tucker, “Clark,” 17.


\textsuperscript{274}Parrish, Jones, and Christensen, 173-74.
recruits enlisted for a period of three years, or the length of the war.\footnote{\textsuperscript{275}}

During this time, the unit was bolstered to a five-gun battery, with the addition of another brass 6-pounder. The battery now possessed six caissons (one more than was needed), one forge, and six horses per carriage. "Clark’s Missouri Battery” joined the First Missouri Brigade on December 27, 1861, at Springfield. The unit then became officially designated as the “\textsuperscript{2nd} Missouri Light Artillery” in the Confederate States Army. Clark was once again elected captain of the unit on January 16, 1862. Two days later, the battery was mustered into the Provisional Army of the Confederate States.\footnote{\textsuperscript{276}} While in winter quarters, Clark’s battery quickly became renowned for its “proficiency in drill and military maneuvers.”\footnote{\textsuperscript{277}}

Soon after this new army’s formation, Union forces threatened. With no aid forthcoming from Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch’s Confederates in Arkansas, Union forces under Major General Samuel R. Curtis clashed with Price’s men on February 11, 1862, forcing them to withdraw from Springfield and retreat toward the Arkansas border. A series of delaying actions by one of their cavalry regiments convinced the Federals that Price’s army was still within the city and helped to stall the Union’s ultimate advance.\footnote{\textsuperscript{278}}

The First Missouri Brigade, which included Clark’s \textsuperscript{2nd} Missouri Light Artillery

\footnote{\textsuperscript{275}Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Guns.”}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{276}King’s Historic Roll” confirms that the election of officers did not occur until January 16, 1862. “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4; Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark”; Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Guns”; Castel, 64-65; Winter, 13; Bevier, 77-78; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{277}Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{278}Ibid.; Kennerly, 242; Castel, 56-65; Bevier, 87-93.}
and William Wade's battery, formed the rear guard. A friendly competition between the two artillery officers arose over who would be allowed the prime position from which to shell the enemy. It ended in a compromise, by which they agreed to switch places each day.279

While on the march, Price's weary soldiers were constantly harassed by Federal artillery and cavalry. A minor engagement occurred at Crane Creek, where the Confederate column was attacked by the Federal vanguard headed by Colonel Calvin Ellis' 1st Missouri Cavalry and Major William D. Bowen's Missouri Cavalry division, which was equipped with four 12-pound howitzers. The Confederate rear guard was shelled briefly by the Federal artillery, just before sunset. This skirmish convinced Price that Federal troops were collecting in the vicinity in great numbers, and that the retreat had to be hastened. The final fifty miles stretching from Crane Creek to the Arkansas border were covered in a grueling and unrelenting thirty-six hour march in the bitter cold. On February 15 at Flat Creek, Ellis' men again caught up with the trailing Confederate column, and for the remainder of the arduous march Little's brigade was harassed constantly. As such, they were regularly forced to halt their advance and secure their position against the enemy's encroachment. All along the path through Dug Springs, Cassville, and Keetsville, Missouri, Clark's artillerymen had to remain on constant alert, ready at a moment's notice to draw battle lines in order to repulse the Federal charges, repel their bombardments, and protect the retreating column.280

About three miles below Keetsville, the Telegraph Road wound through an eight

279Kennerly, 242; Castel, 56-65; Bevier, 87-93; Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.

280Shea and Hess, 30-36; Kennerly, 242; Bevier, 90; Tucker, 17-18; Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.
mile-long ravine known as Cross Timber Hollows. The Confederate line entered this area on February 16, 1862. Approximately two to three miles in, in the vicinity of Big Sugar Creek, the army paused for a few tense hours of rest at a bend in the ravine. Toward evening, just as the Confederate column began to move out, Clark’s battery, limbered and unsupported, was suddenly charged by Ellis’s Federal cavalry, which had been reinforced by Jefferson C. Davis’ 3rd Division. One soldier described Clark, and his response to the sudden melee:

Just behind his guns, in company with some of his men, he is standing by a mouldering fire parching an ear of corn, which is poised on a small stick, as part of an extempore breakfast. His appearance is boyish, hardly eighteen in fact, rather small and delicately formed, features regular and almost effeminate, cheeks fair and rosy - although beginning to show the bronze of war - the general expression of his face bright and attractive. He wears a dark overcoat reaching below the knee; his hat is looped up on the side and surmounted by a black, jaunty plume. The free and easy intercourse between him and his men exhibits a kind and cordial feeling. He is fresh from West Point and ranks as a fine artillery officer.

The Federal mountain howitzers were soon in position, and commenced playing. As a regiment of their cavalry came dashing up the lane, “Cannoneers to your posts!” cried Clark, as his sabre flashed in the sunlight, and his “breakfast” was thrown aside. In a moment the voice of the youthful captain is again heard: “Ready - aim - fire!” and the simultaneous discharge of his four guns causes the head of the bold attacking column to reel. The artillery fire soon became incessant. . . .

Colonel Elijah Gates’ Confederate cavalry regiment had also joined in the fray.

A second account of the same skirmish claims that Clark was surprised by the attack and that he did not have time to unlimber his cannons. In consequence, the undaunted young commander boldly ordered his men “to ’stand by their guns,’ and with

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281 It is not known why Clark’s meal was referred to as “breakfast,” given the late hour of the attack. This could be a misremembered detail from an earlier clash, given that the battery had seen almost constant skirmishing previous day. Bever, 91.

282 Shea and Hess, 34-38; Kennerly, 242; Bever, 90; Tucker, 17-18; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.
swords, revolvers, sponge staffs and boulders, they checked the astonished enemy until the glittering bayonets of Rives’ regiment proclaimed relief."^{283} This is probably something of an exaggeration. Although Clark was taken by surprise and may have fended off the cavalry any way possible during the initial stages of the encounter, he would certainly have brought his cannons into the fray as soon as it was practicable, well prior to Rives’ relief efforts. It would have been impossible to hold off their well-armed opponents without the use of their guns. An hour of being subjected to Clark’s volleys and to the small-arms fire of Gates’ cavalry was enough to convince the Union forces to withdraw, albeit temporarily.^{284}

Late in the day, on February 16, 1862, the McCulloch’s Arkansans made contact with Price’s men near Elkhorn Tavern. Price’s army had now crossed over into Arkansas. They continued the march for three miles, and encamped at Little Sugar Creek Valley.

At about 1:00 p.m., the following day, Ellis again caught sight of the rear guard of the Confederate army. Price had decided, early that morning, to move the army a further twelve miles south to Cross Hollow. His men had already vacated the valley, followed by McCulloch’s army. The rear guard, commanded by Colonel Louis Hébert and supported by Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, was now situated on the ridge opposite Ellis, covering the retreat. Ellis mistakenly concluded that the entire Confederate army was positioning itself on favorable ground, with the intention of gearing up for a fight, and so informed General Curtis. By the time Curtis arrived with reinforcements, however, the

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^{283} Kennerly, 242; Bevier, 90.

^{284} Shea and Hess, 34-38; Kennerly, 242; Bevier, 90; Tucker, 17-18; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.
Confederates were gone. Ellis was ordered to pursue the retreating column.  

Little Sugar Creek was half-mile wide, east-west depression. It was bordered by tall limestone ridges approximately one hundred feet in height, which gave Hébert a commanding position. The Telegraph Road ran perpendicular to these ridges. Hébert had deliberately allowed his men to be seen earlier that day by the Federal vanguard, but had then voluntarily abandoned the high ground. He had not expected Ellis’ cavalry to attempt an assault, and was surprised when the Union guns were called into action. Hébert sent word to Little’s 1st Missouri brigade, that a fight was eminent. Little soon joined Hébert’s men and deployed the men, in preparation to fend off the impending attack.

Hébert’s three regiments were positioned to the east of Telegraph Road, with Clark’s impressive and reliable 2nd Missouri Light Artillery in the center, and Hébert’s men to the west. The Confederate line ran alongside the southern border of a large, open field that belonged to a farmer named James Dunagin. Several dismounted members of the 1st Missouri Cavalry were sent 400 yards ahead into the forest to act as skirmishers. The Confederate line faced north, toward the ridge and the valley beyond. The Federals were not long in coming.

Ellis had reached the limestone heights and there caught a glimpse of the retreating Southern army. His first instinct was to immediately pursue the trailing column, as he had done all the way from Flat Creek. His unsupported cavalry charged

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285 Shea and Hess, 38-41.

286 Ibid.

287 Ibid., 41-42.
headlong down telegraph road and ran straight into the waiting Confederate brigades. The Federals were met with a wicked hail of shot, which soared just above their heads, from the cannons of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery.\textsuperscript{288}

Ellis immediately ordered his 1st Missouri Cavalry into the woods. Wright’s 6th Missouri Cavalry, accordingly, swung off the road to the right, while McConnell’s 3rd Illinois Cavalry took to the left. Unfortunately, Major James M. Hubbard’s section of the 1st Missouri Cavalry had not heard the order, and continued their rush straight down Telegraph Road, where they mingled with a group of retreating Confederate soldiers who had burst out of the woods. In the confusion, Hubbard’s horses ended up in Dunagin’s field, in prime position, and within perfect range, for the guns of the Confederate infantry and artillery. Hubbard’s men fled this “hornet’s nest,” but not before several casualties were inflicted, including both men and horses. Meanwhile, Ellis battled Gates’ dismounted 1st Missouri Cavalry in the woods just above Dunagin’s field, until he caught sight of the solid line of southerners on the far end. Ellis then realized that he was outnumbered and ordered his troops to withdraw.\textsuperscript{289}

Meanwhile, to the north, Curtis had sent Carr’s 4th Division and Vandever’s 2nd Brigade, which included the 9th Iowa and the 25th Missouri infantry, up the southern slope of Little Sugar Creek to reinforce Ellis. Vandever arrived at 3:00 p.m. and deployed his men. Hayden’s 3rd Iowa battery took up a position in the center of Telegraph Road and began a firefight with Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. The 9th Illinois Infantry were caught in the midst of this shelling, but took cover and were not injured. However,

\textsuperscript{288}Ibid., 42.

\textsuperscript{289}Ibid.
several Confederates on either flank of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were killed.\textsuperscript{290}

Curtis then ordered Dodge’s 2nd Brigade, which included the 4th Iowa, the 35th Illinois, and the 1st Iowa Battery, forward to further reinforce the position. However, by the time they arrived, an hour later, Hébert had disengaged from the fight. The Confederates continued on their way to Cross Hollow. With night setting in and his lines over-extended, Curtis chose not to pursue. Casualties numbered approximately forty-six Federals soldiers dead, as well as several horses, as opposed to an estimated twenty-six Confederates.\textsuperscript{291}

This engagement, fought on February 17, 1862, was known alternately as Dunagin’s Farm and Little Sugar Creek. It was the first Civil War battle fought on Arkansas soil, and helped to boost the morale of the weary Confederate soldiers, due to its success and the fact that it fostered a sense of fellowship between the Missouri and Arkansas troops. The next engagement would be the Battle of Pea Ridge.\textsuperscript{292}

Price’s army, its baggage train fully intact, regrouped with McCulloch’s men at Cross Timber Hollows, late on February 17, 1862. From here, the two armies moved through Cove Creek, where new recruits were mustered in, and onward to Fayetteville, where they procured much-needed food, clothing, and shoes. They then retraced their steps to Cove Creek and the Boston Mountains, where Major General Earl Van Dorn assumed command of the army on March 1, 1862.\textsuperscript{293}

\textsuperscript{290}Ibid., 42-43.

\textsuperscript{291}Ibid., 43.

\textsuperscript{292}Ibid., 43-44; Bevier, 91-93; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.

\textsuperscript{293}Bevier, 94; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.
In the meantime, Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was bolstered to a full six-gun battery, including three 6-pound cannons (one iron, and two brass), and two 12-pound howitzers. On February 20, 1862, McCulloch gave Clark one additional caisson and a battery Wagon, which had been captured during the battle of Wilson’s Creek. He also gave Clark another brass gun, most likely a 6-pounder. This meant that Clark now had a full gun battery, with caisson, a forge, and battery wagons. There were six horses to each carriage. It is not known whether the 12-pound guns were used at Pea Ridge.\footnote{This last brass gun was probably a 6-pound cannon. Shea and Hess indicate that during the battle of Pea Ridge, Clark’s battery consisted of four guns, all 6-pounders (thus, suggesting that this last gun was a 6-pounder), and that William Wade controlled four 12-pounders and two 6-pounders. However, Samuel Churchill Clark, in a letter to his father, Jo Wilson, a soldier in the battery, indicate that the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery definitely had possession of two brass 12-pound howitzers, in addition to three 6-pound guns (one iron and two brass), and one other brass gun, prior to Pea Ridge. Samuel Clark, Meriwether Lewis Clark, and Jo Wilson have been considered the most reliable sources, especially since those cited by Shea and Hess were not actually members of Clark’s battery. Henry Little does not denote the number of guns in his battle report. It seems significant that William Wade had, in fact, conferred one of the aforementioned 12-pound howitzers on Clark’s battery back in November 1861. It is possible that Clark and Wade, who worked closely during the retreat from Springfield, either shared their cannons or had them temporarily reassigned, during the battle, thus making what was likely a four gun battery under Wade (two 6-pounders and two 12-pounders) into a temporary six-gun battery, with the use of Clark’s Howitzers. Guns had, after all, been loaned to Clark at the battle of Lexington. It is equally possible that due to a lack of ammunition, Clark was not able to make use of his brass 12-pounders, and that they were relegated to the sidelines. This paper assumes that Clark, at least on paper, controlled a six-gun battery during the battle of Pea Ridge, most likely composed of four 6-pound guns, three of which were brass, and one of which was iron, and two brass 12-pound howitzers. Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Guns”; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Shea and Hess, 162, 233, 250, 365 n.21, 373 n.24, 375, n.16; O.R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 307, 310; Sifakis, 73; Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark.”}

By March 6, Curtis’ Union army was concentrated on the banks of Little Sugar Creek, in a defensive line of breastworks. Hoping to avoid a costly frontal assault on these entrenched lines, Van Dorn ordered his force of 16,000 men on an eight mile flanking march around the Union right, behind Big Ridge, on a route known as the Bentonville Detour. This route intersected the Telegraph Road at Cross Timber Hollow, far to the rear of the Federal position. Van Dorn intended to outflank Curtis and catch the outnumbered Federal troops off guard, while simultaneously blocking their supply lines.
as well as their line of retreat. If successful, the Federal troops would be forced to surrender. 295

In the early evening of March 6, 1862, Van Dorn’s men lit campfires in front of Curtis’ lines, and pretended to bivouac for the night. As soon as darkness fell, they formed lines for the march, with Price’s Missourians as the advance guard. Van Dorn had expected that Price’s men would reach Curtis’ rear by first light. But he had failed to reconnoiter the planned route of their march and was unaware that Curtis’ men had obstructed its already difficult terrain with logs. Moreover, Van Dorn’s soldiers were hungry, and exhausted by the previous three days’ grueling march through a snowstorm on minimal rations. Their draught animals were similarly worn down. By dawn, Price still had a fair distance left to travel, before he could attack. Although Curtis had been fooled by the demonstrations the previous night, he realized early on the morning of March 7 what Van Dorn was up to. The slowed progress of Price’s men allowed Curtis the time to re-deploy his lines in order to meet Price’s assault head on. Meanwhile, McCulloch’s troops, who had initially intended to follow Price, were split off from the rest of the army, and sent to attack Curtis from the west. 296

The next day, March 7, 1862, Price’s men engaged the enemy at Cross Timber Hollow, near Elkhorn Tavern. This fight occurred just as Colonel Peter J. Osterhaus was preparing to face off against the left wing of the Confederate army under McCulloch at the village of Lectown, which was situated on the other end of the battlefield. 297 In

295 Castel, 66-74.
296 Castel, 66-74; Shea and Hess, 88-89.
297 Shea and Hess, 150-51.
essence, the first day's battle was composed of two separate and basically unconnected Confederate assaults, which occurred several miles apart, with the Union forces situated squarely in the middle.298

At 10:00 a.m., Van Dorn's advancing Confederate column was unexpectedly intercepted by the Federal 24th Missouri Infantry, at the bottom of the hollow, which led, up a steep incline, toward Elkhorn Tavern. This unit skirmished with Lieutenant Colonel James T. Cearnal's Missouri Cavalry Battalion, Colonel Elijah Gates' 1st Missouri Cavalry, and Captain Joseph Shelby's company of State Guard Cavalry for about an hour, and successfully delayed their advance. This delay allowed Carr to not only alert Curtis of the presence and approximate strength of the Confederates, but also to bolster his own force with the addition of Colonel Grenville M. Dodge's Brigade. Carr deployed the 35th Illinois, 4th Iowa, and 3rd Illinois Cavalry along the high ground of Pea Ridge, in a line, that stretched from the vicinity of Elkhorn Tavern east along the Huntsville Road. Carr emplaced his artillery in support. The guns of Captain Junius A. Jones' 1st Iowa Battery were split between two positions. Two guns were placed between the 35th Illinois and the 4th Iowa, so that they could directly target Williams Hollow. The remaining four guns were placed adjacent to the Telegraph Road, on Narrow Ridge, approximately 300 yards beyond the crest of the ridge. These guns were aimed down the slope, thus allowing the battery to fire downward into the advancing Confederates, with impunity. After the deployment was complete, the 24th Missouri was pulled back, up the hollow, to a position west of the tavern, opposite the Tanyard Ravine. Carr then requested reinforcements.

298Ibid.

160
Colonel William Vandever’s 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade was immediately dispatched from Little Sugar Creek, but was an hour’s march away from Carr’s fragile position. For this reason, Carr took the offensive, in hopes that a sudden Union assault would confuse the Confederates, and further stall their progress, thereby buying sufficient time for Vandever’s men to reach the tavern. The time was now approximately 11:30 a.m.\textsuperscript{299}

Van Dorn and Price had arrived on the scene at 10:00 a.m., but their view of Carr’s forces was obstructed by the precipitous and heavily wooded terrain. Van Dorn was troubled firstly by the unexpected presence of Union troops in the area, and secondly by the presence of Federal artillery. Although he ordered Price to deploy his men, he did so with the understanding that they would exercise caution in their efforts to advance up the ridge. This inordinate degree of caution cost Van Dorn the chance to immediately overrun his opponent, and very likely carry the field. There were approximately 5,000 men under the command of Price and Van Dorn at this time. They were deployed as follows: William Yarnell Slack’s 2<sup>nd</sup> Missouri Brigade comprised the far right of the Confederate line, his men being positioned at the bottom of the Tanyard Ravine. Henry Little’s 1<sup>st</sup> Missouri Brigade was situated to Slack’s left, at the bottom of Narrow Ridge, straddling the Telegraph Road. Next to Little, at the base of the Middle Ravine, was Colonel Elijah Gates’ 1<sup>st</sup> Missouri Cavalry. Colonel Colton Green’s 3<sup>rd</sup> Missouri Brigade was in line atop Broad Ridge. He was flanked by a row of State Guard troops that began on Broad Ridge and then descended east, down into the base of Williams Hollow. These troops included Brigadier General Daniel M. Frost’s 7<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> Divisions, Missouri State Guard, Colonel John B. Clark’s 3<sup>rd</sup> Division, Missouri State Guard, and Colonel James P.

\textsuperscript{299}Ibid.
Saunders’ 5th Division, Missouri State Guard, which was deployed on the far left. Cearnal’s and Shelby’s cavalry were also deployed in Williams Hollow. Five Missouri State Guard artillery batteries and four Confederate artillery batteries were held in reserve at the bottom of the Tanyard Ravine. Slack’s and Little’s infantry led the first assault up Narrow Ridge and the Tanyard Ravine, respectively. They were soon greeted by the unlimbered cannons of the 1st Iowa Battery. The Missourians immediately lay down and took cover, as the shots sailed overhead. The artillerymen had failed to take the sloping ground into account when calculating their trajectories, and as a result actual casualties were few. However, the Federal objective of bogging down the Confederate advance up Narrow Ridge worked.\(^{300}\)

In response, Van Dorn sent Henry Guibor’s battery of two 6-pounders and two 12-pounders into action atop Broad Ridge. This gave the Missouri artillerist the higher ground, and positioned him within 300 yards of the Iowa gunners. Little took the initiative of adding Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery and William Wade’s battery to the mix, shortly thereafter. These guns ascended the ridge after Guibor, and fell into line alongside him. This addition made for a total of fourteen Confederate cannons, including eight 6-pounders, and six 12-pounders, hurling shot and shell toward the hapless gunners of the 1st Iowa Battery. One of the Iowans, Sam Black, recalled the “terrible effect” of the shelling, and observed, “Any reply we could make seemed but feeble resistance.”\(^{301}\)

Indeed, the barrage from the Confederate guns was highly effective, as the

\(^{300}\)Ibid., 161-62.

\(^{301}\)Quoted in ibid., 162.
cannoneers unleashed a veritable hailstorm of solid shot, case shot, and shell upon the beleaguered Iowans, who were also pelted with rocks and splinters of wood, as the missiles landed in their midst. Captain Jones brought up two additional 12-pound howitzers in support, but these did little to alleviate the pressure, for the 1st Iowa battery was within “perfect range” of the Missourians, and its cannons were vastly outnumbered. In short order, one of the Union cannon barrels became hopelessly jammed while returning fire. This occurred at approximately the same time that Guibor corrected the trajectory of his men, who had been targeting the plumes of smoke that were drifting above the Iowan’s position. The effects were immediate and dramatic. Two Federal ammunition chests were demolished, and the resultant blasts destroyed one caisson and one limber. A team of frightened horses darted away, pulling behind them a second caisson, which crashed into the Tanyard Ravine. Throughout this firestorm, the Missouri guns were “pounding away with clocklike regularity.” As the Federal casualties mounted, the three remaining guns became unserviceable due to lack of manpower. Meanwhile, Captain Emmett MacDonald’s battery of one 6-pounder and two 12-pound howitzers, and Lieutenant Charles Higgins’ (Bledsoe’s) Battery of four 12-pound howitzers, were brought into action on the Confederate side, making for a grand total of twenty-one Confederate cannons (nine 6-pounders, and twelve 12-pounders) versus the three remaining Federal cannons. Black recounted the bleak mood among the Iowans follows: “We stood in that tempest of death [for what felt like hours]... I believe every man at the guns had made up his mind to die there, for it did not seem

302 Quoted in ibid., 162.

303 Quoted in ibid., 163.
possible any of us could get out alive.” An onlooker observed that “At times there were more than twenty discharges of artillery within the space of one minute...and it would continue for some time and then there would be a cessation for a time, as the smoke would become so dense that all would be enveloped in darkness.” The situation was clearly impossible for the 1st Iowa Battery. Jones ordered that preparations be made to abandon the position, and accordingly, that the ammunition be detonated on the unserviceable caisson which had earlier toppled into the Tanyard Ravine. Jones was then carried from the field, for medical attention. The artillery duel made an indelible impression on all who had occasion to witness it. Captain Henry Cummings of the 4th Iowa Infantry, which was deployed on Broad Ridge, stated that “Grape and shell whistled over our heads pretty thick” Captain William H. Kinsman, also of the 4th Iowa, declared that “the thunder of the artillery was terrific and the shot and shell hissed and screamed through the air like flying devils, while the infantry with their rifles, shotguns, and muskets, kept a perfect hurricane of death howling in the woods.” Another soldier, who had been deployed on Narrow ridge, recalled after the war: “I never heard anything to equal it in any other battle... the incessant crash of musketry and roar of artillery, amid curtains of rising smoke, appeared both to sight and sound as if two wrathful clouds

304 Quoted in ibid., 163.
305 Quoted in ibid., 164.
306 Quoted in ibid., 166.
307 Quoted in ibid., 166.

164
had descended to the earth, rushing together in hideous battle with all their lightning and thunder.\footnote{308}

Simultaneous to the artillery battle, Little ordered Gates to execute a flanking manoeuvre up the Middle Ravine, in order to overrun the 1st Iowa Battery. This move was to be supported by the musketry fire of the infantrymen of Little’s Brigade. The attempt was repulsed, and the dismounted cavalrmen retreated in disorder, due to the unexpected attendance of the 35th Illinois and the 4th Iowa Infantry, who were now in formation, and had undertaken a partial descent along the length of Narrow Ridge, the Middle Ravine and Broad Ridge, in an attempt to link up with Carr’s men. Far from being a coordinated assault, however, the Union soldiers came to a halt one third of the way down, lay flat, and commenced a sporadic fire at whatever targets they could distinguish through the impenetrable smoky haze that now shrouded the battleground. During the descent, gaps had arisen between the Union soldiers, because Dodge had failed to realize that the Middle Ravine intersected the two ridges. This spread his men farther apart than anticipated and caused a thinning of the lines. The Union opposition was somewhat feeble. Nevertheless, its gave Price additional pause for thought and ultimately caused him to take up a defensive posture. Thus, the advance up Cross Timber Hollow was further delayed.\footnote{309}

At 12:30 p.m., Vandrever’s Brigade began to trickle in at Elkhorn Tavern, led by Captain Mortimer M. Hayden’s 3rd Iowa Battery. Also known as the Dubuque Battery,

\footnote{308 Quoted in ibid., 167.}
\footnote{309 Ibid., 164-167.}
this unit possessed four 6-pound guns and two 12-pound howitzers. After receiving two sets of conflicting orders, they eventually took up a position atop Narrow Ridge, in relief of the 1st Iowa Battery, which was thereupon withdrawn from the fight. The 35th Illinois, who had been situated in the thick of the Confederate artillery barrage, was pulled back up the slope to a position supporting the 3rd Iowa battery. The remnants of Dodge's 1st Brigade were also ordered to withdraw back up the slope to its initial area of deployment alongside the Huntsville Road.310

The 3rd Iowa Battery fared no better than their predecessor. No sooner had they entered the fray, than the Missourians immediately adjusted their trajectories, in order to account for the new expanse of distance. First, an ammunition chest atop a limber was exploded. Then, one 6-pound cannon and one 12-pound cannon were disabled when both carriages were obliterated by solid shot. Elkhorn Tavern and the surrounding area was caught in a maelstrom of Confederate artillery fire, so much so that the wounded soldiers being housed inside had to be evacuated, and a new building found to serve as the Union hospital. Despite the success of the Missouri cannoneers in harassing both Iowa batteries, as well as the Federal infantry caught in between the opposing gunners, Van Dorn had squandered the element of surprise that his men had worked so hard to gain via the previous night's forced march. By failing to press their advantage, and being content to merely hold their ground at the bottom of Cross timber Hollows, repulsing the tentative Federal strikes, Van Dorn wasted several crucial hours that might have allowed him to run roughshod over the weak Union lines. The Confederate troops in front of

310Ibid., 165-167,170-171.
Elkhorn Tavern would now be forced to fight their way out of the gully against Carr’s newly-reinforced 4th Division.\textsuperscript{311}

By 2:00 p.m., Vandever’s entire brigade had arrived, followed shortly thereafter by three other units.\textsuperscript{312} These men were used to bolster the Union left at Elkhorn Tavern. Vandever then attempted a series of ill-conceived manoeuvres down the steep and heavily wooded slope of the Tanyard Ravine, but the Confederates who lay in wait at the bottom quickly repulsed each incursion. Over sixty Federal casualties were suffered in one skirmish, alone. These heavy losses convinced Vandever that the force he was up against was substantial. He was correct, for his fragile lines were currently outnumbered by a ratio of 2:1 in men and 4:1 in cannons. Accordingly, Carr shifted his strategy to the defensive; shortening his lines on both ends of the battlefield, and pulling back his lines, along the entire front, in preparation to repel any concerted Confederate attack. His only motive, at this point, was to delay the enemy for as long as possible from breaking through the Union lines, rolling over the forces at Little Sugar Creek, and eventually linking up with the rest of the Confederate forces at Leetown.\textsuperscript{313}

Brigadier General William Yarnell Slack was killed in the Tanyard Ravine during the repulse of Vandever’s Union forces. Shortly thereafter, acting on his own initiative, an impatient Henry Little ordered his brigade to advance up Narrow Ridge in pursuit of the Union infantrymen who were being withdrawn. This successful charge advanced the

\textsuperscript{311}Ibid., 169, 172-175.
\textsuperscript{312}Ibid., 179-180.
\textsuperscript{313}Ibid., 173-180.
Confederate lines to the position formerly occupied by the decimated 1st Iowa Battery, which was described as "a scene of wreck and disaster. . . . The remains of parts of the Federal battery were scattered around, and the effect of the explosions could be plainly seen. Dead horses and dead and wounded infantry told of the storm of iron which had beaten them down." 314 Almost simultaneous to this charge, Price was wounded in the arm and Van Dorn received word that McCullough had been killed at Leetown; the progress of the left wing of the Confederate army toward the Tavern had stalled. It was now 2:00 p.m. Van Dorn decided to re-deploy his forces, in anticipation of launching a full-scale attack on the Federal lines. However, two more hours passed, before the troops were in position on Pea Ridge, and before the Van Dorn and Price were sufficiently convinced of their tactical superiority on the right, and confident enough in the probable outcome of the fight, to commence the attack. 315

In order to initiate a successfully coordinated, two-pronged assault, Price was given command of the far end of the battlefield, while Van Dorn directed the troops near Elkhorn Tavern. The Confederate artillery was divided between the forces. Guibor's Battery had been redeployed in support of Little's Brigade, along with Gorham's Battery. The rest of the artillery, including Clark's 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, Bledsoe's Battery, and McDonald's Battery, initially remained on Broad Ridge, but subsequently took up a supportive position behind the Confederate infantry and cavalry units, who lined up along the eastern edge of Clemon's Field, after the outflanked Union forces had fallen back to a

314 Quoted in ibid., 181.

315 Ibid., 175-76, 180-184.
position 200 yards beyond, along the western edge of the undulating cornfield. The Federal troops were deployed in a north-south line along the narrow road known as Clemon’s Lane. Their position was partially sheltered by the surrounding woods, and by several felled trees, which the farmer had hauled to this end of the field earlier in the year. The Union soldiers had quickly fashioned these logs and a number of fence rails into a breastwork, which afforded them a critical degree of protection for much of the impending battle.\textsuperscript{316}

Van Dorn and Price commenced their attacks simultaneously. Van Dorn’s men were ultimately successful in pushing their way up and out of the hollow, from two directions; Little’s Brigade charged up Narrow Ridge, while Colonel Thomas H. Rosser’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Brigade fought its way out of the Tanyard Ravine, across the eastern lip of Big Mountain, and rolled down the Federal left flank. Carr’s soldiers put up a stubborn resistance, but they were eventually overwhelmed and forced to pull back, first to Elkhorn Tavern, and then in a partial retreat down the Telegraph Road, towards Pratt’s Store, Ford Road, and finally, Ruddick’s Field, where they positioned themselves for a final stand before nightfall. The Confederate soldiers immediately began celebrating their success, looting the area around Elkhorn Tavern in a desperate search for food. They had to be gathered together and reorganized, before they were able to pursue the enemy forces. Skirmishing commenced along the route of the Federal withdrawal, but by the time the Confederates reached the final Union position it was close to sunset. The Confederate soldiers made one last-ditch effort to mount a conclusive charge across

\textsuperscript{316}Ibid., 180-84, 197-99.
Ruddick’s field, in a frontal assault on the Union forces, but they were met with a vicious artillery barrage, from thirteen cannons, which put a decisive halt to the offensive.\textsuperscript{317}

At Clemon’s Field, the battle had opened with a massive artillery barrage by the Confederate guns against the 4\textsuperscript{th} Iowa Infantry, who were taking shelter behind their makeshift barricade on the other end of the field, as they attempted to form the centre of the Union line of battle. Captain Henry Cummings, of the aforesaid unit, spoke of how his men were frozen into place by the thick fire, commenting, “had we not lain down we would not have had ten men to the company.”\textsuperscript{318} Another Union officer described the “terrible” shelling as “the most terrific cannonading” that he ever witnessed during the entire war.\textsuperscript{319} Trees were blown to splinters by the smothering cannon fire, and the Iowans would have been decimated, if not for their makeshift shelter. The shelling lasted for about thirty minutes, at which point Clark’s 3\textsuperscript{rd} Missouri Infantry, which formed the centre of the Confederate battle line, made an unsupported and, ultimately, disastrous charge across Clemon’s Field, toward the protected Union position. The undulating terrain and the breastworks worked in unison to obscure their enemy’s specific location, until it was too late. The charge was bloodily repulsed, by the close range musketry fire of the Iowans, who outnumbered the Missourians by a factor of two to one.\textsuperscript{320}

\textsuperscript{317}Ibid., 185-197.
\textsuperscript{318}Ibid., 199.
\textsuperscript{319}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{320}Ibid., 197-200.
Clark’s 3rd Missouri Infantry retreated to the centre of the field, and the Confederate guns began a second barrage. When it ended, Clark’s infantrymen advanced a second time toward the scene of the previous disaster. A second time, they were cut to ribbons and again forced to retreat. At this point, Price changed his strategy. He ordered the cannoneers and Clark’s infantrymen to concentrate their collective fire against the log breastworks. At the same time, he ordered his remaining divisions to execute a pincers movement against the exposed Federal flanks. This time the movements met with success. The Union troops were slowly and steadily overpowered by their Confederate opponents on all sides, despite the addition of one battalion of reinforcements. However, just moments before the pincers closed, around 5:30 p.m., Dodge was informed of the loss of Elkhorn Tavern, and the consequent retreat of Carr and Vandever. Realizing the futility of the situation, he ordered an immediate withdrawal. Their movements obscured by the blanket of thick smoke that clouded the battlefield, the Union forces disengaged and pulled back before the Confederate onslaught. They left just in time to escape complete annihilation, and instead the Confederate pincers closed in on itself, creating a temporary state of confusion among the Southern troops, who had to be reorganized. The Union forces managed to hold off their pursuers and eventually hooked up with Vandever and Carr in Ruddick’s field, who had, fifteen minutes prior driven back the final Confederate charge of the evening. At 6:30 p.m., as night fell, Carr realized that his spent troops’ ammunition was running dry. It was at this critical juncture that Carr was reinforced by Curtis, who assumed overall command and unleashed a concluding counter-strike of artillery fire. This held the Confederates in place at the far end of Ruddick’s field and effectively prevented any further hostilities that night. Curtis’s forces
remained situated at the edge of the field, in anticipation of a renewal of battle the following day.\textsuperscript{321}

The day's fight on the Confederate right was therefore partially successful. Van Dorn had succeeded in capturing the Telegraph and Huntsville roads, driving the Union forces back from Elkhorn Tavern. The Missourians had even captured several cannons for good measure. Curtis's communication lines, as well as his route of supply, were now effectively severed. By the close of the day, Van Dorn's men had formed their lines around Elkhorn Tavern, in good position to continue the struggle the following morning. However, the possibility of a rout had been lost early on, and the tenacity of the Union forces in the area had prevented the Southerners from achieving a total victory.\textsuperscript{322}

The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery had accompanied the rest of Price's Missouri troops on their arduous march, and one Confederate soldier fondly recalled how Clark,

joyously move[d] his battery into battle . . . not grudgingly, but as if he loved the sound of his guns as they thundered . . . It was a grand sight to see him move the boy battery in the very paths of the blue coats and open great lanes through their brave ranks, and to behold him in the very gates of death and hear his orders given as cool as on a field day.\textsuperscript{323}

At one point, Clark had aimed his favorite cannon, one of the brass 6-pounders captured at Lexington, at an enemy gun and successfully dislodged it from its limber. Indeed, Clark's 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery had contributed to all of the heaviest and most effective shelling of Union troops that had taken place on the field that day, and as a

\textsuperscript{321}Ibid., 199-206.

\textsuperscript{322}Tucker, "Clark," 18; Meriwether Lewis Clark, "Memorandum of Guns."

\textsuperscript{323}Tucker, "Clark," 18.
result, Clark had been promoted by General Price to the rank of "Major of Artillery" while on the field. The battery was to play another crucial role the following morning.\textsuperscript{324}

The fate of McCulloch's wing that day was a study in opposites. Whereas Price's forces had been on the verge of carrying the field, McCulloch's had, at the same time, been courting disaster at Leetown, where the army had encountered Federal resistance, and soon became bogged down. Although meeting with some initial success, McCullough's army soon fell back in disorder, when it met with Federal artillery fire. While riding ahead in an attempt to personally reconnoiter the enemy position, McCulloch was killed. His second in command, Brigadier General James M. MacIntosh, was killed in similar fashion while attempting to rally his men shortly after assuming command. Leadership of the army would then have fallen to Hébert, whose brigade was detached from the main force on MacIntosh's right flank, where he was preparing to lead an assault upon the Union position, opposite. Hébert was never informed of the events that had transpired, and as a result never took control of that wing of the army. Instead, he proceeded with the assault. Although Hébert was initially very successful, without backing support from the center, his opponent, Osterhaus, was able to reinforce his lines against the onslaught. Hébert's brigade was driven back, and Hébert was captured in the process. From this point on, the left wing of Van Dorn's army stood paralyzed. Van Dorn did not learn of the magnitude of the disaster until the wee hours of the following morning, when the remnants of McCulloch's column finally linked up with his own

\textsuperscript{324}Shea and Hess, 162, 198-200, 233, 250, 252; Tucker, "Clark," 18; Meriwether Lewis Clark, "Memorandum of Guns"; Meriwether Lewis Clark, "Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark."
troops, near Elkhorn Tavern.\textsuperscript{325}

Having dealt a severe blow to McCulloch’s forces, Curtis was free to reinforce the lines facing Price, overnight. Intent on repairing his broken supply lines, he launched an attack the next morning. March 8 saw the Union troops fight with renewed vigor. Twenty-one Federal cannons were massed in Cox’s field against the Missouri Brigades. Six additional guns were collected together in Ruddick’s Field, facing the Southern lines. To make matters worse for the beleaguered Confederate soldiers, in the night their supply train had, inconceivably, been ordered back to Bentonville, leaving the starving men without food, or adequate ammunition for the upcoming fight. Their artillery was particularly hampered, due to a lack of shells. This effectively nullified the advantage that should have been conferred by their numerical superiority.\textsuperscript{326}

Slowly, the Federal troops gained ground, supported by a devastating and concentrated artillery fire, which inflicted terrible losses on the Southerners, whose shattered lines gradually began to yield under the pressure. Despite possessing a mathematical advantage of almost two-to-one in cannons, the Confederate gunners were hard-pressed to compete with their Northern opponents, because the Missouri batteries were never used together and because their ammunition was in such short supply. Van Dorn had initially sent Good’s Texas Battery into Ruddick’s Field, in order to offer some measure of resistance against the imposing Federal lines. Good’s Battery was soon bolstered by the addition of Wade’s Battery. Both units fought valiantly in exposed positions, but were forced to retreat in rapid succession, once their ammunition was

\textsuperscript{325}Castel, 74-76; Shea and Hess, 205-10.

\textsuperscript{326}Castel, 75-76; Shea and Hess, 214-22.
spent. Most of their shots had flown harmlessly above their opponents’ heads, because
the Union troops had lain prostrate when the firing began. Hart’s Arkansas Battery and
Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were sent into action, in relief of Good and Wade.
However, Hart’s untested battery, which had been instructed to displace Good’s position
within Ruddick’s field, fled the scene almost immediately, under a storm of Federal
artillery fire. Since Ruddick’s field seemed untenable, Clark’s 2nd Missouri Light
Artillery was placed at the junction of Ford Road and Telegraph Road. A few other
batteries, situated near Elkhorn Tavern, tried to aid Clark, but their fire was inaccurate,
haphazard and rather ineffective.327

The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery had gained a favorable, well-merited reputation,
and it was, without a doubt, the most effective of all of the Confederate artillery on the
battlefield that day. Clark’s precise gunners were immediately presented with the
ammunition that had been confiscated from Hart’s lackluster battery, and Clark
proceeded to visit well-placed shots upon his targets, at a staggeringly rapid rate of fire.
Nevertheless, the lone battery was out-manned, and the Federal guns proceeded to
unleash a vicious, two-hour barrage, during which the Southern infantry was pushed back
from Ruddick’s Field into the surrounding woods. The Federal guns then raked the
Confederate lines on either side of Telegraph Road, pounded the army’s right flank,
which was situated atop Big Mountain, and blasted Elkhorn Tavern, while Federal

327 Only one-tenth of the Southern troops had rations. The Confederates possessed fifty-four
cannons to twenty-seven on the Union side. Castel, 74-83; Shea and Hess, 214, 229, 231-233; Charles E.
Steele, M.M. Tice, W. D. Moore, John Kennedy, B. L. Allen, William Masterson, N. B. Milton, and James
Pitkins of Hart’s battery were investigated by a court of inquiry, headed by Henry Guibor, but were found
“guilty of no misconduct” at the battle of Pea Ridge. The battery was “relieved from the censure contained
in General Orders, No. 10, dated March 22, 1862, disbanding Hart’s Battery Light Artillery, ‘for shameful
infantry prepared for a major assault across the entire front. The Confederate casualties were horrific and as mid-day approached Van Dorn felt compelled to order a retreat.\textsuperscript{328}

As the Federals attacked, Van Dorn began to retreat in disorder. However, a large part of his infantry was hard-pressed to disengage from the combat, and Van Dorn had already galloped to the head of the retreating column before his army had been safely extracted. Moreover, the Confederate general neglected to inform any of his artillery batteries of his decision to abandon the field. Thirteen batteries positioned at Elkhorn tavern remained unlimbered, as did Clark’s vulnerable 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery.\textsuperscript{329}

In order to cover the withdrawal of Van Dorn’s disheveled forces, the 1\textsuperscript{st} Missouri Brigade, under Colonel Little, was forced to hold its position and keep Curtis occupied. It was purportedly on Price’s enthusiastic recommendation that the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was given the task of shoring up their fragile lines. Clark assured Price that his gunners would “do their duty” and “hold their own.” This they did, firing constantly, though in a dangerously exposed position, subject to the full onslaught of enemy artillery fire.\textsuperscript{330}

It was due to Clark’s obvious talent at the guns and the piecemeal efforts of the remaining artillery batteries that several of the Federal batteries eventually saw fit to focus all of their efforts upon silencing the cannons under Clark’s command, which carried on firing even as the Union army descended upon the weary soldiers of the State.


\textsuperscript{329} Shea and Hess, 243-50.

Guard. “Missiles rained down on the battery and broke limbers, disabled guns, exploded ammunition chests, and sprayed men and horses with deadly debris.” Casulties were mounting all around them, but the resolute Missouri battery continued to pound away at the encroaching Union lines. Clark’s determined efforts were enough of a diversion to secure their comrades the time needed to make good their escape. As the soldiers of Little’s Brigade finally began to disengage and pull back, a respected officer, Colonel Benjamin A. Rives, was suddenly killed. No sooner had the shock of Rives’ death set in, than Clark was decapitated by a piece of solid shot from the Union cannons. Ironically, Clark had just been ordered to limber his guns and depart.  

Colonel Little bemoaned the death of the “gallant” Rives, in his report to headquarters, and then went on to describe the successive tragedy of Clark’s death in the following passage:  

... and, as though fortune sought to dispossess our resolutions by multiplying disasters, within a few minutes after the fall of Rives we suffered an irreparable loss in the fall of the young and chivalrous Clark, whose battery kept up a galling fire on the advancing foe as our lines retired; and as we had now fallen back on a line with his position, being ordered to withdraw his guns, he fell, decapitated by a round shot while executing this maneuver; the last battery in action.

Major William Clark Kennerly, acting ordnance officer, also witnessed the numbing death of Clark. He wrote:

In the latter hours of the battle, there was the most deafening and awful cannonade from the guns on both sides, and it was then that I witnessed one of the most shocking deaths of the war. Young Churchill Clark, son of Meriwether Kennerly.

331 Quoted in Shea and Hess, 250.


Lewis Clark, was a particularly gallant boy, and I never knew such nerve under fire. When a cannon ball came so close that it took his mustache right off, he threw back his shoulders and remarked with a grin, “God! That was a close shave!” The next one took his head off.\footnote{Kennerly, 243.}

Jo Wilson summed up his esteemed captain in a remembrance:

Capt. Clark was an officer of great promise, full of ardor and of a buoyant, cheerful disposition; nothing seemed to depress his spirits. Thoroughly posted in tactics and army regulations, he labored to bring his company up to the highest standard of efficiency. Though small in stature, his figure was graceful and his physical powers well developed. In the management of the horse and the use of the saber he excelled. Beloved and respected by all, his death, at the early age of 20, cast a gloom over all who knew him.\footnote{Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.}

Lieutenant Sam Farrington gathered up Clark’s body, but he was forced to abandon it on the field, due to the rapid approach of the Union forces.\footnote{There are two entries for a Sam Farrington on the Civil War Soldiers and Sailors website. The first entry was for a first lieutenant in the Missouri State Guard who was mustered out as a senior first lieutenant. The second entry is for a Lieutenant in Captain Walsh’s Company of the Missouri Light Artillery, who was later promoted to captain. It is not clear if this is the same individual or under which unit Farrington served at Pea Ridge. Tucker states that the officer who initially caught Clark’s corpse was Houston King. He goes on to say that the Federal troops had marked Clark’s grave, and the body was subsequently exhumed and given a Catholic burial at Van Buren, Arkansas. N.P. Minor says that it was “Clark’s Indian,” Peter King, who gathered up the captain’s body, and that it was never captured. Minor states that Clark was buried at Fort Smith, Arkansas. This story, however glorious, is contradicted by Jo Wilson and by Clark’s own father. Wilson states that, “owing to the rapid advance of the enemy, Clark’s body was left on the field and buried with the dead of both armies. Capt. Wright Schaumberg of Van Dorn’s staff was afterwards sent in with a flag, and brought the body to Van Buren, where it was buried with military honors.” Wilson did not specify who had last had hold of the body. His account agrees with that of Meriwether Lewis Clark, who would certainly be expected to recall the details of his own son’s death. Meriwether Lewis Clark was informed of the tragedy on March 30, 1862, and arrived in Little Rock that same day. His “Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark” states that Clark’s body was indeed captured on the field of battle on March 8, 1862. He was initially buried in a ditch at Elk Horn Tavern, by Federal troops on March 9, but the body was requested by flag of truce that same day, first by Wright C. Schaumberg, then again by Clay Taylor. The body was disinterred and reburred, by Clay Taylor. However, it was again disinterred by W. Moore of Fayetteville and moved to Van Buren. There Clark was buried with military honors on March 29, 1862, with Reverend W. J. Harrell officiating. The body was laid to rest in Major Ogden’s lot in the cemetery. His trunk and carpetbag were later found and delivered to his father, along with his Burnside Carbine No. 220, that he had apparently captured, a Colt Revolver Navy, No. 95935, and various papers. Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Dates &c. About S. Churchill Clark”; Tucker, “Clark,” 19; Minor, “Captain Clark’s Indian,” 9; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; O.R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 310-312; Winter, 15-17; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1; CWSS.} Farrington’s efforts drew
praise from Colonel Little, as did the initiative shown by James Farris,

who succeeded to the command of the battery after the fall of Clark, [and] behaved with much gallantry, succeeding in bringing off his guns without loss under a heavy fire from the enemy. Sergeant Nelson, of the same battery, was conspicuous for his coolness and courage in covering with his gun the movement of the battery when ordered to retire, keeping up a repeated fire on the enemy’s line until the last of the battery had limbered up and moved away.338

The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery made a narrow escape from the battlefield that day, as did the remainder of the Confederate batteries, but Van Dorn’s oversight was costly. A retreating Confederate infantryman, who stumbled across the location of Clark’s final stand mere minutes after the battery had pulled out, commented that the ghastly image of the cannoneers’ lifeless bodies was “the most horrible spectacle it was my lot to witness during the war.”339 Clark’s men were “lying across each other and mingled with dead horses, all scorched and burned black from the explosion of the ammunition wagon.”340 The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery had managed to vacate the field with its guns basically intact, and with the majority of its gunners still breathing, but the singular loss of the talented and courageous Clark was a solemn blow to both the battery and to the army, as a whole.341

The reaction of the army’s commanders to news of Clark’s death was one of universal sorrow and shock. When Sterling Price learned that an 18-pound rifle shell had decapitated the popular youth, he was grief-stricken, and choking back tears, exclaimed

339 Shea and Hess, 250.
340 Ibid., 250.
“My God! Is my boy dead?” \(^{342}\) Henry Little’s epitaph for this fearless and dashing young officer, cut down in his prime was the following:

Our exalted respect for [Benjamin A. Rives]. . . was second only to the deep affection with which we cherish the memory and virtues of that youthful martyr to the cause of liberty S. Churchill Clark; a child in simplicity and purity of character, a boy in years, but a soldier in spirit and a hero in action, his character at the age of nineteen years was obnoxious to no imputation of enemies or frivolities which, alas, but too frequently characterize youths who have not attained more than half his years. His life was useful to him only so far as it might be useful to his country, and to her liberation and the defense of her constitutional rights were all his energies consecrated. Had he lived, who can estimate the height of rank he would have attained and the elevation of the niche of fame in which a grateful people would have enshrined his memory? But mayhap it is better as Heaven ordained. He has passed away before corruption had beguiled his heart or the whisperings of malice detracted from his fair repute. Were it not a crime against God’s Providence our hearts would envy the rest of the silent but honored grave. \(^{343}\)

Clark had, indeed, been one of the best-liked officers in the army. “Everyone who knew him loved him, and his battery boys idolized him,” Little concluded. \(^{344}\) Perhaps the most outward sign of the exceptional regard for the fallen captain can be seen in the fact that the Van Dorn’s headquarters for the Army of the West during the month of May 1862 was named “Camp Churchill Clark,” in his honor. \(^{345}\)

The effectiveness and bravery of the 2\(^{nd}\) Missouri Light Artillery had been

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\(^{342}\) "King’s Historic Roll,” I.

\(^{343}\) O.R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 311. Van Dorn wrote “A noble boy, [S.] Churchill Clark, commanded a battery of artillery, and during the fierce artillery actions of the 7th and 8th was conspicuous for the daring and skill which he exhibited. He fell at the very close of the action.” O.R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 285. Sterling Price reiterated the sentiments of Van Dorn and Little, calling Clark an officer “of whom any nation might be proud.” He goes on to say, “Churchill Clark was, as Colonel Little justly observes in his report, ‘a child in simplicity and piety of character, a boy in years, but a soldier in spirit and a hero in action.’ [He] fell at the very close of the hard-fought battle, [and is] well-deserving the glowing praises which [his] immediate commander bestows upon [him].” O.R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 306.

\(^{344}\) W. L. Truman, “Battle of Elk Horn - Correction” Confederate Veteran, XII (January 1904), 28.

apparent to all throughout the two-day struggle. Clark’s battery was one of the first into the fray on both days, and it was the very last unit to relinquish its position. The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was without a doubt the most effective of all of the Confederate artillery on the field, being one of the few batteries returning fire at all on the second day. The fact that Hart’s ammunition was presented to Clark’s battery, above all others, speaks volumes to its skill and reputation. Nevertheless, the Battle of Pea Ridge had ended in a complete rout, with the defeated Confederate soldiers scattered over a huge distance. It took approximately two weeks for Van Dorn to reassemble the army. The casualties numbered around 2,000 for the Confederates, and 1,400 for the Union. Moreover, the Union forces had captured the field, and their victory was unquestionable and decisive.346

After the debacle had ended, Price’s troops were ordered to cross the Mississippi River, in order to help strengthen the Army of Tennessee. Many Missourians did so reluctantly. It was bad enough that they had been forced to abandon their home state, but to leave the Trans-Mississippi altogether seemed unthinkable. Nevertheless, with some prodding from Price, most soldiers headed, albeit reluctantly, toward Memphis with “Old Pap,” their trusted leader. The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery appears to have been somewhat exceptional, in that, by all accounts, the majority of its members enlisted in the Confederate States Army enthusiastically. In April 1862, they transferred into Green’s Brigade, Price-Little’s Division in the Army of the West, Department #2, where it remained until July. The battery had some seventy-one soldiers in its ranks from the time

346Ibid., Series I, Vol. XVII, pt. 1, 127; McPherson, 404-405; Castel, 82-83.
of the transfer through the Battle of Iuka.\textsuperscript{347}

The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was inspected at Des Arc Arkansas, on April 17, 1862, by Major Meriwether Lewis Clark, Artillery, and by Ordnance Commander, Captain William Clark Kennerly. The battery now consisted of two brass 12-pound howitzers, two brass 6-pounders, and one iron 6-pounder, along with carriages for each gun, six caissons and a traveling forge. They had apparently either abandoned or returned the sixth cannon and the battery wagon, which had been on loan from McCulloch. Their extra caisson had been blown up, probably on the second day of Pea Ridge. There were six horses to each gun.\textsuperscript{348}

After the tragic death of Clark, command of the battery fell to Captain Houston King. King was a newcomer to Missouri. He was born in Kentucky in the year 1837, and his family was also from that state. A resident of Lafayette County, he had been an overseer in 1860, though he was poor, and owned no land or slaves, himself. By the time of his enlistment King designated his occupation merely as that of a farmer. He left behind a wife and small child, a one-year old girl named Belle, to enlist in Price’s army at Sac River in 1861.\textsuperscript{349}

King was elected captain of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery at Memphis, in April 1862. The battery was then split into two sections. King’s section of the battery “served with Green’s brigade at Corinth, mostly on outpost duty.”\textsuperscript{350} Meanwhile, the other

\begin{footnotes}
\item[348]Meriwether Lewis Clark, “Memorandum of Guns.”
\end{footnotes}
section, operating under the command of Lieutenant James L. Farris, "was detailed to go on a scout with [Colonel] William H. ['"Red"'] Jackson's First Tennessee Cavalry through Northwest Tennessee, and rejoined the main army at Tupelo. [They] served with the 1st Missouri Brigade during the summer of 1862."\(^{351}\) The battery was engaged at Farmington, Mississippi, where the Confederate forces successfully repulsed the Union forces, but suffered serious losses.

The 2\(^{nd}\) Missouri Light Artillery also saw action at the Battle of Iuka, Mississippi, on September 19, 1862, where Price's men fended off a two-pronged Union assault by Major General Edward O.C. Ord and Major General William S. Rosecrans, under the overall command of Ulysses Grant.\(^{352}\) Price initially positioned his troops to guard against the threat from Ord, but upon learning of the advance of Rosecrans he sent Henry Little to meet the enemy head on, with two brigades. King's was the only battery of Confederate artillery to participate in the engagement that day. Still attached to Little's Brigade, and operating under Brigadier General Louis Hébert, it was split into two sections, one commanded by Lieutenant Farris, the other by Lieutenant Henry S. Johnston. Farris initially was initially ordered to move along New Road in the direction of Bay Springs and unlimber atop "an eminence commanding the ridges upon which the Federals were advancing."\(^{353}\) His men were temporarily forced back by Federal skirmishers, until infantry support could be brought in, but at that point they unlimbered and initiated "a heavy fire of canister and case shot . . . upon the advancing columns of

\(^{351}\) Ibid.

\(^{352}\) Ibid.; "King's Historic Roll," 1-4; Castel, 86, 97-104; Hewett, 38:354.

the enemy. The men worked at the pieces coolly and calmly, taking good aim, every shot producing a telling effect, the first discharge from one of the pieces, as we were informed by the prisoners, killing six men outright. 354 Johnston placed his own guns alongside the road, facing the fields to the right, and emptied case shot upon the Federal troops, who were disordered and fell back. 355

It soon became clear to all concerned that the opposing force was substantial, but before Little could reinforce his men he was mortally wounded, “within a few yards” 356 of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery’s position. Price assumed direct command of Little’s brigades and ordered a counterattack against Rosecrans’s forces. Once Price’s countercharge had been ordered, both of King’s batteries retired from the battle, their fields of vision being obscured by the advancing Confederates. Price’s charge succeeded in driving back the Federal lines and capturing nine Federal artillery pieces just as the sun was beginning to set. Three of King’s men were wounded in the fight, and six horses were casualties. 357 In his battle report, Price complimented the battery’s “willingness and its ability to sustain the reputation which it had gained under its former captain, the lamented young S. Churchill Clark.” 358 Convinced that their opponents could be routed the following day, Price had intended to press the advantage, but the desperate pleas of his subordinates, who foresaw the threat from Ord’s forces, convinced him to retire from

354 Ibid.


the field. Price’s men retreated to Baldwin, Mississippi, awaiting word from Van Dorn. Rosecrans learned of Price’s departure the next morning but was unable to overtake them.\textsuperscript{359}

The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was stationed at Lumpkin’s Mill from September until October 1862. During September the battery was assigned to Hébert’s Brigade, Hébert-Bowen’s Division, Price’s Corps, Army of West Tennessee. At the beginning of October, Hébert’s Brigade was moved to the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, and the artillerists transferred along with it. However, later that same month, they were reassigned to Green’s Brigade, Bowen’s Division, Price’s Corps, Army of West Tennessee, Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana.\textsuperscript{360}

The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery fought alongside Bob McCulloch’s Second Missouri Cavalry at the Battle of Corinth on October 3-4, 1862, and helped to cover the army’s retreat from that engagement. The battery also fought at Hatchie’s Bridge on October 5, 1862, under the leadership of Price. Following this, they marched to Grenada Mississippi, with the First Missouri Brigade, where they served on outpost duty on the Yallabusha River, near the town.\textsuperscript{361}

In December, Green’s Brigade transferred into the Army of North Mississippi, and it carried the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery along with it. On December 20, 1862, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was deployed with Van Dorn’s troops as he launched an

\textsuperscript{359}Castel, 86, 97-104.

\textsuperscript{360}Ibid., 86, 97-104; Sifkais, 73; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.

astoundingly successful cavalry raid against Holly Springs, Grant’s key supply base in his campaign to capture Vicksburg. The stunned and demoralized Federal forces surrendered almost without a fight. Van Dorn secured Grant’s stores of food, ordnance and other equipment for the Confederate army, in excess of $1.5 million worth of goods, and severed his supply lines. Simultaneous to this operation, Nathan Bedford Forrest was tearing up track and burning supplies at Jackson, Mississippi. These joint operations forced Grant to abort his advance upon Vicksburg. For his efforts, Van Dorn was promoted to Chief of Cavalry under Bragg. Thus, in January of 1863, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery joined Van Dorn’s newly organized Cavalry Corps in the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana.\(^{362}\)

In February 1863, when Price was transferred back to the Trans-Mississippi, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was sent to Okolona, Mississippi. Here it was trained as horse artillery, and, once more placed directly under Van Dorn’s cavalry command, which was destined for General Braxton Bragg’s Middle Tennessee operations. At this time, the battery was specifically assigned to Brigadier General William H. “Red” Jackson’s Division. The battery now possessed “two 12-pounder howitzers, confederate make, and two three-inch brass rifles, federal trophies; each carriage was drawn by eight horses [and the] cannoneers were all mounted and drilled to maneuver with cavalry.”\(^{363}\) The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery would remain a “flying battery,” permanently attached


\(^{363}\)\textit{History of Lafayette County}, 371-373.
to Jackson’s cavalry, at the divisional level, for virtually the duration of the Civil War. Consequently, the battery was often passed back and forth between Jackson’s brigade commanders, and was occasionally split into two independently operating sections.364

In late February, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery “marched with [Jackson’s] cavalry division to Tennessee, where [they] served on Gen. Bragg’s extreme left, mostly along the roads leading into Franklin and Nashville.”365 Over subsequent weeks, they saw repeated deployment between Franklin and Columbia, Tennessee, conducting raids and skirmishing with the enemy.366

On March 5, 1863, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery played an integral role in Van Dorn’s raid on another of Grant’s supply bases, Thompson’s Station, near Spring Hill, Tennessee. The forces engaged were about even, each numbering around 3,000 men. Colonel John Coburn initiated a failed assault against Van Dorn. In response, the Federal position was assaulted on three sides. While Forrest attacked the Union left and rear, Jackson’s dismounted 2nd Cavalry Division, alongside which the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was deployed simultaneously charged the Union forces’ hilltop position, and on the third attempt achieved a glorious victory. Along with the usual weaponry and ammunition, Van Dorn captured 1,221 prisoners, among which were seventy-three

364 Jackson was a West Point graduate and a former artillery officer who had been promoted earlier to a colonelcy in the 7th Tennessee Cavalry. His efforts at Holly Springs won him promotion in December to brigadier general. Castel, 127, 138-139; Wills, 104-21, 300; Daniel, 6; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4; Faust, 392; Sifakis, 73; Symonds, 69; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9, History of Lafayette County, 371-33; Bevier, 110-11, 125-68; O.R., Series I, Vol. LII, pt. II, 473; Hewett, 38:354; Crute, 206.

365 Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9

commissioned officers. In his official report of this engagement, Van Dorn complimented the battery’s “well directed fire,” which checked the Federal lines and inflicted numerous casualties, and praised its “particular courage,” to which he was a witness. Jackson was similarly impressed with their calm demeanor under fire and the accuracy of their shots. Jo Wilson wrote of the battery’s achievements at Thompson’s Station:

The fight lasted three or four hours, a portion of the time in a blinding snow storm. The enemy, being strongly posted on a wooded hill, repulsed our cavalry several times, although the attack was made great determination and bravery, our men being dismounted and fighting on foot. Just when it seemed as if we would have to retire and give up the field we heard the order, “Limber to the front!” “Cannoneers, mount!” “Forward, gallop, march!” And away we went, up the turnpike, through a shower of balls, right at the enemy’s line. When within 100 yards of the enemy, the guns were unlimbered and poured a destructive fire of cannister was poured into the dense mass of infantry, driving them back in some disorder. The advantage gained was quickly followed up, and the surrender of the entire force of federal infantry was the consequence. Their cavalry and artillery retreated towards Franklin. The loss on both sides was heavy. The officers and men of the battery were highly commended in the report of the battle.


The author of that article took notice that the cannonading of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was exceptionally strong.

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369 Ibid., Vol. XXIII, pt. I, 122-123.
370 Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9. Wilson’s account, with minor alterations, also appears in History of Lafayette County, 372.
On March 5, 1863, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery moved to the vicinity of Yazoo City, and on the 19\textsuperscript{th} the battery received a circular order that called for it to be inspected, and divested of spent horses and "unserviceable" soldiers.\textsuperscript{372} Although it is difficult to know whether any of King's men participated in Forrest's assault upon Brentwood, which occurred on March 24, 1863, given the route of march, the time-line, and the fact that Van Dorn's cavalry was acting in concert with Forrest's around this period, it is possible that one section could have aided Forrest in this fight and accompanied him during the pursuit of Colonel Abel D. Streight's raiders.\textsuperscript{373} Jo Wilson stated that over the course of the spring and summer months "we were almost constantly on the march, being engaged so frequently as to make it very difficult to mention each engagement. Several times we drove parties of federals into Franklin, and in turn sometimes they drove us back into Columbia, where we narrowly escaped being captured."\textsuperscript{374} However, he did not denote any particular engagements.

During this time, 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenant Henry S. Johnston commanded a section of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, which was sent with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Woodward's Kentucky cavalry regiment and Major R. M. White's Texas battalion on a scouting expedition to the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. The battery was engaged in the area for six weeks. Battling gunboats "at the mouth of the Duck river and near Clarksville," they "captured and destroyed a number of transports and a large quantity of


\textsuperscript{373}\textit{Wills, 106-107; "King's Historic Roll," 1-4.}

\textsuperscript{374}Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.
April 5, 1863, was a particularly bloody day. Johnston's section was locked in a vicious firefight against Federal gunboats in the Tennessee River. At one point during the encounter, one of their 12-pound howitzer cannons exploded from overloading, with devastating effect. Three of Johnston's gunners were killed, and another was wounded. A sixth could not be accounted for after the engagement. The clash with the Federal fleet continued over the next week. On April 10, 1863, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery battled with Elliot's boats. These operations resulted in the sinking of two gunboats and four armed transports. Six others were severely damaged, and 157 Union soldiers were killed. Many others were wounded or captured. The combined damages visited upon the Union fleet by Johnston's section and the accompanying units were in excess of $25,000. The Confederates suffered only nine casualties during these operations. Johnston received a commendation from Jackson for his courageous deportment. He was also singled out by Captain George Moorman, the Assistant Adjutant General, Second Division, Cavalry Corps, for the "highest praise," due to the "extraordinary skill and daring" which he had displayed during this engagement.\footnote{377}{Dead were Conrad McEntyre, Christopher C. Sleger, and Morgan L. Smith; missing was Willis Cox. Hiram Craig Wallace was wounded. 2nd Missouri Light Artillery Final Statements, ML 283, S 929, Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City; O.R., Series I, Vol. XXIII, pt. I, 122-123; Vol. LII, pt. II, 470-71; Wills, 104-21; "King's Historic Roll," 1-4; History of Lafayette County, 371-73; Bevier, 110-11; Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.}

On April 24, 1863, Forrest took Tuscumbia. Soon after, he was received word of
Van Dorn’s untimely demise at Spring Hill, which had occurred on May 7, 1863, at the hands of an irate man who had accused Van Dorn of an affair with his wife. As a result, Forrest assumed command and reorganized his troops into two divisions. One of these was placed under Jackson, who, as mentioned previously, had been operating under Van Dorn, and in concert with Nathan Bedford Forrest, up until that time.\textsuperscript{378} The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery remained under Jackson’s command, operating harmoniously with various cavalry brigades until February of 1865.\textsuperscript{379}

Jackson and the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery did not remain long under Forrest’s command. Almost immediately after Forrest’s reorganization, they were transferred to General Joseph E. Johnston’s army, in the Department of the West, which sought to raise Grant’s siege of Major General John C. Pemberton’s forces at Vicksburg. Rather than engage in pitched battles, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery operated largely on the sidelines, as was the usual lot of horse artillery. The battery was initially lent to Brigadier General John W. Whitfield, and on June 4, 1863, was stationed in the region of Canton, Mississippi. Later that month, a portion of the battery moved to Vernon, Mississippi, where part of the battery remained until June 21\textsuperscript{st}, 1863. However, Henry S. Johnston’s section was offered to Brigadier General Lawrence Sullivan Ross’s brigade on June 10,

\textsuperscript{378} Castel, 127; Wills, 104-21; Daniel, 6; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4; Faust, 392.

\textsuperscript{379} There is a caveat to this fact. At some point the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was split between Forrest’s divisions. As seen previously, it was only Johnston’s section, which operated on the Yazoo River in April 1863. Many of the references found in the Official Records over the succeeding months also refer only to particular sections of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery (e.g. “Johnston’s section,” “King’s Section,” etc.). The implication, of course, is that while one section was operating in the area referenced by the Official Records, another section was operating elsewhere. It is not known if the battery was ever again divided between divisions. Wills, 104-21; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4; History of Lafayette County, 371-73; Bevier, 110-11; O.R., Series I, Vol. LII, pt. II, 473; Wills, 300; Sifakis, 73; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Faust, 124.
1863, and accompanied them to an area southeast of the Big Black River, near the town of Bolton. Ross had been ordered to "guard and protect all the country between Coxe's and Baldwin's Ferry, on the Big Black."\textsuperscript{380} Ross was to prevent enemy scouts from reconnoitering east of the river. He was also commanded to oversee Confederate scouting operations in the region on Jackson's behalf, with orders to report the strength and positioning of enemy troops. To that end, Ross deployed Colonel Hinchie P. Mabry's brigade of cavalry to spy on the Union forces in the vicinity of the Big Black River. Johnston's section of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was temporarily attached to Mabry's command.\textsuperscript{381}

For the next two weeks, the battery "served under Jackson near Vicksburg, in [the] rear of Grant's army."\textsuperscript{382} It had not yet been officially assigned to a specific brigade commander, but merely fell under the auspices of Jackson's Cavalry Division, now situated in the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana. After the fall of Vicksburg, on July 4, 1863, the battery "assisted in covering the retreat of Gen. Joseph E. Johnson's army [toward] Jackson, Miss[issippi]."\textsuperscript{383} The artillerists were "closely pressed and frequently engaged during the retreat. [They came] [u]nder fire at Jackson, but [were] not engaged. [They] [s]couted with [the] cavalry in [the] rear of [the] federal army, cutting off trains, etc." during these operations.\textsuperscript{384} The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was moved


\textsuperscript{382}\textit{Wilson}, "Clark's Battery," 9.

\textsuperscript{383}\textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{384}\textit{Ibid}.; \textit{Crute}, 206; \textit{Sifakis}, 73.
back and forth between General Johnston’s lower echelon commands fairly regularly over the succeeding months. During July and August, the battery was attached to Brigadier General George Cosby’s 1st Brigade, but in September they were reassigned to Whitfield’s Brigade, where they remained for a month. The battery was reassigned three more times before the year’s end.\footnote{Sifakis, 73.}

At some point during the autumn of 1863, King’s unit was bolstered by the addition of twenty Arkansas artillerymen from the 1st Field Battery, Arkansas Artillery (McNalley’s Battery), and their 10-pound Parrot gun, which replaced the 12-pound howitzer previously destroyed on the Tennessee River. The original unit strength of McNally’s battery was ninety-four men, but, according to Wilson’s recollection, “the rest of this battery had been captured, and most of the men killed and wounded at Vicksburg.”\footnote{Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.} The Arkansans “proved a valuable addition” to the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery.\footnote{Sergeant Tucker, who may or may not have been from McNally’s battery, was the chief of the parrot gun. He was killed six months later, on June 19, 1864 near Marietta, Georgia, having been “cut nearly in two by a shell.” Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Lafayette County History, 371-373; Entry for Edward S. Violett in Military Service Records: King/Clark’s 2nd Battery Light Artillery, C.S.A.; CWSS: “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4.}

In October, the battery took part in Chalmers’ Raid. For this purpose, it was attached to Colonel John McGuirk’s 3rd Mississippi Cavalry. By November, they were once again operating with Brigadier General George Cosby’s 1st Brigade, under Jackson’s Division, in the Department of Mississippi, Alabama, and East Louisiana. Their commanding general at this time was Stephen D. Lee. Jackson’s men spent the
month of December guarding the Yazoo River country, the Mississippi Central Railroad, and the Big Black River Bridge across from Vicksburg. At some point in December, the battery was again reassigned, this time to Ross’s Brigade, within Lee’s Cavalry Corps, in the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana.\footnote{\textit{O.R.,} Series I, Vol. XXX, 763-64; Vol. XXXI, pt. III, 365-68; Vol. XXXI, pt. III, 746; Crute, 206; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4.}

In January of 1864, Johnston’s section of the battery, now situated in the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana,

\ldots served with Ross’ Texas brigade (formerly Whitfield’s) conveying a wagon train loaded with arms for the trans-Mississippi department. After crossing Sunflower river at Garvin’s Ferry it was found impossible to move the wagon. The arms were then taken on horseback, four or five guns being carried by each man, the drivers of the battery taking one each, and in this way they were carried to the Mississippi river near Gaines’ landing. [They] succeeded in putting about 2,000 muskets across the river in spite of federal gunboats and cavalry, which annoyed and harassed the command constantly.\footnote{\textit{Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,”} 9.}

Ross then headed back toward the Yazoo River, arriving in the area some time around February 3, 1864.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.; Sifakis, 73;“King’s Historic Roll,”} 1-4.}

In early February 1864, Major General William Tecumseh Sherman sent a force out from Vicksburg. As part of a joint operation with Brigadier General William Sooy Smith’s cavalry, he sought to destroy the Confederate lines of communications along the route to Meridian. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was split between two commands at this time. As indicated previously, Johnston’s section of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery had been detached from the rest of the battery and had been working in support of Ross. Thus, it fought separately from Captain Houston King’s section, which, in early February
was simultaneously operating under the direction of Brigadier General Wirt Adams.\footnote{O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXII, pt. I, 371-74.}

On February 3, 1864, Johnston’s section of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was situated near Liverpool, Mississippi, fighting Federal gunboats on the Yazoo River. Ross reported the artillery’s efforts to have been fairly successful, forcing several of the vessels to retire and preventing others from landing. However, as ammunition ran short and men and horses grew weary, its ultimate effectiveness was somewhat diminished.

Two days later, the battery was involved in a skirmish with Federal troops. Ross described the skirmish as follows:

[The enemy] had one brigade of infantry on the fleet and two regiments of infantry and Osband's negro cavalry on land at Mechanicsburg yesterday. Two of my regiments whipped the brigade and fleet, and the Third Texas kept the force advancing via Mechanicsburg in check and compelled them to retire late in the evening. The infantry brigade attempted to drive the Sixth and Ninth Texas from a high hill on top of which there was a depression forming natural breast-works. They were driven back twice. The Nineteenth [One hundred and ninth] and Eleventh Illinois Infantry came to the base of the hill, within 25 yards, when my men used their pistols and drove them back in great confusion, many of them throwing down their arms in their hasty retreat. Night and a gun-boat which lay in short range and watching and shelling us until dark prevented us from getting all the arms left on the field. Many, however, were saved. The Legion was engaged for a short time with the force that attempted to flank the portion of the Sixth and Ninth Texas, and behaved very creditably.\footnote{Ibid., Vol. XXXII, pt. II, 830.}

Jo Wilson described the battery’s specific involvement in this action:

... while Ross' brigade and the left section of our battery were going into camp on Benton Plank Road, near Yazoo city, they were charged by a force of negro [sic] cavalry being supported by white troops from gunboats on the Yazoo river. After two or three rounds of canisters were fired from one of the howitzers, which threw the negroes [sic] into confusion, the Sixth Texas and the "Legion" charged with sabres and pistols, turning the retreat into a rout.\footnote{Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.}
At some unspecified point, either during or following this skirmish, two soldiers from the 6th Regiment Cavalry, Texas Brigade were taken prisoner, and then summarily executed by Union soldiers under the command of Colonel Wood. This action would result in a reprisal against Federal black troops by Ross’s men, twenty-four days later.\textsuperscript{394}

Meanwhile, King’s section of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery became separately enmeshed in the Battle of Baker’s Creek, February 4-5, 1864, which constituted the first leg of Sherman’s Meridian expedition. Adams’ Cavalry Brigade had been on an expedition to East Louisiana, and had arrived back in Raymond, Mississippi, on January 28, 1864. He was immediately ordered to keep a watch on “all the ferries and approaches in the direction of Big Black [River], south of the railroad bridge, in anticipation of the expected advance of the enemy, and, in case he crossed, to advance and oppose him, offering all the resistance and at points as near the river as possible.”\textsuperscript{395} It was not long before Confederate scouts brought him news of Union troop manoeuvres in the area.

On the evening of February 3, 1864, Adams was informed that, “the enemy was crossing in force at the railroad bridge and advancing towards Bolton.”\textsuperscript{396} Sherman had left Vicksburg with a huge force of 23,519 soldiers, heading east towards Meridian. Adams and Colonel Peter Starks were the only Confederates in the area able to offer opposition. In response to the Federal movements, Adams gathered 800 horsemen and King’s rifled section of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, and pressed forward to intercept them. The following day, Adams harassed the Federal advance along the Bolton Road.


\textsuperscript{396}Ibid.
between Champion’s Hill and Jackson, but, being vastly outnumbered he was eventually forced to fall back toward the Baker’s Creek bridge on the Bolton and Clinton road. At the bridge crossing, Adams was assaulted on three sides as Federal troops descended on the Confederate position from the north, south, and west, two corps aiming to crush two brigades. Adams sent two companies of cavalry under Major William B. Bridges to hold off the Union cavalry assault from the south long enough so that the rear guard could be adequately deployed. Somehow the strategy worked and the Federal advance was delayed long enough for Adams’ to deploy Colonel John Griffith’s regiment of 11th and 17th Arkansas mounted infantry into the woods west of the bridge, supported by heavy shelling from King’s section of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery and Roberts’ battery. These units checked the encroaching Union lines, and enabled Adams to get his men across the creek, before nightfall.397

On February 5, Adams prepared to hinder the Federal crossing. He directed “Captain King to train his rifled pieces on the bridge over Baker’s Creek,”398 a mere 800 yards away. Griffith’s 11th Arkansas Mounted Infantry was situated to the right of the battery, and Major Thomas R. Stockdale’s 4th Mississippi Cavalry to the left. Both of these were dismounted, so that they could effectively support the artillery. Colonel Robert C. Wood Jr.’s Mississippi Regiment was also dismounted and held in reserve, along with Colonel Dumonteil’s 14th Confederate Cavalry, which was on horseback and


in column formation. As the Federal infantry began their crossing of the river, a barrage from King's section helped to turn back three regiments, albeit temporarily, and slowed the Federal advance there. In one instance, with a single shot King brought down two soldiers from the 32nd Ohio Infantry, one of whom lost a leg. Adams' troops put forth a valiant effort, and their determined musketry and artillery fire temporarily stalled the crossing. Despite this, the sheer numbers facing them eventually overwhelmed the stalwart band, for the ratio of Union to Confederate soldiers was almost fifteen-to-one.

When Major General James B. McPherson ordered that the 20-pound Parrot guns of the 15th Ohio Battery be brought into the fray, Adams' overpowered force was finally forced to withdraw. A similar rear guard action occurred at Clinton, where once again the Federal column was stalled by Adams' troops, but ultimately could not be halted. Nevertheless, Adams' Cavalry Brigade and the gunners from King's section of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery continued to assail Sherman's flanks and rear all along his route of march.\textsuperscript{399}

As Jo Wilson tells it,

From February 9 till March 4 we were moving rapidly with the cavalry, hovering on the flank of Sherman's raiding column, a force estimated at 30,000 men, with which he moved along the Southern railroad from Vicksburg to Meridian and back, laying waste the country and burning towns. The confederate force was too small to offer serious resistance, but could only harass [sic] him and keep his foraging parties from spreading too much over the country. We had several engagements with his rear guard, the most serious being at Sharon, Miss., near Canton, Sunday and Monday the 27th and 28th of February.\textsuperscript{400}


\textsuperscript{400}Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.
Sherman had captured Jackson on the evening of February 5, and Meridian on February 14, 1864. He razed both of these cities to the ground, before retracing his steps back to Vicksburg on February 20, 1864. The Meridian expedition constituted a dry run of the “total war” policies that Sherman would employ later, as he carved a swath of destruction through Georgia and the Carolinas.

On February 28, 1864, Johnston’s section of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was still operating in the Yazoo River region, once again situated on the Benton Plank Road. A skirmish, similar to that of February 4, 1864, occurred that day as the 1st Mississippi Cavalry, African Descent, under Major Cook, and possibly some soldiers from the 8th Louisiana Infantry, African Descent, charged the battery and the 6th and 9th Regiments Cavalry, Texas Brigade. The Confederate cavalry successfully repulsed the Union charge, then proceeded to hunt down and slaughter the retreating blacks, undoubtedly in a retaliatory measure for the murder of their own men earlier that month. Approximately seventy-five of the eighty men who comprised the unit were killed during the battle. Their lifeless bodies were strewn all the way along the ten-mile stretch of road leading to Yazoo City. In addition, at least six black soldiers were taken prisoner, tortured, and killed by men of the 6th Texas. The bodies of thirteen others who went missing after the skirmish were never recovered. In regard to this incident, Wilson acknowledged it, and commented unapologetically that: “The negroes did not ‘fight nobly’ and in the slaughter which ensued it is to be feared that their ‘rights’ as belligerents were not treated with that respect which is usually accorded in modern warfare.”

On March 5, 1864, Ross’s Brigade attacked Yazoo City. Johnston’s section of the

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2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was involved in the siege. On March 6, the Union army evacuated the town, and the Confederate forces entered. Jo Wilson commented that the appreciative citizens of the town “treated us with great hospitality, and seemed to consider us the deliverers of their city.”\footnote{Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.} During the remainder of the month, King’s battery, presumably reunited at some point, did not see much action. Wilson stated that, “From the 5\textsuperscript{th} of March to the 6\textsuperscript{th} of April [the men] lay in camp, or moved about by easy marches, resting and shoeing our jaded horses; remaining in the vicinity of Canton and Yazoo City.”\footnote{Ibid.; Sifakis, 73.}

On April 13, 1864, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was stationed at Columbus, Mississippi. Here, Lieutenant General Polk inspected Jackson’s cavalry division, at which time several horses were pressed into service for the battery’s use. However, these animals did not fare well over the course of the upcoming Atlanta campaign, and were soon worn out. At some point in April, possibly at the time of the inspection, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery left Ross’s Brigade and was assigned to Starke’s Brigade, Jackson’s Division, Lee’s Cavalry Corps, in the Department of Alabama. This was a brief transfer, however, as the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was shifted to the Artillery Battalion of Jackson’s Division, in the Army of Mississippi in May.\footnote{Ibid.: O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXII, pt. I, 323-30, 385-91; Vol. XXXII, pt. II, 830.; Vol. XXXII, pt. III, 876; O.R.N., Series I, Vol. XXVI, 15-17.}

After Polk’s review was complete, the battery moved to Tuscaloosa Alabama, where they remained from April 18 until May 5. Following this brief period of relative
inactivity, they traveled to Rome, Georgia, where, on May 15, the battery was involved in a clash against Sherman's cavalry. This skirmish marked the beginnings of the 2\(^{nd}\) Missouri Light Artillery's protracted involvement in the fight for Atlanta. Jackson's cavalry hooked up with the left flank of Johnston's Army of Tennessee two days later, in the midst of the battle of Adairsville. "Falling back towards Marietta, a skirmish [took] place at Kingston on the 18\(^{th}\), the battery taking part."\(^{405}\) The 2\(^{nd}\) Missouri Light Artillery formed "the extreme left of the army [and was] under fire every day and night. [They were] scarcely ever out of sight of Sherman's right wing, which he seem[ed] to be gradually spreading around [them]."\(^{406}\) Thus, the 2\(^{nd}\) Missouri Light Artillery had once again become engaged in opposing Sherman.

At this juncture, the 2\(^{nd}\) Missouri Light Artillery had been assigned to Captain John Waties' horse artillery battalion, in Jackson's Cavalry Division, in the Army of Mississippi, and operated as a rear guard unit, under the overall direction of Major General Joseph Wheeler, throughout the battles of New Hope Church (May 25), Pickett's Mill (May 26), Dallas (May 28), Marietta (June 9 to July 3) and Kennesaw Mountain (June 18-19). At Marietta, the battery was positioned near Lost Mountain and witnessed the death of General Polk, who on "June 14 . . . was killed . . . while reconnoitering from the outworks."\(^{407}\) At Kennesaw Mountain, on June 19, the battery was embroiled in "a severe engagement outside of the works, while the rain [was] pouring down heavily.

\(^{405}\) Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.

\(^{406}\) Ibid.

\(^{407}\) Ibid.
Sergt. Tucker of the Arkansas detachment was killed while serving his piece."406 Over the course of the summer, six additional casualties were suffered.409

The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery "was engaged in whole or in part on July 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 28, and on August 6, 8, 20, and 30."410 The function of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery at these engagements was basically diversionary in nature, namely to slow Sherman's advance toward Atlanta through skirmish operations, and to foil the enemy's cavalry in their attempts to target the Confederate supply lines. Civil War horse artillery was ideally suited to these kinds of operations, due to its mobility and firepower.411

In July, Jackson's Cavalry Division and the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, officially joined the Army of Tennessee. From July to August, the battery continued to operate on its left flank, from the vicinity of Bear Creek Station, Georgia. On July 3 the battery was present as Johnston pulled back from Kennesaw Mountain and Marietta. The artillerymen observed "new levies of Georgia militia 'Jo Brown's pets' under fire for the first time" that day, and were impressed with their conduct.412 On July 5 the battery crossed the Chattahoochie River and encamped on its left bank. Union pickets were posted on the

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406 Ibid.

409 It is not known whether the battery participated directly in Hood's attack at Kolb's Farm. Ibid.; Hewett, 38:355; Daniel, 146.

410 These dates would imply that the battery fought at almost every engagement during the Atlanta Campaign. They did not, however, fight at Ezra Church or Dalton II, since they were fighting with Jackson's Cavalry elsewhere on both occasions; during the first battle, they were chasing down a Federal raiding party, and during the second battle, they were engaged at Lovejoy Station. Hewett, 38:355.; John B. Hood, "The Defense of Atlanta," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. Ned Bradford (Reprint, New York: The Fairfax Press, 1988), 519-20.


412 Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.
other side and the men took advantage of their close proximity to arrange a brief, unauthorized truce, in order to trade sorghum for some tobacco and take a swim in the river. On July 13, “after a forced march of thirty miles at night, the left section engaged [George] Stoneman’s Cavalry at Moore’s Bridge and drove them back in confusion. The battery, in various points, for two weeks in July, assisted in guarding the fords in the Chattahoochee River from Sandtown to Campbelltown.” On July 18 one section of King’s battery embarked on an eighty-mile forced march in pursuit of the “Opelocha Raiders.” On July 20, just before the battle of Peachtree Creek, General Johnston was relieved of command and replaced by John Bell Hood. The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was apparently present for this engagement and the Battle of Atlanta on July 22. On July 27, Joseph Wheeler was dispatched to chase down the Federal Cavalry that was threatening Hood’s right flank. Meanwhile, Jackson had been ordered to set out the following day, and stave off the efforts of the Federal Cavalry to Hood’s left, as they attempted to destroy the army’s only remaining line of supply and communication to Atlanta, which ran along Macon & Western Railroad. The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery accompanied Jackson on these blocking maneuvers. They pursued the Federals toward Jonesborough. On July 29 a portion of the Federal cavalry entered into diversionary skirmishes with Hood’s main army in order to distract Jackson, thus permitting their main force to ride into their rear. They severed the telegraph lines at Fairburn and Palmetto, destroyed a Confederate wagon train, and then targeted the Macon & Western Railroad

413 Hewett, 38:354.

414 Wilson. “Clark’s Battery,” 9. Although Wilson called them the “Opelocha Raiders,” he was very likely referring a brigade operating under Major General Edward M. McCook.
four miles to the south of Jonesborough, tearing up one and a half miles of the track. Jackson was not fooled for long and his men quickly marched toward Fayetteville and Jonesborough, where they were met by General Lewis’s brigade. The Federal troops beat a hasty retreat as Jackson’s men gave chase, and the track was repaired. On July 30, at the town of Newnan, Jackson and Wheeler joined General Phillip Dale Roddy’s 4th Regiment, Alabama Cavalry. Their combined forces, numbering about 1,400 men, engaged and routed Brigadier General Edward M. McCook’s force of 3,600 cavalry at the Battle of Brown’s Creek, taking 2,000 Federal prisoners, and releasing 500 Confederate soldiers who had recently been taken captive at Fayetteville. Meanwhile, at Macon, Major General Howell Cobb and Brigadier General Alfred C. Iverson similarly thwarted Major General George Stoneman, who had been intending to capture Andersonville and release the 34,000 Federal prisoners housed inside. After this clash, Wheeler was dispatched northward to Tennessee, to operate in concert with Forrest against Sherman’s supply lines. Jackson, however, returned to Atlanta, where on July 29 Wilson observed the “enemy throw[ing] rockets into Atlanta, setting fire to houses.”

The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was not involved in the Battle of Ezra Church (July 28) with Lee, since they were involved in Jackson’s Cavalry independent operations concurrent to that event. It is not clear if the battery was at the battle Utoy Creek (August 5-7), owing to the fact that Wilson did not comment upon the engagement, specifically. It is clear that in early August the battery spent a portion of its time “in the trenches

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415Ibid.; Hewett, 38:354; Sifakis, 74; Hood, 519-20; Shelby The Civil War: A Narrative, 3: 350.

[surrounding Atlanta] with the infantry."\textsuperscript{417} This was a relatively brief interlude, however, and from August 18 to 21 the battery was once again mobile, accompanying Jackson’s cavalry on another blocking movement against a Federal raiding party. At Lovejoy’s Station, they encountered Brigadier General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick’s Cavalry, which was once again targeting the Macon & Western Railroad, south of Atlanta, with the purpose of tearing up the tracks. Wilson described the clash:

After a continuous march of twenty-four hours, without halting to feed or rest, we surrounded them near Lovejoy, where an obstinate and severe engagement took place. One of the enemy’s guns burst, killing and wounding several of their men. Forming his command in columns of fours, with the Fourth regulars in the advance, he forced our line where the Texas brigade was posted, making his way back to Sherman’s main army, after a heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners.\textsuperscript{418}

Having helped repel Kilpatrick’s raiders, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery traveled 100 miles back to its previous position at East Point, on the far left of the long line of Confederate entrenchments, which stretched down from Atlanta. They saw further action at Jonesborough on August 31 alongside Hardee’s Corps, and later helped to cover its retreat back toward Atlanta on September 1. They encountered “heavy firing along the line” from Sherman’s forces, who seemed “disposed to crowd [them].”\textsuperscript{419} The following day, King’s battery was involved in another skirmish with Kilpatrick’s cavalry at the Flint River, and forced them back. Hood’s army abandoned Atlanta that evening and Sherman’s forces occupied it the next morning. “Since the 18\textsuperscript{th} of May,” the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery had been “almost constantly in the presence of the enemy, a part of the

\textsuperscript{417}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{418}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{419}Ibid.
time in the trenches with infantry, but mostly outside and on the flanks. They had acquitted themselves well during the extended campaign.

From September 3 until October 20, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was involved in “guarding fords on the Chattahoochee river, protecting wagon trains, skirmishing with federal foraging parties,” and other tasks of that nature. In late October, Hood launched a diversionary invasion of Tennessee in the hope that this would draw Sherman north, relieving some of the pressure on Georgia and Alabama. Jackson moved to Tuscumbia, Alabama with his 2,000-man cavalry force. Forrest caught up to Hood in November, after completing a series of raids in the area of Nashville and Johnsonville. Forrest would function as Hood’s advance guard at the Battle of Franklin.

Around this time, Houston King was promoted to the rank of colonel and transferred back to the Trans-Mississippi Department. Command of the battery was placed in the capable hands of James L. Farris on November 18, 1864, while the battery was stationed at Crawfordsville, Mississippi. The new commander was a second generation Kentuckian and the second child of nine who were born to his father’s household. In 1856, Farris immigrated to Millville, in Ray County, Missouri, where he became a schoolteacher. He wed Amanda Tinsdale three years later. In 1861, Farris had joined Reeves’ regiment, and fought as a member of the Missouri State Guard until the

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420 Ibid.

421 Hewett states that only one section of the battery went to Lovejoy’s Station on August 19, accompanying Armstrong’s Brigade, but this cannot be confirmed. The battery’s presence at Lovejoy’s Station precludes its participation in Dalton II. Hewett, 38; 354 Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Foote, 3: 520-30; Daniel, 146-66; Faust, 27-30, 392, 450, 565-66; Sifakis, 72-74; Hood, 519-24.

422 Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.

423 Faust, 285-86, 392.
winter of 1861-1862. At that point, he transferred into the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, where he served as first lieutenant until King’s transfer in late 1864. With their new captain at the helm, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was now placed in the Artillery Battalion of Jackson’s Division, Forrest’s Cavalry Corps in the Army of Tennessee.\footnote{Although “King’s Historic Roll” presents this event as having occurred in October, Jo Wilson states that Farris’ promotion fell on November 18, 1864, at Crawfordsville, Mississippi. Bevier agrees that Farris’ promotion happened in November 1864. Farris’ promotion is therefore assumed to have occurred on the date provided by Wilson. \textit{O.R.}, Series I, Vol. XLV, pt. 1, 863, 865, 870; Crute, 206; Bevier, 110-111: \textit{Portrait and Biographical Record}, 569-70; Loeb and Shoemaker, 84; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9; Sifakis, 74.}

While at Crawfordsville, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was issued fresh harness and new weaponry. The battery then moved to Florence, where the forces of Forrest and Hood were assembling. Joseph Boyce, an infantry captain in the 1st Missouri Brigade, crossed the Tennessee River at Florence on November 20, 1864. His men were weary and miserable, but their mood immediately brightened when they met Forrest’s command.

Boyce recalled:

\begin{quote}
Among his troopers we saw our old friends of the famous 2nd Missouri Cavalry, Col. Bob and King’s 2nd Missouri Battery. This was a splendid company of flying artillery, well equipped and drilled to perfection, commanded by Captain Faris [sic] and J. Russell Dougherty. Most of its members were from St. Charles, Mo.\footnote{This statement appears to be inaccurate, given the statistical information found. See: Chapter 4 Statistical Analysis of the Soldiers of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery.} These two commands represented Missouri with Forrest’s Cavalry during most of the war and always bore Missouri’s banner in the front of the conflict with the enemy.\footnote{Captain Joseph Boyce, “Missourians in the Battle of Franklin,” \textit{Confederate Veteran} XXIV (March 1916): 102.}
\end{quote}

Ten days later, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery arrived at Forrest’s headquarters in Verona, Mississippi.\footnote{Bevier states that the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was sent away to be refitted in Mobile, after which, it was reattached to Forrest’s command, and thence re-united with Hood’s “shattered” army. This}
King’s unit, as a whole, was not directly involved in the disastrous Battle of Franklin, during which eighteen of Hood’s brigades were decimated in a direct frontal assault against entrenched Union positions surrounding the town. However, “Lieut. Johnson, Sergts. Black, Francisco, and five or six others were, at their own request, detailed from the battery and went to Tennessee as aids, scouts, etc., taking part in the battle of Franklin, as well as other engagements.” The remainder of the battery seems to have remained with Jackson’s command, which had instead been ordered to demonstrate in the region of Murfreesboro. The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery helped to form part of the rear guard on the Army of Tennessee’s retreat toward Alabama. This operation met with a high degree of success. The Union proved incapable of breaching the Confederate lines, and when the venture was halted in late December, Forrest’s men had taken twelve pieces of Federal artillery and a large number of prisoners.  

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contrasts with Wilson’s claim that the battery was serviced at Crawfordville, Mississippi. There is the possibility that Crawfordville was only a partial refit, and that further equipment and horses had to be provided elsewhere, in order to restore it to its full capabilities. Boyce, 102-103, 138; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4; Bevier, 110-111; Crute, 206; Faust, 284-286; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.


429It does not seem entirely logical that the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was brought up to Verona, in preparation for operations in the vicinity of Franklin, and then sent away almost simultaneously to the commencement of the campaign. The battery remained under Forrest’s control until December 8, 1864, before its hiatus. Wilson’s article seems to imply that the battery did not participate at the Battle of Franklin aside from a few volunteers, and, indeed, their date of arrival in Verona (November 30) would seem to preclude their participation in that fight. However, other sources have placed it with Jackson’s Cavalry near Murfreesboro, where a battle was fought from December 5-7, 1864, and have listed the Franklin-Nashville Campaign among its record of battles and campaigns fought. The fact that the battery was not sent south to Mobile until December 8, 1864, at which point the battle in the Murfreesboro area had already been decided, might suggest some form of participation in this engagement. It is quite possible that the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery may have been involved in Jackson’s operations in the vicinity of Murfreesboro just after the battle of Franklin, and that it may have helped with the first leg of Forrest’s defense of the Confederate rear guard. On the other hand, it may have merely been those men who had volunteered for duty, who were involved in these operations. Neither situation has been proved definitively. This paper takes the middle ground, and assumes that Wilson was correct, and that the battery, as a whole, did not participate directly at any of the battles leading up to and including Franklin, but that it was involved in Jackson’s demonstrations at Murfreesboro, after which it was dispatched to Mobile. Boyce, 102-103, 138; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4; Bevier, 110-111; Crute, 206; Faust, 284-286; Sifakis, 74.
On December 8, 1864, the cannons of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, along with sixty of Farris’s gunners and all of the officers, were shipped along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to its terminus in Mobile, Alabama, “leaving the stock, wagons, and forty-five men, mostly drivers, under the command of the first sergeant, with the “cold deck” or wagon train of the Texas brigade.” On December 12, 1864 Brigadier General Dabney H. Maury requested that the battery be sent back north from Mobile to Bucatunna, Mississippi, in case of a Federal attack.

The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was being carried north by rail when it became involved in a series of skirmishes with Brigadier General Benjamin Grierson’s cavalry. This Federal unit had been sent out from Memphis December 21 to tear up the tracks of the Mobile and Ohio Railway. The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, for its part, had been sent to Mobile two weeks previously, possibly for further refitting. Its guns had now been loaded atop platform cars and the battery was being taken to Macon, and Egypt Station, en route to Corinth. It was then December 26 and the Union forces had already razed Okolona, destroyed the track, and immobilized the trains in that vicinity. Their next target would be the train carrying the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery. As Wilson described it, “Christmas festivities were inaugurated by a federal cavalry force...”riding a road” down the M. & O. R. R., runding [sic] into Verona, capturing part of our baggage and burning some wagons and stores; [the] “cold deck” and “cavyard” move rapidly towards Columbus.”

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captured some of the rolling stock. The result could have been far worse but for the astuteness of Sergeant Hiram Warriner Campbell. On his command, the guns were quickly unloaded and brought into position. The battery commenced firing "with such rapidity and precision that the [enemy fell] back and allowed the train to draw out."433 This was a small victory, however, and a second engagement was not far off.434

On December 28, Jo Wilson recalled that,

While passing through Aberdeen [the members of the battery] heard cannonading near Egypt Station and, taking a squad of twelve or fifteen men, as many as could get arms and serviceable horses, we started towards the scene of action as independent volunteer scouts. [We] [a]rrived at Egypt just at the close of an engagement between the federal cavalry and a mixed crowd, hastily collected from our hospitals and wagon-trains reinforced by citizens. A portion of the battery was brought up from Columbus or Meridian and did good service firing from flat-cars. After tearing up a part of the railroad track, the enemy moved towards Canton. Brig.-Gen. Gohlson [sic] of Mississippi was severely wounded.435

After skirmishing intermittently with the Confederate infantry and Farris's men for two days, Grierson left Egypt Station on December 28, with Major General Samuel Gholson's entire Confederate cavalry brigade following closely on their heels. The Confederate troops tried to continue the pursuit the following day but were unable to catch up. The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery rejoined Forrest's command at Columbus, Mississippi.436

On January 12, 1865, the battery was still in camp at Columbus, Mississippi, "where the remnants of [H]ood's army seem[ed] to be collecting after the disastrous

433“King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4.


436Gholson’s men had been scouting the enemy position, but being entirely bereft of ammunition, they quickly fell captive to Grierson’s Federal forces. O.R., Series I, Vol. XLV, pt. I, 861, 863, 865, 870;
Tennessee campaign." Wilson observed that, "The men look[ed] worn and ragged. Some of them [had] marched barefoot from Franklin." Here, Farris's men were reunited with the half-dozen or so artillerymen from their battery who had voluntarily accompanied the army on the Franklin-Nashville campaign. From January 19 to 30, the battery was stationed at Verona, with Forrest's army, and received some pay, which they quickly and happily gambled away. "Twelve men [from the battery] were granted furloughs from February 1 for sixty and ninety days. From this time to the surrender but little occurred to break the monotony of camp life."  

On January 24, 1865, Nathan Bedford Forrest was made the commander of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana. The following month he reorganized his command, consolidating units based on their point of origin. In connection with this order, "Red" Jackson was to command the troops from Texas, and the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was on February 16, 1865, placed under the charge of Forrest himself. The battery would conclude its service as part of the [Sub-]District of South Mississippi and East Louisiana, District of Mississippi and East Mississippi, Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana. In parting, their old commander delivered the following circular address to the men of the King's 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, a unit that had served him faithfully for two and a half years: 

Circular Address to the Members of King's Battery.

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"King's Historic Roll," 1-4; Bevier, 110-11.

\(^{437}\) Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.

\(^{438}\) Ibid.

\(^{439}\) Ibid.
Headquarters Jackson's Cavalry Division
Verona, Miss., February 16, 1865.
SOLDIERS: In parting with you I take this occasion to express my approbation of your past services and my regret that necessities of the late reorganization are to sever our association. During our long connection in the field and camp you have given to me as your commander the hearty cooperation and support so essential to discipline and good order. The promptness of the officers and the alacrity and cheerfulness of the men to obey all orders in courtesy and pleasantness, and the patient endurance of all under hardships, and their distinguished gallantry on every battle-field has ever characterized you and will speak well for you in the new sphere in which you are called to operate. In bidding you good-bye, accept my wishes for your success and the belief that, as you have ever proven to be one of the best companies in the service, you will continue so to act as to reflect credit alike upon yourselves and your old commander.
W. H. Jackson, Brigadier-General.\textsuperscript{440}

These words reflect the same sentiments that were voiced over, and over again, in the reports of all of the commanders with which the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery had occasion to connect, as well as the regular soldiers who knew its members. The words of Jackson verify the outstanding abilities of the men of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery.\textsuperscript{441}

For the last few months of the war, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery once again operated under Forrest as horse artillery, assisting in the last-ditch effort to thwart Brigadier General James Harrison Wilson's cavalry raid into Alabama. With the Federal capture of Selma, Forrest made intimations toward surrender to Major General Edward R. S. Canby. The members of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery were despondent over "the news from Virginia, and elsewhere," which "convinced [several of them] that the days of the confederacy were numbered."\textsuperscript{442} However, "some of the stout-hearted still clung to the idea with which [they] started out that success must ultimately crown [their]\textsuperscript{443}


\textsuperscript{441}Wills, 300.

\textsuperscript{442}Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.
This tenacity was reflected in the group's extreme reaction to the attempt by their commander to inaugurate the laying down of arms. Wilson described the dramatic events:

While in camp at Gainesville, Ala., with Forrest's division of cavalry, April – 1865, Gen. Denny of Canby's staff, accompanied by a small escort, came up from Mobile by railroad, and the terms of the surrender were arranged. Our company at first showed signs of mutiny, attempting to seize the guns and outfit and start for Mexico. This plot failing, they run [sic] the guns out on the bank of the Alabama river with the intention of throwing them in; in fact, the ammunition was nearly all thrown in the river, when Forrest placed a guard around the camp and quieted the malcontents.\textsuperscript{444}

In order to achieve calm, the mutinous artillerymen were "by General Forrest, placed under arrest until the surrender was consummated."\textsuperscript{445} Wilson believed that "this incident...show[ed] the spirit which animated the men, even at the closing hour of the great drama in which [they] were actors."\textsuperscript{446} Forrest surrendered his command on May 9, 1865. Farris' men were detained as Federal prisoners at Gainesville, Alabama, though they would be paroled forthwith.\textsuperscript{447}

After four long, arduous years of service, the men of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery headed home. Wilson estimated that at that time "There were eighty or more

\textsuperscript{443}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{444}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{445}Bevier, 111.

\textsuperscript{446}Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9.

\textsuperscript{447}Sifakis lists the surrender as having occurred on May 4, 1865. This would correspond with the battery being with Lieutenant General Richard Taylor at the time. However, Wilson remarks that the battery was with Forrest at Gainesville at the time of the battery's surrender. Hewett confirms this. As noted above, Forrest surrendered on May 9, 1865. The conflicting dates suggest that the battery may have been split at the time of its surrender. Wilson, "Clark's Battery," 9; Sifakis, 74; Wills, 314-317, 421 n. 60; Hewett, 38:354; Confederate Organizations, Officers and Posts 1861-1865 Missouri Units, (Springfield: Ozarks Genealogical Society, 1988), 54.
men in the battery, and perhaps 150 head of stock. Each man secured one or two horses or mules to get home with. But for this many would have suffered, being so far from home, without money, in a country utterly impoverished by war.” Despite an obvious desire to return to their homes, Wilson observed that the occasion was bittersweet for the soldiers:

The breaking up of our little band was like the parting of a family. The collapse of the confederacy was a stunning blow, and with heavy hearts and some tearful eyes we separated into squads of from two to six and took various routes homewards; some taking up their abode with friends they had found in the South; some striking out at once for their homes in “Old Pike,” from which many of us had not heard since our enlistment in 1861.  

R.S. Bevier considered the members of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery to be “[T]he best blood of Missouri; and their gallantry, uniform good conduct and intelligence rendered them favorites with the Southern people and with every command with which they came in contact.”  

Jo Wilson summed up the deeds of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery as follows:

In a little less that four years the battery marched over 9,000 miles, travelled [sic] by rail and steamer about 1,200, took part in over sixty engagements and fired about 15,000 rounds of ammunition . . . . The company was composed of the best material Missouri could furnish, being mainly from the first volunteers.

Their uniform good conduct in the presence of the enemy, their constant fortitude and cheerful, soldierly bearing under increasing hardship, caused them to be warmly welcomed by every body of troops to which they were attached.

The Texas and Mississippi cavalry as well as our general officers, were always proud of “The Battery.”

To belong to it was a sure passport to the hospitality of the Southern people and the confidence of Southern soldiers. To have served with it during the war is as sure guarantee of a good “war record.”

\footnote{Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.}

\footnote{Bevier, 110-111.}

\footnote{Wilson, “Clark’s Battery,” 9.}
Indeed, their war record speaks for itself. This highly esteemed unit was well deserving of the praise, which was lavished upon it by its superiors, concerning everything from the accuracy of its fire to the deportment of its men. The members of the “boy battery” were exceedingly loyal, brave, and devoted to its cause. The unit was so well trained and highly skilled that half way through its service it was equipped as horse artillery, regularly being used in rear-guard actions to cover the retreats of the armies to which it was attached. Its officers were universally admired and its record of service was unblemished. After the war the names of at least two men who had served in the battery were submitted for consideration to “receive crosses of honor from the United Daughters of the Confederacy.”451 In every way, the members of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were a remarkable band of soldiers.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The soldiers of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery truly represented a cross section of Missouri. Theirs was not a homogenous band of soldiers, made up entirely of men from one town, or even one county. Instead, it was a diverse collection of men, residents of thirty-two different counties, natives of fifteen different states. There were, in fact, almost as many officers who had been born in Kentucky in this unit as had been born in Missouri. In fact, when the numbers for Kentucky and Tennessee are combined, the men born in these states actually outnumber the native-born Missourians. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery also contained men from Canada, England, Ireland and Germany, as well as one man from the Choctaw Nation. This ethnic diversity is reflective of Missouri’s heritage as a frontier state. The battery grew even more eclectic when McNalley’s Arkansans were added to its ranks. Though most of the soldiers were from the Boonslick region of Missouri, they were not exclusively from that area.

Clark’s men were not especially wealthy, though there were a few rich men in its ranks. Likewise, the majority did not own slaves, though there were some who did, and two who owned over ten. The vast majority of the farmers did not tend to own huge tracts of arable land, nor did they cultivate cash crops on a large scale. Rather, the focus was on livestock production or subsistence level agriculture. Most were lower middle class or
middle-middle class yeoman, while a substantial number were poor whites. There were very few men who could be classified as wealthy.

Despite these facts, however, the men of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery did have a much higher percentage of slave-ownership (32.79%) than residents within the state (2.28%), as a whole. This may be partially due to the fact that the residency of most of Clark’s soldiers was centered along the Missouri River, in the Boonslick region, a prime agricultural area. The percentage of slaveholders in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was also appreciably higher than was average on a county-to-county basis, with the highest percentage (7.96%) being found in Howard County. In this sense, then, the number of slaveholders within the battery is at least partially significant. The results of the study agree, at least in part, with Douglas Hale, that slaveholders were well represented in Civil War units, due to them having a vested interest in the preservation of slavery as an institution. Almost certainly, Captain Houston King, who was once an overseer, would have been prone to this view.

However, the men of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery differ from Hale’s Texans, in that most of the members of Clark’s battery who did own slaves owned them in very small numbers. Moreover, the vast majority of men in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery (67.21%) did not own any slaves at all. Thus, while the number of slaveholders within the battery was certainly larger than what might have been expected, slaveholders were not present in overwhelming numbers, and none owned sufficient slaves to be considered to be part of the planter class. This would seem to lend some credence to the notion that the poor and middle classes performed much of the fighting during the Civil War. Oddly enough, though, this fact appears not to have negatively affected the devotion of the men
of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery to the Southern cause.

The occupations held by the men of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery were also for the most part mainstream, and measured up fairly evenly with what might have been expected, when compared with the division of occupations inside Missouri in 1860, being mostly comprised of farmers. There did seem to be an over-representation of mechanics (7.77\%) in the battery, however, which was undoubtedly to its benefit, where repairs and maintenance of the guns was concerned. The presence of several other tradesmen, including a blacksmith, carpenters, and a wagon maker, would also have been blessing for any artillery battery, as would any man who possessed specific knowledge of animal handling, such as the stage driver, or even some of the farmers, especially those who raised horses, asses or mules. The civil engineer would also have been a boon to the unit, due to his mathematical skills, and the river pilot, for his familiarity with waterways, and local geography. It would be interesting to know, for certain, if any of these men were actively sought out for their skills, or whether they were, perhaps by the character of their occupations, naturally drawn to the artillery service.

Students were also over-represented in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery, which was extremely well educated, with 3.88\% of the soldiers listing "student" as their occupation. In addition, Clark had been a cadet at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, thus providing an additional 0.97\%. When figures for school attendance, prior to enlistment, were examined in greater detail, it was further revealed that 33.87\% of those soldiers found on the census had attended school in 1860. By comparison, in 1870 only two percent of the nation’s young people had graduated from high school. In total, a full 14.56\% of Clark’s men were drawn from among the “educated” professions. These
included the aforementioned students, army cadet, and civil engineer, as well as several clerks, a lawyer, a schoolteacher, a man of letters, a preacher, a physician, and a surgeon. Within Missouri, as a whole, the “educated professions” accounted for only 3.21% of the total occupations in 1860. The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was therefore a select unit in more ways than one.

Military experience was lacking in the battery, as a whole. However, the presence of Clark more than made up for the deficit of battle-hardened warriors or West Point graduates. In the person of this charismatic, enthusiastic nineteen year old, the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was blessed with one of the most talented artillery captains in the Trans-Mississippi, and perhaps the Confederacy. His skill and ingenuity were aptly demonstrated at Lexington in the assault on the Masonic College. The accuracy of his fire was unsurpassed. It is extremely telling that among all of the well-trained artillerymen present, it was Clark who downed the American flag that fluttered above the Union fortress. It was the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, which received the excess ammunition from Hart’s Arkansas battery at Pea Ridge. Moreover, it Clark whom Price called upon when the critical hour drew near.

Clark’s well-honed skills were reflected in the proficiency of the battery that he personally recruited and trained. His battlefield prowess and utter fearlessness made an indelible impression upon everyone who had occasion to witness it. In merely six months, Clark was able to impart his own talents to his subordinates, and instill in them an enduring sense of determination and discipline. Clark’s death at Pea Ridge was a tragic loss for the unit. Nevertheless, his early influence remained tangible. The battery gained an immediate reputation for excellence, and was well regarded by all of its
commanders.

Military rank within the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, interestingly enough, was not conferred based on wealth or status. Although Clark was certainly well known, it was his talent and his military training rather than the favor of higher-ups, either in Richmond or Missouri, which procured him the Captaincy of the battery. It was due to his proven skill in battle that he was rewarded with additional guns. When Clark died command fell to Houston King, a man of little means. Nevertheless, he proved himself to the point where he gained a promotion, and was transferred back west of the Mississippi. When King left, James Farris, a schoolteacher who was unlikely to be wealthy, was promoted to the captaincy. Skill was the decisive factor behind the election of officers. Some of the richest men in the battery never rose above the rank of private, and one wealthy soldier was eventually discharged because of his age.

The 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was unusual, in that it was a particularly young unit. This is reflected in the fact that over half of the men were childless, unmarried, and still living at home with their parents and siblings. One-third of the soldiers were still attending school in 1860, and almost one-fifth of the soldiers were under-age when they joined the army. The majority would not have been able to vote in the 1860 election. It is possible that Clark was more willing, as a young commander, to recruit young soldiers. Conversely, the soldiers, themselves might have been more attracted to the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, and more willing to follow him for the same reason. Then again, Clark’s magnetic enthusiasm might have been enough to attract soldiers to his command, regardless of age.

The characteristics of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery raise interesting questions
about the motivations of the men who served in its ranks. The regions in which they lived had overwhelmingly supported Bell and Douglas in the 1860 Presidential election. Were these soldiers political moderates, as their fathers appear to have been, or were they of a more radical bent? In the absence of specific data, one can only assume that many of the soldiers probably reflected the basic political views of their parents at the outset of the Civil War. However, youth tends to carry with it a more fervent ideology. Clark certainly saw fewer shades of gray than did his father. Did the influence of a southern lineage make some of them fiercer proponents of the States Rights philosophy? How much of their reason for enlisting was based merely on youthful exuberance and a desire for adventure and glory, and how long could this have been sustained? Certainly any sense of immortality that they might have felt initially would have been irreparably shattered after Clark’s sudden and violent death on the battlefield of Pea Ridge.

If it is assumed that many of these men were initially in favor of compromise between the states, and that they joined the Missouri State Guard largely because of the “Lyon” factor, and a desire to protect their homes and the sovereignty of their state, the question then becomes: why did they join the Confederate service and why did they remain loyal until the very end of the war? It was fairly clear, as early as 1862, that Missouri was a lost cause. Yet the vast majority of Clark’s soldiers remained with their unit to the bitter end. They followed Sterling Price across the Mississippi River, when others did not. One might postulate that they did so because they felt a sense of personal loyalty to their leader, but the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery fought under three different captains and under many different commands. Why remain in service after Price had been transferred back to the Trans-Mississippi theatre? What kept these men committed
to their cause after four years of empty stomachs, inadequate clothing, illness, homesickness, and constant exposure to the horrors of war?

Strangely enough, war weariness and demoralization seems to have been startlingly absent from the battery. Confirmed desertions from the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were extremely rare, when contrasted with the rest of the Confederate army, especially during the last two years of the war. Battlefield trauma may have affected some of the deserters, although this cannot be verified absolutely. Most of the deserters were under the age of twenty, however, and the concomitant lack of maturity, which tends to accompany youth, may be partially to blame for their eventual desertion. Despite this pattern, however, the majority of the young soldiers in the battery remained loyal to the cause until the very end of the war.

As a whole, the unit displayed an uncommon degree of devotion; so much so that their order and discipline received special mention by General William H. Jackson, in his parting address to the artillermen. These men not only willingly transferred east of the Mississippi, but they continued to fight with dedication after the Battle of Franklin, at which half a dozen had voluntarily served. The normally disciplined and calm group grew irate and insubordinate when Forrest spoke of surrender. How many other Civil War units would try to head for Mexico, rather than submit? How many would cast their guns into the river in protest, at the mere mention of capitulation? How many had to be placed under arrest before they could be made to yield?

Perhaps Clark’s men grew more entrenched in their beliefs as the war progressed. This certainly seems to have been the case, but why? Perhaps their youth made them impressionable. Perhaps their opinions concerning the war grew polarized under the
influence of firebrand commanders, such as Nathan Bedford Forrest and Lawrence Sullivan Ross. Could it instead have been the fervent idealism, working in combination with the charm and charisma, of young Samuel Churchill Clark, himself, that swayed their views? Many of the soldiers in the battery were similar in age to their captain, and were probably somewhat impressionable. Could his opinions have shaped those of his underlings? Could the fact that Clark’s family owned slaves have influenced the opinions of the men serving under him? Likewise, could the traumatic memory of his horrific and shocking death have banded Clark’s subordinates together, with the fervent intent of “doing ‘Churchy’ proud,” and, if so, how long would this brand of personal loyalty have sustained them, under such harsh conditions? Would the fact that Clark’s successor, Houston King, was once an overseer, presumably with a vested interest in maintaining slavery as an institution, have counted for anything? And what of the thirty percent within the battery who owned slaves? It is impossible to gauge the extent to which these individuals might have held sway in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery.

Naturally, there also exists the possibility that the increasing regularity with which the Missourians engaged black regiments in combat might have had a role in their willingness to fight so far from home, for so many years. And, what of the execution of black prisoners by the 6th Texas Cavalry while the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery was under Ross’s command? Jo Wilson justified the action, arguing that the blacks did not “behave nobly.” Was he speaking for the other members of his battery, in this assessment? Did negative experiences, in fighting black soldiers, solidify their resistance toward the idea of post-war black emancipation, and by extension, to the notion of surrender? Perhaps, the blatantly racist attitudes of some of their comrades helped to shape the artillerymen’s
own views. Perhaps not. Whatever the case, this last question is a particularly intriguing one.

The simple fact that the men of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery had suffered through so many trials and tribulations together may have helped to invest them more closely in working towards a positive outcome to the war. Certainly they had developed a sense of Confederate nationalism by 1865. Conversely, could the fact that this unit was so far removed from its home state have dissuaded mass desertions? It is possible that the men perceived the odds of returning to Missouri successfully, to be unfavorable, given the lengthy distances involved. On the other hand, one known deserter did not travel home to Missouri, but instead stayed in Mississippi. Surely this suggests that daunting notions of the journey homeward would not have dissuaded the truly desperate. No steadfast conclusions in either direction can be drawn, due to the paucity of evidence.

The composite soldier who enlisted in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was in some ways characteristic of what one might expect of a southern unit, but in other ways quite different. Unfortunately, a study of this nature raises far more questions than it can possibly hope to answer. Embarking upon this type of socio-military research is akin to lighting a candle in a very dark room. It can shed light upon some areas, but cannot hope to be comprehensive. Speculation can only pose possibilities. Without further research to uncover new evidence, it is impossible to make vast or sweeping generalizations, or to conclude whether the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery was truly a “typical” artillery battery, or even a “typical” Missouri State Guard artillery battery. Deeper investigation is vital if these mysteries are to be solved.
EPILOGUE

After the war, the soldiers of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery went back to their everyday lives. There were 115 confirmed survivors. Of these, thirty-one provided post-war information on their occupations. There were twelve farmers (38.7%), including Minoah Beamer, who relocated to Saline County. Corporal Thomas Lyons and Sergeant P.M. Black both became planters (6.45%), the former in Yazoo County, Mississippi, and the latter in Memphis. Corporal John Russell Dougherty was a merchant after the war, as was Private Andrew Francisco (6.45%). Each of the other occupations was only represented singly (3.2% each). Sergeant William B. Jennings moved to Bloomfield, Iowa, to become a railroad agent. Lieutenant William Brown became an officer in the St. Louis Metropolitan Police force. Richard Inge relocated to Shelby, Tennessee, where he resumed his pre-war work as a preacher. This is not entirely surprising, as he had deserted at Grenada, Mississippi, in November of 1862 and was consequently demoted in rank from sergeant to private. Presumably, this occurrence may have dissuaded him from returning to Missouri. There was additionally one carpenter, one insurance agent, one painter, one miller, one city marshal, one furniture dealer, one photographer, one printer, one teacher and one teamster. Jo Wilson, the author of several articles on Civil War units, became a banker immediately after the war, but in 1885 moved to Lexington, Missouri, where he took a job as a civil engineer. James Farris went on to practice law in
Richmond, Missouri, and was elected prosecuting attorney in 1872. He later held political office as a Democrat and served as one of that party’s representatives to the 1875 State Constitutional Convention.\textsuperscript{452}

Information on post-bellum residency was available for ninety-two soldiers. The vast majority, sixty-nine (75\%) returned to Missouri after the war. Another seven (7.61\%) settled in Mississippi, the area in which most of their time had been spent over the past four years. Six went to Arkansas (6.52\%) and four to Tennessee (4.35\%). The states of Louisiana, Iowa, Texas, and New York each received one soldier, as did the Indian Territory. Interestingly enough, Captain Houston King returned to Kentucky, the land of his birth. These areas each received 1.09\% of the soldiers.\textsuperscript{453}

Statistics on marriage and child rearing were found for 21 soldiers. After the war, seventeen (80.9\%) of these soldiers were married. Three men, Jacob Hicks, Jason W. James and Richard Inge (14.2\%), were still single and one, James C. Slater (4.7\%), was apparently widowed. Jo Wilson commented that five or six soldiers had married women that they met while in service in the south. Of the eighteen soldiers that were married or widowed, children were found in fourteen instances (77.7\%). Three men (16.6\%) had no

\textsuperscript{452}Bevier lists 110 survivors (assuming that Shookley and Shockley are the same person). Another soldier, Rich M. Robertson, is found on the 1880 Federal Population Census, but not in Bevier. It has been assumed that he and Marion Richardson are two different people. The History of Lafayette County lists four other survivors not mentioned in Bevier’s appendix: Jo Wilson, Allen Coleman, John C. Campbell and Wesley Smith. This makes 115 confirmed survivors in 1865. However, by 1881 at least five of these soldiers had died. Aaron R. Levering and James Rollins died some time after the census was taken in 1880. Three other soldiers, Sgt. John C. Campbell, Allen Coleman, and Joseph D. Marquis died “after the war,” but no dates could be gleaned. Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census, Free Schedules; Missouri 1860 Federal Population Census, Slave Schedules; Missouri 1860 Census, Agricultural Schedules; 1880 Federal Population Census [on C.D. Rom], Springfield-Greene County Library, Springfield; Bevier, “Appendix,” 1-27; History of Lafayette County, 371-373; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4; Portrait and Biographical Record, 569-570; Wilson, “Clark’s Battery;” 9; Loeb and Shoemaker, 84.

\textsuperscript{453}Bevier, “Appendix,” 1-27; “King’s Historic Roll,” 1-4; History of Lafayette County, 371-73; 1880 Federal Population Census [on C.D. Rom]
children living with them.\textsuperscript{454}

The casualties within the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery were quite low, numbering only eleven dead,\textsuperscript{455} seven wounded, two missing and eight captured, for a grand total of twenty-eight (13.15%).\textsuperscript{456} The percentage of casualties in both the Union Army and the Confederate Army were comparably higher. Over the course of the war, the Union army contained 2.5 million soldiers. Of these, 390,000 perished outright, either during battle, as a result of their wounds, or from diseases, while another 280,000 were injured. One in four Union soldiers was a war casualty. In the Confederate army, the odds of survival were even worse, standing at one in three, the highest casualty rate of any American war to date. Altogether, 680,000 soldiers died, a number that translates into a full 4\% of the total number of men residing in the continental United States at that time.\textsuperscript{457} This statistic includes those killed or incapacitated by disease, as does the corresponding statistic for the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Missouri Light Artillery.

It is not unreasonable to assume that casualty rates would likely have been smaller in most artillery batteries than in the infantry, but separate statistics for each division of


\textsuperscript{455}Richard Piggott, listed as killed at Van Buren, is listed among the survivors in Bevier’s appendix. Thus, the confirmed number of dead for the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery is eleven, rather than twelve. Bevier, “Appendix,” 1-27.

\textsuperscript{456}This percentage is derived from the total unit strength of 213 men. If Wilson’s figure of 150 men is used, the percentage increases to 16%.

the Confederate States Army are not currently available. Nevertheless, the statistics for the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery still seem particularly low. Three presumed casualties in the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery are known to have survived the Civil war. Thirteen deserters from the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery were confirmed survivors of the war.458

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Appendix: The Organization of the Missouri State Guard Artillery.

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<tr>
<th>First Division (Brigadier General Nathaniel W. Watkins)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battery A - Captain Drake McDowell</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant, Captain John T. O'Connor</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, Captain Samuel Standhope Harris, M.D.</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, Captain John G. Montgomery</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, Captain Benjamin Lee Bowman</td>
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<td>Third Lieutenant, Captain John Godfrey</td>
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<td>Battery B - (Richardson Artillery) - Captain L.G. Richardson</td>
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<td>First Lieutenant, W. J. Bilhinghoff</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, W. S. Smith</td>
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<td>Third Lieutenant, J. M. Harwood</td>
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<td>Battery C - Captain Robert McDonald</td>
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<td>First Lieutenant, J. H. Williams</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, Captain James Taylor</td>
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<td>Battery D - (Booth Artillery) - Captain Benjamin Lee Bowman</td>
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<td>First Lieutenant, Captain John O. Sorrell</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, Captain John C. Bryson</td>
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<td>Third Lieutenant, Captain John W. Watkins</td>
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<td>Battery E - (Price Artillery) - Captain Benjamin Lee Bowman</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, W. S. Smith</td>
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<td>Third Lieutenant, J. M. Harwood</td>
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<td>Marion (County) Artillery - Captain William T. Davis</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, Captain J. W. Davis</td>
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<td>Battery F - (Bolivar Artillery) - Captain Benjamin Lee Bowman</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, Captain John C. Bryson</td>
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<td>Battery G - (Polk Artillery) - Captain Benjamin Lee Bowman</td>
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<td>Third Lieutenant, J. M. Harwood</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third Division (Brigadier General John Bullock Clark, Sr.)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Artillery Battery - Captain Samuel McDowell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant, Captain John T. Davis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third Lieutenant, Captain John G. Montgomery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battery A - Captain Samuel G. Farrington</td>
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<td>First Lieutenant, Captain Richard C. Walsh</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, Captain John Keaney</td>
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<td>Third Lieutenant, Captain James C. Barnett</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battery B - Captain William Brown</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant, Lawrence Murphy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant, John G. Brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C - (Tull Artillery) - Captain Francis M. Tull</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant, Captain James C. Barnett</td>
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<tr>
<th>Fourth Division (Brigadier General William Turrent) Slack</th>
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<tr>
<td>Clark's Light Artillery Battery - Captain Samuel Churchill Clark</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant, James L. Harris</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, John E. Brown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third Lieutenant, Captain John W. Watkins</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battery B - (Booth Artillery) - Captain Benjamin Lee Bowman</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant, W. J. Bilhinghoff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant, W. S. Smith</td>
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<td>Third Lieutenant, J. M. Harwood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battery C - Captain Robert McDonald</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant, J. H. Williams</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant, Captain James Taylor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third Lieutenant, Captain L. A. Card</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battery D - (Booth Artillery) - Captain Benjamin Lee Bowman</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, W. S. Smith</td>
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<td>Third Lieutenant, J. M. Harwood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battery E - (Price Artillery) - Captain Benjamin Lee Bowman</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, W. S. Smith</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battery F - (Bolivar Artillery) - Captain Benjamin Lee Bowman</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, W. S. Smith</td>
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<th>Sixth Division (Brigadier General Moses Monroe Parsons)</th>
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<tr>
<td>First Artillery Battery - Captain Henry Guibor</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant, William P. Dukes</td>
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<td>Acting Captain, John T. Bailey</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, Jonathan Harris</td>
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<td>Battery B - (Polk Artillery) - Captain Benjamin Lee Bowman</td>
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<td>First Lieutenant, W. J. Bilhinghoff</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, W. S. Smith</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant, Lawrence Murphy</td>
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<th>Eighth Division (Brigadier General James L. Rank)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clark's Light Artillery Battery - Captain Samuel Churchill Clark</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant, James L. Harris</td>
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<tr>
<th>Independence Artillery Battery - Captain George</th>
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<td>First Lieutenant, Captain John T. Davis</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant, Captain John G. Montgomery</td>
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<th>Ninth Division (Brigadier General Meriwether Lewis Clark)</th>
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<tr>
<td>McDowell's Light Artillery Battery - Captain Drake McDowell</td>
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Note: This appendix comprises all of the artillery companies that were ever organized for service in the Missouri State Guard, including their officers, as outlined in Peterson. These companies did not all materialize on the same day, but were organized gradually. Some (e.g. Guibor's battery, Bleesoe's battery, etc.) were involved in the fighting at the various battles discussed in this paper, but others never saw active service. A few were completely disbanded, or reorganized under preceding Missouri State Guard artillery commands. Thus, by definition, there is some repetition of names and units. Names placed inside square brackets are my own speculations.

Note: Some of the brigadiers generally listed declined or resigned their commissions, and all were replaced at one time or another, for various reasons. For the sake of brevity, I have listed only those who were initially offered commissions by Governor Jackson, according to Peterson.