Critical Pedagogy and the Ethics of Care: How Values Affect the Classroom Dynamic

Colby D. Reed
Missouri State University, Colby119@live.missouristate.edu

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CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AND THE ETHICS OF CARE: HOW VALUES AFFECT THE
CLASSROOM DYNAMIC

A Master’s Thesis
Presented to
The Graduate College of
Missouri State University

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Writing

By
Colby David Reed
December 2018
CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AND THE ETHICS OF CARE: HOW VALUES AFFECT THE CLASSROOM DYNAMIC

English

Missouri State University, December 2018

Master of Writing

Colby David Reed

ABSTRACT

This thesis centers on the benefits of Paulo Freire’s critical and liberatory pedagogy for introductory composition classes when used as an ethical and moral template as opposed to a sociological ideology. Using care ethics as a lens, chapter one begins by addressing current difficulties and criticisms present in the discussion of care ethics and the pedagogy as the models for composition classes and then applying the ethics of critical and liberatory pedagogy to these issues. Chapter two builds on that by exploring what ethical and moral elements are present in Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed and how they relate to the present state of care ethics, specifically the commonalty of beneficence and value of individual freedom. Chapter three will demonstrate the functional utility of critical pedagogy in the classroom and chapter four will give a full conclusion. The research that is the core of the thesis leads to the conclusion that a moral view based on the ideals necessitated by critical and liberatory pedagogy has an immensely beneficial effect of the classroom dynamic, promoting true learning and academic discourse.

KEYWORDS: Critical and liberatory pedagogy, care ethic, justice, liberation, moral, ethic, world view.
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Approved:
Margaret Weaver, Ph.D., Thesis Committee Chair
Lanette Cadle, Ph.D., Committee Member
James Baumlin, Ph.D., Committee Member
Julie Masterson, Ph.D., Dean of the Graduate College

In the interest of academic freedom and the principle of free speech, approval of this thesis indicates the format is acceptable and meets the academic criteria for the discipline as determined by the faculty that constitute the thesis committee. The content and views expressed in this thesis are those of the student-scholar and are not endorsed by Missouri State University, its Graduate College, or its employees.
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I dedicate this thesis to my family and friends who have given me their encouragement and support.
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In the recent past, scholars have attempted to apply the critical and liberatory pedagogy outlined by Paulo Freire in his work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* to the American composition classroom. This pedagogy is a method of teaching that focuses on helping students develop skills of critical analysis and social awareness, so that they might actively influence the society around them for the better. While Freire had established working principles and goals for empowering students with literacy, current conversations and studies of the composition classroom have turned away from pursuing the benefits of these pedagogies. This is largely because the pedagogy is based on certain social ideologies that are considered to be irrelevant to the American classroom. Freire developed this pedagogy for oppressed adult students in a social structure very different from the democratic United States. Students who do not feel that they are oppressed or have no desire to rebel against the social structure they live in may not see the need to use a pedagogy that teaches literacy for these purposes. Other theorists, such as Maxine Hairston, see the use of pedagogy with such ideologically charged elements as outside the professional purview of a composition teacher. They argue that to present ideological elements, like those of critical pedagogy, puts the students of introductory composition classes at risk to the unethical indoctrination (intentional or accidental) of the personal ideologies of the instructor or other class members. However, the utility of Paulo Freire’s pedagogy does not end outside the social structures in which it was created. When his pedagogy is read through the lens of care ethics, it reveals a moral framework that is relevant for today’s composition classroom.

Care ethics proposes that actions and responses of certain occupations should be based on care, rather than justice. In other words, ethics should focus on the question of how the
individual’s choices and actions affect the relational dynamics of interpersonal relationships that s/he is a part of. As Carol Gilligan explains, “the logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic of relationships, which contrasts with the formal logic of fairness that informs the justice approach” (73). To enact an ethics of care, certain personal values and morals must be embraced. Many of these are the same personal values and morals that inform Freire’s pedagogy.

By analyzing critical and liberatory pedagogy’s ethical elements, instead of becoming preoccupied with its social and ideological contexts, we see the relevance in modern composition classes. While Freire’s pedagogy was specifically designed to allow an under privileged proletariat to engage in a kind of guerilla warfare against an oppressive social system and regime, Freire had to appeal to certain universal moral and ethical values in order for his pedagogies to have any sort of real world relevance beyond hypothetical wishing. This is where the pedagogy remains relevant, even within a prosperous and democratic society like the United States. By studying how these elements function within the pedagogy and how the pedagogy uses these elements in comparison to the care ethic, we can understand how and why Freire’s contributions are crucial for today’s American composition classroom. Likewise, we can also study the negative effects that result from the corruption of those morals and the practical strategies that Freire gives in order to combat the oppressive impulses that come from the people around us and from ourselves.

This pedagogy also gives teachers a way to respond to the concerns and criticism surrounding the implementation of care ethics in the classroom. Many fear that care ethics may induce people into a kind of self-imposed slavery to others, to the detriment of themselves and the people the individual intends to care for. Common examples are the burned out teacher who
tries to give every student one on one attention, or the overly helpful tutor who tries to spare the students’ feelings and leads them by the hand through all their assignments. However, critical and liberatory pedagogy seems to adequately address these concerns, at least as they pertain to the composition classroom. Freire directly addresses the problem of the individual accepting a state of oppression. The primary goal of critical and liberatory pedagogy is to achieve and maintain liberty. According to Freire, the ability to care for another individual is something that can only come from a free individual. The oppressors, and the oppressed, can ultimately only care for themselves. Also, the effort to liberate the oppressed also means that the liberated become self-sufficient and mature. This directly addresses the concern that the care ethic leaves the caregiver either a self-sacrificing slave or a condescending salvationist while the care-recipent remains dependent on the teacher.

Also, many of the supposed dangers of care ethics are addressed by the critical reflection that is necessitated by critical and liberatory pedagogy. Many critics of the ethic of care suggest that there are certain situations where the caregiver would be forced into a choice between two harmful alternatives. Usually, teachers and critics perceive the choice as a question about the allotment of their time and resources, and whether they should let intelligent students remain stagnant or neglect a student who needs extra help to succeed in the class. However, these choices are not often limited to the false binary that the critics imply. Proper critical analysis often reveals that these choices may require a decision that, though as painful as the alternatives, is less harmful or more beneficial.

The first chapter will illuminate the reasons that Freire’s pedagogy has been largely excluded from the current studies and academic discussions of how to improve beginning composition classes and why it is still relevant to American composition classes as a system of
ethics. This will be accomplished primarily by highlighting the presence of moral and ethical elements within the ethic of care currently being studied that are reflected in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. The second chapter will provide an in-depth comparison of the ethical and moral elements within Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* and those within the seminal works on care ethics. This comparison will focus on how Freire explains and demonstrates the primary moral elements of his pedagogy, specifically how he defines the concepts of benevolence, trust, and humility, and how these elements are reflected and practically enacted in the current system of care ethics. The third chapter will demonstrate how the ethical elements of Freire’s pedagogy are at work in various practical strategies that composition teachers have implemented in their classrooms in order to counter ethnocentric elements within the classrooms. In this chapter the focus will be on why these changes in American composition classes are necessary and how they specifically address the challenge of student ethnocentrism.

Although the relevance and utility of critical and liberatory pedagogy as social ideology may be past (or at least very situational), the pedagogy has a great deal of potential concerning the question of ethics. Not only does it share, or rather foreshadow, the moral values of the current discussion on ethics, but it also gives answers to common criticisms of the current approach and practical strategies that can be implemented in current composition classrooms.
At the time of Paulo Freire’s formative years, Brazil was in the grip of the economic depression of the 1930s. Freire's father died during this time, and at this very early point in Freire’s life the social and economic elements of his country influenced his education. He learned how simple hunger could cripple his education and make him, and other members of the poorer classes, feel dehumanized. At times he was forced to steal food for his family and at one point he had to drop out of elementary school in order to help support his family. Kim Díaz writes that “It was through these hardships that Freire developed his unyielding sense of solidarity with the poor. From childhood on, Freire made a conscious commitment to work in order to improve the conditions of marginalized people” (Díaz). These struggles with hunger and poverty in his early life showed Freire the importance of education (especially how it is related to and influenced by poverty) and motivated him from a young age to try and help the poor classes through education.

Freire did manage to finish elementary school between Recife and Jaboatão and later attended Oswaldo Cruz secondary school in Recife, where the principal agreed to allow Freire to study at a reduced tuition. According to Díaz, “To reciprocate the favor, Freire began to teach Portuguese classes at Oswaldo Cruz in 1942. Freire then went on to study law at Recife's School of Law from 1943 to 1947” (Díaz).

Later, when he began working with the illiterate poor, he developed his views which focused heavily on empowerment through literacy. In 1947 Friere began to work at the government agency called the Serviço Social da Indústria (SESI) as an assistant in the Division of Public Relations, Education and Culture. Freire worked for SESI for 10 years. His experiences
during this time shaped his doctoral studies at the University of Recife and his dissertation, titled *Educacão e Actualidade Brasileira (Present-day Education in Brazil)*, which he completed in 1959. He wanted learners to understand their social problems and to discover themselves as creative agents. In 1961, the mayor of Recife, Miguel Arraes, asked Freire to help develop literacy programs to encourage literacy among the working class, foster a democratic climate, and preserve their Indigenous traditions, beliefs, and culture. Díaz notes that “It was during this time that Freire began to work with his cultural circles and found out just how pervasive the damage of the institution of slavery continued to be, even decades after slavery had been abolished” (Díaz). Eventually, Freire transferred the cultural circles from the city of Recife to the Cultural Extension Service (SEC) in the University of Recife. Freire and his team trained college students and others how to work with adult literacy learners from June of 1963 to March of 1964. Freire planned to reach as much of Brazil as he could by establishing more than 20,000 cultural circles around the country, hopefully teaching five million adult learners how to read and write in two years. This was especially poignant because at the time the laws of Brazil required citizens to be literate in order to vote in their presidential elections. If the poor could become literate enough to vote, then they too would have a voice in determining the direction their country took and they would have agency that had previously been denied to them.

However, on April 1, 1964 Freire’s fortunes would reverse. According to the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* “a military coup that was supported by the CIA overthrew the Goulart administration” (Díaz).

Freire was discharged from his position, and all of Freire’s teaching materials were confiscated. Freire was subjected to a series of interrogations and accused of being a communist. He spent 75 days in jail, where he began to write his first book *Educação como Practica da*
Liberdade (Education as the Practice of Freedom). The new military regime deemed Freire's literacy project as subversive and stopped the funding for the project. Freire and his family were exiled from Brazil from 1964 to 1980. They first lived in Bolivia, then in Chile, where Freire continued his literacy project with Chilean farmers (Díaz).

All these events shaped what Freire put into his theories: thoughts influenced by “existentialism, phenomenology, humanism, Marxism, and Christianity” (Kim Díaz) which all influenced the pedagogical model Freire describes in his book Pedagogy of the Oppressed. According to Díaz, Freire’s critics argue that “Although teachers in the U. S. A. have tried to work with Freire's pedagogical model, the U. S. A. context is too different from the one where Freire developed his ideas” (Díaz). Freire worked primarily with illiterate adults, while American schools work primarily with children, many of whom come from well off families. Freire observed the conditions of a country in economic depression, whereas the United States is considered one of the world superpowers. Because of this the benefits to be gained from the pedagogy have been largely omitted from the conversation. Donald Lazere notes in his essay “Back to Basics: A Force for Oppression or Liberation?” that there have been effective applications of Freire’s theories in the United States among the poor people recounted by teachers like Jonathan Kozol in Death at an Early Age and Ira Shor In Critical Teaching and Everyday Life. Lazere writes, “Where such applications run into trouble in the United States is with students who are neither poor nor ostensibly oppressed and alienated, or with students who are, but who have decided on pursuing upward mobility and integration rather than rebellion or separatism” (Lazere 130). However, immediately after this acknowledgement, Lazere maintains that Freire’s pedagogy is still useful for teaching students of most social classes in nearly every academic subject.
Another reason for this omission is that other theorists view the use of such ideologically laden pedagogies as an action outside the professional purview of a composition teacher. Freire’s pedagogy promotes a critical outlook of one’s society. As such, liberatory pedagogy is often defined as part of or promoting an ideology because it supposedly leads students to either associate themselves with the oppressed or as members of the exploitive or apathetic elite who rely on the maintenance of the status quo. The pedagogy is then associated with the ideology in opposition to the established one, and it also supposedly encourages students to take radical action in the exercise of this ideology. These theorists commonly give a few reasons for this position. One reason is a perceived ideological vulnerability in the students of a composition class. These theorists feel that the students are placed in a position of ideological susceptibility due to the nature of the power dynamic within the classroom. The teacher necessarily assumes a position of authority within their classroom. Margaret Weaver and James Baumlin quote these words from Jacques Lacan to express this reality: “Hence . . . the teacher, in order to be effective, to be a teacher at all, must fully assume the mantle of the subject supposed to know” (qtd. in Baumlin 78). Because the teacher is the one who is most trusted in the classroom, students accept what the teacher tells them. This difference in authority can influence students to accept ideologies that they would otherwise reject. For this reason, many teachers prefer to take the route outlined by Maxine Hairston. According to this school of thought, the students and teacher are aware of each other’s ideologies, but they do not need to navigate the differences between them or explore the points of conflict. This mandate not only comes from teachers who fear the danger of unethical ideological influence within the academic structure but also from the governing political and social forces outside academic intuitions. Examples of these forces would be law and government officials that interpret school and state regulations (such as
regulations related to the division of church and state), the related yet unspoken assumption that teachers are prohibited from sharing personal ideological beliefs in class, and the economic forces that influence both the financial resources of a school and the prospective job market for the students.

What Hairston would have teachers focus on is the students’ own writing. This is a stance in line with the school of expressionism. She argues that the focus should be taken away from ideological topics that the teacher may try to present, and it should be given to helping the students develop their own views and styles. This effort should be free of the influences that would necessarily be felt if the authority figure in the classroom presents a point of view. According to Hairston teachers of Composition should “focus…on the experiences of our students. *They* are our greatest multicultural resources, one that is authentic, rich, and truly diverse…Real diversity emerges from the students themselves and flourishes in a collaborative classroom in which they work together to develop their ideas and test them out on each other” (190-1). Theorists who argue against ideological discussion in the manner of Hairston may simply believe that students at this point in their education do not have the experience to properly evaluate ideological elements outside their own life experiences, or to make choices about them. So these theorists argue that to use pedagogy with such ideological elements, any ideological elements, would be an unethical and risky decision.

There is a strong sense that this is the judgement that most institutions currently accept, or it is forced on them through economic pressure from governments, business, and regulations from the state. These elements are the source of expectations placed on the teachers. Linda McNeil writes in a response to Henry Giroux’s "Pedagogy, Pessimism, and the Politics of Conformity" that many teachers of a wide range of ideological, political, and personal
commitments expressed institutional survival in this day of lowered expectations of schooling as
the dominant fear in their choice of content and instructional methods (394). This means that for
many teachers this fear is the main concern which influences their choice of class material and
their methods of teaching, not the needs of the students. Where some teachers would choose to
open ideological discussions in classrooms, to the benefit of their students’ critical reasoning and
dialogue skills, they end up deciding not to do this because it could mean displeasing the various
authorities over them and possibly being removed from their teaching positions.

However, the choice to overlook ideology in classrooms also comes with its own share of
criticism. Many teachers who favor a critical or liberatory pedagogical structure in their
classrooms find that Hairston’s view is too timid to meaningfully engage the students’
uniqueness, the quality that is so prized by expressionists. John Trimbur wrote in his response to
Maxine Hairston’s article, which she " titled ‘Diversity, Ideology, and Teaching Writing’, that
“What comes across quite strikingly in Maxine's article is not only her defense of a "pure" and
"low-risk" classroom devoted to students' composing processes but, more tellingly, a fear of
differences…For Maxine, students are too "unsophisticated" and "uninformed," and besides the
teacher has "all the power” (249). Trimbur sees the students as capable and daring. These
students are able to address topics of ideology and politics and express their own views, even to
the point of possibly challenging their teacher.

Other teachers also responded to Hairston and expressed the conviction that the teacher
of a composition class would be able to use critical or liberatory pedagogy without forcing
ideology on the students. They went further to state that the best way to avoid the dogmatism that
Hairston feared was to be open about their personal ideologies, as opposed to hiding them.
Robert Wood writes “the best way to avoid the trappings of the ideological dogmatism that can
manifest itself in either the political left or the political right is to foreground our ideologies, to make them known first to ourselves, then to our students” (250). Likewise, William Rouster maintains that the use of critical pedagogies does not involve forcing ideologies on students but is an effort to bring awareness. He writes “we should not attempt to force our ideologies on our students, but, instead, we attempt to create a kind of cultural awareness in students that they may not have had before entering our classrooms” (253).

Thankfully, Linda McNeil writes that there are individual teachers who have given up on the school structure but remain determined that within their classroom, their students will explore controversy, will examine societal issues, will be required to think and compare and investigate the relation of their personal lives to patterns of oppression in the larger society (394). This demonstrates, in a way, the reality that the actual classroom experience (as opposed to what is planned by the teacher, expected by students, or mandated by the institution) is determined by the actual participants of it. How the teacher and the students choose to exchange and dialogue are what determines it.

However, there are still dangers to be avoided and considerations to be made in order to ensure the integrity of the classroom. The temptations for people to either passively submit to the demands of others or to impose their views on others is ever present. Robert Wood reminds us of Freire’s warning in his Pedagogy of Oppressed (Continuum Press, 1990) for teachers not to engage in ideological dogmatism with their students:

> It is not our role to speak to the people about our own view of the world, nor to attempt to impose that view on them, but rather to dialogue with people about their view and ours. We must realize that their view of the world, manifested variously in their action, reflects their situation in the world. Educational and political action which is not critically aware of this situation runs the risk either of "banking" or of preaching in the desert (qtd. in Wood 250).
This casts the current topic in a much simpler light and demonstrates the potency of critical and liberatory pedagogy. The problem is no longer choosing between a risk of exposing students to dogmatism (either from the teacher or other students) or a willful neglect of the students’ education. A teacher or student can hold certain ideas to be irrefutably true, but this does not automatically make him or her close-minded to the other’s view. Teachers and students can hold these ideas and still participate in true dialectic communication where both parties are able to accept the humanity of the other party and to respect the others’ points of view.

Freire does have an ideology. The pedagogy he developed does have an ideology behind it. However, Freire does not require people to accept this ideology blindly in order to learn or engage in dialogue. The pedagogy is more of a call to be critical of what we observe and to carefully reflect on it and come to our own conclusions. Then, we can take it further, should we choose to do so, and have open dialogue with the people around us. Freire’s pedagogy promotes an ideology of questioning. Questioning is perceived as the best way to cultivate awareness and analyze the true state of people’s conditions. Freire does not force this, however, to take up the ideology that is present in liberatory pedagogy is something that an individual must decide for her(Im)self with the advice that s/he make sure that s/he truly understand all the implications that come along with it. Sincerity and comprehension of belief is one aspect that Freire’s pedagogy and Ethics of Care (EOC) share. It is something that students are made aware of as an option or possible choice, not as a mandated requirement. Where the theorists who object to the mention of ideology in schools fear the student’s susceptibility to dogmatism, the pedagogy and EOC extend the students enough trust to allow them to either accept or reject as they choose. Indeed, the idea that teachers should with-hold such discussion, while it might seem like an act of benevolence, ignores the principles of trust and humility that EOC and Freire’s pedagogy use.
While theorists may seem to hold Freire’s pedagogy as little more than a historical legacy that gave us an appreciation for dialogue, we can see its ethical ‘bones’ being used in the EOC being discussed today. This quote from Freire gives us a quick list of some of the principles that he felt necessary for dialogue to succeed in the project of liberation: “Founding itself upon love, humility, and faith, dialogue becomes a horizontal relationship of which mutual trust between the dialoguers is the logical consequence” (72). So we have love (or benevolence), faith (or trust), and humility. These are the principles of care.

The link between care and liberation is one of the most compelling reasons to use ethics of care (EOC) as a lens to examine Freire’s pedagogy, and find the elements of the pedagogy that can strengthen the use of EOC in classrooms. Roger Bergman notes the link between caring and liberation in his analysis of Nel Noddings’ works. “Authentic human liberation and social justice, Noddings argues, can only be achieved by caring people in caring communities” (151). Efforts towards liberation and care are intrinsically linked. While Bergman states that liberation can only be achieved by people who care, Freire seems to suggest that only people engaged in the effort to be more fully human, or in the process of liberation, are capable of care. This relationship of mutual necessity can be clarified as we recognize the ethical principles that move within EOC.

Since the publishing of Gilligan’s A Difference Voice, EOC has become a focus of discussion. Many theorists and educators (such as Noddings, Carol Gilligan, Virginia Held, Michael Stole, and others) have advanced the current understanding of EOC. In addition, many theorists who argue the merit of EOC interpret the dynamic of teachers and students as a relationship. By viewing teaching through the lens of a relationship EOC removes focus from the dilemma of teachers figuring out how to use their inherent authority in classrooms and
focuses on the question of how teachers are to act in a caring manner within the (inherently unequal) teacher-student relationship that defines the classroom.

Another likely reason for the current interest in EOC is that it is considered to be a feminist theory. According to Sue Holbrook the field of Composition acquired certain structural characteristics during the time that English became a professional academic field (207). These characteristics of the field of Composition are the focus given to applying and imparting the knowledge of English, its status as a lower order of work earning lower pay, and a link to nurturing (204). Holbrook writes that “At present, furthermore, not only do women exist in greater proportion in Composition than in the university overall, but they are probably on the way to outnumbering the men” (208). Accordingly, Feminist theories on Composition and education have been resurging since the 1960’s. Maureen Sander-Staudt observes that “While early strains of care ethics can be detected in the writings of feminist philosophers such as Mary Wollstonecraft, Catherine and Harriet Beecher, and Charlotte Perkins, it was first most explicitly articulated by Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings in the early 1980s” (Sander-Staudt). While classic theories and pedagogies of education are still in use, many theorists turn to feminist thought in order to gain new perspective and review ideas and observations that were likely to have been overlooked before in order to gain new insights and possible solutions for current challenges in the field, such as raising the esteem and regard for the field itself as an profession and securing social and economic equality (Holbrook 211). In general, EOC is an element of a general movement of academics from a more reserved disposition to a more inclusive approach.

EOC is supposed to help a care-giver develop the maturity and self-sufficiency of a cared-for and, according to Gilligan, help the care-giver maintain proper self-care so that the teacher does not burn out or neglect h(is)er own wellbeing to provide care to others. Steve
Sherwood gives a good explanation of this danger: “For when altruism degrades into neurotic unselfishness, it can lead to student dependency and tutor burnout” (64). Teacher or tutor burnout refers to a point of mental and physical exhaustion where the teacher or tutor is subject to feelings of depression, chronic fatigue, negative self-concept and view of their work, and risks treating the students in dehumanizing ways (Sherwood 67). These dangers are especially poignant for teachers and students, as students must eventually be able to use skills and knowledge acquired in the class outside the presence and influence of the teacher. EOC acknowledges the existence (and necessity) of the hierarchal structure (pointed out by Lacan and other theorists) that is inherent in our understanding of the classroom. However, it does not allow students to remain trapped or dependent on this structure. Baumlin and Weaver point out that the teacher must actively break their students’ expectations of how the hierarchy of teacher and student functions. The teacher must encourage the students to become independent as opposed to waiting for h(is)er answers. They write in their article, “Clearly, then, the student’s development requires that the teacher break the transference—break with traditional pedagogy. Instead of saying to students, ‘Tell me your problems and I’ll work them out for you,’ the teacher encourages dialogue: ‘Talk your way through this one; how can we make it work for all of us?’” (83). The teacher-student relationship which uses EOC is supposed to change and move the students to a point where they are independent of the teacher and capable of their own thoughts, theories, ideologies, intellectual work, and maintaining their independence.

The reason for this focus on relationship may be due to the legacy of Freire and other theorists who stressed the importance of dialogue. Many theorists operate on the premise that the act of teaching is based on dialogue and communication, like any relationship. EOC maintains that certain relationships warrant, and at times require, partial or different treatment on the part
of the care-giver in order for the ethical self to be realized or enhanced. For example, a teacher’s time and energy will be allotted differently to help different students according to their individual requirements. While some teachers may choose to use an ethical system that is based on ‘fairness’ or impartiality, EOC allows teachers to ethically show special attention to the students who require it or benefit the most from it. This desire to do the best for each student demonstrates the first ethical principle of EOC, benevolence.

Benevolence is one of the most pervasive principles in EOC. This is because the act of caring is not something that is easily accomplished. It is difficult and often painful. According to Bergman, “Like a mother responding to the cry of her infant, we must receive the situation of the other as if it were our own. To do so requires emptying ourselves of attention to our own situation, at least for the moment, so as to make room to take in the existential condition of the other. For the moment, and whatever our situation, her need becomes our need” (Bergman 151). Benevolence creates care for the other, and results in acts of care focusing on the needs of the other. All this is necessary for the act of teaching. Bergman notes that benevolence must be an intentional choice on the part of the teacher; it is not something that can be demanded:

As a negative example, Noddings observes that ‘professors of education and school administrators cannot be sarcastic and dictatorial with teachers in the hope that coercion will make them care for students. ‘Such inauthenticity is also morally significant: ‘the likely outcome is that teachers will then turn attention protectively to themselves rather than lovingly to their students’ (Noddings, 1992, p. 22). Ethical ideals will be diminished all around. (154).

Noddings identifies four ways that teachers can demonstrate benevolence toward students: modelling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation. These four methods of nurturing reveal how EOC replicates some of the major tenets of Freire’s pedagogy. The modeling method
serves as an example of benevolence and generosity in practice. The teacher demonstrates care to the students by becoming the care-giver: “Thus we do not merely tell [our students] to care and give them texts to read on the subject; we demonstrate our caring in our relations with them” (Noddings qtd. in Bergman 154). At the start of this caring based relationship its nature is primarily one-directional. While the teacher may reasonably expect quick responses to this initial act of care (in this case presuming the capabilities of a student in a composition class), it is in no way guaranteed that the relationship will become an even exchange in the near future. However, the teacher (by nature of h(er)is professional choice and responsibilities) is still supposed to make the first demonstration of care.

The next means of nurturing listed by Nodding (dialogue) is probably, in a practical sense, the most important element of both EOC and Freire’s liberatory pedagogy. According to Noddings, dialogue is so essential to care that it is present in the other methods of nurturing as well as a method on its own. Freire similarly states, “dialogue becomes a horizontal relationship of which mutual trust between the dialoguers is the logical consequence” (72). As a method of nurturing, dialogue provides a clear demonstration of the moral principles of trust (or faith) and humility. Noddings explains, dialogue “suggests, rather, a nonselective form of attention that allows the other to establish a frame of reference and invite us to enter it. As dialogue unfolds, we participate in a mutual construction of the frame of reference, but this is always a sensitive task that involves total receptivity, reflection, invitation, assessment, revision, and further exploration” (231). While the principle of humility is not often explicitly listed as an element of EOC, the stress that Noddings and others place on receptivity, reflection, and the mutual construction of the frame of reference is a clear indication of the necessity for humility to be present in dialogue if it is to function as a method of nurturing an ethic of care. The persons
involved in dialogue cannot presume that they know the entirety of what the other will say. Each person must receive the communication from the other and reflect on how this communication enhances their dialogue. If one member of the dialogue presumes that s/he hold all that is necessary or beneficial in the exchange (an attitude reflecting arrogance and pride) then the dialogue breaks down to nothing more than a one-way ‘banking’ deposit of information, and no care will be demonstrated.

In the classroom, the teacher demonstrates communication with the goal of the students learning how to communicate and practicing communication for themselves. Thus, students are free to effectively care for others and become more fully human. Students will not understand care if they are not directly addressed by the teacher. As Freire demonstrates, the banking model of teaching which is devoid of meaningful dialogue objectifies and ignores the students out of arrogance, reducing them to mere objects and not recipients of care.

It is not surprising that the banking concept of education regards men as adaptable, manageable beings. The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less they develop the critical consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world as transformers of that world. The more completely they accept the passive role imposed on them, the more they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of reality deposited in them (Freire 54).

The necessary result of the banking system is that the students are reduced to passive things that are fixed in their state of dependency. The teacher’s humility, which results from benevolence and reflection, protects students from this. It allows individuals, especially teachers, to realize that the ‘others’ have ideas and observations to contribute as well. Equally important, this humility leads to “a recognition that the virtues we admire can be found in other ways of life,
and that the evils we deplore can be found in ours as well as those of others” (Noddings234)”.

Practice and confirmation are the methods of nurturing where the teacher guides and perpetuates the student efforts of care and their growth toward maturity. Noddings writes that “Children need to participate in caring with adult models who show them how to care, talk with them about the difficulties and rewards of such work, and demonstrate in their own work that caring is important” (232). Of course this involves dialogue again, this time fostering it between the students and others beyond the teacher.

While the necessity of trust in dialogue may be ‘inferred’ from the work of Noddings and taken as a stated fact from the writing of Freire, Noddings plainly states that it is a necessary element of confirmation. She writes, “Trust and continuity are required for confirmation. Continuity is needed because we require knowledge of the other. Trust is required for the carer to be credible and also to sustain the search for an acceptable motive” (233). As a teacher tries to foster the possible ideal selves of the students, s/he must believe that this ideal is possible.

The act of caring is essentially an act of faith and trust. The teacher has faith and trusts that through modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation, students will begin to effectively care for others. Though this can be challenging for the cynical minded, its necessity is demonstrated by the consequences of its absence. “Whoever lacks this trust will fail to initiate (or will abandon) dialogue, reflection, and communication” (Freire 48). Care ethic and pedagogy allow/encourage the teachers to take this step of faith, and care for/empower those who need it (even if reciprocation is not readily apparent). Again, a rather obvious ethical element required for critical pedagogy is benevolent will. Freire explains “Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for people” (70). Benevolence is a necessary element because it is the source of selfless thought and action which is required for the critical
pedagogy to be put into action. Although this aspect of ideology is almost universally understood to be a worthy virtue, it is not fully practiced or usually carried to its logical conclusion. This unfulfilled conclusion is the point where people make personal sacrifices to help people around them.

The time spent using these methods of nurturing is challenging. It requires reflective care, appropriate persistence, attention, and an awareness of when the relationship must end or change in nature. A teacher must have a firm understanding of his/her capabilities and limitations. The prayer asking for “the courage to change what I can, the willingness to accept what I can’t, and the wisdom to tell the difference” is a very apt description of the presence of mind necessary to avoid teacher burn out at these stages. The teacher must know when the continuation of the teacher-student relationship ceases to be beneficial. The true act of care in such a case may be to terminate the relationship.

It is also at these stages, or rather the use of these methods of nurturing, that many of the objections against EOC come into the discussion. Most of these objections focus on examples of teachers failing at the successful implementation of EOC is usually the burned out teacher example. However, EOC does not require the teacher-martyr nor does it allow for the creation of a dependent student. The goal is sustainable caring and maturity.

Most of the objections to EOC seem to arise from examples are of teachers who misguidedly cite care (which in reality was neurotic altruism) as a reason to exhaust themselves in such places as writing centers. Sherwood reminds of this danger with a personal example. Sherwood had taken a job at another school and announced his intentions of leaving the writing center and moving away. A needy student was desperate enough to consider transferring to this other school so that could continue to work with him. “The stress of such encounters takes a toll,
especially as dependents grow in number and intensity of need” (67). Such examples are usually instances where the teacher or tutor has disregarded one of the goals of EOC and either neglected h(er)is own care or failed to properly reflect on the needs and individual situation of a student. Because of this, s/he failed to determine what actions needed to be taken to foster the student’s growth towards independence and maturity. Sherwood writes, “by intervening too directly, not simply as advisor but as indispensable rescuer and benefactor, I’d failed her” (66).

One of the primary criticisms is that EOC leads to a danger of exploitation and “slave morality” (Puka, 1990; Card, 1990; Davion, 1993)” (qtd. in Sander-Staudt ). The exploited teacher has neglected his/her own care and has inadvertently retarded the maturity and independence of their students. However, scenarios like Sherwood’s seem to overlook the fact that the purpose of EOC is to foster maturity in the students so that the teacher does not need to exhaust h(er)isself to meet the students’ needs. EOC also requires a teacher to evaluate whether or not s/he is the educator that is capable of giving the student the help s/he needs, or whether or not the student must be directed to another teacher more equipped to foster h(is)er maturity.

Since EOC is based upon the individual’s relationships, the requirements of EOC are also based on the individual’s needs. This is one of the primary points of perceived weakness in this system of ethics. In *A Different Voice* Gilligan showed a transition where a woman coming into maturity learned to care for herself as well as others around her in a way that was supposedly neither selfish nor self-harming. Gilligan writes that “Once obligation extends to include the self as well as others, the disparity between selfishness and responsibility dissolves” (94). Though the care ethic does allow the teacher to protect h(im)erself from overtaxing h(is)er abilities, humility allows the teacher to take the critical focus off how to make circumstances more convenient for h(im)erself and focus on how to best care for the students. The purpose of the
ethic is to allow the care-giver to care for the recipient without causing dependence or destitution. The ethical care-giver avoids fostering the child’s selfishness or h(is)er own self-harm (or selfishness) that could leave the recipient without care before they are mature.

Another point of contention is with EOC’s basis as a feminine idea or theory. Some theorists argue against the image of motherhood being used as the primary illustration for EOC. To quote from the Encyclopedia of Philosophy “critics challenge tendencies in care ethics to theorize care based on a dyadic model of a (care-giving) mother and a (care-receiving) child, on the grounds that it overly romanticizes motherhood and does not adequately represent the vast experiences of individuals (Hoagland, 1991)” (qtd by Sander-Staudt). These arguments usually proceed to the conclusion that this illustration makes EOC inaccessible to the understanding of male teachers and students. Supposedly, this gives the theory a gendered nature. Also, the image of a mother giving care to a child that is not yet capable of reciprocating this care accentuates the fear of the burned out care giver and (the more irritating of the two) an eternal dependent.

Bergman infers the answer to this problem by bringing attention to the importance that Noddings places on the community around a care-giver. “A major feature of character education, according to Noddings, is its dependence on a strong community with a consensus on core values. This raises several issues. For a school sponsored by a religious community, for example, this may be assumed. But what about a school where no such consensus exists? Whose values and which virtues are to be taught?” (Bergman 158). Unity, along with cooperation, allows the caregiver or teacher or mature student the ability to care without fear that they will become exhausted or likewise the ability to administer self-care without fear that the recipients will be neglected. The unity is not necessarily based on a common ideology, but a common purpose to care and to liberate. Freire clearly states that these common purposes do not differentiate
between genders. He writes, “At all stages of their liberation, the oppressed must see themselves as women and men engaged in the ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully human” (47-48). The commonality of these goals does not necessitate that everyone be in perfect agreement about everything (least of all religious ideologies or gender experiences), but that they agree on these two goals.

While it could be argued that this supportive community does not necessarily need to include both genders, or even people outside the care-givers professional circle, Nodding does favor the idea that both genders can and should care. First of all, she claims to agree with theorist Jane Martin, who “would educate both female and male children for both “productive” and “reproductive” life” (Noddings 217). Then goes on to specifically express the opinion that boys should “learn care, compassion, and connection” (217). This indicates that EOC is supposed to include a diverse community of support, a community which includes men.

Noddings also states that the differences between genders may be confirmed realities but that it is unlikely that they are necessarily as prohibitive as EOC objectors seem to indicate.

Indeed, I think it would be remarkable if thousands of years of very different experience did not produce some enduring differences between males and females. But that is not to say that these will endure forever, that they are not subject to alteration through education, or that there is no overlap between males and females in their manifestation” (Noddings 219).

Noddings does not contest the idea that men and women are different; however, not all these differences are immutable or blocks to the learning and implementation of care. So to say that one cannot gain from EOC because of gender is to underestimate the capabilities of students.

The last objection to EOC that will be covered in this chapter is EOC’s relativistic characteristics. While some consider this one of the strengths of the theory, other academics feel
that it is a trait that makes it unsuitable for implementation in academic institutions. Noddings shows her awareness of this objection and the source of it in her book. She writes, “Like epistemologists in their quest for certain foundations of knowledge, moral philosophers have sought to anchor moral life and ethical discussions in something universal and certain” (147). However, Noddings and other theorists are quick to point out that an individual’s perception of right and wrong, or caring and un-caring, is largely affected by h(is)er cultural and personal experiences. Because of this, many theorists, while they may have beliefs that they believe to be universally true, acknowledge a kind of ethical/moral relativism in order open dialogue in academic settings. Noddings gives us a quick definition of this doctrine: “Ethical/moral relativism is the doctrine that moral values, including conceptions of the good and the right, are relative to particular societies or communities. What is good in one society may be a matter of indifference or even evil in another” (147). This means that the good or harm that may result from an action depends greatly on the context of the setting. The fear of moral relativism necessarily leading to a kind of egotistical nihilism is misplaced. While certain individuals may use this philosophy as an excuse to act selfishly, the purpose for it in EOC is to place teachers in a state of reflection and awareness where they carefully consider how their actions and intentions are received by those under their care.

The ethics of care and Freire’s pedagogy are linked in such a way that they appear to share a circular cause and effect relationship. While EOC does resist exploitation, outside forces still try to use it as an opportunity to exploit caring teachers. Holbrook reminds us of the gender gap and how occupations that are considered women’s work are paid less (203). The mother is an image of unpaid self-sacrifice. Here is where oppressive outside forces descend to take advantage. While EOC may be able to logically resist these forces, Freire’s pedagogy provides to
the tools to effectively oppose them and safeguard care. Only those who are liberated can really care. But the act of caring is itself freeing. And why must we be free? The answer seems to be ‘so that we can care for others.’ Only when someone is free, can they choose to cultivate the ability to care. The free can choose to self-sacrifice, while the oppressed are merely meeting the demands placed on them. And as caring cannot come from oppression, only the liberated can show the young how to care.

The act of caring, like the act of liberation, should produce more of the same. A truly caring act will produce more caring and an act of liberation creates more opportunity for caring. This process should be the definition of the classroom. The liberatory efforts and caring acts of the teacher should present the students with the opportunity to perpetuate these same values and actions. This allows more people to reach that level of maturity and freedom where they can analyze the needs of those around them, dialogue with those people, and respond to their needs.
ETHICS OF CARE (or rather the theorists who support this idea) typically provide answers to the objections that critics bring against it, as shown in the previous chapter. The difficulty that seems to persist is the idea that a person must choose to act and evaluate students according to either ethics of justice or ethics of care depending on whether the situation is of a personal or academic nature. This is often attached to an assumption that care (or rather proficiency in care) makes an individual unsuitable for authority in social positions.

Ethics of Care (EOC) theorists have argued that this “either or” choice is based on misconception. However, critics still maintain the argument that EOC’s relativistic properties make it unsuitable for practice on the public level. They maintain that justice and fairness are what must guide these interactions, and EOC simply leaves room for too many inappropriate allowances and opportunities for favoritism. Paulo Freire’s pedagogy demonstrates the application of care on a personal and public level, especially in the classroom. Liberatory pedagogy applies EOC’s principles of benevolence (love), humility, and trust to social action and like EOC, emphasizes maturity as personal responsibility for choices and actions and acceptance of their consequences. Liberatory pedagogy points to dialogue as a means to achieve this.

In order to understand how liberatory pedagogy demonstrates the resolution of this conflict, the cause of the conflict’s persistence should be examined. One reason why Carol Gilligan’s *In a Different Voice* has been appropriated by feminist theorists is that it tries to examine the ethics that guide human interactions in the spheres of life that have been typically ignored or undervalued. Gilligan starts by pointing out how the currently accepted system of justice ethics reflects a primarily male perspective, and specifically calls attention to the fact that
most of the studies on this topic were composed of samples of male students and children:

“While in Piaget’s account (1932) of the moral judgment of the child, girls are an aside, a
curiosity to whom he devotes four brief entries in an index that omits “boys” altogether because
“the child” is assumed to be male” (Gilligan 18). She goes on to remind readers that historically the experiences and development of women were considered in an offhand reflexive way to be insufficient or incomplete. The popular view was that women valued relationships and emotions as moral and ethical guides where they should have been looking to higher universal principles. Gilligan cites theorists Lawrence Kohlberg and Matthew Kramer as examples of this dismissive view. It is also important to note that Kohlberg is credited with virtually establishing moral development as a field. William Puka writes that “Kohlberg's approach centers the field to this day, with no comparable rival but skepticism” (Puka). He organized his theoretical process of development into six stages that are organized into three groups called levels.

The first two stages are the preconventional level, when outside forces like parents, teachers, or other authority figures control morality. This is when rules are conformed to primarily in order to avoid punishment. This perspective involves the idea that what is right is what one can get away with or what is personally satisfying. Stage 1 and 2 and are defined as when behavior is determined by consequences and rewards respectively. The next stages are when the emphasis shifts from self-interest to relationships with other people in order to win their approval or to maintain social order. Stage 3 is where standards of behavior are determined by social approval.

It is at this point that Kohlberg supposedly perceives a divergence in the development of boys and girls, or rather a point when boys start to develop more. Stage 4 is when social rules and laws start to determine the individual’s behavior more than consideration of close ties to
others. The individual begins to believe that rules and laws maintain a social order that is worth preserving. The third level is the postconventional or principled level. This is when “the individual moves beyond the perspective of his or her own society. Morality is defined in terms of abstract principles and values that apply to all situations and societies” (Sanders). This level is divided into stages five and six. At stage 5 laws and rules are seen as flexible tools for improving human purposes. This means that the individual realizes that exceptions to the rules exist. For instance, when the rules allow atrocities or ignore the good of the people they must be replaced or amended. Stage six is the last stage and is, according to Kohlberg, the highest stage of functioning and is a point that some people (namely girls) would never reach. “At this stage, the appropriate action is determined by one’s self-chosen ethical principles of conscience. These principles are abstract and universal in application” (Sanders).

Gilligan writes that “Kohlberg and Kramer imply that only if women enter the traditional arena of male activity will they recognize the inadequacy of this moral perspective (EOC) and progress like men toward higher stages where relationships are subordinated to rules (stage four) and rules to universal principles of justice (stages five and six)” (18). It is these supposed higher principles of justice and fairness (or objectivity) that have been studied and pondered for the bulk of recorded history. However, Gilligan points out that woman have historically been encouraged to follow a different standard of ethics, “Yet herein lies a paradox, for the very traits that traditionally have defined the “goodness” of women, their care for and sensitivity to the needs of others, are those that mark them as deficient in moral development” (18). This means that in order to be good and care for their families, as is expected of them, they will not be able to achieve the higher stages of moral development in Kohlberg’s scale. Though care ethics have
technically been around since there have been people and families (and women have practiced them) they had not really been examined and studied until Gilligan began to articulate them.

Gilligan does not refute the value of justice and other principles but she does note that there is a kind of tension between these values and EOC that marks the nature of the human experience.

The experiences of inequality and interconnection, inherent in the relation of parent and child, then give rise to the ethics of justice and care, the ideals of human relationship—the vision that self and other will be treated as of equal worth, that despite differences in power, things will be fair; the vision that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one will be left alone or hurt. These disparate visions in their tension reflect the paradoxical truths of human experience—that we know ourselves as separate only insofar as we live in connection with others, and that we experience relationship only insofar as we differentiate other from self (Gilligan 62–63).

The rights of the individual and principles of justice exist even when the individual is alone. The ethical reality of these rights does not change. However, in order for rights to be observed there must be a society of others separate from the individual. Similarly, acts of care require others separate from the individual to be present. Also, there are instances where the exercise of care requires the submission of ‘rights’ and rules of fairness. Gilligan shows how these two seemingly contradictory ideas are happening simultaneously, sometimes competing for prominence in a difficult situation and other times harmonizing in a more comprehensive way.

Other feminist theorists such as Virginia Held also readily agree with this assessment: “Feminist understandings of justice and care have enabled us to see that these are different values, reflecting different ways of interpreting moral problems and expressing moral concern. Feminist discussion has also shown, I think, that neither justice nor care can be dispensed with: Both are extremely important for morality” (Held 68). Unfortunately, these differing ethics have traditionally been presented as contradictory or developmental, one leading to another, not as co-existent.
Gilligan’s work is composed mostly of observations on the presence and development of EOC and morality as it occurs in the process of personal maturation. Gilligan shows the development by interviewing various women (16 in a study on abortion decision, 8 in a college student study and 8 in a study about rights and responsibilities) as they describe their thought processes when making difficult decisions (181). These women seemed to perceive maturity as an ability to balance care for themselves and others and to take responsibility for their actions. As Gilligan explains, “The essence of moral decision is the exercise of choice and the willingness to accept responsibility for that choice” (67). Maturity is taking responsibility for one’s own actions and how those actions affect others (especially those who are in a relationship with the person). When an individual is mature enough to know what actions will help or harm those around him/her, s/he can make the conscious choice to help or harm. A person who makes the conscious choice to help someone exercises care. Thus, caring is the act of a mature person. The best care is given by one who reflects on how best to care, and who has the benevolent will to sustain this action.

As they continue to develop greater maturity, these women anticipate being able to make decisions that better maintain their relationships and give proper consideration to their own wellbeing and the people they are in relationship with. This contrasts with the typical outlook that favors the individual’s own comfort or moral ideology at the cost of another’s wellbeing (like a person who blocks a friend on social media for differing political views). These outlooks assume a fair (just) arena of opportunity where people are capable of earning their success. Such a competitive environment devalues attachments. EOC stipulates that the true mark of maturity and independence is not the ability to separate oneself from others, but to maintain relationships in a healthy way. Gilligan writes that “By changing the lens of developmental observation from
individual achievement to relationships of care, women depict ongoing attachment as the path that leads to maturity” (Gilligan 170). In these cases the mature woman takes herself and others into account, which allows a more comprehensive and balanced moral understanding than the simple consideration for the individual’s good and freedoms.

This idea of maturity being derived from the ability of an individual to assume the responsibility for his/her own actions and how they affect the people around him/her is the first of many points established by Gilligan that serves as a connection to the pedagogy that Freire outlines. She writes “The essence of moral decision is the exercise of choice and the willingness to accept responsibility for that choice” (67). Freire begins Pedagogy of the Oppressed with a focused explanation on what he defines as freedom and oppression. He defines freedom for people as being able to “endeavor to be more fully human” (26). But it has requirements. Freedom requires people to assume autonomy and responsibility (29). This means that being free is not simply a state in which a person can do whatever s/he wants. It is the ability to grow and change things for the betterment of themselves and those around them and to accept the consequences of their decisions and actions.

Humans have the capacity and responsibility to govern themselves and their surroundings, and it is in this way that we move forward and become, as Freire would put it, more fully human. This becoming more fully human is the essence of the freedom that Freire says must be defended, and it is the antithesis of this freedom that he defines as oppression.

The ways that one can become oppressed are too many to count here, but Freire does boil it down to its essential nature. It is when one human uses violence to deny the humanity of another. He writes, “Any situation in which A objectively exploits B or hinders his and her pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person is one of oppression. Such a situation in itself
constitutes violence, even when sweetened by false generosity, because it interferes with the individual’s ontological and historical vocation to be more fully human” (37). This means that any time one person exploits another, even if it seems to be for a good reason, the person is engaging in an inherently violent act. Protection from violence and oppression is one of the primary functions of justice. However, oppression also is often justified as necessary according to someone else’s ethic of justice.

In both EOC and Freire’s pedagogy, personal responsibility and agency are used as measures of one’s personal development and the personal liberty that the individual is able to exercise. Most critics readily acknowledge and accept these premises. However, since the focus of Gilligan’s book was on determining a new perspective on morality and ethical maturity, many critics indicate that certain aspects of EOC, as established by *A Different Voice*, do not address larger concerns, namely issues of broad scale social fairness and wellbeing. EOC is now criticized, in other words, for what it doesn’t say or account for, not for its main premises.

The primary criticism is that EOC is unsuitable as an ethic of morality on a social level (that it cannot function as a proper ethical system for a city or country, at least not in the same way that the justice ethic functions). The fear here is that when an individual only cares for those people who s/he are in a relationship with, or favors those relationships, the individual may be prone to dismiss actions that promote the common good over the relationship or require a sacrifice of the relationship in order to protect the rights and equality of other members of society. Joan Tronto and Marilyn Friedman are two particular critics concerned with the possible development of favoritism. They worry that “care ethics may allow for cronyism and favoritism toward one’s family and friends” (qtd. in Sander-Staudt Friedman, 2006; Tronto, 2006).
Friedman writes “The hottest question in this debate is whether or not partiality can adequately be justified by the dominant theoretical traditions of modern moral philosophy—traditions which call for impartiality, for the equal consideration of all persons” (Friedman 818). These critics fear that the care-giver will be vulnerable to the temptation of exploiting h(is)er position for the benefit of h(is)er own relationship.

Nel Noddings provides readers with assurances against favoritism and exploitation by pointing out that part of the purpose of morally educating students on care is to prevent such occurrences. Competent carers should be able to recognize the negative effects of cronyism and favoritism and work to prevent these elements from being present in their relationships. She writes, “Third, and finally, the ethic of care guards against exploitation by emphasizing moral education. If all children, both girls and boys, are raised to be competent carers and sensitive cared-fors, exploitation should be rare” (Noddings 228-229). Though people are fallible, she specifies that competent and sensitive care-givers minimize such occurrences (though immature or ignorant ones may not be able to).

Freire gave a demonstration of ethics of care and justice functioning together in 1970. He demonstrates how the favoring of oneself and one’s people over other peoples within society leads to oppression and a breakdown in the relationships that are the core of EOC. The most obvious motivation for oppression would be to relieve one’s own state of oppression or the oppression of a particular group. Freire states that many who belong to an oppressed group feel that liberation means obtaining the means to oppress those who have oppressed them. He writes, “But almost always, during the initial stage of the struggle, the oppressed, instead of striving for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors, or “sub-oppressors” (27). Other seemingly noble motivations can also be observed. There are instances where one individual or group will
place themselves over another based on the pretext of provision or protection. This provides another comfortable delusion to legitimize oppression. However, the end result is the same if the human agency that is an inherent part of human nature is denied to them.

After firmly defining and denouncing oppression, whatever form it takes, and with all its motivations, Freire shows why the dehumanizing nature of oppression is so detrimental to people. Not only is the victim denied his humanity, but living in the lie of oppression can lead him/her to forsake his/her own humanity. The oppressed thus being internally branded with the mark of oppression often mirror the treatment they receive from their oppressors and oppress others in their vicinity, which can in many cases create a self-sustaining cycle of oppression (29). The oppression of the elites on their working class will continue to be replicated and perpetuated by the oppressed on individuals of a lower status and this cycle continues to trickle down so that at each level, individuals are committing acts of oppression on behalf of the oppressor. The oppressed oppress their fellow victims until they have divided themselves to the individual, where everyone watches the other essentially committing the violence of oppression on behalf of the ruling elites.

While the oppressed unite and try to free themselves, they are constantly tempted to reenact their oppression on their former oppressors or others once they perceive themselves free of their former condition. Because of this, Freire places a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the goal of liberation should not be to merely trade places of dominance and submission with the elites, but to make everyone aware of their common humanity and what that requires.

The link between justice and Freire’s pedagogy is so obvious that it requires almost no elaboration. Freire establishes this in his first chapter. When introducing humanization as the vocation of the people he writes, “It is thwarted by injustice, exploitation, oppression, and the
violence of the oppressors; it is affirmed by the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and justice, and by their struggle to recover their lost humanity” (25-26). This shows that the yearning for justice is an essential part of Freire’s pedagogy, but we also know his pedagogy shares the same principles as EOC. This indicates that a sustainable coexistence of justice and care is possible. Virginia Held (an EOC theorist who focuses on the relationship between EOC and Justice Ethics) writes in her book *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global*, “It is plausible to see caring relations as the wider and deeper context within which we seek justice and, in certain domains, give it priority” (Held Locations 2554-2555). This is demonstrated in Freire’s pedagogy.

Another way to summarize oppression would be to define it as the use of violence to keep people from becoming mature and stifling their efforts to take responsibility for their choices regarding their relationships and how they help or harm those around them. Thus, caring for others or fostering caring relationships makes up a large part of what it means to be liberated and empowered. Caring plays an important role in combating oppression. It means once an individual begins to care, the person cannot keep another from maturity.

Because caring is so intimately connected to maturity, it is no surprise that several theorists began to see the relevance of EOC for education. Nel Noddings is largely regarded as the main theorist to apply EOC to the classroom and the field of education. Though she has written a number of books and papers on the topic, her fourth edition of *Philosophy of Education* is one of the more comprehensive published works on the subject in recent years. It has been demonstrated in the past chapter of this thesis that her outline for the use of EOC in the classroom, along with demonstrating effective classroom strategies for integrating and
demonstrating care, also reveals a vivid parallel to the practical strategies that Freire outlined in his work.

Noddings sought to help students be competent and sensible in their caring. This means teaching caring in classes. To do this, teachers must demonstrate care in the classroom. “This attention or engrossment is thoroughly receptive; that is, when we really care, we receive what the other person conveys nonselectively” (Noddings 71). The teacher who is able to do this pays attention to h(is)er students and is able to determine what they each need, being very careful not to ignore what is inconvenient or what was outside of h(is)er expectations. S/he, as honestly as possible, observes and reflects on the reality of the classroom. The nature of this kind of attention in the classroom calls attention back to the one of the key aspects of Freire’s dialogical action, praxis.

Praxis is the combination of reflective thought and action and is one of the concepts of Freire’s pedagogy that serves as a tool to ensure that the dialogical action of the classroom works. Freire’s view of praxis provides a clear argument for how language serves an essential part of what makes us human, and functions as a tool of liberation and thus a necessary part of our ability to care. He begins his explanation of praxis with the revelation that reflective thought or speech cannot achieve anything on its own. Freire calls this mere “idle chatter” or “verbalism” (68). Though words are powerful, they are ineffective if they do not lead to some kind of action. In the same way, actions without the guidance of reflective thought amount to nothing as well. In fact, unguided actions are prone to be reactionary in nature and easily descend into violence. But when reflective thought is acted upon, positive change is possible. In this way, praxis helps ensure that the teacher’s caring is not just a topic of dialogue but a modeled action. According to Noddings, modeling only works if teachers in their own behavior demonstrate what it means to
care. She writes “Thus we do not merely tell them to care and give them texts to read on the subject; we demonstrate our caring in our relations with them. However, we do not care merely for the purpose of modeling. Our caring must be genuine; the inevitable modeling is a by-product” (Noddings 230).

The concept of praxis also highlights the ever present importance and purpose of dialogue. Dialogue is the primary way that Noddings proposes to develop the care relationships between the teachers and students. The importance that Noddings places on dialogue hints at a relationship of cyclical support between EOC and the pedagogies where the presence of one supports and increases the efficacy of the other. Dialogue is one of the four necessary actions of care that she describes and is the primary action of Freire’s pedagogy. In EOC it is both the means to enact care in the classroom and the way that the teacher is able to determine the best way to care. Without it the teacher is blind and merely making noise at the students. Likewise in liberatory pedagogy, dialogue is the primary force for both critical thinking and liberation. Both EOC and liberatory pedagogy maintain the idea that learning how to dialogue is of paramount importance for students.

Freire explains that liberating education, what EOC would define as fostering care, is only possible when the ‘teacher-student’ contradiction is resolved and true communication is made possible (61). This contradiction is the state where students wait merely to receive information from the teacher. This state (what Freire refers to as the banking model) makes problem posing education impossible and must actively be rejected by the teacher. According to Freire, this contradiction is resolved through dialogue. He writes, “Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with students-teachers. The teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but
one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach” (61). He goes on to say that “Only dialogue, which requires critical thinking, is also capable of generating critical thinking. Without dialogue there is no communication, and without communication there can be no true education” (73).

The aim of fostering the ability to care in students and the aim of developing critical thinking and empowerment appear to be separate. However, the motivations that Freire expresses show the relation of the two goals. His pedagogy may seem to favor a pursuit of social justice focusing on equality and our common humanity, but Freire goes into lengthy and repeated discussions on how the pedagogy is motivated by love, trust, and humility (the same values that propel the EOC perspective) and how these principles mark any effective dialogue. He writes, “the act of love is commitment to their cause— the cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it is loving, is dialogical” (71). Through dialogue both teachers and students learn more about the other. “Teachers engaged in dialogue with their students can invite their students to participate in the ‘immortal conversation.’” Freire explains that this loving, trusting, humble dialogue is what builds the relationship where the dialoguers (teachers and students) partner in the naming and defining of the world around them (72).

As the students then begin practicing and critically analyzing their experiences and ethical understanding, teachers provide confirmation. When they confirm someone, they identify a better self and encourage its development (Noddings 232). This is one of the responsibilities that are particularly critical to the efforts of the teacher, and where the dangers of harm due to teacher error are most likely to occur. One of the things that teachers need to be especially careful of is becoming cynical or demonstrating a false trust. This is a critical theme that both Freire and Noddings agree on despite the divide of time between their two works. Noddings
writes “Trust and continuity are required for confirmation. Continuity is needed because we require knowledge of the other. Trust is required for the caregiver to be credible and also to sustain the search for an acceptable motive” (233). This acceptable motive that Noddings refers to is the hypothetical reason that the care recipient acts a certain way. According to her, the care giver must be able to believe that the recipient acts from acceptable motives. Freire writes that trust is also needed for the stability and sustainability of a liberatory action or movement. Within the movement there will be/should be leaders who serve in a capacity that is different from other members of the movement. In the academic setting these leaders are the teachers. These leaders must first of all overcome the marks of oppression within themselves to make sure that they do not end up oppressing the people they are trying to liberate. Suspicion of one’s fellow humans is one of the biggest and most detrimental of these marks. This is especially important in the classroom. If the teacher cannot trust that his/her students will use the power of literacy wisely s/he will end up sabotaging the students’ efforts to achieve literacy. Freire writes that a real humanist can be identified more by his/her trust in the people. This is what engages him/her in their struggle, rather than enacting a thousand actions in their favor without that trust (42). False generosity, Freire believes, is a tool of oppression. In the case of teachers, false generosity might be found in educators who give good grades that haven’t been earned, or tell the students what information they need to produce in order to succeed in exams (i.e. the banking model). This ‘banking’ may be done with the best of intentions but it shows a lack of trust.

Freire further supports this claim with a negative example of a society of teachers and those in power who do not demonstrate this trust. In his example, elites perpetuate a state of oppression and conquest “reducing of people to non-entities” (119). They perpetuate this state by (as Freire would say) mythizing the oppressed class’ perception of the elites’ society (120). “All
these myths (and others the reader could list), the internalization of which is essential to the subjugation of the oppressed, are presented to the oppressed by well-organized propaganda and slogans, via the mass “communications” media—as if such alienation constituted real communication!” (Freire 121). Noddings repeats this sentiment as it applies to EOC: “Formulas and slogans have no place in confirmation” (Noddings 232). These formulas and slogans displace the critical thinking and dialogue that should foster caring relationships and individual maturity. In the case of academics, academic institutions assign students they don’t trust to curriculums based on the banking model because the students are not trusted with critical thinking. Essentially, the students function as objects to be filled, not as humans capable of meaningful dialogue. Within this arrangement, teachers are unable to have caring relationships with their students. Meanwhile, the oppressed students will hear from the academic institutions that they live in a fair and free system that must be maintained in order to protect their liberty and livelihoods.

Freire’s work stresses the importance of dialogue and dialectic action in a way that predates the views expressed by the core of EOC. EOC uses dialogue to maintain caring relationships and impart the skills and understanding necessary for these caring relationships, whereas Freire uses dialectic communication to ensure that outside forces do not try to sabotage the people’s (student’s) ability to care. In this way Freire’s concept of cultural synthesis comes into sharp relevance, as if the arrival of a concept of EOC was foreseen and he wanted to make sure that the pedagogies could help in the development of these ideas. Freire stresses the importance of the people and their leaders (in the case of the classroom students and teachers) working together in harmony, as opposed to one group dominating the actions of the other. This is the synthesis of a new culture of community as opposed to one where the groups are separate.
The teachers are allowed to leverage their vision and knowledge on behalf of the students. Also, the students are able to express their own ideas and practical experiences. With these two forces working together transformative action is possible.

The more sophisticated knowledge of the leaders is remade in the empirical knowledge of the people, while the latter is refined by the former.

In cultural synthesis— and only in cultural synthesis— it is possible to resolve the contradiction between the world view of the leaders and that of the people, to the enrichment of both. Cultural synthesis does not deny the differences between the two views; indeed, it is based on these differences. It does deny the invasion of one by the other, but affirms the undeniable support each gives to the other (Freire 162).

In this section is probably the most obvious indication to the classroom dynamic that Freire desires, without overtly stating that he is talking about his teaching. In the classroom teachers are the ones who have studied and their thinking has been tested and refined over time and personal experience. However, the students also have their own experiences. The teacher cannot simply state that the experiences of the students didn’t happen or assume the students misunderstood those events. Thus, the teacher and the students must work together in order to gain understanding. This is the essence of the caring relationship that EOC outlines and the realized state of the principles of communication, community and dialogue that Freire’s pedagogy advocates.

In conclusion, the goal of an ethic of care, as it is described by Carol Gilligan, is for the care giver to be a mature individual who is capable of taking responsibility for his/her own actions. This means that actions are not dictated by academic institutions and the individual is capable of making his/her own decisions and accepting the consequences that result. It also means that the individual is capable of making choices that are for the good of h(is)er relationships and self and that the individual is able to maintain both without sacrificing one to
the detriment of the other. The caregiver’s goal in the care relationship is to foster the maturity of the recipients and help them assume responsibility for their own actions so that they can maintain caring relationships in turn. Freire’s pedagogy is in alignment with these goals. This state of maturity and responsibility is in essence the same one that is to be sought and protected from oppression. And those who are currently in a state of oppression should make every effort to reach a state where they can take personal responsibility for their actions and develop interrelationships with each other where the kind of caring described by Gilligan is possible.

According to Nel Noddings, the way that we teach ethics of care to the recipients of our care, especially children and students, is through modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation. Modeling is how caregivers demonstrate care and allow students to both receive care and observe how it is given. Dialogue is another way that caregivers show care and is how they are able to make sure that their care recipients comprehend and receive care. Practice is putting the principles of care ethics into action and developing the ability to care. Finally, confirmation is the extending of trust to the recipients and allowing them in turn to assume responsibility and form their own caring relationships.

Care Ethics and Freire’s Pedagogy work together for the same purpose even though they were developed more than a decade apart. In tandem, EOC and liberatory pedagogy give teachers a way to work toward the purpose of developing mature and responsible students from a viewpoint that takes into account social justice through an understanding of the importance of caring and communication.
THE CHALLENGE OF ETHNOCENTRISM AND HOW CRITICAL PEDAGOGY ADDRESSES IT

There are many educators who don’t know how to address ethnocentrism when it surfaces in a classroom. The most likely explanation is that there are innumerable things that require a teacher’s attention. By looking at the word, it can be understood that it is an idea that focuses on ethnicity. The word ending suffix of “ism” is shared with a more familiar term in the American education system. Racism. Racism has been and remains a stain on the history and current culture of America and is one of the many reasons that Ethics of Care is of such interest. Racism is such an antithesis to the EOC that many hope that educating students with EOC will help combat this problem. However, ethnocentrism is an ideology that is much more pervasive and sinister than racism in that it often goes overlooked and unaddressed.

This ideology doesn’t always show itself as the oppression of one ethnicity by another, as its name might suggest. It is the favoring of one’s own group over another. This tempts individuals to neglect the care of those who are not immediately present. However, Virginia Held tells us that our care can be extended to those who are not immediately present with us. She writes “We can, for instance, develop caring relations for persons who are suffering deprivation in distant parts of the globe” (Held loc 2529-2530). For many, this aspect of EOC may be much more difficult to keep in mind and in practice. Depending on what the individual considers to be h(is)er group, the demonstration of an ethnocentric ideology may occur. Even more disturbing, actions motivated by an ethnocentric ideology may appear to be demonstrations of EOC.
Many American teachers feel an attraction to critical and liberatory pedagogy because it directly addresses these kinds of difficulties. Henry Giroux spoke of critical pedagogy in an interview with José María Barroso Tristán. Giroux said:

Most importantly, it takes seriously what it means to understand the relationship between how we learn and how we act as individual and social agents; that is, it is concerned with teaching students how not only to think but to come to grips with a sense of individual and social responsibility, and what it means to be responsible for one’s actions as part of a broader attempt to be an engaged citizen who can expand and deepen the possibilities of democratic public life.

This is why many teachers in the United States feel drawn to critical and liberatory pedagogy, despite some people implying that American students have little call to use the pedagogy because they are not oppressed. As Grioux indicates, it is not just about freeing oneself from oppression. It is about using the power of literacy and education responsibly to maintain the society that we live in.

While ethnocentrism can cause the same problems as other academically unacceptable ideas, it is an ideology that is more difficult to detect because it is often not as overt. Ethnocentrism does not obviously target a distinct group. It proclaims the superiority of the author’s own group and often implies (very subtly) the inferiority of other groups. In American academic circles such an idea may more easily go unnoticed for several reasons. One is that most students often write for institutions that are overseen by members of their own group. Another reason is that a student’s group may seem to be inclusive and diverse, but only have opportunity to include people or ideas that are familiar to them or from areas nearby.

Teachers acknowledge that ethnocentrism is a flawed belief that affects a person’s critical thinking, rhetorical effectiveness, and political worldview. Because teachers are to an extent responsible for the development of their students’ thinking, they have an obligation to be aware of this element in their students and to curb it. However, teachers cannot force their own views
on their students or force their students to change their minds, but it is necessary for teachers to try and prevent the logical fallacies and ineffectiveness caused by ethnocentric elements in a way that is respectful to the students and acceptable to educational institutions. Critical and liberatory pedagogy provides methods for recognizing and dealing with ethnocentrism, but it also requires teachers to sincerely hold the specific principles common to EOC and Freire’s pedagogy. This is likely one of the reasons why many teachers in America are drawn to critical pedagogy, but also are hesitant to use it at the same time.

In order for teachers to properly use the guidelines of Freire’s pedagogy in this situation, they must have a firm idea of ethnocentrism. The topic of ethnocentrism has been researched from the perspectives of various fields, each of which have focused on a different aspect. Because ethnocentrism is such a complex issue, researchers have begun to use it as an umbrella term to refer to how a person, or group, views the group to which he belongs and other groups. The current views and analyses of ethnocentrism find their bases in the work of a Social-Darwinist by the name of Graham Sumner. Sumner’s book *Folkways* compiled observations and conclusions from the anthropological works of his time. Although other Social-Darwinists began the scientific interest in ethnocentrism as early as the late 19th century, it was Sumner who elaborated the concept in such a way that his definitions have remained popular even today. His basic argument, according to Boris Bizumic and John Duckitt, is that strong in-group preferences are closely linked to strong hostility to the out-group (889). This combination of preference and hostility often result in violent and exploitive behavior. Current theories and definitions regarding ethnocentrism elaborate on the relationship between the in-group and the out-group. What is often called classical ethnocentrism, mirrors Sumner’s works and is the holding of favorable opinions for the in-group and negative for out-groups. However, theorists like David
Raden claim that in-group bias emphasizes positivity towards the in-group and does not necessarily denote an antipathy to out-groups. In these cases, ethnocentrism would only result in a more harmonious community. Hypothetically, the individual identifies h(im)erself with a larger group and acts in the interests of that group. This clarification is supported by many research projects such as the survey designed by Raden which created an ethnocentrism scale. This scale specifically distinguishes between Positivity (where the own-group and other-group ratings are both favorable), Classic ethnocentrism (where own-group rating is favorable and the rating of the other group is unfavorable), Neutral matching (where both the own-group and other-group ratings are neither favorable nor unfavorable), Self-dislike (where the rating of the other group is favorable and the rating of one’s own group is unfavorable), and Misanthropy (where the own-group and other-group ratings are both unfavorable) (808). Although these views maybe distinct from one another, the research also shows that they are related, especially among the uneducated. Any group that has limited interaction with or knowledge of other groups is at risk to classic ethnocentrism. Also, Freire’s observations of the social groups described in Pedagogy of the Oppressed clearly demonstrate how the poor and uneducated (especially if marked by oppression) can be susceptible to both self-dislike and misanthropy.

The research of Boris Buzimic and John Duckett also categorize the various parts of ethnocentrism and how they may play out in common behavior. The identified components are preference, superiority, purity, exploitativeness, group cohesion, devotion. These categories are further divided by ingroup bias and intragroup ethnocentrism, each of which have specific ramifications and have different individual indications. Below are examples and reverse examples of how these components of ethnocentrism could affect the thinking, and possibly speech and actions of an individual that held these views:
**Ingroup Bias**

Preference. Example: In most cases, I like people from my culture more than I like others. (Reversed) I don’t think I have any particular preference for my own cultural or ethnic group over others.

Superiority. Example: The world would be a much better place if all other cultures and ethnic groups modelled themselves on my culture. (Reversed) The values, way of life, and customs of most other cultures are probably just as good as those of my own.

Purity. Example: Our culture would be much better off if we could keep people from different cultures out. (Reversed) I like the idea of a society in which people from completely different cultures, ethnic groups, and backgrounds mix together freely.

Exploitativeness. Example: We need to do what’s best for our own people, and stop worrying so much about what the effect might be on other peoples. (Reversed) We should always show consideration for the welfare of people from other cultural or ethnic groups even if, by doing this, we may lose some advantage over them.

**Intragroup Ethnocentrism**

Group Cohesion. Example: We should focus all our energy on trying to develop a greater sense of unity, community, and solidarity in our cultural group. (Reversed) Instead of greater unity and more cohesion, our people need more change, innovation, and freedom for individuals to express themselves however they want to.

Devotion. Example: No matter what happens, I will ALWAYS support my cultural or ethnic group and never let it down. (Reversed) I cannot imagine myself ever developing an intense, passionate, total devotion and commitment to my ethnic or cultural group (Bizumic and Duckitt 896).

Many researchers seem to support this interpretation of ethnocentrism and in-group bias (which differentiates between the two) due to the fact that, as many social Darwinists observed, some in-group bias is necessary in order to maintain society. If groups did not have a positive opinion of the aspects of their group they would not be able to operate as a group. Donald Kinder and Cindy Kam show that ethnocentrism has a basis in or stems from the authoritarianism that is in the structure of most groups (64). In the United States a healthy level of authoritarianism and in-group preference could be interpreted as patriotism, good citizenship, or love of country.

However, regardless of how innocuous a preference for one’s own group may seem it leaves the individual, especially the uneducated or isolated, susceptible to classic ethnocentrism. When someone has developed a preference for their own group, they have already established an ‘us
and them’ mentality which can lead to the selfish, greedy, fearful, and bigoted behavior that is abhorrent to humanity as a whole.

One reason that classic ethnocentrism is less prevalent among the educated is because many educators are aware of the detrimental effects it has on intergroup relations. In regards to students in writing classes and composition courses, the main concern is with the students’ efficacy. William Catton and Sung Chick Hong acknowledge in the summary of their research paper “The Relation of Apparent Minority Ethnocentrism to Majority Antipathy” that while ethnocentrism may be useful in controlling forces within a particular group it made interaction with other groups more difficult: “The results of the study re-reported in the present paper support the statement that however functional ethnocentrism may be within the group, for a group to appear ethnocentric entails measurable costs in intergroup relations. Socially dominant groups do not escape this dilemma but rather are particularly subject to being penalized for the appearance of ethnocentric behavior” (190-191). Individuals who have developed a strong in-group preference also exhibit the aspects of devotion to the in-group and aspects of exploitation of out-groups to some degree. This pattern of behavior was also observed by Freire in his study of the interactions between social elites and the oppressed. While these traits may not be readily shown in normal activities, certain cases and situations will elicit responses that reveal these views, and once these views are revealed to members of the out-groups, it is usual for the out-group members to become hostile or at the very least resistant to the in-group.

Ethnocentrism is an antidualogical viewpoint that is the result of lack of unity and communication with persons perceived as belonging to outside groups. This separation may be due to either ignorance or willful rejection. In either case, when a teacher sees such behavior in a student, they are obligated to take the opportunity for correction. While students must make their
own decisions and may choose to hold to their bias, the teacher may make every effort to provide relief to any ignorance that may be causing such views. If the teacher can provide opportunity for the student to have dialogical communication with the outgroup, then the student can assume the responsibility for critical thought. Likewise, if the student harbors more than a simple preference for the in-group to which he/she belongs and expresses knowledgeable and willful antipathy for a particular out group, then the teacher may guide and foster appropriate resistance.

The ethics of care do provide a reasonable response to the problems of ethnocentrism. The strategies outlined by Noddings in her various works give teachers the tools they need to foster care in students; however, the practice of these strategies may require a new context or ideological framing in order for the students to grasp the purpose of Ethics of Care in regard to individuals that they perceive to be outside their in-group. A few of the common criticisms of EOC make this ideological framing difficult.

First, one of the most prevalent objections is that EOC is based on feelings and can be exercised despite evidence against continued caring in the current form. Secondly, an ethic of caring does not employ truth claims that can be rationally verified. Thirdly, EOC calls for behavior that is tailored to each individual situation, thus there is no universal theory of ethical behavior. The teacher is simply changing h(is)er view of what is acceptable and what is not to suit the situation. Finally, the care-based approach supposedly clouds the basic moral code. Emotions and feelings make it easier to break moral codes when care “requires” doing so.

Many of these objections have been shown to be a misunderstanding of the purpose of EOC or to be the result of not properly implementing EOC and neglecting the guiding principles that are to motivate the caring teacher’s decisions. Some common objections are based on the assumption that EOC allows an individual to address the perceived needs of their own in-group
at the expense of other groups under the argument that the individual’s primary moral responsibility is to the people that they are directly in relationship with. However, the purpose of EOC’s priority on relationships is not to allow the individual to neglect or abuse those outside their in-group, but to empower the individual to appropriately care for all the people they influence (without “burning out”). The goal of this is that the people the caregiver is in relationships with are in turn equipped to care beyond the in-group as well. While it is true that the teacher’s actions and the rules governing the classroom may be changed as situations arise, the purpose behind these rules remains the same. The purpose should always be the fostering of the student’s maturity and ability to care. When a teacher forgets to prioritize a student’s maturity, (s)he may pander to the student’s perceived “needs” at the expense of the moral and ethical principles (s)he is trying to model. For example, if a teacher panders to the ethnocentrism of a student in order to maintain a caregiving relationship with the student. This kind of failure can lead the student to take up a practice which parrots the activities of care but fails to critically implement the principles which should motivate these actions. The result being that the ethnocentric student becomes limited to h(is)er own in-group, and in turn, fails to foster the maturity of others within the in-group. Thankfully, Freire’s pedagogy is well suited to address these issues, and illuminate EOC’s direct opposition to ethnocentric ideology.

According to critical pedagogy, the first action taken against antidialogical systems is to promote communication. As it has been demonstrated, dialogue is the cornerstone of EOC. By communicating, the individual is no longer isolated from those who s/he denigrates. Many teachers like George Bereday (32), Mariana Souto-Manning (152), Nicole Carignan (Carignan et al. 7), Ken Kantor (175), and Dan Morgan (322) have taken pains to curb the ethnocentric tendencies in both their students’ practices and in their school systems. Most of these teachers
use a method of exposure. By diversifying the material that the teacher provides in the classroom, the teacher hopes to show equal regard for other cultures and ideas. The teacher may also instruct students to go observe other cultures or groups in order to correct any ethnocentric ideas that may be the result of ignorance. And still others try to turn student focus to the purpose of their writing. All these strategies demonstrate the practicality of the dialogical communication that is mandated in Freire’s pedagogy and EOC.

This implementation of critical and liberatory pedagogy is important because while dialogical action may be an active part in the process of using EOC to foster maturity, Freire’s pedagogy helps bring the necessity and importance of dialogical communication to the attention of students and teachers. In the first place, the pedagogy more specifically defines dialogical action as it pertains to dialogue between people belonging to different groups. More importantly, it definitively affirms the necessity of the persons trying to initiate dialogue recognizing the humanity of their audience. Secondly, Freire’s pedagogy also directly addresses the oppressive elements that try to disrupt or corrupt this dialogical effort, such as propaganda, pride, cynicism, dogmatism, and other traits associated with ethnocentrism. With the lens of Freire’s pedagogy, the teacher and the students can strategically focus their dialogical efforts on overcoming these elements with conscious effort on fostering beneficence, trust, and humility.

Ricardo L. Garcia contends that while a certain amount of preference for one’s own group is necessary, if it swelled into pride it would halt communication between groups (1). His strategy for dealing with this issue demonstrates the cultural synthesis that is outlined in critical pedagogy. By explaining the concepts of cultural borrowing and cultural relativism he hopes to curb this arrogance and maintain the effectiveness of his students’ communication. Teaching cultural borrowing shows students that their current culture and language are founded on
elements that are borrowed from other groups that possessed them first. Garcia also suggests using literary material from other cultures in order to expose students to the thoughts and lifestyles of other groups.

Phyllis Puffer suggests a similar approach. It was demonstrated in Puffer’s study how exposure to other ethnic groups and practices was useful in reducing the ethnocentric feelings of her largely hegemonic classes. She explains that in this exercise students attend a religious service of the same denomination to which they belong (implying that the service is held within their community or one of similar economic conditions) but of a different race (40). This was based on the principle that other groups are more likely to react positively to each other if they share a similar economic status. Though religious services may have participants from diverse economic backgrounds, they usually extend to the people of a particular community due to the services’ locations. These communities usually have a common economic status. Thus, religious gatherings were most likely to supply the conditions for these cultural exercises. This kind of direct contact allows the students to directly experience communication with other groups and the benefits that the contact brings.

Both EOC and Freire’s pedagogy suggest this kind of direct personal exposure to expand an individual’s social awareness. Caregivers and those seeking to engage in the common struggle of humanization cannot afford to think of social issues (oppression, racism, violence, and/or poverty) as a distant occurrence. As with the other principles of EOC and critical pedagogy, social awareness and caring must be made sincerely and personally relevant. Held warns that when individuals concern themselves with more distant others, care must be not reduced to the mere "caring about" that has little to do with the face-to-face interactions of caring labor. If the care is so reduced it can easily become paternalistic or patronizing (loc 238-240). The individual
must learn to care for and think of the “other” as a person. The other is not an alien from somewhere far away that the individual must provide aid to. The other is a fellow human who has thoughts and ideas that the individual can learn and benefit from. This way, the individual and the other humanize each other.

Unfortunately, not all students are ready recipients of this type of education. Some are not even willing to accept the idea that they hold ethnocentric ideas (ignoring the flaws in their arguments and writing) or that it is necessary to amend their views. At this stage students are being encouraged to express themselves, but they may have not yet had enough education to curb their ethnocentric ideas, and if the educator does not curb such ideas early on they leach into and cripple the students’ communication later. Thus, the first year composition and other composition teachers are given both great opportunity and responsibility. As students are encouraged to express themselves but have not yet developed their discernment, the composition teacher is able to learn about the students’ ideas and worldviews that might otherwise be hidden so as to not offend the academic and classroom communities.

However, telling the students not to express ethnocentric ideas is not as simple as it sounds. Students come to academic settings from family structures that may have promoted certain kinds of ethnocentric views. Family solidarity and the love of (preference for) family are good things which are maintained by that family’s rituals and practices. Diane Levy states that this indoctrination is where a parent’s views are most likely to be passed to their children (313). Being indoctrinated into the family group, the student will likely express some of these ethnocentric views regarding other cultures or families’ rituals and practices in his or her writing. Also, students come to the composition class environments carrying the ideas that they gained not only from their parents but from their previous academic situations as well. If the students
come from a school system that was largely hegemonic, then they are more likely to exhibit ethnocentric opinions. Thus, composition teachers must also be wary of ethnocentric views in current and past curriculums.

Critical pedagogy is ideal for giving teachers a way to systematically and consistently deal with the obstacles that ethnocentrism brings to the classroom. Though it is unknown if the teachers cited in these examples consciously utilized critical and liberatory pedagogy, their actions and practices align with the guidelines of these pedagogy and were implemented with the same goals in mind. Thus, the pedagogies were used in practice, if not with conscious intent, in these particular (and other similar) instances. The pedagogy functions when the professor and students work to maintain dialogical communication within the classroom. This allows the students to recognize their shared humanity that is overlooked when ethnocentrism is the focus of their worldview and cultural interactions. The exercise of dialogical discussion transforms the moment of contact from a point of cultural conflict to an opportunity for cultural synthesis and shared exploration of the truth. Though Freire never claims that critical pedagogy would provide a strategy to change the minds of the oppressive society or the ethnocentric student, it does provide protection and guidance to the willing individual and group. In the case of ethnocentrism, the greater harm comes from the temptation to doubt someone’s humanity (whether the self’s or another’s). Having the proper regard for one’s own humanity and the humanity of others protects against allowing oneself to be oppressed or being seduced into oppressing others. When the students and teachers recognize that they are all part of a large community, they recognize the division of ethnocentrism for the lie that it is. In fact, when teachers begin to address ethnocentrism as a fallacy that values one ethnicity or culture over another, they are acting out critical pedagogy’s first step. They are also expanding the
responsible reach of their care. The acknowledgement of humanity leads to the dialogical interaction and opens up the possibilities of unity and cooperation. In the case of the writing classroom, this cooperation leads to a greater understanding and more effective writing.

All of this is predicated on the choice of the individuals to value their fellow humans and EOC’s principles of love, trust, and humility. The individuals who slide back into the practice of concerning themselves only with their own perceived well-being will never receive the full benefit of the unity and cooperation that the exercise of Freire’s pedagogy may make available to them. Nor will they, despite appearances, contribute real benefit to the group. These individuals are essentially isolated and their presence in the classroom amounts only to so much clutter and noise.

In order for individuals to gain the benefits of the classroom, a degree of strength is necessary. In the case of ethnocentric individuals, they must have the strength to refuse the privilege that they think they receive at the expense of the outside groups or groups. Or the oppressed must look past the historic injustices his/her group has suffered due to other groups’ actions or apathy. And though persistent ethnocentric students may never receive the benefit of the cooperative classroom, the critical pedagogy can empower the rest of the classroom with the clarity and unity to properly resist ethnocentrism.

As the teacher serves as the direct leader of the classroom environment, his or her guidance is of critical importance. Though it is hoped that the students will have some idea of how to deal with ethnocentrism and to be critically aware and active in combating oppression around them, it would be irresponsible of the teacher to assume such knowledge on the part of the students or to shirk the responsibility of instruction that comes with his or her position as a leader in a multicultural environment. This creates a dilemma of responsibility on the part of the
teacher. This dilemma is one that has currently divided teachers between those who want to use critical pedagogy in classes as a way of directly addressing ideological conflicts and topics, and those who see a danger of the teacher pressuring students with his or her own ideological beliefs and political views.

Teachers like Maxine Hairston are largely of the opinion that allowing ideology to be debated in classrooms (outside a neutral presentation of one’s ideology) would give too much opportunity and temptation for teachers and institutions to canonize their own ideological beliefs over those of the students. The students would then constantly perceive pressure to conform to the views of the teacher or institution. According to John Trimbur’s review, the ideal goal that she expresses in her article “Diversity, Ideology, and Teaching Writing” is a class in which the students may express their ideologies but need not defend them against the scrutiny or criticism of the teacher or their fellow students (Trimbur 248). Hairston seems be wary of ideology in classrooms precisely because of a situation like an ethnocentric teacher or student being present. She highlights the obvious harm that such an ideology could do and questions the appropriateness of other ideologies.

However, many other teachers think that this is a weak approach that condescends to the students and underestimates their abilities and willingness to navigate such conflicts. As Trimbur explains, “What comes across strikingly in Maxine’s article is not only her defense of a “pure” and “low-risk” classroom devoted to student’s composing process, but more tellingly, a fear of differences” (249). Essentially, this is a class where it is universally acknowledged that everyone may hold their own beliefs and opinions. Unfortunately, in this sort of class structure there is no reason for students to engage outside of their own groups or systems. In his essay “Negotiating
the Contact Zone” Joseph Harris ends with an appeal to teachers to work towards showing students a new way interact with cultures different from their own:

We need to imagine a different sort of social space where people have reason to come into contact with each other because they have claims and interests that extend beyond the borders of their own safe houses, neighborhoods, disciplines, or communities. We need to find ways of urging writers not simply to defend the cultures into which they were born but to imagine new public spheres which they would like to have a hand in making (168).

This is where Freire’s model of leadership and cultural synthesis come into play. In the classroom the teacher is the appointed leader, but s/he cannot be a dictator. The teacher cannot, or should not, simply ignore the experiences and cultures of the students. But the teacher can and must empower and educate the students. By expanding the knowledge of the students, they are able to view their experiences in the larger context. Their cultures become foundations that can be refined and serve as a basis for their praxis. And this remains true for teachers as well. While they must not demonstrate ethnocentric principles regarding culture and ideology, they must still value their own beliefs or risk sounding like a hypocrite when they ask students to respect each other’s cultures. Critical pedagogy allows the individuals to value their own cultural views and values, while at the same time not being blind to the shortcomings of their views. This also allows individuals to share and appreciate what other groups have to offer. Thus, teachers are able to guide ideological interaction in classrooms without the necessity of overriding students’ values or beliefs with their own in order to maintain control.

In summation, critical pedagogy provides a way for the composition teacher to leverage EOC’s principles of beneficence, trust, and humility to directly combat the present issue of ethnocentrism and conflicting ideologies in the classroom. Ethnocentrism needs to be addressed because of its detrimental effects on student communication, the way it promotes oppression in society and classrooms, and the extent to which it can go undetected in academic and social
institutions. While the principles of EOC do directly oppose ethnocentrism, it does not yet provide clear direction on how to do so, nor does it give teachers a clear way to bring about positive change through care on a large social scale. However, EOC is capable of these feats with critical and liberatory pedagogy as a focusing tool. EOC gives teachers the goals and strategy of fostering maturity and care in classrooms, while critical and liberatory pedagogy define what this maturity looks like, what forces threaten it, and how to promote its growth outside the classroom and into society. With critical and liberatory pedagogy the teacher simply meets the impulse of antidialogical action with the conscious effort towards dialectic communication. Liberatory pedagogy helps teachers prioritize encouraging the students’ communication and dialogue; at the same time, critical pedagogy gives a clear description of what to be on guard against (in student behavior and the teacher’s own conduct).
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

Despite critics and the passage of time, composition teachers still have much to gain from revisiting the principles that are found in the pedagogy developed by Paulo Freire in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. The original intent of the pedagogy was for the poor and oppressed to empower themselves through literacy, and thus be able to defend themselves and others from the oppression of a ruling elite class of citizens who were apathetic to the condition of the poor. This was a radical idea and Freire suffered much personal persecution from the government when his works were decided to be seditious to the current establishment.

The pedagogy focuses on critical reasoning and awareness. Freire maintains that individuals can not presume that the state of the society they live in, or their place in it, is as it appears. Individuals may think that they are free, especially if their media and government tell them repeatedly that they are, while in reality they may serve as slaves or as the oppressors. Individuals must be aware of the reality that they live in. Beyond this they should be aware of the reality that others live in as well. When individuals see their situations for what they are, then they can make informed decisions whether to try to maintain their humanity, or to take what actions are necessary for them to achieve freedom and greater humanity.

The way that Freire’s pedagogy directs people to accomplish this is through praxis and dialogue. The combination of reflective thought and action, that is praxis, allows the individual to prudently pursue greater empowerment and humanity. Praxis, however, is not enough. Dialogue is a necessary component. Dialogue is how educators and students learn and teach without becoming passive or oppressive. In order to keep dialogue functioning in this way, Freire asserts that love, trust, and humility are indispensable to dialectic action. Freire writes:
If I do not love the world— if I do not love life— if I do not love people— I cannot enter into dialogue…

Dialogue, as the encounter of those addressed to the common task of learning and acting, is broken if the parties (or one of them) lack humility….

Without this faith in people, dialogue is a farce which inevitably degenerates into paternalistic manipulation (70-71).

The reality that these principles are of vital importance to the efforts of teaching is becoming more apparent to educators. Shari Stenberg writes in her article *Liberation Theology and Liberatory Pedagogies* about how discussion of teaching has turned away from including these principles, particularly to the detriment of the efficacy of Freire’s pedagogy. She writes, “Indeed, because of the deep chasm between intellectualism and spirituality, many of the values from which Freire wrote have been severed from critical pedagogy discourse in the United States—a split that I contend limits the potential effectiveness of critical pedagogy's work” (275). This breach between these principles and the pedagogy maybe why some remain resistant to Freire’s pedagogy.

While love, faith, and humility may be claimed as humanist principles that are found in any number of belief systems and intellectual philosophies, it is difficult to ignore the ideological tenets of Christian theology in liberatory pedagogy. Stenberg explains the core value of this theological system at the start of her article. She writes, “This tradition, exemplified in the Exodus event of the Old Testament, insists that God is on the side of the oppressed” (272). Unfortunately, this link to biblical tradition makes many academics uncomfortable.

This unease and critical stance towards religious ideologies is a long standing tradition of American academia. Stenberg notes that many of the “pace setting” institutions that laid the foundation for America’s current academic culture functioned as spaces where intellectuals were protected from the influences of Roman Catholicism. She writes, “they espoused a nonsectarian
liberal Protestant view whose faith was built upon the Western cultural heritage, American democracy, and science. In many ways, nationalism constituted the university's new religion” (276). This attitude multiplied as these academic institutions continued to grow in influence. “Increasingly, identification with any particular religious tradition in the university was deemed divisive and ultimately harmful to democratic ideals” (Stenberg 276). So over time, the theological ideas and traditions that were supposed to protect liberty and the humanizing efforts of academics became the suspected tools of oppressive ideologies.

However, the principles of love, faith, and humility are essential for liberatory pedagogy to be effective in the classroom. Stenberg writes,

To place these traditions back in dialogue is not to espouse theology in the critical classroom, it is to return to roots that might better allow us to realize the goals of liberatory education: valuing student knowledge, enacting a reciprocal teacher-student relationship, enriching critique with both compassion and action, and participating in ongoing reflection and revision (288-289).

Without these principles, a critical approach may degrade into little more than a farcical act where the teacher forces the minds of h(is)er students to reorient as s/he sees fit. Stenberg further warns that the push to use the critical rationalism of the teacher or the academic institution as the core of classroom pedagogy not only risks alienating students to the point where they either reject the pedagogy of academia out of hand or closet their true opinions in order to succeed, but also risks positing critical knowledge as truth, which is a form of fundamentalism (279, 284)

Interestingly, the modern theory known as Ethics of Care actively uses the same principles espoused by Freire. This theory was articulated first by Carol Gilligan in A Different
Voice, and then refined by theorists Nel Noddings and Virginia Held. Ethics of Care (EOC), when used as pedagogy, is designed to help people reach self-sufficiency and maturity. According to Nel Noddings, EOC uses four methods of care instruction: modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation. Each of these methods reveals at least one of the primary principles that Freire maintains must guide dialectic action.

The first method is modeling. Modeling demonstrates love and trust, because a teacher must be willing to make the first caring action. The recipient of this care may not be able to properly reciprocate this care at the start of the caring relationship, so the initial act of care is one of great beneficence. This kind of selfless act, that does not require reciprocation or worthiness on the part of the recipient, is one of the primary definitions of love. It is also an act of trust because the teacher is acting on the faith that the effort to impart care will lead to the recipient’s eventual maturity and ability to sustain a caring relationship. Of course, if love and trust are not the basis of this modeling then the recipient’s efforts to mature will be impaired. Without love and trust the caregiver is likely to dictate action to the recipient in order to guarantee that the care relationship is ‘properly’ reciprocating. This kind of dictation is a classic demonstration of the banking model which leads to student immaturity and dependence on the teacher, which also increases the likelihood of teacher burnout. Furthermore, even if the student becomes the ideal dictated by the teacher, the student will have become the recreated self of the teacher (the self that the teacher loves and trusts over the students) incapable of contributing thoughts different from the views of that teacher.

The second method Noddings discusses is dialogue. Dialogue demonstrates love for many of the same reasons as modeling, but it also serves as a strong example of the principles of trust and humility. Dialogue is also another point of connection between Freire’s pedagogy and
EOC. In order for meaningful dialogue to take place, the teacher must trust that the students will be able to receive it, but s/he must also be humble enough to receive the input of the students as well. Stenberg notes that “this ethos of sharing in knowledge making (rather than denying the validity of one another's knowledge) is at the heart of Freire's notion of praxis. Praxis requires that the teacher trusts in the student's ability to reason” (280). If the teacher is too proud, then the exchange becomes simply the teacher talking at the students. As Freire, Noddings, and others note, all participants in dialogue must be able to receive what is said by the other. If one side is unable to do this, then dialogue has not yet occurred.

Like dialogue, practice and confirmation demonstrate the principles of love, trust, and humility. However, the principle of trust is of great importance because practice is the method where the students begin to reenact the care that they have seen demonstrated. The teacher must trust that the students will be able to mature and develop the ability to make choices for the good of themselves and the people that they have relationships with. This maturity is one of the primary goals of care. If the teacher cannot exercise this trust s/he will step in to correct imminent student errors as they attempt to demonstrate care. However, this denies the students the chance to reciprocate the caring relationship, and may lead to their dependence on the care of the teacher and the retardation of their maturity. Educators are aware that errors and mistakes are a necessary part of the learning process. This is no less true in learning to care effectively. Without practice, that has the potential to fail, students become dependent on the direction of the teacher. The students then become tools for the teacher’s caring acts, as opposed active caregivers themselves.

Confirmation, perhaps, requires the most trust of all the methods of teaching care. The teacher must affirm the presence of the students’ good intentions (the most reasonable and
acceptable motive) behind their actions and trust that these good intentions will be maintained beyond the classroom. Receiving the teacher’s trust affirms the students’ knowledge and ability. At this stage the teacher removes the guiding hand that directs and restrains the students and trusts that they will act in a caring and mature way on their own and of their own volition, outside the teacher’s view. One way that teachers demonstrates this trust and confirms the students’ abilities is to introduce new material or challenges that require the skills or knowledge that have just been confirmed. The teacher trusts that s/he no longer has to guide the students in the use of these skills and focuses on the new lessons without revisiting the old. For instance, a teacher who wants to confirm the students’ motives and care may give the students unguided opportunities to care. Without this trust, the teacher must go over the old lessons over and over again. Likewise, if the teacher goes over old lessons too many times the students may decide that the teacher does not trust them and the confirmation is lost. And without this confirmation, the students must return to the direction of the teacher, the supposed to know, and again become immature dependents.

Due to the importance that EOC places on love, trust, and humility there are many who do not necessarily feel comfortable with this as a standard system of education. They worry over the possibility of exploitation on the part of the teacher towards the students, of the teacher by the administration, of the students from other sources. However, the guidelines of Freire’s pedagogy help teachers and students guard against such exploitation. The kind of exploitation that these educators fear is almost a copy of the “banking method” that Freire’s pedagogy warns against and that the principles guard against. If the individuals in power operate from a principle of love, then they must value the humanity of those who are under their guidance. This value of humanity means that they must not, and cannot, exploit those under their authority because to do
so would be to reduce these precious humans into things that are incapable of becoming more human. The principles of trust and humility allow a person in authority to confirm the humanity of those under his/her authority. This acknowledgment opens the possibility of dialogue which enhances the authority figure’s ability to care and thus heightens an aspect of their humanity. Without a principle of love, those under authority serve merely as resources for the authority figure. And if the authority figure is without trust and humility, then those under their authority not only require continuous guidance but are also dangerous liabilities which can only be allowed to operate in systems of lasting control. As Freire emphasizes, liberation happens when the individual becomes aware of how s/he is oppressed and, equally important, how s/he oppresses others.

Liberatory pedagogy gives those who value EOC a way to deal with some of the most difficult and pervasive ideological problems in America. One ideological problem that serves as a great example is ethnocentrism. Though it directly opposes the goals and efforts of EOC, some who seek to use this ideology to their advantage, or even those who are ignorant of its implications, may say or assume that actions motivated by ethnocentrism are done out of care. However, it is impossible to engage in ethnocentrism and adhere to the principles of care. Though a person’s caring actions may be limited to the people s/he are in relationship with, s/he cannot deny the need to apply these principles to people outside his/her own ingroup. In the first place, it represents an arrogance that bars the individual (and any other person influenced by this ideology) from any benefit of dialogue with outside groups. Likewise, it makes trust and cooperation difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. Here again, the ethnocentric individual (and those under this individual’s guidance) receive none of the humanizing benefits to be had from dialogue. And perhaps most importantly, this kind of denial limits and corrupts any claim or
practice of the principle of love. This kind of denial dehumanizes the outgroup and thus limits the ingroup’s own process of humanization (which is dependent on respecting and fostering the humanity of others).

Freire’s pedagogy allows people to see ethnocentrism for the dangerous element that it is and to directly address it with communication and dialogue. Through this, the division that is caused by ethnocentrism can be bridged and closed, creating unity and community rather than division and conflict. In fact, most of the successful efforts made by educators to deal with ethnocentric elements in their classroom have direct correlation to the strategies that Freire outlines: meaningful dialogue between groups where the dialoguers hold attitudes of trust and humility, efforts to establish a culture that encompasses both groups involved, and an overarching goal of achieving harmony and unity.

This emphasis on trust and humility gives Freire’s pedagogy immense value to those instructors who doubt the possibility or virtue of academic ideological neutrality. Freire’s pedagogy allows for ideological discussion while (ideally) maintaining student ideological autonomy and fostering critical thinking and awareness. This allows the classroom to function as the “contact zone” where students learn to navigate these issues from their own (hopefully informed) opinions and ideological views. For many teachers, this is the essence of teaching and learning, and the pedagogy allows them to achieve this in an ethically valid way.

If the teacher restricts such discussions in the classroom, then the teacher may be thought to be pushing a counter ideology without realizing it. To say that certain ideological views or thoughts should not be discussed in a classroom is to say that certain ideas are right and others are wrong. It is very unlikely that ideology allows for the neutrality that these teachers are hoping for.
The pedagogy of Freire and EOC may have their own ideological elements (less so EOC); however, their nature is to press for awareness from the individual. The teacher does not push his/her ideological values or political agendas onto the students. But, the teacher does make the students aware of the reality that their choice to be students and to learn necessitates the taking of a critical mind and an awareness of the reality around them. It is part of the teacher’s responsibility to remind the students that they have come to the classroom to grow and change. Whether students decide to do this by taking up alternate ideological views is a decision that must be left to them, not the teacher or the administration. The teacher must trust that the students can eventually do this. This reality is discussed in an article coauthored by Jim Baumlin and Margaret Weaver titled “Teaching, Classroom Authority, and the Psychology of Transference.” The authors maintain that the student’s dependence on the teacher’s guidance should be lessened over time. The article states, “Clearly, then, the student’s development requires that the teacher break the transference—break with traditional pedagogy. Instead of saying to students, ‘Tell me your problems and I’ll work them out for you,’” the teacher encourages dialogue: “Talk your way through this one; how can we make it work for all of us” (Baumlin and Weaver 83).

It can be safely said that the effort to care is one of the most humanizing efforts that an individual can take up. It validates and acknowledges the humanity of both the caregiver and recipient. When Freire speaks of the efforts of individuals to be more fully human, this is what he is talking about. When one finds his/herself in a state of oppression, the care of or for another may be the first impetus that draws his/her into the effort to acknowledge his/her own humanity and the humanity of those around him/her. An object cannot care or receive care. If a person wants to give or receive care, he/she must seek fuller humanity for him/herself and the other. It
can also be argued that a reason to seek a state of being more fully human is to be able to better care for the people who one is in relation with and empower them to care for others.

The point of using ethics of care and Freire’s pedagogy in a composition classroom is to foster the maturity that students will need to move beyond the composition classroom into other studies and social life. This means that while some protection and guidance is to be afforded to the students, this should not be the state they remain in by the end of the class. Ideology may prove to be a difficult or complicated subject at the start of the class, but students should be allowed to meet this challenge as they will meet it sooner or later in life. Those who adequately use and promote care do not do so by condescending or patronizing. They meet the recipients of care with respect and try to help foster independence and maturity without allowing themselves to fall into the trap of a savior complex. These care givers realize that their ability to care, or to provide a sphere of protection (which some mistakenly prioritize as the main purpose of care) is only sustainable for a limited time. The hope is those who receive care will be able to give care by the time that the current care giver is unable to continue h(is)er efforts.

The link between justice and care, their place in classrooms, and especially the composition classroom promises many benefits. Nel Noddings writes that “There is, for example, lively debate over the primacy of rights or needs in a system of justice, and care theorists are working to produce a care-driven theory of justice” (229). With greater reflection guided by the core principles, Freire’s pedagogy can help teachers leverage EOC to greater effect in the classroom.
WORKS CITED


