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## A Hollow Victory and Unending Problem: The Undying Anti-Russian Insurgency in Ukraine


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**A HOLLOW VICTORY AND UNENDING PROBLEM:  
THE UNDYING ANTI-RUSSIAN INSURGENCY IN UKRAINE**

A Master's Thesis

Presented to

The Graduate College of  
Missouri State University

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Science, Defense & Strategic Studies

By

Abraham E. Ashley

May 2023

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Defense & Strategic Studies

Missouri State University, May 2023

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**ABSTRACT**

This thesis uses quantitative and qualitative research methods to: (1) explore the base causes of insurgency in Ukraine, (2) examine the historical basis for Ukrainian insurgency, (3) provide historical examples of successful and unsuccessful insurgencies to contrast against Ukraine, and (4) provide recommendations for NATO and Ukrainian policy. Collectively, this project demonstrates that current Russian counterinsurgency tactics will not be successful without significant adjustment. This Ukrainian insurgency may also derail the possibility of peace in the region.

**KEYWORDS:** terrorism, counterinsurgency, insurgency, resistance, Ukraine-Russia War, state sponsored insurgency, barriers to peace, Ukraine

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In the interest of academic freedom and the principle of free speech, approval of this thesis indicates the format is acceptable and meets the academic criteria for the discipline as determined by the faculty that constitute the thesis committee. The content and views expressed in this thesis are those of the student-scholar and are not endorsed by Missouri State University, its Graduate College, or its employees.

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I dedicate this thesis to the Soldiers of the Joint Multi-National Training Group –Ukraine and the unending list of units that have supported the mission. The work has been long, and the goodbyes heart-wrenching, but a difference has been made every day.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On the morning of February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Russian forces began moving across the Ukrainian border in mass. The Russian goal was the elimination of a Ukrainian regime that was no longer supportive of Russian policies, one growing ever closer to the West. The result was expected to be the complete elimination of Ukrainian armed resistance and the installation of a friendly government within days or weeks. Instead, Ukrainian civilians took to the streets to defend a government led by a man the world dismissed as an entertainer.

A year later, the world still watches a war that has wavered along a battle front more than a thousand kilometers in length with no end in sight. The question is why the Ukrainian populace resists. The answers to that question lie in the more than a thousand years of shared bloody history between Ukraine and Russia. The Ukrainian populace feels justified in taking any action for their survival because history has taught the Ukrainian people that surrender does not mean survival.

This justification, however, is not enough to create a successful resistance. It must be supported and grown. The anti-Russian insurgency in Ukraine has been afforded many advantages since its birth. Combined with a conventional force that has amplified insurgent effectiveness, anti-Russian insurgents are highly effective and numerous. Russian tactics have been ineffective in addressing this situation, a situation Ukraine and the West have encouraged. Considering this, it is unlikely Russia will be able to deal with its growing insurgency in Ukraine, one that may make real stability in the region impossible.

## ANTI-RUSSIAN INSURGENCY

Terrorist, extremist, insurgent, and freedom fighter—these words and the individuals behind them are often misused and the individuals misrepresented. Each term has a specific definition that does make it possible to differentiate.

Under the umbrella concept of irregular warfare, “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s),”<sup>1</sup> the United States Department of Defense *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines insurgency as “The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.”<sup>2</sup> Fitting inside this seemingly wide definition of insurgency is terrorism, what Bruce Hoffman offers as the following: “Terrorism, in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term, is fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence—or, equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or service of, a political aim.”<sup>3</sup> By this definition, terrorism, when it directly uses violence, it is a subset of insurgency, and part of the greater terminology of irregular warfare.

This does not make insurgency terrorism. Yasir Arafat,<sup>4</sup> Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Front, spoke at length on this difference in 1974. “The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist,” Arafat stated, “lies in the reason for which each fight. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington D.C.: The United States Department of Defense, 2016), 119, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod\\_dictionary](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary).

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02*, 113.

<sup>3</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Third Kindle Edition ed. Bruce Hoffman, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), Kindle Location 224.

<sup>4</sup> This has also been spelled Yasser Arafat.

invaders, the settlers, and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called a terrorist.”<sup>5</sup> By committing to an outright war of aggression and targeting civilians, Vladimir Putin has lost international credibility and created broad support for Ukraine in the West. The Russian military has made Ukrainian civilians a party to the conflict. Consequently, Russian civilian leadership, military industry (and its workers), and Russian patriotic symbols are legitimate targets for Ukrainian insurgents. These institutions and arguably all of Russia hold a collective responsibility for the prosecution of this war. “Where citizens have established some voluntary connection with their state—by participating in a war, voting for the regime, or even taking pride in it—they may share in responsibility for what the state has done.”<sup>6</sup> By this reasoning, the only targets that should and have been considered off limits by Ukrainian insurgents are uninvolved Russian civilians in Russia. If Ukrainian resistance organizations continue to restrain themselves to these legitimate targets while the Russian military commits war crimes, Ukrainian insurgents will continue to enjoy the moral high ground as will be examined in the chapter covering what is feeding anti-Russian sentiment.

It is not just the tactics that determine acts of insurgency, but the perceived justice of the act.<sup>7</sup> Behind the lines, Ukrainians use the tactics of the insurgent, almost universally variations on the gun and the bomb,<sup>8</sup> simply because they have nothing else, and the situation has dictated that they must.<sup>9</sup> The car bombing conducted by the anti-Russian insurgency in the occupied

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<sup>5</sup> Walter Laqueur, and Dan Schueftan, *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict* (New York: Bantam, 1974), 510. Yasser Arafat was Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization from 1969 to 2004 and President of the Palestinian National Authority from 1994 to 2004.

<sup>6</sup> Anna Stilz, “Collective Responsibility and the State,” *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 19, no. 2, (2001): 208. [https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/Stilz\\_JPP\\_0.pdf](https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/Stilz_JPP_0.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> Walter Laqueur, and Dan Schueftan, *The Israel-Arab Reader*, 510.

<sup>8</sup> Richard Clutterbuck, "Trends in terrorist weaponry," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5, no. 2 (1993): 130-139, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546559308427213>. The biggest change in conventional weapon has been handheld missiles, but they are expensive, so they need rich sponsors.

<sup>9</sup> These tactics have included both assassination and car bombing.

Ukraine that resulted in the death of pro-Russian administrator Yevgeny Yunakov,<sup>10</sup> is a strike against legitimate military targets, targets that were unreachable by other means.<sup>11</sup> When it is an action against a legitimate target it is not terrorism just because it happens utilizing the tactics of a “poor man's air force.”<sup>12</sup> These weapons and the tactics that have brought Ukraine such success will be reviewed in the chapter on resources supporting Ukrainian resistance.

The Russians loudly decry these Ukrainian resistance and even conventional military strikes as wanton acts of destruction by terrorists, yet to the West, in keeping with the definition of insurgency, these attacks are a just war for territorial integrity, an idea that America holds dear.<sup>13</sup>

Russian tactics have been counterproductive and have given Ukraine the justification to resist by almost every means available. Due to the moral imperative to resist and the dedication to territorial restoration, the efforts of the Ukrainian resistance will be referred to as an insurgency for the duration of this paper. The current causes of this insurgency’s formation are presented in the following chapters.

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<sup>10</sup> Al Jazeera Media Network, "Leader of Russian-Occupied Ukrainian Town Killed by Car Bomb," *Al Jazeera*, July 11, 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/11/leader-of-russian-occupied-ukrainian-town-killed-by-car-bomb>. It should also be noted that this has not been the first nor the last bombing targeting Pro-Russian leaders.

<sup>11</sup> Anastasia Tenisheva, "Assassinations Of Russia-Installed Officials on the Rise in Occupied Ukraine," *The Moscow Times*, September 01, 2022, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/01/assassinations-of-russia-installed-officials-on-the-rise-in-occupied-ukraine-a78689>. These operations have included brutal assassinations of Russian ministers appointed in occupied areas of Ukraine.

<sup>12</sup> Alex P Schmid and Albert J Longman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), 12.

<sup>13</sup> Grenville Byford, "The Wrong War," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4, (July/August 2002): 40-43. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/wrong-war>.

# WHAT CAUSES INSURGENCY AND EXTREMISM

## Chapter Overview

The causes of insurgency are diverse but at their core is a perceived injustice that can be addressed through violence.<sup>14</sup> The US Army Special Operations Command identifies eight factors of political violence.<sup>15</sup> These are “economic deprivation, poor governance, lack of legitimacy, marginalization, and persecution of identity groups, history of conflict in the country or conflict in nearby countries, and unfavorable demographics,” in addition to the non-human factors of a primary commodity resource and terrain type.<sup>16</sup> This section presents an overview of these causes of insurgency, along with how those conditions exist or do not exist within Ukraine.

## Economic Deprivation

The US Army’s Special Operations handbook, entitled *Human Factor Considerations of Undergrounds and Insurgencies*, recognizes poverty as a contributing factor to civil unrest but not a direct cause.<sup>17</sup> Poverty causing unrest is not a unique idea. It was articulated at least 32 years by Martha Crenshaw, where she acknowledged that economic deprivation does not always exist in concert with extremism and insurgency but often does.<sup>18</sup>

Morris Miller also explored correlation verses causality between poverty and insurgency in 2005. “There is a probable but undefined correlation between poverty and warfare. This link,

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<sup>14</sup> Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 383. “The first condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population.”

<sup>15</sup> Paul J Tompkins Jr., *Human Factor Considerations of Undergrounds and Insurgencies*, ed. Nathan Bos, (Fort Bragg: The United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 15.

<sup>16</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 15. These are what the United States Army has accepted as the contributors to terrorism and insurgency.

<sup>17</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations Insurgencies*, 15. “Poverty is generally considered to be an indirect contributing factor and not a primary cause of political violence.”

<sup>18</sup> Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 383. It is seemingly a case of correlation not causation.

however, belies conventional wisdom. The type of governance and the degree of social emancipation seem to be more determinant factors in the behavior of societies.”<sup>19</sup> Miller proposed that it is not economic deprivation but the resulting lack of power that creates insurgency.<sup>20</sup> The populace lack of power, due to poverty leaves that populace open to influence by those who control wealth.<sup>21</sup>

Prior to the engagement of outright hostilities between Russia and Ukraine in February of 2022,<sup>22</sup> the Ukrainian economy was in flux.<sup>23</sup> A large portion of Ukraine’s production was being siphoned off due to corruption<sup>24</sup> and a protracted war in the Donbas Region.<sup>25</sup> Poverty was widespread, with many average Ukrainian citizens struggling to pay for food or basic services.<sup>26</sup> Ukraine’s economy was still recovering from 70 years of Soviet rule and the vast economic upheaval caused by the Cold War.<sup>27</sup> Even worse, Ukraine faces a world economy shattered by a Covid-19 pandemic, that resulted in a global 5% decline in GDP.<sup>28</sup> In 2014, the median income in the largely pro-Russian portions of Eastern Ukraine was over 10 percent higher at \$320 (USD)

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<sup>19</sup> Morris Miller, "War, Terrorism and Poverty," *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 9, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 69, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48504776>.

<sup>20</sup> Miller, "War, Terrorism, and Poverty," 74. In this case wealth is made equivalent to power.

<sup>21</sup> Miller, "War, Terrorism, and Poverty," 78-79. Those that cannot be convinced can be bought and if they cannot then the proper amount of force can be bought instead.

<sup>22</sup> Vladimir Putin, "21 February 2022 Address by the President of the Russian Federation," *The Kremlin*, February 21, 2022, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828>. It is generally considered that Russian forces did not start invading Ukraine in mass till February 24, 2022.

<sup>23</sup> Adrian Karatnycky, and Alexander J. Motyl, "The Key to Kiev: Ukraine’s Security Means Europe’s Stability," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no.3 (May/June, 2010): 106-108, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2009-05-01/key-kiev>. Ukraine's economy is based heavily upon energy and agriculture, leaving it at the mercy of world prices.

<sup>24</sup> Working Group on Corruption and Security, *The Unrecognized Threat to International Security*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), 11, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13073>.

<sup>25</sup> Karatnycky and Motyl, "The Key to Kiev", 106-108. Corruption has been a constant concern in Ukraine despite a series of both pro and anti-Russian governments that are vowed to combat it.

<sup>26</sup> Connolly, "A Divided Ukraine," 2. At the time of this stories writing the 2018 war had not yet begun.

<sup>27</sup> John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 13.

<sup>28</sup> The UN Department of Global Communications, *COVID-19 to slash global economic output by \$8.5 trillion*, *The UN Department of Global Communications*, July 2020, <https://www.un.org/ar/desa/covid-19-slash-global-economic-output-85-trillion-over-next-two-years>

per month compared to \$291 (USD) in Eastern Ukraine.<sup>29</sup> This same distortion is reflected in the 2014 unemployment numbers. Eastern Ukraine enjoyed a rate of 6.8 percent compared to Western Ukraine's rate of 8.6 percent.<sup>30</sup> The commencement of hostilities in 2022 has resulted in a massive loss of housing and infrastructure<sup>31</sup> and created huge numbers of refugees.<sup>32</sup> The resulting lack of resources has created further widespread deprivation,<sup>33</sup> increasing the appeal of violence to restore personal power.

The significant differences in economic well-being between ethnic populations of Ukraine translates to underrepresented economic and political influence.<sup>34</sup> This in turn creates anti-Russian sentiment contributing to insurgency.<sup>35</sup> The US Army's Special Operations Command considers such an imbalance of power from economic disparity fertile ground for the creation of insurgent organizations seeking to change the status quo.<sup>36</sup>

### **Poor Governance**

In addition to economic disparity and the disproportionate power that comes with it, poor governance also contributes to extremism.<sup>37</sup> Democracies tend to provide outlets for non-violent

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<sup>29</sup> Richard Connolly, "A Divided Ukraine Could See Two Radically Different States Emerge," *The Conversation*, March 4, 2014, 2, <https://theconversation.com/a-divided-ukraine-could-see-two-radically-different-states-emerge-23946>. "Only Kherson, a sparsely populated region just north of Crimea, is poorer than the West Ukrainian average."

<sup>30</sup> Connolly, "A Divided Ukraine," 2.

<sup>31</sup> Pavel Polityuk, "Russian Invasion Damaged Up To 30% Of Ukraine's Infrastructure, Says Minister," Reuters, April 4, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-russian-invasion-damaged-up-30-ukraines-infrastructure-says-minister-2022-04-18/>.

<sup>32</sup> United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "UNHCR Operational Response eDelivery Updates 12 October 2022," *Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights*, October 12, 2022. As of 12 OCT internally displaced persons are in excess of 6.24 million Ukrainian citizens.

<sup>33</sup> Polityuk, "Russian Invasion Damaged."

<sup>34</sup> Lester M. Salamon, and John J. Siegfried. 1977. "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy," *The American Political Science Review* 71, no. 3 (September, 1977), 1042, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1960105>. The author advocates for further study on this situation.

<sup>35</sup> Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 383.

<sup>36</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 15-16. Deprivation does not directly lead to organized resistance but it does lead to individuals to becoming involved in theft and protest.

<sup>37</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 15, 17-19.

expressions of dissatisfaction with governments and their actions.<sup>38</sup> Such non-violent outlets seldom exist in other forms of government, leaving few options other than violence. Yet, by their very nature, autocracies enjoy having no limits on the ability to crack down, which allows them to quash any dissent effectively.<sup>39</sup> If the government fails to be responsive to what the citizenry perceives as its concerns, it creates a legitimate grievance.<sup>40</sup>

A condition of poor governance already exists within the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.<sup>41</sup> Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has worked to exploit Ukrainian resources for profit, colluded in customs fraud, and actively sought to enrich individual elites within Russia at the expense of the Ukrainian populace.<sup>42</sup> Even if Russia were able to create a government of occupation in Ukraine, history suggests it would be a government based on corruption. Once established, such a government would lack responsiveness to the Ukrainian population's welfare as it falls neither to the extremes of pure autocracy nor pure democracy and has instead been diluted by corruption.<sup>43</sup>

In areas of Ukraine where a pro-Russian occupation government does successfully form it is ruling over ruins through absolute force, a case that Vladimir Putin seems willing to accept.<sup>44</sup> As of April 2022, 20% to 30% of all infrastructure in Ukraine was damaged to varying degrees,<sup>45</sup> and the damage is likely much worse in the contested, Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.

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<sup>38</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 17.

<sup>39</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 18.

<sup>40</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 18.

<sup>41</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 17-18. It should be assumed that an occupation is not conducting its rule through democratic processes, but neither can it express the full control of an autocracy. United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Updates 12 October 2022." Neither Russia nor Ukraine is able to be responsive to the 17.7 million people are currently in need of humanitarian assistance within Ukraine.

<sup>42</sup> Working Group on Corruption and Security, *Threat to International Security*, 11.

<sup>43</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 17-19.

<sup>44</sup> Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Katherine Lawlor, and Frederick W. Kagan, "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 3," Institute for the Study of War, October 03, 2022, 11-12, <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3>.

<sup>45</sup> Polityuk, "Russian Invasion Damaged."



Considering the extent of this destruction, even if the Russian occupying government could interact with the Ukrainian people without immediate violence,<sup>46</sup> its ability to meet the needs of those people is effectively crippled due to destroyed infrastructure. Any support to the population is nearly impossible as Russia continues to fight what is, as of October 2022, a protracted war.<sup>47</sup>

### **Lack of Legitimacy**

Poor governance will hurt a government's counter extremism efforts, but illegitimacy of that government combined with the above can make the situation untenable. It has been proposed in the US Army's Special Operations handbook, entitled *Human Factor Considerations of Undergrounds and Insurgencies* that a government's legitimacy is based on that government's ability to provide security, justice, meet its economic needs, and meet cultural ideological legitimacy standards.<sup>48</sup> Of these, security and basic stability are the most important, as they enable meeting people's basic needs.

The legitimacy of the Russian government of occupation is already questionable, considering international condemnation for the annexation of sovereign Ukrainian territory.<sup>49</sup> Despite Russian efforts to pacify the region, which will be further expanded on in the chapter covering what is feeding anti-Russian sentiment,<sup>50</sup> the area still hostile.

Across the border in Russia, the Russian government enjoyed broad support for the War. In May of 2022, 74% of Russians agreed that they either defiantly supported (45%) or rather

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<sup>46</sup> Hird, et al, "Russian Offensive October 3," 11-12.

<sup>47</sup> Hird, et al, "Russian Offensive October 3," 1.

<sup>48</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 19-20.

<sup>49</sup> Antony J. Blinken, "Press Statement: Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, October 12, 2022," *U.S. Department of State*, October 12, 2022, <https://ua.usembassy.gov/un-general-assembly-resolution-condemning-russias-attempted-annexation-of-ukraines-territory/>.

<sup>50</sup> Hird, et al, "Russian Offensive October 3," 11-12. These difficulties include widespread efforts to filtrate former Ukrainian police and officials and their families who have apparently been inspiring resistance.

supported (29%) what was dubbed in Russia as the special military operation in Ukraine.<sup>51</sup> Such support is due to the Russian government's ability to meet the continued needs of the Russian people, despite mounting sanctions.<sup>52</sup> Combined with a cultural tradition in Russia for a strong central government, Putin's regime is both popular and considered legitimate.<sup>53</sup> This cultural tradition reaches back to the Russian czars, creating a precedent for Putin's solitary authority. Thus, the annexation elections on October 12th, 2022, which were viewed as a sham by the US government,<sup>54</sup> are thus a partial completion not just of Putin's goals but of Russia's.<sup>55</sup>

Despite Donetsk and Luhansk's traditionally pro-Russian stance that will be expanded on in the chapter on the historical basis for anti-Russian sentiment, support has been eroded by Russian actions.<sup>56</sup> These moderately occupied puppet states would be officially annexed by Russia in October of 2022, along with the Ukrainian oblasts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.<sup>57</sup> The Russian government's ability to meet the needs of the citizens of these oblasts is questionable, considering daily conventional weapon bombardment from the Armed Forces of Ukraine and a continuing insurgency.<sup>58</sup> If the Russian government does not meet the needs of its new "citizens" in the occupied territories, it is unsurprising when Ukrainians feel grievance and resist violently.

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<sup>51</sup> The ANO Levada Center, "The Conflict with Ukraine and Responsibility for the Deaths of Civilians," *Levada Center*, May 18, 2022, <https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/05/18/the-conflict-with-ukraine-and-responsibility-for-the-deaths-of-civilians/>. The legitimacy of the organization providing this data, however, has been called into question by the Russian government. This lack of independence is not because the surveys are pro-Russian but because a portion of its funding is traced to American sources.

<sup>52</sup> Gerard DiPippo, "Strangling the Bear? The Sanctions on Russia after Four Months," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, June 22, 2022, 3-4, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/strangling-bear-sanctions-russia-after-four-months>.

<sup>53</sup> Richard Wortman, "The Invention of Tradition and the Representation of Russian Monarchy," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 28, no. ¼ (2006), 652-660, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41036989>.

<sup>54</sup> Blinken, "Press Statement, 12 October."

<sup>55</sup> Stilz, "Collective Responsibility," 208.

<sup>56</sup> Roy Allison, "Russian 'Deniable' Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke The Rules," *International Affairs* 90, no. 6, (2014): 1255-1297. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24538666>.

<sup>57</sup> Blinken, "Press Statement, 12 October."

<sup>58</sup> Hird, et al, "Russian Offensive October 3," 1, 11-12.

When such resistance is backed by the might of Ukrainian conventional forces the results are impressive as showed in the subchapter covering the Ukrainian artillery-backed insurgency.

### **Marginalization and Persecution of Identity Groups**

: Perhaps the strongest and most direct contributor to the radicalization of individuals, and thus the creation of insurgency, is the marginalization and persecution of identity groups.<sup>59</sup> These identity groups can be based on tribal, religious, political, ideological, regional, or economic differences.<sup>60</sup> This theory gained great traction during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Based on that conflict, Martha Crenshaw proposed in 1981 that the “...condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism” and likely insurgency, “is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority.”<sup>61</sup> When these differences are combined with economic and/or political exclusion, however, extremism and insurgency will follow.<sup>62</sup>

Recent events in Ukraine include examples of how such identity groups can be persecuted.<sup>63</sup> Ukraine has maintained a strong Russian-speaking minority that still holds close cultural ties to Russia,<sup>64</sup> a population that is concentrated in the eastern part of Ukraine.<sup>65</sup> As of 2022, taken as a whole, Ukraine remained a majority ethnic Ukrainian and Ukrainian-speaking populace despite this Russian minority.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 20.

<sup>60</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 20.

<sup>61</sup> Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 383.

<sup>62</sup> Hegar, and Salehyan, "Ruthless Rulers," 385–403.

<sup>63</sup> While Russian examples of the persecution of the Ukrainian culture are well documented and will be expanded on in the historical basis of anti-Russian sentiment, such persecution has been conducted by both parties of this conflict.

<sup>64</sup> State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, “About number and composition population of Ukraine,” accessed April 22, 2022, <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/>. As of 2001 Russians make up 17.3% of Ukrainian residents.

<sup>65</sup> Connolly, "A Divided Ukraine," 2.

<sup>66</sup> State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, “Population of Ukraine.”

The differences between these minorities go beyond a petty squabble over language or culture. It has erupted into outright violence over whether Ukraine is best served by closer ties to Russia or NATO, an idea that is expanded on in the section discussing events leading up to the annexation of Crimea.<sup>67</sup> This conflict would be coupled with the sweeping anti-Russian laws passed in 2012 by Ukraine in an effort to retain its culture.<sup>68</sup> These laws had the unintended consequence of making repression of Russian-speaking minorities widespread and government-supported.<sup>69</sup> Ukrainian became the only official language, street and town names were changed, and pro-Russian government officials were removed all to preserve Ukrainian culture.<sup>70</sup> The anti-Russian laws have further encouraged ethnic violence, propagating both pro and anti-Ukrainian attacks through the creation of state-sponsored discrimination.<sup>71</sup> This systematic repression by the Ukrainian Government gave Russian speakers a concrete grievance with Kyiv,<sup>72</sup> a grievance that has sparked outright conflict with Russia since 2014. Since then, regular, and irregular units from Russia and Ukraine have been engaged in a shooting war in eastern Ukraine, resulting in the deaths of thousands on all sides.<sup>73</sup> Such a conflict is also a contributor to future violence, even if it was necessary to ensure Ukrainian territorial integrity.

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<sup>67</sup> Putin, "21 February Address." Putin considers Ukraine a traditional part of Russia and disputes the legitimacy of the 2014 ousting of the pro-Russian government which he considers a coup.

<sup>68</sup> Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, "Law of Ukraine: On the principles of state language policy," (Law, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2012), <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5029-17/print1331482006276224>.

<sup>69</sup> Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, "Law Of Ukraine." This law made Ukrainian the official language and made provisions for the changing of education and legal language to Ukrainian.

<sup>70</sup> Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, "Law Of Ukraine."

<sup>71</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 20-23. Systematic marginalization and discrimination is a leading cause of radicalization.

<sup>72</sup> Putin, "21 February 2022 Address."

<sup>73</sup> Vera Mironova, and Ekaterina Sergatskova, "How Ukraine Reined in Its Militias: The Lessons for Other States." *Foreign Affairs*, August 8, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2017-08-01/how-ukraine-reined-its-militias>. Both Ukrainian and Russian militias operated outside of government control targeting civilians of opposing ethnicities.

## Recent History of Conflict

A history of conflict is something that lays the seeds for future insurgency.<sup>74</sup> Large-scale war creates large portions of the population that are both desensitized to extreme violence,<sup>75</sup> and likely still well-armed. The desensitization to violence caused by war and its resultant cycle of insurgency has been well documented in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine.<sup>76</sup> Continued terrorist attacks and Israeli retaliatory interventions there have hardened the positions of both parties, making peace difficult and making violence seem to be the only effective means to settle what is ultimately a discussion of the fate of Israel and Palestine.<sup>77</sup>

Historical violence leading to a predisposition to use force to solve future political questions has existed for centuries in Ukraine as examined in the chapter covering historic anti-Russian sentiment. Restraining the argument solely to 2014 forward still leaves the countryside drenched in blood. The entirety of Ukraine was engaged in a civil uprising after removing a pro-Russian leader.<sup>78</sup> This was followed by a shooting war against separatists backed by Russia in two Oblasts.<sup>79</sup> It is still unclear if this revolution was an organic internal Ukrainian movement or instigated externally.<sup>80</sup> Regardless, it has created a nation and region that has not known peace for the last eight years.<sup>81</sup> Worse, as discussed in a later section, the history before 2014 reveals a

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<sup>74</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 47.

<sup>75</sup> Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, Daphna Canetti, Carmit Rapaport, and Stevan E. Hobfoll, "Conflict Will Harden Your Heart: Exposure to Violence, Psychological Distress, and Peace Barriers in Israel and Palestine," *British Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 4 (2016): 845-859, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26353818>.

<sup>76</sup> Hirsch-Hoefler, et al., "Harden Your Heart," 845-859.

<sup>77</sup> Hirsch-Hoefler, et al., "Harden Your Heart," 845-859.

<sup>78</sup> Lauren Van Metre, Viola G. Gienger, and Kathleen Kuehnast, "The Ukraine-Russia Conflict: Signals and Scenarios for the Broader Region," (Special report, US Institute of Peace, 2015), 1-14, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep12519>.

<sup>79</sup> Metre, Gienger, and Kuehnast, "Signals and Scenarios," 1-14.

<sup>80</sup> Putin, "21 February 2022 Address." Putin has claimed the revolution as an American backed Coup.

<sup>81</sup> Metre, Gienger, and Kuehnast, "Signals and Scenarios," 1-14.

conflict-ridden region that has been ruled through force for centuries and has seldom known peace.

In Ukraine war and genocide are not history, but experiences in living memory of the Ukrainian populace. It is a populace that has experienced both before, and they know what horrors could come next to their nation if they do not resist. It is the only reality young Ukrainians have ever known. It is these populations of affected young people that also form another factor of political violence.

### **Unfavorable Demographics**

The authors of *Human Factor Considerations of Undergrounds and Insurgencies* suggest that “larger than normal proportions of young people may have contributed to historical conflicts including the European Revolutions of 1848, the rise of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s, and the American anti-war and civil rights protests (led by “baby boomers”) in the 1960s.”<sup>82</sup> They expand on how insurgencies grow, based on this “youth bulge,” in four ways.<sup>83</sup>

The first is that a sudden growth in young adults creates an overabundance of labor, creating widespread unemployment.<sup>84</sup> The results of this unemployment are poverty, with predictable frustration and the resulting sense of grievance.<sup>85</sup>

Second, a youth bulge is by its very nature made up of young military-age individuals between the ages of 15 and 24.<sup>86</sup> These are the same individuals that commonly fill lower ranks

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<sup>82</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 25-26.

<sup>83</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 25-26.

<sup>84</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 25.

<sup>85</sup> Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 383.

<sup>86</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 25.

of most terror and insurgent movements.<sup>87</sup> These individuals are also the most likely to be drafted into conflicts by legitimate governments.

Third, these same unemployed youths of fighting age have little to tie them to a location.<sup>88</sup> They will leave rural areas for the perceived opportunity of urban areas.<sup>89</sup> This concentrates youths where they are likely to coalesce to actions such as civil disobedience and rioting. These actions desensitize them to violence,<sup>90</sup> the violence they would further be called upon to conduct once radicalized into an insurgency.

The final reason is the psychological aspect that is associated with youth. Those between the ages of 16 and 25, especially unattached males, are more likely to outright protest autocratic regimes regardless of risk.<sup>91</sup> The reason is that they are likely old enough to fight for a cause and young and idealistic enough to believe in that cause.

Aiding Russia's attempts at counterinsurgency in occupied areas, a youth bulge does not exist in Ukraine. Instead, there is a bulge in the 25-to 39-year-old range as those born because of the optimism of the immediate end of the Cold War come of age. This age range is out of prime insurgent fighting age as defined by *Human Factor Considerations of Undergrounds and Insurgencies*,<sup>92</sup> but still in acceptable ages for conventional military service. The developing bulge in the 5- to 14-year-old range should be of greater concern to Russia.<sup>93</sup> This demographic will be a Ukrainian group that has never known peace with Russia, one whose first memories of

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<sup>87</sup> Ami Pedahzur, Arie Perliger, and Leonard Weinberg, "Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists," *Deviant Behavior* 24, (2003): 405-423. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233413763\\_Altruism\\_and\\_Fatalism\\_The\\_Characteristics\\_of\\_Palestinian\\_Suicide\\_Terrorists](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233413763_Altruism_and_Fatalism_The_Characteristics_of_Palestinian_Suicide_Terrorists)

<sup>88</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 26.

<sup>89</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 26.

<sup>90</sup> Hirsch-Hoefler, et al., "Harden Your Heart," 845-859.

<sup>91</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 26.

<sup>92</sup> State Statistics Service of Ukraine, *Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine for 2020*, (Kyiv: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2020) 32-33, [https://ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat\\_u/2021/zb/11/Yearbook\\_2020\\_e.pdf](https://ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2021/zb/11/Yearbook_2020_e.pdf).

<sup>93</sup> State Statistics Service of Ukraine, *Statistical Yearbook 2020*, 32-33.

politics include the Russian annexation of Crimea and now an ongoing war.<sup>94</sup> It is this generation that will become the face of future anti-Russian insurgency and resistance.

### **Primary Commodity Resource**

There are contributing factors to insurgencies outside of human factors. For instance, a country's reliance on a single primary commodity can give an insurgency access to readily available funds.<sup>95</sup> In the past, this commodity has taken the guise of oil or diamonds. In the Middle East, crude oil has been exported and sold by insurgents to less than discerning customers.<sup>96</sup> While the motives driving an organization are often unclear—political change or profit—portable, consumable resources are perfect for funding an insurgency.<sup>97</sup>

Ukraine is no stranger to such a dependence on a primary commodity. It is a breadbasket country of Europe as well as a route through which much of Europe's natural gas flows from Russia. Ukraine is number seven in global wheat production and number five in global wheat exports.<sup>98</sup> This wheat production and the rest of Ukraine's agricultural activities were actively employing 14 percent of the Ukrainian population, contributing 27.8 billion USD to their exports. This makes it 41% of the value of Ukraine's total exports.<sup>99</sup> Unfortunately, agricultural goods generally make for a poor way of funding an insurgency as low value density and perishability limit portability.

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<sup>94</sup> Volodymyr, Zelenskyy, "We will return freedom to Crimea and make the peninsula one of the most comfortable places in Europe - address by the President of Ukraine, *The Presidential Office of Ukraine*, September 4, 2022, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-povernemo-svobodu-krimu-j-obovyazkovo-zrobimo-pivostriv-o-77521>. This is a shame they will see revenged.

<sup>95</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 50.

<sup>96</sup> Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffle, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4, (2006): 588, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3488799>.

<sup>97</sup> Collier, and Hoeffle, "Greed and Grievance," 589.

<sup>98</sup> Foreign Agricultural Service, "Ukraine Agricultural Production and Trade April 2022," *U.S. Department of Agriculture*, April 2022, 1-2, <https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/Ukraine-Factsheet-April2022.pdf>.

<sup>99</sup> Foreign Agricultural Service, *Ukraine Agricultural Production*, 1-2.



Ukraine's access to the natural gas pipelines connecting Russia to Central Europe could provide additional sources of income, but Russian dependence on these pipelines has decreased in recent years. Before February's 2022 hostilities commenced, about 25% of Russian energy exports moved through Ukrainian to the European Union (EU) and Great Britain.<sup>100</sup> In 2014, before the completion of the Nordstrom pipeline and other similar projects, over 60% of Russian energy exports used Ukrainian pipelines.<sup>101</sup> This decrease occurred in conjunction with Ukraine's loss of the Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea oblasts in 2014,<sup>102</sup> all hubs natural gas and oil production.

While a Ukrainian insurgency in occupied Ukraine using natural gas to fund a resistance would find a ready market in the rest of Ukraine and mainland Europe, makes the scheme unfeasible. Simply put, for an insurgency in occupied Ukraine, there is no primary resources that can be exploited, so funding must come from elsewhere. This funding gap is something the Western powers seem eager fill as shown in the chapter on resources supporting Ukrainian resistance.

## **Terrain Type**

An easily transportable resource is not the only non-human factor contributing to an insurgency's support. Rugged and dense terrain which makes access difficult, is often a crucial requirement for insurgency success.<sup>103</sup> Such terrain also has the effect of isolating the population, making it harder for a central government to control and easier for insurgents to operate.

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<sup>100</sup> IEA, "Russian supplies to global energy markets" accessed August 26, 2022, <https://www.iea.org/reports/russian-supplies-to-global-energy-markets>.

<sup>101</sup> IEA, "Russian global energy markets."

<sup>102</sup> IEA, "Russian global energy markets."

<sup>103</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 27.

Environments like mountains, dense forests, swamps, and jungles make it harder for centralized forces to track insurgents and bring their advantage of superior firepower to bare.<sup>104</sup>

Urban terrain and built-up areas can also hide an insurgency.<sup>105</sup> The ability of the IRA to operate safe havens within Catholic cities across Ireland with near impunity from the British is one example.<sup>106</sup> The density of human habitation in cities, combined with narrow streets and tall buildings, makes cities a mixture of complex human and physical terrain. This is a sort of human terrain that renders insurgents invisible and protected.<sup>107</sup>

Ukraine is a country that can claim some broken terrain and urban areas to protect the insurgency. As of 2015, 16.1% of Ukraine is covered in forests,<sup>108</sup> with just over 76% of these forests being young enough that the trees are so close together that they prevent vehicle access and maneuver.<sup>109</sup> An estimated 40 percent of Ukrainian forests are in Polissya Region of northern Ukraine, home to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.<sup>110</sup>

The advantage difficult rugged terrain provides resistance and defense was illustrated in the early part of the Ukraine Russia war when Russian advances on Kyiv stalled.<sup>111</sup> Future Russian moves assaults into urban or in other forested areas of Ukraine will likely face identical

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<sup>104</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 27.

<sup>105</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 27.

<sup>106</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 27.

<sup>107</sup> Concrete or stone, both will stop surveillance and high caliber rounds. Governments face difficult decisions when it comes to rooting out insurgents surrounded by a dense population giving urban terrain an advantage if collateral damage is a concern for counterinsurgency forces.

<sup>108</sup> The Department of Science and Information of the State Forestry Committee of Ukraine, "Official Report of Forestry in Ukraine," (Forestry Report, The State Forestry Committee of Ukraine, 2015):1-5, <https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/timber/docs/jc-sessions/jc-24/reports/ukraine.pdf>. This is a realization of a program that extends wooded lands to 11,3 million hectares and the percentage of forests to 16,1%.

<sup>109</sup> The Department of Science and Information of the State Forestry Committee of Ukraine, "Forestry in Ukraine," 2.

<sup>110</sup> The Department of Science and Information of the State Forestry Committee of Ukraine, "Forestry in Ukraine,"4-5. Also of note more than 50 forestry enterprises are situated inside of the irradiated area.

<sup>111</sup> Gerry Doyle, Samuel Granados, Simon Scarr, Dea Bankova, and Prasanta Kumar Dutta, "The Road to Stalemate." Edited by Simon Scarr and Daniel Flynn, version 2, *Reuters Graphics*, July 20, 2022, accessed August 11, 2022, <https://graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-CRISIS/CONTROL/gdpyzgorxvw/>.

issues against an insurgency and conventional defenses in rugged terrain.<sup>112</sup> Civilian populations have provided limited protection to insurgents in Ukraine.<sup>113</sup> The Russian military disregards collateral damage and places heavy emphasis on artillery prior to assaulting cities, tactics which Russia has used before.<sup>114</sup> This tactic has caused an estimated \$108.3 billion in destroyed Ukrainian infrastructure between February and August first of 2022.<sup>115</sup> The results of such disregard have been the near-total destruction of small villages and portions of cities across Ukraine, with a reported 114,700 privately owned houses damaged or destroyed.<sup>116</sup> The resulting ruins have created adequate cover for an insurgency.<sup>117</sup> The Russian willingness to prosecute targets regardless of civilian considerations,<sup>118</sup> leaves the use of a civilian population as cover by Ukrainian insurgents an untenable situation. Other results of this general disregard for collateral damage by the Russians are expanded on in the section on Russian pacification methods below.

### **Why These Factors Matter**

These human and non-human factors of insurgency presented above exist, will exist or have solutions provided by the West. Ukraine suffers economic deprivation, and the Occupied areas have poor governance. Vladimir Putin's control of the annexed Ukraine territories lacks

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<sup>112</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations Insurgencies*, 27.

<sup>113</sup> United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Ukraine: civilian casualty update 20 April 2022," *Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights*, April 20, 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/04/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-20-april-2022>.

<sup>114</sup> Shaburkin, "Fighting continues in Komsomolskoye" (in Russian), *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, No. 46, Internet edition, March 15, 2000. This is an example of Russia's complete disregard for collateral damage when combating insurgents.

<sup>115</sup> Kyiv School of Economics, "The total amount of documented damages has reached \$108.3 billion, minimum recovery needs for destroyed assets — \$185 billion," Translated by Kyiv School of Economics, (Kyiv: Kyiv School of Economics, August 02, 2022), <https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/the-total-amount-of-documented-damages-has-reached-108-3-billion-minimum-recovery-needs-for-destroyed-assets-185-billion/>.

<sup>116</sup> Kyiv School of Economics, "documented damages."

<sup>117</sup> United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Updates 12 October 2022." 17.7 million people are currently in need of humanitarian assistance and protection within Ukraine as of October 12, 2022. The insurgency can hide within the massive numbers of refugees and dense temporary housing.

<sup>118</sup> United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Ukraine: civilian casualty update."

legitimacy. There is ongoing marginalization, and persecution of identity groups by Russia and Ukraine in a region with a history of conflict. The lack of a primary commodity resource is being backfilled by Western funding. The terrain of northern and western Ukraine and the built-up urban areas across the country favor an insurgency. By meeting not just a few but filling all of the factors of insurgency, the formation of resistance groups describe in the next chapter is of no surprise.

## THE CURRENT FACE OF ANTI-RUSSIAN INSURGENCY

### Chapter Overview

Before the future of anti-Russian insurgency can be explored, the current face of that insurgency must be established. These already formed organizations cover the spectrum from lone freedom fighters to former self-identified neo-Nazi militias like the Azov Battalion. For this paper, the insurgents shall be those that have been identified as terrorist by Vladimir Putin,<sup>120</sup> regardless of the justice or misuse of the label. What makes these organizations unique in insurgent history is that they often work with full approval or are outright integrated into the armed forces of Ukrainian. This section presents an overview and brief history of the Azov Battalion, hacking groups, foreign fighters, and bypassed conventional forces that have taken up arms for Ukraine.

### The Azov Battalion

Arguably the most infamous of Ukraine's Militias, the Azov Battalion was created in 2014 as a volunteer military battalion combating Russian aggression.<sup>122</sup> As of 2019, it has officially become part of the Ukrainian National Guard. The units' veterans have created a political party that embraces professed neo-Nazis into its ranks.<sup>123</sup> This political party has not won any seats in the national legislature in the latest election, despite Russian claims of widespread Nazi influence within Ukraine.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Putin, "21 February Address."

<sup>122</sup> Michael Colborne, "There's One Far-Right Movement That Hates the Kremlin," *Foreign Policy*, April 17, 2019.

<sup>123</sup> Colborne, "One Far-Right Movement." The numbers of these individuals is unknown.

<sup>124</sup> Putin, *Address by the President of the Russian Federation*. Putin claims in this address, "neo-Nazism which have been elevated in Ukraine to the rank of national policy."

This organization is the equivalent of an American right-wing militia drafted into the conventional military after grievous losses from coordination failures.<sup>125</sup> These losses resulted in Kyiv issuing an ultimatum to the group's leader, then Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs, Arsen Avakov.<sup>126</sup> Azov and other such militias operating in the Donbas region of Ukraine had to be incorporated into the National Guard or be declared illegal combatants by the central Kyiv government.<sup>127</sup> Since that time, Azov has enjoyed the status of a special unit in the Ukraine National Guard despite its historic links to extreme right elements across Europe. Prior to the war breaking out, the most extreme personnel had reportedly been removed in a series of expulsions conducted by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.<sup>128</sup> The personnel were discharged and barred from reenlistment. It is likely that most of these individuals immediately found a place in the political party that formed because of these bloodless purges.<sup>129</sup>

In mid-April 2022, most of the Azov Battalion was conducting a bloody defense of the Azovstal iron and steel works in the Ukrainian coastal city of Mariupol.<sup>130</sup> Despite being surrounded and a nearly ninety percent destruction of the city, they, along with a unit of Ukrainian marines, vowed to fight to the last, with the full blessing of Ukrainian President Zelenskyy.<sup>131</sup> The result of this defense was predicted to be the complete loss of the

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<sup>125</sup> Vera Mironova, and Ekaterina Sergatskova, "How Ukraine Reined In Its Militias: The Lessons for Other States." *Foreign Affairs*, August 8, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2017-08-01/how-ukraine-reined-its-militias>. In the battle of Illovaisk, more than 1,000 Ukrainian fighters were killed, about 100 were injured, and 128 were taken prisoner. Lack of coordination is often cited as a main cause of the disaster.

<sup>126</sup> Mironova, and Sergatskova, "Reined In Its Militias."

<sup>127</sup> Mironova, and Sergatskova, "Reined In Its Militias." This same demand was made to the other Ukrainian militias operating in the Dombas region.

<sup>128</sup> Mironova, and Sergatskova, "Reined In Its Militias." The extent to which this political party influences the day-to-day operations of the Azov Battalion is unclear.

<sup>129</sup> Colborne, "One Far-Right Movement."

<sup>130</sup> Marisa, Bella, and Kornfield, *Mariupol*. This is quoted from Mayor of Mariupol Pavlo Kyrylenko, who credits the Azov battalion with defending during the more than month long siege.

<sup>131</sup> Volodymyr Zelenskyy, "If Our Partners Have the Weapons Ukraine Needs, Their Duty Is to Help Protect Freedom and The Lives of People - Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy," *Ministry of Defense of Ukraine*, April 20, 2022, <https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2022/04/20/if-our-partners-have-the-weapons-ukraine-needs-their->

organization's namesake military unit.<sup>132</sup> As of late September, Mariupol has surrendered, and more than 900 members of the Azov Battalion have been taken prisoner.<sup>133</sup> Regardless, these events have made the Azov battalion heroes of Ukraine. Like the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists during the second World War explored in latter chapter, Azov has support in their fight for Ukrainian independency and sovereignty despite aspects of Nazism. This support ensured that the Azov battalion rapidly refilled its ranks, and the unit has currently returned to combat, remaining an enduring if politically questionable part of Ukrainian resistance.

## Hacking Groups

Not all anti-Russian insurgents use guns and bombs. In a recent development, hackers based internally in Ukraine and elsewhere have begun targeting the Russian government's financial and transportation systems.<sup>134</sup> These organizations include the global hacking group Anonymous, cyber security agencies that have been co-opted to conduct offensive cyber operations by the Ukrainian government, and antigovernment organizations in Russia and Belarus supporting Ukraine, such as the Belarusian cyber-Partisans.<sup>135</sup>

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duty-is-to-help-protect-freedom-and-the-lives-of-people-address-by-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy/. During this address he announces awards for 286 servicemen, including members of Azov and the Right Sector volunteers.

<sup>132</sup> Shoigu, *Meeting with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu*. In a meeting with the Defense Minister Shoigu, Vladimir Putin has given the orders to seal off and isolate the industrial part of the city.

<sup>133</sup> Natalia Liubchenkova, "Ukraine war: What happened to the Mariupol defenders taken captive by Russia a month ago?," *Euro News*, June 25, 2022, <https://www.euronews.com/2022/06/24/ukraine-war-what-happened-to-the-mariupol-defenders-taken-captive-by-russia-a-month-ago>.

<sup>134</sup> Kate Conger, and Adam Satariano, "Volunteer Hackers Converge on Ukraine Conflict With No One in Charge," *The New York Times*, March 4, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/04/technology/ukraine-russia-hackers.html>.

<sup>135</sup> Conger and Satariano, *Volunteer Hackers Converge*. Yegor Aushev, Co-founder of a Ukrainian Cyber Security company is confirmed by the Ukrainian government as coordinating more than 1000 hackers to target infrastructure and logistic systems.

Anonymous is an organization that has been hunted worldwide.<sup>136</sup> This organization has deviated from its normal modus operandi, and instead, it is now acting with the full support of the government of Ukraine and Western nations in a surprising turn. They and groups like them have been waging a decentralized and disorganized campaign against Russian government websites and military support infrastructure like railroads.<sup>137</sup> These organizations have penetrated the Russian firewall to spread news reports, actively helped the targeting of Russian soldiers, and stolen money from Russian oligarchs, all in the name of defending Ukraine.<sup>138</sup> While these hackers seem to have had little tactical impact, these groups have been harassing Russian interests. Many of these groups enjoy financial support from Kyiv.<sup>139</sup>

### **Foreign Fighters and Independent Units**

In the early months of the war, Ukraine created an International Legion of Territorial Defense to take in the thousands of foreign volunteers who had appeared at the borders seeking to fight the Russian Army.<sup>140</sup> Notably, most of these people volunteering to fight have no combat experience or plan, and when they find that the Ukrainian International legion requires an

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<sup>136</sup> U.S. Department of Justice: Office of Public Affairs, "Sixteen Individuals Arrested in the United States for Alleged Roles in Cyber Attacks," (Washington D.C.: Office of Public Affairs, 2011), <https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/sixteen-individuals-arrested-in-the-united-states-for-alleged-roles-in-cyber-attacks>. This included raids across the United States and Europe.

<sup>137</sup> Cerulus, Laurens, "Hacktivists come to Ukraine's defense: Moscow cyber agency said threat of cyberattacks in Russia was 'critical,'" *Politico*, February 25, 2022, <https://www.politico.eu/article/hacktivists-come-to-ukraines-defense>. The group claiming responsibility for the railway attack is the Belrusian Cyber Partisans.

<sup>138</sup> Conger and Satariano, "Volunteer Hackers Converge." While the attacks have all been reported against Russian interest, the reasoning of these groups beside the financial gain is unknown.

<sup>139</sup> Conger and Satariano, "Volunteer Hackers Converge." Yegor Aushev is offering a \$100,000 reward for identifying code flaws in Russian cyber targets.

<sup>140</sup> Kacper Rekawek, "Ukraine's Foreign Legion: 12 important points," *C-REX - Center for Research on Extremism*, March 18, 2022, <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/2022/ukraine%E2%80%99s-foreign-legion-.html>. As of 22 April 2022, there is no confirmed number to the strength of the foreign legion.



enlistment for the duration of the conflict, they have no interest in signing up.<sup>141</sup> This requirement has driven most of these volunteers into the ranks of the numerous militias that have formed, which are far less stringent and often have more extremist views like Azov above.<sup>142</sup>

As of April 2014, The three largest groups of domestic Ukrainian Militias: the Azov Battalion, the Right Sector's Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, and the Aidar Battalion, have been folded into the regular Ukrainian military with varying amounts of independence.<sup>143</sup> As of mid-October 2022, the status of these groups is unclear,<sup>144</sup> but it is likely splinters of these groups will remain independent of Kiev and actively recruit foreign fighters in their struggles against Russia.<sup>145</sup>

This is a dangerous combination of foreigners willing to fight, no government control of where they are going, and organizations willing to expedite them to the front lines.<sup>146</sup> The result is the creation of poorly trained irregulars who desire to fight and dislike the central Ukrainian government for not allowing them to do so. This has undoubtedly made any attempt for Kyiv to exercise control over such units even more difficult.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Sudarsan Raghavan, "No Gun, No Helmet, No Action: The Frustrations Of Some Novice Americans Who Signed Up To Fight In Ukraine," *The Washington Post*, March 20, 2022, <https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2022-03-20/the-frustrations-of-some-novice-americans-who-signed-up-to-fight-in-ukraine-5413238.html>. Standards for enlistment have been increasing from no experience required to the now prior combat duty required.

<sup>142</sup> Raghavan, "No gun. No helmet." These groups include the Georgian National Legion, Veteran groups and the dozens of other Territorial Defence forces and private militias.

<sup>143</sup> Mitch Ruhl, "Paramilitary Forces in Ukraine: Matches to a Powder Keg." *Small Wars Journal*, February 21, 2022, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/paramilitary-forces-ukraine-matches-powder-keg>. These groups were given the choice between depoliticization and being forcibly dispersed.

<sup>144</sup> It is clear that an insurgency is taking place but not who is directly responsible.

<sup>145</sup> Ruhl, "Paramilitary Forces in Ukraine." These include former members of the Azov Battalion deemed too extreme to serve in regular Ukrainian military units.

<sup>146</sup> Rekawek, "Ukraine's Foreign Legion." With the withdrawal of Russian forces from the region of Kyiv, this situation seems to have come more controlled as the front line moves farther away from where foreign volunteers enter the country.

<sup>147</sup> Raghavan, "No gun. No helmet." The inability of the central government to control the actions of militia units against Russian forces is well documented and unlikely to change in the foreseeable future in areas of direct conflict.

## Conventional Insurgents?

What has not been covered in a description of the current face of Ukrainian insurgency are two formations. The first is those elements of the Ukrainian military that intentionally operate well behind the lines of Russian forces.<sup>148</sup> These intelligence and special forces units are central government controlled.<sup>149</sup> Their operations are of a military nature with the goal of amplifying conventional military operations.<sup>150</sup> When these forces meet with resistance groups it is likely a relationship of convenience or necessity and not a command relationship that the government of Ukraine could use in the future to reign in its resistance fighters. This loss of control is a concern that that will be expanded on in the final chapter of this paper.

The other group is those line units of Ukrainian forces that have been bypassed during the initial Russian advances of the war. These formations are likely dismounted infantry that have been avoided by fast moving Russian mechanized formations.<sup>151</sup> Cross compatibility between Russian and Ukrainian arms combined with a Ukrainian populace that is supportive could conceivably allow small units to operate for extended periods with some success if they could avoid decisive engagements with larger Russian formations. This will be discussed at length in the chapter covering an artillery backed insurgency.

Whether a member of the Azov battalion, a hacker, an international volunteer, or a member of the Ukrainian special forces, all have joined a fight for an independent Ukraine. It is the continuation of a historic tradition of fighting for the Ukrainian nation that has endured

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<sup>148</sup> Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “Europe Is Not a Place for Promenade for Russian Murderers and Those Who Support Them – Address by the President of Ukraine,” (Kyiv: The Presidential Office of Ukraine, September 6, 2022), <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/yevropa-ne-misce-dlya-progulyanok-rosijskih-ubivc-i-tih-hto-77561>. The President of Ukraine thanks the efforts of those providing intelligence behind the lines.

<sup>149</sup> Zelenskyy, “Promenade for Russian.” These acknowledged are military formations.

<sup>150</sup> Seth G. Jones, “Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare,” CSIS Brief, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2022), 5-8. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare>.

<sup>151</sup> Jones, “Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion,” 5-8.

through some of the darkest history of Europe. It is this history that forms the bedrock of why Ukraine will never stop resisting Russian invasion.

## HISTORICAL ANTI-RUSSIAN SENTIMENT

### Chapter Overview

To understand the future of anti-Russian terror in Ukraine, it must also be accepted that anti-Russian sentiment in the region is neither new nor especially novel. Ukraine has suffered countless grievances from Russia, the Soviet Union, and then Russia again. In this darkness, it has borne a sense of nationalism that, while perhaps tainted, still shines brightly to this day. In this Chapter, the history of ancient Ukraine under the Kyivan Rus is explored before moving on to the next terror in Ukraine's history, the Holodomor. Following the Holodomor a brief study of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and OUA is presented. This is followed by Ukraine's soldiers being used as Cold War cannon fodder, the Budapest Memorandum, before this chapter concludes with the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

### The Kyivan Rus

The current iteration of anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine is based on arguments that span more than 1500 years of history. Despite Russian claims to the contrary,<sup>152</sup> Ukraine came into existence as a full-fledged empire, with the founding of Kyiv in the 6<sup>th</sup> or 7<sup>th</sup> century, almost 500 years before Russia.<sup>153</sup> The fact that Ukraine is the direct culture successor to the Kyivan

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<sup>152</sup> Putin, "21 February Address." Putin claimed that Ukraine has no claim to statehood, and not a sovereign nation but is and always has been a part of Russia.

<sup>153</sup> I. Yerofeyev, Zasenko Alekseyevich, Kryzhanivsky Oleksa Eliseyovich, Stebelsky Stepan Andriyovich, Makuch Ihor, and Lubomyr A. Andrij Hajda, "Ukraine, History: Kyivian Rus", last modified July 22, 2022, accessed August 15, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine>. This is almost 500 years before the first brick was laid in Moscow in 1147 CE

Rus Empire, not Russia, is a point of contention between current Russian and Ukrainian scholars.<sup>154</sup>

In the years following its founding, the Kyivan Rus became the heart of the Slavic world, holding the first code of laws and then converting to Byzantine Christianity in 998.<sup>155</sup> Following this seeming golden age, Ukraine suffered a slow decline as various invasions and annexations of the nation took place.<sup>156</sup> During this time of invasions, Ukrainians often became a minority in their own lands, especially in the more urban areas, as Poles, Armenians, Germans, and Jews migrated to the region.<sup>157</sup> After the partition of Ukraine in 1667, the country was split between Poland and Russia,<sup>158</sup> opening the door systematic repression of Ukrainian culture.<sup>159</sup> In the years that followed, Russia attempted to eliminate Ukraine as a separate nationality and culture, despite being the birthplace of the Slavic world.<sup>160</sup> Ukrainian attempts to preserve this culture in the modern era contributed to unrest as discussed above in the subchapter: Marginalization and Persecution of Minority Groups. Russian oppression turned to destruction of the Ukrainian language in the mid-19th century.<sup>161</sup> It was decreed that no publications could be made in Ukrainian, except for fiction, to drive Russian-Ukrainian integration.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Jaroslaw Pelenski, 1977. "The Origins of The Official Muscovite Claims To the "Kievan Inheritance"," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 1 (1977): 29, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41035738>.

<sup>155</sup> Yerofeyev et al., "Ukraine, History: Kyivian Rus." This religion eventually became the basis of Orthodox Christianity.

<sup>156</sup> Simon Franklin, and Jonathan Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus: 750-1200*, (New York: Routledge, 1996), 323-324. It was conquered and invaded by a host of nations and armies, including the Mongols, Poland, Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire, and then eventually Russia.

<sup>157</sup> Yerofeyev et al., "Ukraine, History: Kyivian Rus."

<sup>158</sup> Yerofeyev et al., "Ukraine, History: Ukraine under direct imperial Russian rule."

<sup>159</sup> Yerofeyev et al., "Ukraine, History: Ukraine under direct imperial Russian rule."

<sup>160</sup> Yerofeyev et al., "Ukraine, History: Ukraine under direct imperial Russian rule."

<sup>161</sup> Yerofeyev et al., "Ukraine, History: Ukraine under direct imperial Russian rule."

<sup>162</sup> Yerofeyev et al., "Ukraine, History: Ukraine under direct imperial Russian rule." Ukrainian nationalist writers such as Shevchenko were exiled. A secret decree followed this, the Ems Ukaz by Czar Alexander II, that closed even that small loophole allowing fiction writing

It was not until 1917 that Ukraine again had a semblance of independence, this time as the short-lived, independent Soviet Ukraine, which the Soviet Union shortly swallowed up.<sup>163</sup> What followed this short-term independence are some of the darkest times in Ukraine and the cause of much of Ukraine's grievance with Russia.

## The Holodomor

The history of attempted destruction of Ukrainian culture, language and the very ethnicity would continue under communist states led by Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, and the line of USSR leaders that would follow. The Holodomor was the first and arguably worst of these actions.<sup>164</sup>

The origin of the Holodomor lies in the policies of the post-World War I Soviet Union's policy of korenizatsiia (nativization or indigenization).<sup>165</sup> The ruler of the U.S.S.R was Joseph Stalin,<sup>166</sup> wielding absolute terror through the use of the State Political Directorate (GPU),<sup>167</sup> successfully stamped out major opposition.<sup>168</sup> One of his key agendas was the collectivization of agriculture to advance to the socialist stage of a planned economy.<sup>169</sup> This was reportable implemented by the mass genocide of ethnic Ukrainian and Kazaks through administratively

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<sup>163</sup> Yerofeyev et al., "Ukraine, History: Soviet Ukraine."

<sup>164</sup> Andrea. Graziosi, "Les famines soviétiques de 1931-1933 et le Holodomor ukrainien, (The Soviet Famines of 1931–1933 and the Ukrainian Holodomor)," *Cahiers du monde russe* 46, no. 3 (2005): 132, <https://doi.org/10.4000/monderusse.8817>. The Holodomor was one of the defining moments in the Ukrainian identity that exists as it does today.

<sup>165</sup> Tomasz Kamusella, *Words in Space and Time: A Historical Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe*, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2021), 113-114, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7829/j.ctv209xmvc.32>.

<sup>166</sup> Joseph Stalin, "The Worker's State: Foreign Delegation's Interview with J. Stalin, On November 5th, 1927," *Communist Party of Great Britain*, November 5, 1927, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/community.29436518>. A totalitarian who rose to power after the death of Lenin.

<sup>167</sup> also known as the Cheka,

<sup>168</sup> Stalin, "The worker's state."

<sup>169</sup> Kamusella, *Language Politics*, 114.

created famine.<sup>170</sup> It has alternatively been presented that this was due to systemic failure to estimate and forecast grain yields correctly.<sup>171</sup> Regardless in 1932, Ukraine only succeeded in producing 39.5 percent of its grain quota, with appalling results.<sup>172</sup> This would pave the way for Stalin's attempts at "Russification" of the Ukraine Republic and the elimination of Ukraine as an independent culture.

The Influence of the Holodomor is still seen with 4,452 signs and memorials dedicated to the event dotting the countryside of Ukraine.<sup>173</sup> The Holodomor is remembered in Ukraine much like the American Civil war is in the United States. Like the statues of Confederates, Soviet statues are defaced or removed by government order.<sup>174</sup>

The fire that the Holodomor holds in the hearts of the Ukrainian populace should be no surprise. The U.S. Army's Special Operations Command cites political discrimination through murder and genocide as the single greatest contributor to political instability, insurgency, and terrorism.<sup>175</sup> The crime creates a grievance that cannot be addressed any other way but through violence.<sup>176</sup> While the Holodomor occurred almost a century ago, the reported Russian war

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<sup>170</sup> Kamusella, *Language Politics*, 114.

<sup>171</sup> Mark B. Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933," *Slavic Review* 50 no. 1 (Spring 1991): 83-84, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2500600>.

<sup>172</sup> Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest," 84. Either premeditated genocide or bureaucratic fumbles, the results were millions of starved Ukrainians.

<sup>173</sup> André Liebich,, Oksana Myshlovska, Viktoriia Sereda, Oleksandra Gaidai, and Iryna Sklokina, *Regionalism without Regions: Reconceptualizing Ukraine's Heterogeneity*, edited by Ulrich Schmid and Oksana Myshlovska, (Central European University Press, 2019), 87, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7829/j.ctvs1g8jn.10>. This number of memorials was current as of 2008. Even decades later, after the deaths of those who lived through it, the wrong is still remembered and attributed solely to the Russians.

<sup>174</sup> Liebich, et al, *Regionalism without Regions*, 82. By 2009 more than 2,800 statues belonging to soviet statesmen, including those that could not have been involved, such as Lenin, who died well before the Holodomor, had been removed from the state registry. Ironically, pro-Russian Ukrainian leader Viktor Yushchenko ordered many of these removals. It seems even he understood the place this holds in the hearts of Ukrainians.

<sup>175</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 23. This is second only to forced resettlement and torture.

<sup>176</sup> Death on such a scale could only be answered by death in the minds of Ukrainians.

crimes in the cities of Stoyanka, Irpin, and Bucha, where Russians killed civilians in mass, have only refreshed memories of the Holodomor.<sup>177</sup>

## The OUN and UPA

During Holodomor the Ukrainian nationalist movement arose in the guise of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the much more militant Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).<sup>178</sup> Both these organizations were extreme in nationalistic views of an independent Ukraine,<sup>179</sup> as they embraced the view of “integral nationalism.”<sup>180</sup> The basis of “integral nationalism” is putting the return of independent Ukraine before social rebirth, with a general hostility to internationalism and the inclusion of nationalism in everyday life.<sup>181</sup>

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists first arose in 1923 in the territories of Ukraine that were ceded to Poland as part of the Paris peace treaties that ended the First World War.<sup>182</sup> This organizations strong nationalist ideology put it in direct confrontation with the Soviets. Up until 1939 the organization maintained strong connections with German intelligence, as it was believed that only Germany had the will and ability to create an independent Ukrainian state.<sup>183</sup> With the German invasion of Poland in 1939, it became apparent that Germany had

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<sup>177</sup> Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “There is ample evidence that it is Russian troops who destroy peaceful cities, torture and kill civilians - address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy” *Ukrainian Ministry of Defense*, April 5, 2022, 1-3, <https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2022/04/05/there-is-ample-evidence-that-it-is-russian-troops-who-destroy-peaceful-cities-torture-and-kill-civilians-address-by-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy/>.

<sup>178</sup> David R. Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine*, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007), 79, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7829/j.ctt2jbn86>.

<sup>179</sup> Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 79.

<sup>180</sup> Oleksandr Zaitsev, "Fascism or Ustashism? Ukrainian integral nationalism of the 1920s–1930s in comparative perspective," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *University of California Press* 48, no. 2/3 (2015): 186, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48610446>. This is an idea put forth in Ukraine by journalist Dmytro Dontso on April first, 1923, with the publishing of Lviv’s weekly *Zahrava* (Crimson Sky).

<sup>181</sup> Zaitsev, "Fascism or Ustashism," 186. Territorial integrity was a necessary perquisite to social justice. This theory and the nationalism that comes with it exists to this day.

<sup>182</sup> Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 79.

<sup>183</sup> John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian nationalism*, Second Edition, (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963), 42-45.



abandon any pretense of support for the Ukrainian Nationalists.<sup>184</sup> Despite efforts to coopt the organization to fight Soviet interests it is clear that any Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-German relationship was one of convenience and not an ideological marriage.<sup>185</sup>

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army was far more militarist in its operations and was formed in 1942 as a direct response to Soviet movements into the Volhynia oblast region of Ukraine.<sup>186</sup> With clashes against Soviet partisans led by Sydir Kovpak this group started to cement itself as the face of militarist anti-Soviet resistance.<sup>187</sup> That is a position the Ukrainian Insurgent Army would continue well after the Second World War.<sup>188</sup> The group would effectively cease to exist in the late 1950's with the deaths of most of its higher leadership, though there were occasional actions attributed to the group into the early sixties.<sup>189</sup> Of great note however is the reasons for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army success during more than 20 years of armed resistance. The organization enjoyed favorable terrain, the near unanimous support of the rural population, time to prepare and a moderate supply of outside arms shipments.<sup>190</sup> These are many of the same advantages effecting modern Ukraine resistance fighters in their struggles against Russia.

Despite the advantages afforded the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the organization does have a history of dubious moral standing, especially when presented by Russian authors. For the duration of Soviet control of Ukraine, from the OUA's first appearance in 1923 till the disillusion of the Soviet Union, the crimes of the OUA and Ukrainian Insurgent

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<sup>184</sup> Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 46.

<sup>185</sup> Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 46.

<sup>186</sup> Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 296-299.

<sup>187</sup> Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 296.

<sup>188</sup> Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 299.

<sup>189</sup> Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 300.

<sup>190</sup> Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 301. The author also includes having a strong supporting nationality base, a fanatic nationalist ideology and authoritarian organizational structure for the organization's success.

Army<sup>191</sup> covered the pages of everything from newspapers to books, to scholarly journals.<sup>192</sup> Alleged collaboration with German occupiers during World War 2 and the OUA's association with the militant Ukrainian Insurgent Army, made the organization traitors to the Russian motherland at a time Russia faced its greatest threat.<sup>193</sup>

The length that the Russians went to discredit the organization is a credit to the success of the OUA, or at least the institutional paranoia of the Soviet Union. For example, a story from Nikolai Romanchenko in the western Ukraine main party newspaper in which he tells the story of a hero of the secret police. Fedor Ulanov and his unit are given the task of capturing alive a "Banderite" leader with the pseudonym of Roman in early 1945. It turns into a trap, and Ulanov is captured, tortured, and eventually hacked to pieces.<sup>194</sup> "His last words—one wonders who recorded them!—were "God damn you animals! Long live Communism."<sup>195</sup>

Regardless of the Russian narrative, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army hold a central part in the mythos Modern Ukraine. The Country still believes that before it can address lofty social, and government concerns it must first ensure its territory. Now, just as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army first yelled a century ago, a forceful "Slava Ukraini! Heroiam slava<sup>196</sup>" is echoed by every member of the armed forces of Ukraine. Despite the organizations near extinction during Soviet occupation, they still hold a special part in the hearts of Ukrainian citizens with the black and red flags of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army often worn by Ukrainian service members as their battle

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<sup>191</sup> Soviet writers seldom distinguished between the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and OUA.

<sup>192</sup> Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 80-85.

<sup>193</sup> Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 79.

<sup>194</sup> Nikolai Romanchenko, "Plamya." *L'vovs'kaya Pravda*, 1988, 3.

<sup>195</sup> Romanchenko, "Plamya," 3.

<sup>196</sup> "Glory to Ukraine, glory to Heroes!"

flag.<sup>197</sup> This ardent nationalism traces its origins to Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army struggles against the Russians.<sup>198</sup>

### **Ukrainians Used as Military Cannon Fodder**

During the birth and then fall of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Ukrainians faced the prospect of fighting in Soviet wars they had no part in making. These wars would primarily be fought and paid for in blood by the Ukrainians and other non-Russians that made up the Soviet military's undesirable services.<sup>199</sup> For example, Ethnic Russians dominated the NCO corps with 42.7 percent and the officer corps at 69.4 percent.<sup>200</sup> With 75% of the 100 top Soviet officials in 1986 being ethnic Russians such discrimination is unsurprising.<sup>201</sup>

Such disproportionate representation in the military had predictable results when the casualty figures from the bloodiest interventions of the Soviet Union arrived in Ukraine.<sup>202</sup> The Russian invasion of Afghanistan created a class of Ukrainian citizens who were bloodied in what was considered a Russian war, led by Russians but fought by the nationalities.<sup>203</sup> This war was also one of Russia's large-scale attempts at counter insurgency so will be covered as an example

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<sup>197</sup> The Red and Black flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is the Ukrainian flag for the nation at war.

<sup>198</sup> Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 125-126. The Current Ukrainian Government has attempted to solidify this connection.

<sup>199</sup> These are more dangerous or menial services such as infantry and sustainment ground forces.

<sup>200</sup> Deborah Yarsike Ball, "Ethnic Conflict, Unit Performance, and the Soviet Armed Forces," *Armed Forces & Society* 20, no. 2 (1994): 246, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45346578>. Ethnic Russians made up far less of the Soviet population at this time, so the military was wildly unrepresentative

<sup>201</sup> Alexander G. Rahr, *Biographic Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials*, (Munich: Rutledge, 1986) 1-222. The figures could be higher because nationalities could not be determined for 5 percent of the "leading officials."

<sup>202</sup> Generally, officers and NCO's make up less casualties than junior enlisted personnel in conflict.

<sup>203</sup> Rafael Reuveny, and Aseem Prakash, "The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union," *Review of International Studies* 25, (1999): 693-708,

<https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docNEBAC59243E6068fd4b603a9c506fa95265e1e3aecbfde53ac8034f13f596df11181b26bf5ee1>. A war that heavily relied on the Soviet infantry, the casualties among non-Russians were terrible.

of anti-Russian Insurgency and as a studies of Russian counter insurgency tactics. By 1985 the Soviet republics, including Ukraine, were directly protesting the use of non-Russian soldiers to fight Russian wars, with funerals turning into outright Anti-Russian demonstrations like those described by the Lithuanian underground journal *Ausra*.<sup>204</sup>

The specter of Soviet conscription would end with the Cold War, but conditions would be set for renewed conflict when Ukraine inherited a significant portion of the Soviet nuclear forces.

### **Budapest Memorandum**

Following the voluntary disintegration of the Soviet state, thousands of nuclear weapons remained inside Ukraine's borders.<sup>205</sup> Between January and May of 1992, Ukraine moved all tactical nuclear weapons into Russia.<sup>206</sup> This left Ukraine with only 1,656 strategic weapons, still making it the third-largest nuclear power by numbers in 1992.<sup>207</sup> While Ukraine lacked access codes to the weapons, and the majority of the strategic rocket forces personnel responsible for maintaining the weapons were ethnic Russian, such issues could have been overcome given time.<sup>208</sup> This would put nuclear weapons in the hands of Russians third most hated enemy.<sup>209</sup>

Such a nuclear development Russia was willing to go to war to prevent coming to fruition.<sup>210</sup> To avoid an early playing of the First Chechen war in the streets of Ukraine as

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<sup>204</sup> Bohdan Nahaylo, "When Ivan Comes Marching Home: The Domestic Impact of the War in Afghanistan." *The American Spectator*, July 15, 1987, 15, <https://www.unz.com/print/AmSpectator-1987jul-00015/>. Soviet Policy had nuclear weapons stationed in many republics of the Soviet Union.

<sup>205</sup> John J. Mearsheime, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3, (1993): 51-52, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2004562>.

<sup>206</sup> Mearsheime, "Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," 52. These tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles were extensive.

<sup>207</sup> Mearsheime, "Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," 52.

<sup>208</sup> Mykola Riabchuk, "Ukraine's Nuclear Nostalgia," *World Policy Journal* 26, no. 4, (2009/2010): 95-196, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40468742>.

<sup>209</sup> Riabchuk, "Ukraine's Nuclear Nostalgia," 104. The year of this survey data is 2009.

<sup>210</sup> Even though Russia was still recovering from a bloody invasion of Afghanistan, a nuclear Ukraine was a development they were willing to fight to avoid.

described in the chapter titled Chechnya: a successful counterinsurgency through firepower, a plan was made by the West to deescalate the situation.<sup>211</sup> To avoid war, Ukraine would give up its strategic nuclear weapons to Russia.<sup>212</sup> For this grievous loss, security assurances from Great Britain, the United States, and Russia would be made.<sup>213</sup> The most damning of the treaty words was the requirement for the signed parties to “reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the charter of the United Nations.”<sup>214</sup> The lack of these nuclear weapons would leave Ukraine militarily inferior to Russia, neutering Ukraine as a potential threat and giving the United States and Great Britain continued peace and stability in the region. This would leave Ukraine ill prepared to face Russian forces just two decades later. The Russian betrayal of this agreement is a unsurprising knife in the back of Ukraine.

### **Lead Up to the Annexation of Crimea**

The Budapest Memorandum brings the reader firmly into current history. Everything prior to 2014 is a preamble to the bloody events that have transformed the Ukraine-Russian antagonism into outright war. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, a land claimed as ancestral by Russia, has destroyed any hope of an amicable reunion.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> The first Chechen war would not erupt into full scale conflict till after the memo was signed.

<sup>212</sup> Ukraine, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America, “Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to The Treaty on The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” (Memorandum, Government of Ukraine, 1994), <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280401fbb>.

<sup>213</sup> Ukraine, et al., *Memorandum on Security Assurances*.

<sup>214</sup> Ukraine, et al., *Memorandum on Security Assurances*.

<sup>215</sup> Vladimir Putin, “Press Statements and Answers to Journalist Following a Meeting of the Russia-NATO Council Bucharest,” *The Kremlin*, April 04, 2008, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24903>. Russia considers itself the heir to the Kyivian Rus, not Ukraine.

The groundwork for the Czarist Russian claim to Crimea goes back centuries.<sup>216</sup> In the 1700s, Catherine the Great had the intent to develop an independent Tatar state that was friendly to Russia and under the control of then pro-Russian Şahin Girey.<sup>217</sup> Şahin Girey formed a short-lived Khanate out of the Crimean peninsula that quickly fell into outright rebellion as his more liberal reforms rapidly turned the traditional Muslim region against his rule.<sup>218</sup> This led to a full annexation of Crimea in 1783 after a series of Russian victories would successfully defeat the Ottoman Empire and hand control of Crimea to Russia.<sup>219</sup> The intervening years involved rule by the Mongols, the Crimean Khanate, and eventually the Ottoman Empire. In 1954 Crimea would officially be returned to the Soviet Socialist republic of Ukraine, a move that increased the ethnic Russian population of Ukraine by almost a million.<sup>220</sup> The annexation would be coupled with the forced deportation of millions tartars from Crimea and Ukrainian peasants(Kulaks) from all of Ukraine to areas of Siberia and Kazakhstan.<sup>221</sup> This Ukrainian claim to Crimea would remain stable until the breakup of the Soviet Union when questions of the legitimacy of the transfer would begin to be made.<sup>222</sup> This came to a head in April 2008 when Putin stunned NATO after

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<sup>216</sup> Alan W. Fisher, "Şahin Girey, the Reformer Khan, and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 15, no. 3, (1967): 341-342, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41043307>.

<sup>217</sup> Fisher, "Şahin Girey," 341-342.

<sup>218</sup> Fisher, "Şahin Girey," 349-352. These liberal ideas included modernizing the army with intergradation of religions within units, a graduated tax levied on all Crimean citizens and other reforms that treated minorities equal to Muslims. This resulted in rumors that he was in fact Christian, something unacceptable to the traditional Muslim Khanate.

<sup>219</sup> Fisher, "Şahin Girey," 341-342. This was the first time since the Kyivan Rus that Slavs administered the area.

<sup>220</sup> Mark Kramer, "Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?" (CWIHP e-Dossier No. 47, The Wilson Center, 2022), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago>. This was likely an attempt to address what Moscow considers the nationalities questions.

<sup>221</sup> Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 17.

<sup>222</sup> Kramer, "Russia Give Away Crimea." These concerns do have some merit. There were irregularities in the process, but both republics consented, which is all that was required under the Soviet constitution of the time.

the Bucharest summit.<sup>223</sup> His territorial claims included Southern and Eastern Ukraine with the justification that Ukraine was an artificial nation.<sup>224</sup>

These threats were given teeth in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the beginning of an interstate war in eastern Ukraine. With a single move, the Russians destroyed the myth of a “brotherhood of Peoples,” which had been the basis of Russian-Ukrainian relations until that time.<sup>225</sup> Ukraine is not the only nation that has run afoul of Soviet and Russian military action. Afghanistan like Ukraine has a complicated history with Russia, yet its history in the next chapter provides lessons to future anti-Russian insurgencies around the world.

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<sup>223</sup> Vladimir Putin, “Press Statements and Answers.” These claims came at the same meeting where Putin declared that any expansion of NATO to Russians borders “would be taken in Russia as a direct threat to the country's security.”

<sup>224</sup> Taras Kuzio, *Putin's War Against Ukraine: Revolution, Nationalism, and Crime*, (Toronto: Chair of Ukrainian Studies University of Toronto, 2018), Table 1.1. Table 1.1 is the authors Chronology of the Ukraine-Russia Crisis and it is exhaustive between 2003 and December of 2016.

<sup>225</sup> Kuzio, *Putin's War Against Ukraine*, 25. This brings the reader back to the Russian held theory that Ukraine is just an extension of Russia.

## HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF ANTI-RUSSIAN INSURGENCY: AFGHANISTAN

### Chapter Overview

In the ending months of 1979, a limited contingent of Soviet Forces entered Afghanistan to support an infantile communist government.<sup>226</sup> This would be the culmination of almost 60 years of advising and friendship between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan started under the rule of Lenin.<sup>227</sup> The Soviet mission there was both simple and impossible. The Soviet Army, with its attendant advisors and support, was to defeat the enemies' main formations in their strongholds and support the newly formed government of Afghanistan in its efforts to expand its governance across the nation.<sup>228</sup> They were to find and kill insurgents while propping up an unpopular central government. The tactics Russia would use and their results are described more in depth in the chapter covering Afghanistan: Pacification by Artillery.

Like in Ukraine 40 years later, Russia was fighting an enemy that came about due to the causes of insurgency.<sup>229</sup> In Afghanistan, like now in Ukraine, the Russians faced enemies hundreds of years in the making but forged into deadly combatants within months due to the same causes of extremism now motivating the people of Ukraine as described in the chapter: "What is feeding anti-Russian sentiment."<sup>230</sup> Economic grievance, poor governance, lack of

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<sup>226</sup> Olga Oliker, "Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience," (Report prepared for the United States Army, Rand Corporation: Arroyo Center, 2011), 1-2, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1078a.9>.

<sup>227</sup> Nikolai Salmin, "Afghanistan: Dorogi Voiny: Part 1." *Ural'skie Voennye Vesti*, no. 6 (2009): 3, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1078a.10>.

<sup>228</sup> Oliker, "Building Afghanistan's Security Forces," 1-2. "Neither the means by which this was to be done nor how success in these two tasks might be defined or measured was made fully clear then or since."

<sup>229</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 39. Many of the ideas presented in this book came from American and soviet experiences in Afghanistan

<sup>230</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 39.



legitimacy, marginalization and a history of conflict all played roles in the formation of the anti-Russian insurgency in Afghanistan.

### **Economic Grievance in Afghanistan**

To understand the economic grievance justifying insurgent action in Afghanistan realize that the gross domestic product per capita was \$275.70 prior to the start of that war.<sup>231</sup> To raise the economic wellbeing even this high the Soviets funneled approximately the equivalent of \$1.265 billion (USD) in credit into the country, mostly in the form of infrastructure and budget support.<sup>232</sup> Despite this massive investment over 25 years, most Afghans still lived in poverty when the 40th Army Group crossed the border into Afghanistan.<sup>233</sup>

Then, like now, poverty does not directly correlate to the formation of an insurgency, but the disproportionate power between the Soviet backed urban populace and the poor rural areas created a grievance.<sup>234</sup> The was left behind rural population, while urban areas with direct relationships with the Soviet Union enjoyed investment.<sup>235</sup> these same economically advantaged urbanites attempted, with the backing of the Soviets, to establish control over the whole of

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<sup>231</sup> World Bank Group, "GDP per capita (current US\$) – Afghanistan," accessed September 01, 2022, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=AF>. This amount is in 2022 US Dollars. To put that into perspective, at that time, the United States had a GDP per capita of \$11,674.20.

<sup>232</sup> M. S. Noorzoy, "Long-Term Economic Relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: An Interpretive Study," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, no. 2, (1986): 159, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/163602>. Figures provided to the authors by Valerii Ivanov give the total of Soviet credits from January 1954 to March 1979 as 1.0125 billion rubles (Ivanov interview). At the official exchange rate of 0.8 rubles to the dollar at the time, this makes \$1.265 billion, tallying with Noorzoy's estimate. Most of it was grant or loans with no real belief it would ever be repaid.

<sup>233</sup> Oliker, "Building Afghanistan's Security Forces," 20.

<sup>234</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 39.

<sup>235</sup> Paul Robinson, and Jay Dixon, "Soviet Development Theory and Economic and Technical Assistance to Afghanistan, 1954–1991," *The Historian* 72 no. 3, (FALL 2010): 605-607, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24454922>. For example is the January 1954 of \$3.5million of Soviet credit to build two grain silos and a flour mill and baker in Kabul.

Afghanistan,<sup>236</sup> turning the conflict from an attempt to establish order into an occupation. This occupation would become especially apparent once the Soviets all but subsumed control of the central Afghan government.

### **Marginalization and Poor Advising in Afghanistan**

Through advising, the Soviets exerted influence and control of the Afghan government. This poor advising contributed to the formation of the insurgency,<sup>237</sup> as that advising often crossed the line into outright occupation covered by the thin veneer of a puppet state.<sup>238</sup> Russia is undoubtedly facing similar issues in its now annexed oblasts Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia as the Russian Military has subsumed militias that have been fighting the Ukrainian Government since 2014.<sup>239</sup>

Soviet forces often dictated to the Armed Forces of Afghanistan prior to combat operations rather than collaborated.<sup>240</sup> Worse, Soviet advising was often focused on training for traditional military operations and tactics, which bore little resemblance to Afghanistan.<sup>241</sup> By 1983, the Soviets had become so overbearing that they had cut Afghan leaders out of the

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<sup>236</sup> Robinson, and Dixon, "Soviet Development Theory," 620-623. The Soviet Union realized that the Afghan government that they were propping up with money and forces was unrepresentative of the overall population of Afghanistan at the time.

<sup>237</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 17-18.

<sup>238</sup> Aleksandr Maiorov, *Pravda ob Afganskoi Voine*. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Prava Chelovek, 1996).

<sup>239</sup> The result is even the thin veneer of justification for fighting for independence for Donetsk and Luhansk has been lost.

<sup>240</sup> Maiorov, *Pravda ob Afganskoi Voine*. "There was also some confusion among advisors as to whether their role was to advise or to dictate. Maiorov (the chief military advisor in Afghanistan) reports a conversation with Yuri Andropov (then the KGB chief) in which Andropov told him that he should provide the Afghan authorities with options from which to choose. Maiorov reports that he insisted that he also had to make the final decision, a view to which he says Andropov agreed."

<sup>241</sup> Aleksandr Liakhovskii, *Tragediia i doblest' Afgana*, (Moscow: GPI Iskona, 1995) 163-164. "...It was oriented to the traditional forms of fighting battles, without considering the specifics of local conditions and methods of partisan war..." By the time the 40th Army Group began its Afghanistan invasion in 1979, it was backing an inadequately trained Afghan army.

decision-making process for the disposition of Afghan forces completely.<sup>242</sup> On the battlefield, this came with predictable results of miscommunications and defeats.<sup>243</sup>

In Afghanistan, just like in occupied areas of Ukraine, excluding or targeting ethnic or social groups was destructive to forming any sort of stable rule.<sup>244</sup> This resulted in systemic failure and a lack of aggressiveness on the battlefield.<sup>245</sup> The 40<sup>th</sup> Army Groups actions with even their partner nation created a grievance that drove Afghan from the ranks. The ineffectiveness of the Soviet advising would be made worse by the complete lack of legitimacy of the Central Afghan government.

### **Legitimacy of Governance in Afghanistan**

The legitimacy of the Soviet forces during the intervention in Afghanistan is almost identical to the legitimacy of the Russian forces during the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.<sup>246</sup> Like then, Russia now claims to support a minority to advance a Russian agenda.<sup>247</sup> They have become invaders in an independent land with a distinct culture. It is a culture with long memories keeping seemingly longer grudges.

In Afghanistan, religious and tribal differences, especially in rural areas, became fertile recruiting grounds for the Taliban. Most of these religious and tribal differences flew in the face

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<sup>242</sup> Evgenii. Nikitenko, "Afganskaia Kampaniia: Nevostrebouvannyi Opyt" (Part 3)." *Vostok Delo Tonkoe* 2008b, no. 5, (2008): 102-113.

<sup>243</sup> Nikitenko, "Afganskaia Kampaniia: Nevostrebouvannyi Opyt," 102-113. By 1982, the Afghan counterparts to soviet forces were only informed of operational plans the morning of, over security concerns with predictable impacts on operations, a dangerous move in a war attempting to unify their own country. The result was that the very army that was supposed to be doing the lion's share of fighting was marginalized even in the decision-making process.

<sup>244</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 20. Persecution of minority groups is considered the greatest contributor to instability.

<sup>245</sup> Nikitenko, "Afganskaia Kampaniia: Nevostrebouvannyi Opyt," 102-113.

<sup>246</sup> As of October 24 this war is still ongoing.

<sup>247</sup> Putin, "21 February Address." On 21 February 2022 the Russian government recognized the Ukrainian separatist regions of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic as independent.

of Russian values. This meant little consideration was made for cultural allowances. Worse, being non-represented and Soviet-oriented, any action led by the Soviets or central Afghan government lacked legitimacy from the beginning.<sup>248</sup> When this is added to the Kabul's inability to meet basic needs like avoiding mass famine, the resistance's depth is of little surprise.

In history, it has occurred that one nation will reach out to another to deal with an external insurgent, such as NATO invoking article 5 after 9/11.<sup>249</sup> Such a move may increase the government's legitimacy due to the obvious grievance coupled with the internal domestic support for forming a coalition for a just war.<sup>250</sup> The threat comes from outside the borders; thus, actions of a coalition of nations are not just justified but encouraged.

However, when another country is called in to deal with an internal security issue, such as an internal insurgency from a minority, it is another matter. The nation getting involved is, in fact, taking a side in a civil war,<sup>251</sup> and the actions lack the legitimacy of a just war, leaving it open to its internal dissension and external condemnation purely on that basis alone. Worse, such support often does little to decisively end the war and often extends it indefinitely.<sup>252</sup>

## **Afghanistan's History of Conflict**

Afghanistan has been engulfed in almost continuous war since Alexander the Great almost died after being struck by an archer's arrow while facing heavy resistance in the Konar

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<sup>248</sup> Olikar, "Building Afghanistan's Security Forces," 1-2.

<sup>249</sup> George Robertson, "Lord Robertson's Press Conference, 9/11," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, September 11, 2001, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified\\_137119.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137119.htm).

<sup>250</sup> Rory Cox, "Expanding the History of the Just War: The Ethics of War in Ancient Egypt," *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 2, (2017): 371, 373, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx009>. In ancient Egypt the idea of a just war "existed many centuries earlier than the advent of Christianity or even the emergence of Greco-Roman doctrine."

<sup>251</sup> Katherine Sawyer, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and William Reed, "The Role of External Support in Civil War Termination," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 6, (2017): 1195, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26363924>.

<sup>252</sup> Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed, "Civil War Termination."

Valley. In 327BC.<sup>253</sup> It is where armies go to die, as they meet the hard mountains of the Hindu Kush and the even harder people that live there.<sup>254</sup> Nearly 2000 years later, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, The Great Game, “the contest between the United Kingdom and Russia for control of Central Asia and India,” once more tore apart the region in the 1839-42 First Afghan War.<sup>255</sup> This played out with the same players again in 1878-81.<sup>256</sup> Until the Soviet Invasion, Afghanistan remained in a near-constant state of tribal war. The region has well-earned its title of “Graveyard of Empires.”<sup>257</sup>

Each of these conflicts used similar tactics resulting horrendous casualties for all sides and no decisive outcome.<sup>258</sup> Even the might of the US Military and NATO could not pacify the region in over 20 years of conflict. Like Ukraine, Afghanistan also has history of violence causing the evolution of significant insurgencies.

Exploring the factors of insurgency in Afghanistan show that lessons from that war have not been learned by the Russians. Russia is still using brutal, counterproductive tactics in a multi-cultural society as will be described in the next chapter.

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<sup>253</sup> Milton Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 6 (November/December 2001):17-20, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2001-11-01/afghanistan-graveyard-empires>.

<sup>254</sup> Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," 17-20.

<sup>255</sup> Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," 18.

<sup>256</sup> Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," 18.

<sup>257</sup> Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," 17-20. “This spot, perhaps more than any other, has witnessed the traverse of the world’s great armies on campaigns of conquest to and from South and Central Asia. All eventually ran into trouble in their encounters with the unruly Afghan tribals.”

<sup>258</sup> Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," 21. By 1985 in the Russian invasion, the 40<sup>th</sup> army group would be faced by 250,000 full and part time Mujahedeen even after absorbing more than a million dead and 1.5 million wounded.

## WHAT IS FEEDING ANTI-RUSSIAN SENTIMENT

### Chapter Overview

While there are many factors that can contribute to the formation of insurgency within a country, in Ukraine, two have come to the forefront. This includes the social makeup and distribution of Ukraine citizens, with their easily identifiable ethnicities based on language as covered earlier in the subchapter on persecution and marginalization of minority groups. It also includes the increasingly brutal tactics of Russian forces that have also appeared in Chechnya and Afghanistan and is covered in detail in the chapter Historic Lessons for Countering Insurgency. In theory, either factor could contribute to a rise in anti-Russian violence within Ukraine independently, but their combined presence makes it a continuing certainty.

### Social Makeup of Ukraine

The persecution of Russian minorities by the Ukrainian government was a recipe for violence.<sup>259</sup> Worse, it fed justification for war directly to the Kremlin.<sup>260</sup> As previously noted, Ukraine is a majority Ukrainian-speaking populace, with a strong Russian-speaking older generation minority that maintains close ties to Russia.<sup>261</sup> Myriad other minorities inhabit the country, further complicating efforts to form a cohesive national identity.<sup>262</sup> Ukrainian speakers, heavily populated on the western side of the nation, are countered by a strong Russian-speaking

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<sup>259</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 20-23. Government persecution of minorities is leading cause of both pro and anti government violence.

<sup>260</sup> Putin, "21 February Address."

<sup>261</sup> State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, "Population of Ukraine." As of 2001 Russians make up 17.3% of Ukrainian residents.

<sup>262</sup> State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, "Population of Ukraine." These numbers include groups from across the former USSR and neighboring nations.

minority in the eastern part of the nation.<sup>263</sup> The reported oppression of the Russian minority by the Ukrainians gave Putin the pretense and support of the Russian people for this war.<sup>264</sup>

By the same measure, the language difference between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian individuals has created a way to easily identify adversarial minorities. In Ukraine, Russian speakers are viewed with suspicion. In the occupied areas, it is the Ukrainian speakers who undoubtedly are. This has drawn individuals into the conflict purely on the basis of their language when they likely would have stayed uninvolved. By targeting ethnic Ukrainians with discrimination in occupied areas and creating collateral damage in unoccupied areas, Ukrainians are being actively encouraged to participate in the conflict by Russian forces.

### **Russian Brutality Encouraging Resistance**

This active involvement by the individual Ukrainian citizen also has other blatant causes. Every hostile act and reported war crime seems to have entrenched anti-Russian opinion among the Ukrainian Populace.<sup>265</sup> As of November 2022 there is little support for a negotiated peace in light of growing reported Russian war crimes.<sup>266</sup> Ukrainian deaths have strengthened the Ukrainian people's resolve to retaliate against the Russians, just as oppressive invaders have inspired insurgencies throughout history.<sup>267</sup> Reports of widespread rape, looting, and ethnic cleansing have put Ukrainian civilians at risk for radicalization.<sup>268</sup> Worse, Russian forces have

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<sup>263</sup>; State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, "Population of Ukraine." In May, portions of this regions Russian speakers outnumber Ukrainians. The city of Sevastopol' had a strong Russian majority of 71.3% as of 2001.

<sup>264</sup> Putin, "21 February Address." It is eerily similar to Hitler's justification for taking the Sudetenland prior to World War Two.

<sup>265</sup> Zelenskyy, *The more Russia escalates*.

<sup>266</sup> Zelenskyy, *The more Russia escalates*.

<sup>267</sup> Fromkin, *The Strategy of Terrorism*. This 1975 Foreign Affairs article details the inspiration of many of history's was aggressive resistance movements.

<sup>268</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 22. Such actions on the part of a government directly radicalize affected individuals and indirectly motivate others.

begun targeting electrical production and distribution networks to destabilize and crash Ukraine's power grid. This may bring the cold winter that Putin hopes will break the resolve of the Russian people. It will also have the direct effect of bringing the war into the home of every Ukrainian citizen, giving them a personal grievance in the war. As conditions for the citizens of Ukraine worsen, it can directly be attributed to the Russians, driving resolve for violent conflict against them.

This total war on civilians is only possible because Russia is a personalist autocracy with little limit on the use of violence to enforce compliance.<sup>269</sup> Russia's battlefield tactics reflect this little regard for civilian wellbeing.<sup>270</sup> Worse, like the resistance fighters of France in World War two, Ukrainian militias and insurgents are viewed as terrorists by the Russians, deserving no mercy.<sup>271</sup> As a result, Russian troops have taken little regard for collateral damage in pursuit of insurgent forces, resulting in widespread and likely underreported civilian casualties.<sup>272</sup> This is often justified to the Russian populace by claimed atrocities committed by Ukrainian militias.<sup>273</sup>

This seemingly indiscriminate bombing and shelling have also occurred in predominantly ethnic Russian cities such as Mariupol.<sup>274</sup> This has resulted in active resistance to Russian forces

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<sup>269</sup> Timothy Frye, "Russia's Weak Strongman: The Perilous Bargains That Keep Putin in Power." *Foreign Affairs* 100, No.3 (May / June 2021), 118, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2021-04-01/vladimir-putin-russias-weak-strongman>.

<sup>270</sup> Frye, *Russia's Weak Strongman*, 118. The brutal tactics are likely influenced by the fact that there is limited necessity to appeal to constituents.

<sup>271</sup> Byford, *The Wrong War*, 36.

<sup>272</sup> United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Ukraine: civilian casualty update."

<sup>273</sup> Putin, *Address by the President of the Russian Federation*. Putin has claimed ethnic cleansing on the part of Ukrainians as a pretext for war.

<sup>274</sup> Michelle Bachelet, "High Commissioner updates the Human Rights Council on Mariupol, Ukraine," *The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights*, June 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/06/high-commissioner-updates-human-rights-council-mariupol-ukraine>.

"We assess that up to 90 per cent of residential buildings have been damaged or destroyed, as well as up to 60 percent of private houses. An estimated 350,000 people were forced to leave the city. The humanitarian situation is devastating, with civilians continuing to bear the brunt of this conflict."



by civilians that previously would have welcomed Russian troops as liberators.<sup>275</sup> The deaths from these clashes have been filling reported mass graves in the region, further enraging the Ukrainian populace.<sup>276</sup> According to the US Army's Special Operations Command, the war crimes of ethnic cleansing and murder is the single form of government repression most likely to spur radicalization.<sup>277</sup>

Brutal Russian tactics have united a nation that, until this conflict, had divided itself along language and ethnic boundaries. Now, Ukraine fights both a conventional and unconventional war against a common enemy over what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claims is "literally for the survival of our people."<sup>279</sup> It is a resistance that has been handed both the iron will to fight and the deadliest tools conceived to fight with as described in the next chapter.

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<sup>275</sup> Volodymyr Zelenskyy, "Weapons Ukraine Needs." President Zelenskyy recognizes the bravery of civilians in Mariupol.

<sup>276</sup> Volodymyr Zelenskyy, "Speech by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Assembly of the Republic, Parliament of Portugal." *Ministry of Defense of Ukraine*, April 21, 2022, <https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2022/04/21/speech-by-president-of-ukraine-volodymyr-zelenskyy-in-the-assembly-of-the-republic-parliament-of-portugal/>. In his April speech to the Portuguese parliament, he details war crimes committed by Russian troops as justification for Portuguese weapons. Many of these reports have been confirmed independently.

<sup>277</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, See Table 2-1. Code guidance for three discrimination categories from the MAR Dataset.

<sup>279</sup> Zelenskyy, "Parliament of Portugal."

## RESOURCES SUPPORTING UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE

### Chapter Overview

Few insurgencies have had access to such a wealth of resources to plan, equip, and execute their operations. Current Ukrainian insurgent and militia units enjoy global support, with commensurate access to funds, training, military equipment, and modern munitions.<sup>281</sup> This could make them the equivalent of state-sponsored insurgents like Pakistan's LeT,<sup>282</sup> with less political direction and an extreme anti-Russian target set.

### Funding for Ukrainian Resistance

The allocated funding is not insubstantial. As of mid-March 2022, more than \$13 billion in US monetary aid had been funneled into Ukraine.<sup>284</sup> \$6.9 billion is in traditional foreign government aid, most of which is earmarked for humanitarian assistance.<sup>285</sup> Total funding, including consolidated aid from Europe and aid from individual donors, was probably many times this amount, yet much of it was unreported. As of the end of September 2022, US support ballooned to more than 16.9 billion dollars in US security assistance alone.<sup>286</sup> Much of this has likely gone to irregular forces and militia groups not affiliated with the Ukrainian National Guard

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<sup>281</sup> U.S. Department of Defense. 2022. *Fact Sheet*. The US government alone has committed more than 4 billion dollars in Security Assistance to Ukraine as of 22 April 2022.

<sup>282</sup> Angel Rabasa, Robert D. Blackwill, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, C. Christine Fair, Brian A. Jackson, Brian Michael Jenkins, Seth G. Jones, Nathaniel Shestak, and Ashley J. Tellis, *The Lessons of Mumbai*, (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2009), [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional\\_papers/2009/RAND\\_OP249.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP249.pdf). The gunmen of LeT executed their attacks with a level of sophistication and competency equal to military operations.

<sup>284</sup> Bianca Pallaro, and Alicia Parlapiano, "Visualizing the \$13.6 Billion in U.S. Spending on Ukraine," *The New York Times*, March 18, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/03/18/upshot/ukraine-aid-details.html>. This only includes official aid from the US Department of Defense and Department of State, not the myriad of other private organizations that have assisted.

<sup>285</sup> Pallaro and Parlapiano, "Visualizing the \$13.6 Billion." This also includes refugee and immigration assistance, grants and loans for military supplies, and Ukraine's economic support fund.

<sup>286</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Ukraine Fact Sheet - Sept. 28," *U.S. Department of Defense*, September 28, 2022, 1-2, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/28/2003087045/-1/-1/1/UKRAINE-FACT-SHEET-SEP-28.PDF>.

but that still hold the required anti-Russian intentions.<sup>287</sup> This means, unlike some resistance movements where fighters support themselves with other work, Ukrainian insurgents will be solely engaged in operations. These full time insurgents will also have the advantage of actual military training.

### **Training for Insurgents**

The Ukrainians have faced a protracted conflict that has led them to open military training to every one of military age.<sup>289</sup> The only requirement to receive such basic military training is the willingness to engage Russians. Tens of thousands of civilians have received classes in guerrilla tactics, such as ambushing armored vehicles, building improvised explosive devices, and producing weapons such as Molotov cocktails.<sup>291</sup> This training was not usually conducted by Ukrainian military units but by the numerous militias and territorial defense organizations that have arisen since the Ukraine-Russia conflict began. The earlier discussed Azov battalion specifically has been training the citizens of Mariupol to conduct resistance,<sup>293</sup> a move that contributed to a protracted siege that lasted 82 days.

The limited nature of this training has still increased civilians' battlefield lethality and augmented conventional forces' intelligence-gathering capability. However, it has also led to staggering civilian casualties as Russian troops struggle to discern combatants from non-combatants.<sup>295</sup> Those that survive the intense urban conflict in Ukraine are likely to have gained

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<sup>287</sup> Katie Bo Lillis, Jeremy Herb, Natasha Bertrand, and Oren Liebermann, "What happens to weapons sent to Ukraine? The US doesn't really know," *CNN*, (April 17, 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/19/politics/us-weapons-ukraine-intelligence/index.html>.

<sup>289</sup> Andrew E. Kramer, "Training Civilians, Ukraine Nurtures a Resistance in Waiting," *The New York Times*, December 26, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/26/world/europe/ukraine-russia-civilian-training.html>. This training has gone on to varying degrees since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

<sup>291</sup> Kramer, "Training Civilians." This number was reported before the war began so is likely now much higher.

<sup>293</sup> Kramer, "Training Civilians."

<sup>295</sup> United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Ukraine: civilian casualty update."

extensive combat experience while becoming entrenched in their anti-Russian views. These views are what may make any possible peace in the future difficult as will be examined in the conclusion chapter.

## **Military Equipment and Munitions**

Training and money alone are not enough for an insurgency to mount a successful insurgency. An insurgency must also have the tools with which to fight. Ukraine unlike most insurgences in history has had no shortage of weapons with which to resist

The world has flooded military equipment and munitions of all kinds into Ukraine. This includes more than 75,000 sets of body armor, 8,500 Javelin Anti-Armor systems, and 1,400 Stinger Anti-aircraft systems from the United States alone.<sup>297</sup> Additionally, Eastern European nations have donated Soviet-era equipment that is only a generation behind the current Russian issue and still perfectly lethal.<sup>298</sup> With the inclusion of some American systems, Ukrainians have gained a significant defensive advantage in an unconventional urban fight.

Much of this equipment has not made it to frontline troops but instead gone to militias, civil defense groups, and private organizations.<sup>300</sup> Many of these groups were armed during the siege of Kiev and other cities, with no regulation on membership and only a vague requirement

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<sup>297</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Fact Sheet - Sept. 28." NATO has contributed additional equipment.

<sup>298</sup> Joe Gould, and Sebastian Sprenger, "Ukraine weapon switcheroos are flushing Soviet arms out of Europe," *Defense News*, April 28, 2022, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/04/28/ukraine-weapon-switcheroos-are-flushing-soviet-arms-out-of-europe/>.

<sup>300</sup> Lillis, et al., "What happens to weapons." The DoD has acknowledged that they lack visibility of weapons shipments once they enter Ukraine.

to resist.<sup>301</sup> As such, maintaining any accountability for this equipment and munitions has been problematic for the Ukrainian government and America alike.<sup>302</sup>

This surge of equipment and munitions from Western nations is the insurgency's dream. The streets of Ukrainian cities are filled with access to a host of anti-tank and anti-air weapons, from old Soviet equipment to the newest American in a country with one of the highest arms trafficking rates in Europe.<sup>304</sup> Future insurgencies will have access to stockpiles of munitions left over from the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war and a strong black market arms trade that will continue well after the conflict ends, both of which will likely increase the destructiveness of future attacks. These lethal donations are just part of the support that insurgents have enjoyed from Ukrainian and world governments.

### **Domestic and International Sponsorship**

There is a very real fact that militia, insurgent, and resistance movements across Ukraine enjoy wide support both from the Ukrainian populace and the West as they fight their war against Russia.

The Ukrainian government actively encourages Ukrainian civilians to harm Russian forces in any way possible, with a special emphasis on soft Russian military targets.<sup>306</sup> These

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<sup>301</sup> Jordan Cohen, "Sending Weapons to Ukraine Could Have Unintended Consequences," *Cato Institute*, March 1, 2022, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/sending-weapons-ukraine-could-have-unintended-consequences>.

<sup>302</sup> Lillis, et al., "What happens to weapons." The Department of Defense has acknowledged that they have little to no visibility of weapons shipments once they crossed the Ukrainian border.

<sup>304</sup> Cohen, "Sending Weapons to Ukraine." "According to the 2021 Global Organized Crime Index, Ukraine has one of the largest illegally trafficked arms markets in Europe, especially when it comes to small arms and ammunition. About 300,000 small arms and light weapons were reported lost or stolen between 2013 and 2015."

<sup>306</sup> Oleksii Reznikov, "Address by the Minister of Defence of Ukraine Oleksii Reznikov," *Ministry of Defense of Ukraine*, February 26, 2022, <https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2022/02/26/address-by-the-minister-of-defence-of-ukraine-oleksii-reznikov/>. In this press statement the minister orders Ukrainian civilians to stop and burn Russian fuel convoys.

soft targets included fuel trucks during the Russian attack on Kiev.<sup>307</sup> The same Ukrainian government has released in mass imprisoned anti-Russian militia and Insurgent group members, to bolster defenses.<sup>308</sup> In statements to the Press, the President of Ukraine thanks these groups for their bravery and sacrifice.<sup>309</sup> Ukrainian insurgents should be considered sponsored by Ukraine through weapons shipments, public acknowledgment, and training.

The international community has also shown support for Ukrainian resistance beyond the military. Unlike World War Two, the rest of Europe does not seem willing to let one country gobble up another for a fleeting promise of peace.<sup>312</sup> Instead, they are doing everything short of direct conflict to harm Russia, funneling billions into a war effort with an uncertain outcome.<sup>313</sup> This has singled the West's intention to back a Ukrainian resistance, something it has done against Russia before, from Albania in 1940 to Afghanistan in the 1980s.<sup>314</sup>

This increasing lethal support forces Russia to face the prospect of a growing insurgency in the occupied areas of Ukraine. It has highlighted the need for Russia to learn from past counterinsurgency campaigns if it is to have any success in ending Ukrainian insurgency.

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<sup>307</sup> Reznikov, "Defence of Ukraine."

<sup>308</sup> Volodymyr Zelenskyy, "Stand firm: Address by the President of Ukraine," *Ministry of Defense Ukraine*, February 28, 2022, <https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2022/02/28/stand-firm-address-by-the-president-of-ukraine/>. In this address to the Ukrainian people, President of Ukraine Zelenskyy announces his intention to release from custody militia members responsible for breaking cease fires with the Russians and other crimes to allow them to "compensate for their guilt in the hottest spots of war."

<sup>309</sup> Zelenskyy, "Weapons Ukraine Needs." of Ukraine acknowledged the bravery and dedication of Azov Brigade, militia's, territorial defense units and ordinary civilians in the defense of Ukraine.

<sup>312</sup> C., "Will Hitler Save Democracy?" *Foreign Affairs* 17, no. 3, (May/June 1939): 455-464. Hitler then, like Putin now, is responsible for unification among democratic nations against what they perceive as a threat

<sup>313</sup> Pallaro and Parlapiano, "Visualizing the \$13.6 Billion."

<sup>314</sup> O'Rourke, Lindsey. "The False Promise of Arming Insurgents: America's Spotty Record Warrants Caution in Ukraine." *Foreign Affairs*, March 18, 2022. <https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/false-promise-arming-insurgents-americas-spotty-record-warrants-caution-ukraine>. Despite the fact that there is limited control that comes with arming insurgents America has a history of doing so.

## HISTORIC LESSONS FOR COUNTERING INSURGENCY

### Chapter Overview

It must be remembered that anti-Russian, ethno-nationalist terrorism, insurgency, and even civil war are not new to the Russian people. The very streets of Moscow have been torn apart on numerous occasions.<sup>315</sup> In 1919, pro-Czarist White Russians conducted and were eventually crushed during a bloody advance on Moscow, fighting the communist who had declared Moscow their capital.<sup>316</sup> In 1991 the Russian capital of Moscow again convulsed into civil war.<sup>317</sup> In this short-lived but dramatic series of events, only three civilians died, stopping the advance of a line of military vehicles.<sup>318</sup> Regardless, both internal insurgencies in Russia proper were put down. Insurgencies outside of Russian borders have caused far worse difficulties and have proven much harder to combat. Ukraine is an Insurgency Russia will undoubtedly look to history to combat.<sup>319</sup>

First, it must be considered if the base causes of the anti-Russian insurgency can be eliminated.<sup>320</sup> Second, it must be determined if the insurgents themselves could be eliminated to

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<sup>315</sup> Peter Kenez, *Red Advance, White Defeat: Civil war in South Russia 1919-1920*, (Washington D.C.: New Academia Publishing, 2004), 214-218.

<sup>316</sup> Kenez, *Red Advance, White Defeat*, 214-218.

<sup>317</sup> Victoria E. Bonnell, Ann Cooper, and Gregory Freidin, *Russia at the Barricades: Eyewitness Accounts of the August 1991 Coup*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 71-78. The 1991 Soviet coup, also known as the August Coup, was a unsuccessful attempt by hardliners of the Communist Party to forcibly seize control from Mikhail Gorbachev the at that time Soviet President and General Secretary of the Communist Party.

<sup>318</sup> Celestine Bohlen, "Soviet Turmoil; Moscow Mourns and Exalts Men Killed by Coup," *The New York Times*, August 28, 1991, <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/25/world/soviet-turmoil-moscow-mourns-and-exalts-men-killed-by-coup.html>. The dead were Dmitry Komar, Ilya Krichevsky, and Vladimir Usov. Each were posthumously by Gorbachev made Heroes of the Soviet Union for their bravery in "blocking the way to those who wanted to strangle democracy."

<sup>319</sup> For the purpose of this argument anti-Russian insurgency will not include direct actions of Ukrainian conventional forces along the forward line of troops. It will however include those forces that were cut off and have been operating behind enemy lines for the duration of the war and have been utilizing guerrilla tactics.

<sup>320</sup> The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, *Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of European human rights and the fight against terrorism*, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2002), 3,

eliminate the anti-Russian threat in that manner.<sup>321</sup> To answer these questions, Russian kinetic attempts to combat insurgency in Afghanistan and Chechnya are examined in contrast with the Chinese attempts to control a Muslim minority through widespread incarceration. This history will show why neither one of these tactics will be successful in combating the growing Ukrainian Insurgency describe in the last chapter.

### **Afghanistan: Pacification by Artillery**

Afghanistan was the Soviet Union's first real counter-insurgency campaign in a foreign land, but not their first counter-insurgency.<sup>322</sup> They went into the country to support the new communist revolution as previously discussed.<sup>323</sup> What has not been covered is the tactics that Russian forces, particularly those of the 40th Army Group, utilized to pacify and unify the country under communist rule.<sup>324</sup> It is these tactics, many of them counterproductive in the long term,<sup>325</sup> which have set the example for every follow-on counter-insurgency campaign the Russians have conducted.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union used overwhelming force to crush all insurgents through the use of artillery, helicopters, and airstrikes.<sup>326</sup> This was otherwise put as “an over-

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[https://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/Source/Docs2002/H\\_2002\\_4E.pdf](https://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/Source/Docs2002/H_2002_4E.pdf). “Keeping in mind that the fight against terrorism implies long-term measures with a view to preventing the causes of terrorism, by promoting, in particular, cohesion in our societies and a multicultural and inter-religious dialogue.”

<sup>321</sup> Ministers of the Council of Europe, *Guidelines of the Committee*, 3.

<sup>322</sup> Oliner, “Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces,” 1-2. Until this time Russian counter insurgency actions had only involved internal Soviet Union dissenters.

<sup>323</sup> Oliner, “Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces,” 1-2.

<sup>324</sup> Imtiaz H. Bokhari, “The War in Afghanistan: A Study of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency.” *Strategic Studies* 5, no. 3 (Spring 1982): 19-47, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45181918>. “Coupled with this Soviet policy of destroying the villages rather than seeking out the Mujahedeen is their use of gas and lethal chemical agents. In the early stages they “seem to have used lethal nerve gas and incapacitating gas in Badakh-shan, Kunar, Nangarhar and Wardek provinces.”

<sup>325</sup> Bokhari, “The War in Afghanistan,” 19-47.

<sup>326</sup> National Defense University Press, *The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*, Second Printing, ed. Lester W. Grau, Trans. Lester W. Grau, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), 145-146, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA316729.pdf>.



reliance on firepower.”<sup>327</sup> This overreliance on force resulted in the deaths of an estimated 1.3 million people and the displacement of five and a half million Afghans.<sup>328</sup> This meant a full third of the prewar population was forced out of the country as refugees.<sup>329</sup> Many of these Afghan civilians lost their lives outright due to direct action or from the starvation and loss of shelter that resulted from their homes becoming collateral damage,<sup>330</sup> just like Ukrainian civilians now.

This unwritten counter insurgency policy seems to be the use of overwhelming force with little regard for collateral damage, a move first shown in the Soviet 1956 intervention in Hungary.<sup>331</sup> Then, 14 Soviet divisions were used to pacify Budapest, with heavy use of tanks in urban areas to crush resistance.<sup>332</sup> It set a precedent for using a sledgehammer response to all insurgency, a tactic that was again apparent during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.<sup>333</sup> There the Russians engaged in outright collective punishment and reprisals.<sup>334</sup> Entire Afghan villages were systematically killed in retaliation for Mujahedeen attacks against a few Soviet Troops.<sup>335</sup> Take, for example, the Russian actions on 12 October 1983 where it is reported by

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<sup>327</sup> National Defense University Press, *The Bear Went Over the Mountain*, 145-146. “There is an overreliance on firepower”

<sup>328</sup> National Defense University Press, *The Bear Went Over the Mountain*, xviii.

<sup>329</sup> National Defense University Press, *The Bear Went Over the Mountain*, xviii.

<sup>330</sup> National Defense University Press, *The Bear Went Over the Mountain*, 145. There was an extreme reliance on firepower over closing with the enemy. This resulted in destruction of Mujahedeen occupied villages through air strikes, helicopter attacks and artillery rather than traditional urban fights.

<sup>331</sup> Terry Cox. "Hungary 1956" *History Ireland* 17, no. 3 (May-June 2006): 38-43, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27725463>.

<sup>332</sup> Cox, T., "Hungary 1956", 38-43.

<sup>333</sup> Felix Ermacora, “Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan / Prepared By the Special Rapporteur, Felix Ermacora, In Accordance With Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1984/55,” (Situation Report, UN Commission on Human Rights, 1985), 30-31, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/86023?ln=en>.

“Eye witnesses told the Special Rapporteur of alleged massacres of civilians during the bombardment of villages. According to these witnesses, such acts were part of a deliberate policy, especially over the last two years, to force the people to take flight.”

<sup>334</sup> Ermacora, Human Rights in Afghanistan, 30-31.

<sup>335</sup> Ermacora, Human Rights in Afghanistan, 30-31. “The population, consisting of children, old people and a few combatants, took fright and hid in an underground channel used for irrigation, (Karez) To dislodge them, troops poured a whitish liquid mixed with white powder into three outlets of the channel and set fire to it. Charred and decomposed bodies were brought out 'by the villagers. The corpses were said to include 12 children.”

Felix Ermacora, Special Rapporteur with the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, that “in the villages of Kuichabat, Bala Karz” and Mushkizi in the province of Kandahar, 360 persons ‘were executed in the village square, including 20 girls and about 20 old people.’<sup>336</sup> The Soviet army then, as the Russian army now, is an army that holds no regard for civilian casualties.

However, this has also illustrated the one issue such tactics create. By utilizing creating unnecessary collateral damage, the very insurgency that is being fought is encouraged.<sup>337</sup> Such tactics directly create more insurgents from those families that have experience casualties, of which almost every family in Afghanistan could claim a grievance.<sup>338</sup> This righteous grievance would be combined with a steady funnel of funds and military equipment that came over the mountains from Pakistan. The conditions became set for an insurgency that was both bloody and seemingly without end to the Soviet invaders. It became a situation that ended in the Soviet withdraw from Afghanistan, which is eerily like building events in Ukraine that have engrained support for an insurgency as examined in a previous chapter covering Russian brutality encouraging resistance.

### **Chechnya: A Successful Counterinsurgency Through Firepower**

Not all Russian Counter insurgencies have ended in defeat, however. While unseemly, it is a fact that modern, post-Soviet Russia has also successfully tamped down a major insurgency

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<sup>336</sup> Ermacora, Human Rights in Afghanistan, 31. This report is merely incidental, but it does fit the pattern with the massive number of civilian casualties and the extremism of the Mujahedeen that resulted from Soviet tactics.

<sup>337</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, See Table 2-1. Code guidance for three discrimination categories from the MAR Dataset.

<sup>338</sup> Ermacora, Human Rights in Afghanistan, 28. “One representative of the Afghan opposition movements told the Special Rapporteur that in all probability hardly a family or village in Afghanistan had not suffered a loss as a result of the hostilities.”

without making any immediate political concessions. Russia did so through the direct and overwhelming use of military force, just like its Soviet predecessor.<sup>339</sup>

The First Chechen War was costly to both Chechnya and the Russian military and ended with an independent Chechnya, though with the city of Grozny in ruins.<sup>340</sup> This indecisive intervention is something that modern Russia learned from.<sup>341</sup> Just years later, it made another attempt at eliminating the Chechen insurgency.<sup>342</sup> This Second Chechen War, with the destruction caused to Grozny through a massive bombardment,<sup>343</sup> was followed by a large-scale and deliberate advance into the city.<sup>344</sup> While plagued with issues and casualties, this advance eventually achieved tactical success.<sup>345</sup> This success would set conditions for the subsequent, if costly, removal of all resistance from the Caucasus in what is considered a dramatic example of military force used to pacify and annex a territory. It demonstrated that if the price is willing to be paid, and little care is taken for collateral damage, it is possible to take, hold and eventually integrate an occupied territory into a greater nation.

A few notes on why the Russians enjoyed such success in Chechnya against the insurgency. First is the Russians' complete disregard for collateral damage.<sup>346</sup> This allowed a conventional army to bring an unquestionable advantage in firepower to any engagement with

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<sup>339</sup> Cox, T., "Hungary 1956", 38-43.

<sup>340</sup> Olga Olikier, *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat*. (Report, Rand Corporation, 2001), 28-32, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mr1289a.9>.

<sup>341</sup> Olikier, *Russia's Chechen War*, 28-32.

<sup>342</sup> Olikier, *Russia's Chechen War*, 28-32.

<sup>343</sup> Reppert, John, interview by Olga Olikier. "E-mail exchange with BG John Reppert (ret.)." *Celestan*, December 10, 1999. "In fact, Russian artillery bombardments of Grozny looked far more like the use of artillery in Russia's World War II campaigns than like a NATO air war. It is therefore more plausible that the Russians were not modeling their operations on NATO's, but rather employing an approach from their own history.

<sup>344</sup> Olikier, *Russia's Chechen War*, 75.

<sup>345</sup> Olikier, *Russia's Chechen War*, 75.

<sup>346</sup> Shaburkin, "Fighting continues in Komsomolskoye."

insurgents.<sup>347</sup> Second, integration with local pro-Russian partisan units gave the Russians many advantages that most conquerors lacked. In Chechnya, this took on the guise of a loyalist Chechen militia led by Bislan Gantamirov, who was pardoned for embezzling to take part in the second Chechen war.<sup>348</sup> Third, they were fighting what they considered a relatively small minority in the region, with an estimated strength of 2000-2500 men.<sup>349</sup> The tactics of this small minority, though only equal to the atrocities of the Russians, allowed the Russians to paint the Chechens as the aggressor in the Russian press.<sup>350</sup> This narrative is something that the Russians had far greater success in during their second intervention due to their tight control of the traditional media.<sup>351</sup> This allowed them to control the story,<sup>352</sup> and despite the counter-narrative being waged in the still infantile internet,<sup>353</sup> it initially allowed the Russian government to avoid the severe erosion of internal Russian support for what they deemed a “counter-terrorist operation.”<sup>354</sup> Finally, there was no nation-to-nation international support for an anti-Russian insurgency or conflict in the region.<sup>355</sup> While the world looked on in horror as Grozny was turned to rubble, it still considered the war an internal Russian matter and not something that

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<sup>347</sup> Oliker, *Russia's Chechen War*, 39. In regards to the Russian move into Chechnya during the second intervention, “On those few occasions when they encountered resistance, troops sealed off the town in question and bombarded it with artillery until it surrendered.”

<sup>348</sup> Oliker, *Russia's Chechen War*, 43-45.

<sup>349</sup> “Operation rather than storm” (in Russian), *Izvestiya*, (December 23, 1999). “The Russians estimated enemy strength in the city at about 2,000–2,500 men with a variety of weaponry at their disposal, including armored and mechanized vehicles, Grad rocket launchers, 152mm howitzers, 120mm mortars, and a handful of air defense missiles.”

<sup>350</sup> Mayerbek Nunayev and Richard C. Paddock, “Rebels in Chechnya Are Defending City in Ruins,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 25, 2000, 1.

<sup>351</sup> Yuriy Zainashev, “‘Souls’ and RPGs” (in Russian), *Moskovskiy Kom-somolets*, January 28, 2000.

<sup>352</sup> Oliker, *Russia's Chechen War*, 63-65.

<sup>353</sup> Paul Goble, “A Real Battle on the Virtual Front,” *RFE/RL Newswire* 3, no. 199, Part 1, (October 12, 1999). The Russians, while they did engage in the posting of official press releases online, paled in comparison to the efforts of the Chechen fighters counter narrative efforts online.

<sup>354</sup> Oliker, *Russia's Chechen War*, 63-65.

<sup>355</sup> Thomas Goltz, *Chechnya Diary: A War Correspondent's Story of Surviving the War in Chechnya*, (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2003), 2. From the author: “I called a well-informed diplomat pal and arranged to meet him at a bar favored by the pan-Turkic crowd known as the Gray Wolves, who were said to be actively supporting the Chechens with men and arms.”

required NATO or UN direct involvement. Even the gross human rights abuses and accusations of ethnic cleansing did nothing but stir outcry with no tactical response.

The Chechen wars made clear that a minority that lacked international military support could be consumed by Russia with toothless international condemnation.<sup>356</sup> It also demonstrated that such a minority could, in time, be ground down to the point that they would seek a political solution or be eliminated. In this case, the political solution for all purposes was surrender. This gave the occupying Russians relative peace and allowed them to reassign conventional military forces to other fronts.

### **China: Killing Insurgency in Its Cradle**

Not all counterinsurgencies require the utilization of outright force. In China, they have taken a different and more worrying tactic to combat the threat posed by an insurgency. In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China, almost the entirety of the Uyghur Muslim population has reportedly been detained in re-education camps.<sup>357</sup> This is an effort by the Chinese Government to counter insurgency and violent extremism.<sup>358</sup> A host of other predominantly Muslim minorities, including ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Huis in the area, have also been targeted in this purported counter-terrorism effort.<sup>359</sup>

The justification for this dramatic move is a reported series of terror, separatist and extremist attacks in the region that have killed thousands of civilians and hundreds of police and

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<sup>356</sup> Goltz, *Chechnya Diary*, 2.

<sup>357</sup> United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China," OHCHR Assessment, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchr-assessment-human-rights-concerns-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region>.

<sup>358</sup> United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Concerns In The Xinjiang*, 1.

<sup>359</sup> United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Concerns In The Xinjiang*, 1.

caused incalculable damage to property between 1990 and 2016.<sup>360</sup> This minority population is considered a threat to the Chinese Communist Party due to its lack of homogeneity with the rest of the nation. As such, China has taken action to prevent any possible insurgency from ever arising in the first place.<sup>361</sup> They are attempting to systematically eliminate the culture of a Muslim religious minority by reeducation before it can become a threat.<sup>362</sup> They claim to have succeeded in doing this during their own rebuttal to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.<sup>363</sup> This effort is similar to Soviet efforts to reduce or eliminate its own minorities in the regions of Russia through mass deportation and manufactured famines in conjunction with Russification efforts as described in the chapter historical anti-Russian sentiment.<sup>364</sup>

It is readily apparent that the Uyghur population has been disenfranchised, rightfully skeptical of Chinese rule, and has become discontented with the influx of ethnic Han.<sup>365</sup> The Chinese government cites a refusal of service to the Han population as a cause of the local Uyghur population's economic difficulty.<sup>366</sup> Such interactions even come with moral stories for the populace. A refusal of service led an Uyghur baker to bankruptcy. He realized his dislike of

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<sup>360</sup> State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang," (Translated report, State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2019), [http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white\\_paper/2019/03/18/content\\_281476567813306.htm](http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm).

<sup>361</sup> Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice, "Opinions on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling," (Criminal Law Ruling, Supreme People's Court, 2018), [http://ca.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/kxz/201903/t20190328\\_4639853.htm](http://ca.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/kxz/201903/t20190328_4639853.htm)

<sup>362</sup> Information Office of the People's Government of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, "Fight against terrorism and Extremism in Xinjiang: Truth and Facts." (Report, Information Office of the People's Government of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 2022), 71-72, [https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/ANNEX\\_A.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/ANNEX_A.pdf).

<sup>363</sup> Information Office of the People's Government of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, "Extremism in Xinjiang," 71-72.

<sup>364</sup> Kamusella, *Language Politics*, 114.

<sup>365</sup> Information Office of the People's Government of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, "Extremism in Xinjiang," 71-74. Han is the majority ethnicity of China.

<sup>366</sup> Information Office of the People's Government of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, "Extremism in Xinjiang," 71-72.

the Han to be wrong, and his life was improved merely by a short and lovely term in the vocational education and training center, after which the baker returned to make 9 times what he was by serving ethnic Chinese.<sup>367</sup> Notably, this rebuttal report has all Uyghur names redacted, making Chinese claims unverifiable.<sup>368</sup>

Like Chechnya, the Uyghur population is Muslim, with ideals and a predisposition to independence from a non-Muslim majority that currently rules.<sup>369</sup> Unlike Chechnya, the Uyghurs are impacted by two notable effects that have limited insurgency. One, they did not have access to the massive stockpiles of munitions left over from the Soviet Union.<sup>370</sup> In Chechnya, the insurgents were joined by a small but steady stream of additional fighters, equipment, and munitions from sympathetic nations that allowed them to bloody a superior enemy in Grozny for over a year.<sup>371</sup> The Uyghur, in contrast, had none of these weapons or foreign fighters and struggled alone. Second, the Uyghur have been ruled by the People's Republic of China since the Chinese Communist Party's victory over the Nationalists in 1949.<sup>372</sup> Since then, it has been effectively cut off from the western world, with little to no visibility from the global community. This has reportedly allowed China to eliminate a future insurgency concern before it can develop

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<sup>367</sup> Information Office of the People's Government of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, "Extremism in Xinjiang," 72. "His business flourished, earning him more than 450,000 yuan of net income each year."

<sup>368</sup> Information Office of the People's Government of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, "Extremism in Xinjiang." All names have been redacted.

<sup>369</sup> Bhavna Singh, "Ethnicity, Separatism and Terrorism in Xinjiang: China's Triple Conundrum," (IPCS Special Report, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2010), 1-10, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep09274>.

<sup>370</sup> Maxim Pyadushkin, Maria Haug, and Anna Matveeva, "Beyond the Kalashnikov: Small Arms Production, Exports, and Stockpiles in the Russian Federation," (Research Report, Small Arms Survey, 2003), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10757>. "For example, after the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Chechnya at the start of the 1990s, the Dudayev separatist regime obtained 42,000 pieces of small arms from army depots, including 28,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles, 200,000 hand grenades, and over 13.5 million rounds of various types of ammunition."

<sup>371</sup> Lenta.ru, "Lists of foreign mercenaries fighting in Chechnya found in Grozny (in Russian)" *Lenta.ru*, February, 19, 2000, <http://www.lenta.ru/vojna/2000/02/19/archives>.

<sup>372</sup> CRSN Staff, *Modern China: An Encyclopedia of History, Culture, and Nationalism*, ed. Ke-wen Wang, (New York & London: Taylor & Francis, 1998), 103.

by constructing massive concentration camps.<sup>373</sup> It is a level of cold calculation that is horrifying, but from official Chinese statements, they have successfully tamped down what they claim was a horrendous insurgency.<sup>374</sup>

History has shown Russia that it has options when dealing with insurgencies. It could like the Soviets in Afghanistan or Russia in Chechnya utilize overwhelming force. Alternately it could take the tactic of massive incarceration like the Chinese. Regardless of the Russian counterinsurgency tactics utilized, there are realities in Ukraine that will likely make Russian counterinsurgency efforts difficult or even impossible to implement successfully.

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<sup>373</sup> Adrian Zenz, "Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang's Extrajudicial Internment Campaign," *Journal of Political Risk* 7, No. 11, (2019): 4, <https://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/>.

<sup>374</sup> Information Office of the People's Government of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, "Extremism in Xinjiang," 2-17.



## WHY THE UKRAINIAN ANTI-RUSSIAN INSURGENCY WON'T DIE

### Chapter Overview

The current and direct causes of anti-Russian insurgency have been examined in detail. They have been exasperated by the 2022 Ukraine-Russian war with all the grievances that the war has continued to create.<sup>375</sup> It could be proposed that a political solution that reestablishes the area back to the status quo could successfully end the insurgency in the occupied areas of Ukraine.<sup>376</sup> In the past, this has also included the ceding of more independence like in other areas under occupation, such as Great Britain's and Ireland's Belfast Agreement that effectively ended the Troubles.<sup>377</sup> Alternatively, the poverty and lack of basic services created by the ongoing conflict could be addressed by the Russians through public work projects.<sup>378</sup> The United States and NATO did such work in Afghanistan through its Provincial Reconstructions Teams, hoping to address anti-American grievances by building basic civil services.<sup>379</sup>

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<sup>375</sup> Zelenskyy, "ample evidence," 1-3.

<sup>376</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 15-16.

<sup>377</sup> The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, "The Belfast Agreement: An Agreement Reached at the Multi-Party Talks on Northern Ireland," (Treaty, Parliament, 1998), <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement>.

<sup>378</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 19. "Governments are expected to make sure people of the nation are fed and to meet their other basic needs, which could include fuel, roads and utilities, health care, education, and employment."

<sup>379</sup> Robert M. Peri, "The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified," (Special Report 152, United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 1-16, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr152.pdf>. "The U.S. model featured a complement of seventy-nine American military and three civilian government representatives. The U.S. PRTs stressed governance, force protection, and quick impact development projects to "win hearts and minds."

## A Lack of Options

All these options, however, assume that the Russian invasion is successful in conquering Ukraine or eliminating Ukrainian defensive forces as a threat.<sup>380</sup> If the war continues, and as of February 2023, it still is, there is no hope for a non-kinetic option for combating the insurgency. Almost all of the Russian-occupied areas and supporting areas in Russia remain well within the range of the Armed forces of Ukraine's indirect fire systems.<sup>381</sup> This has created a situation where the insurgents, hybrid forces, and bypassed conventional forces cannot just coordinate but can be actively supported by indirect fire assets that are well outside their area.<sup>382</sup> This ready access to heavy artillery is something that few insurgencies have enjoyed.<sup>383</sup> This makes it seemingly impossible to win the hearts and minds of the populace in order to prevent insurgents from arising or being supported.<sup>384</sup>

This leads the Russians down a much darker path to combat their issue. If the causes of insurgency cannot be eliminated, then insurgents themselves must be targeted in some way in order to eliminate the issue.<sup>385</sup> This direct tactic is how the Russians have chosen to combat their current insurgency problem, much like their historic attempts in Afghanistan.<sup>386</sup> As of late September, the Russian tactics have seemed to have devolved into a tactic of scorched earth in

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<sup>380</sup> Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan, "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 15," *The Institute for the Study of War*, September 15, 2022, <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15>.

<sup>381</sup> Stepanenko, et al, "Campaign Assessment September 15," 1-16.

<sup>382</sup> Stepanenko, et al, "Campaign Assessment September 15," 1-16.

<sup>383</sup> Max Boot, "The Evolution of Irregular War: Insurgents and Guerrillas From Akkadia to Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs*, February 5, 2013, 100-114, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-02-05/evolution-irregular-war>.

<sup>384</sup> Paul Robinson, "Soviet Hearts-and-Minds Operations in Afghanistan," *The Historian* 72, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 1-22, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24455003>.

<sup>385</sup> Office of the President of the United States, "National Strategy for Counterterrorism 2018," (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018), 1-25, <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/features/national-strategy-for-counterterrorism>.

The US still included kinetic options for dealing with terrorist.

<sup>386</sup> Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics* (New York: Perennial, 2001), 221.

areas that could be lost to Ukrainian forces.<sup>387</sup> It is reasonable to fear that such tactics may escalate to pacification via elimination, especially in light of repeated reports of Russian atrocities.<sup>388</sup> While it is unseemly to consider such an option, it is certainly an option entertained by the Russian leadership. This is the same leadership that has allowed or directed the decimation of the City of Mariupol and the numerous reported killings of civilians.<sup>389</sup> It must also be considered that the region does have a history of mass deportations,<sup>390</sup> purges,<sup>391</sup> and outright genocides.<sup>392</sup> The Holodomor under the Soviets and the mass killings under the German occupiers of Ukraine have made a clear point that killing or removing everyone to ensure security is an effective means of fighting insurgency within Ukraine as it removes all resistance. This is something Ukrainians know and remember.

### **An Artillery Backed Insurgency**

This brings the reader to the question of whether Russian or even Chinese counter-insurgency tactics are sufficient to pacify Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The Russian tactic of overwhelming firepower to suppress an insurgency may very well have been successful if

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<sup>387</sup> Volodymyr Zelenskyy, "We Will Respond To The Terrorists For Each Of Their Vile Acts, For Each Missile – We Are Capable Of That - Address By The President Of Ukraine," Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, September 15, 2022, <https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2022/09/15/we-will-respond-to-the-terrorists-for-each-of-their-vile-acts-for-each-missile-%E2%80%93-we-are-capable-of-that-%E2%80%93-address-by-the-president-of-ukraine/>. "Your missile attacks today, Russian missiles targeting Kryvyi Rih, the dam of the Karachunivske Reservoir, the objects that have no military value at all, in fact hitting hundreds of thousands of ordinary civilians, is another reason why Russia will lose. And not just this war, but history itself."

<sup>388</sup> Volodymyr Zelenskyy, "We will identify all those who brought atrocities from Russia to Ukrainian land – address of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy," The Presidential Office of Ukraine, September 17, 2022, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vstanovimo-osobi-vsih-hto-prinis-zvirstvo-z-rosiyi-na-ukr-77853>.

<sup>389</sup> Bachelet, "On Mariupol, Ukraine." The true tally will not be known if and until Mariupol is liberated by Ukrainian force

<sup>390</sup> Joseph King, *The Russian Revolution: The First Year*, (London: The Union of Democratic Control, 1918), 4, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/community.29436165>.

<sup>391</sup> Peter Whitewood, "The Purge of the Red Army and the Soviet Mass Operations, 1937–38," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 93, no. 2 (April 1015): 286-291 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5699/slaveastorev2.93.2.0286>.

<sup>392</sup> Joseph. King, *The Russian Revolution: The First Year*, (London: The Union of Democratic Control, 1918), 4, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/community.29436165>.

certain conditions had been met. This, much like the Chinese method of mass incarceration to prevent an insurgency from forming, could have been very successful for the Russians.<sup>393</sup>

However, it seems that the changing situation on the ground has rendered both of these options moot.<sup>394</sup> As such, the answer to Russian success in combating the insurgency it has created is very much in doubt.

Russia has historically used overwhelming force to defeat insurgents, as was previously presented. In Ukraine, however, such a tactic hinges on the answers to two specific questions. One, how much firepower can the Russians devote to combat an insurgency, given the ongoing conventional war for the rest of Ukraine? It must be remembered that this war has dragged on for 7 months as of mid-September,<sup>395</sup> and cost more Russian troops than Afghanistan with as many as 80,000 casualties as of early August.<sup>396</sup> Second, can the Russians ever successfully combat an insurgency without cutting off Ukrainians from international support?

In October of 2022, the war in Ukraine entered its eighth month with no end in sight.<sup>397</sup> With that month's Ukrainian counteroffensive, all Russian-occupied areas have come within indirect fire system range, notably the American-supplied HIMARS.<sup>398</sup> The range of the rockets fired from these HIMARS systems used by Ukrainian conventional forces is over 70

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<sup>393</sup> Adrian Zenz, "Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang's Extrajudicial Internment Campaign." *Journal of Political Risk* 7, no. 11 (November 2019): 4.

<sup>394</sup> Stepanenko, et al, "Campaign Assessment September 15," 1-16.

<sup>395</sup> Stepanenko, et al, "Campaign Assessment September 15," 1-16.

<sup>396</sup> Jack Detsch, "Russia Is Readying the Zinc Coffins Again: U.S. officials believe Russia is facing its toughest fight since World War II" *Foreign Policy*, August 08, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/08/russia-ukraine-deaths-casualties-rises/>.

<sup>397</sup> Hird, et al, "Russian Offensive October 3," 1, "Ukrainian forces continued to make substantial gains around Lyman and in Kherson Oblast in the last 48hours."

<sup>398</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Ukraine Fact Sheet," 1-2. These weapon systems include purely from the U.S. Government, 155mm Howitzers, 105mm Howitzers, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS).

kilometers.<sup>399</sup> This has put long-range fires in support of an active insurgency<sup>400</sup> that is still operational despite Russian efforts to identify dissent.<sup>401</sup> In addition, the fluid nature of the battlefield means that insurgents in the occupied areas may be closer to hybrid forces.<sup>402</sup> This is due to Russian armored formations' proclivity for bypassing dismounted Ukrainian troops to avoid horrendous casualties from anti-armor systems provided by other countries.<sup>403</sup> These partisans and insurgents are likely a combination of militias and bypassed conventional forces from the starting months of the war that well-meaning civilians support.<sup>404</sup> These bypassed conventional forces are undoubtedly the most dangerous, though the proliferation of intelligence of reporting apps has made all Ukrainians dangerous.<sup>405</sup> Their position in rear areas, able to observe and report on high payoff targets, is the ideal for deep reconnaissance that the Ukrainians seem to capitalize on when conducting their strikes.<sup>406</sup> Even when not calling in indirect fires, the militias and civilians have been deadly to Russians by providing actionable intelligence and status updates from inside occupied areas.<sup>407</sup> Such a combination of even a partially mobilized population and coordinated long-range fires is a nightmare for the Russian occupiers of Ukraine.

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<sup>399</sup> United States Army Acquisition Support Center (USAASC), "Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM)/Unitary/Alternative Warhead," Accessed October 04, 2022, <https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/guided-multiple-launch-rocket-system-gmlrs-dpicmunitaryalternative-warhead/>.

<sup>400</sup> Hird, et al, "Russian Offensive October 3," 3. There are regions of Ukraine experiencing outright partisan warfare including downtown Kherson.

<sup>401</sup> Hird, et al, "Russian Offensive October 3," 3,11-12. There are still ongoing reports of active partisan warfare in Russian occupied areas after more than 4 months of occupation.

<sup>402</sup> Jones, "Russia's Ill-Fated Invasion," 5-8.

<sup>403</sup> Jones, "Russia's Ill-Fated Invasion," 5-8.

<sup>404</sup> Jones, "Russia's Ill-Fated Invasion," 5-8.

<sup>405</sup> Drew Harwell, "Instead of consumer software, Ukraine's tech workers build apps of war," *The Washington Post*, March 24, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/24/ukraine-war-apps-russian-invasion/>.

<sup>406</sup> Jones, "Russia's Ill-Fated Invasion," 5-8.

<sup>407</sup> Zelenskyy, "promenade for Russian." The President of Ukraine thanks the efforts of those providing intelligence behind the lines.

## A Flood of International Support

Second, Russia has failed to cut off Ukraine from international logistical support pouring over the Polish-Ukrainian border.<sup>408</sup> This means they have not cut the direct support of the Ukrainian military and the insurgents operating in occupied areas.<sup>409</sup> Statistically, the Ukrainian military and populace started the war in February grievously outnumbered on the battlefield<sup>410</sup> by their Russian adversaries.<sup>411</sup> If international support had not been provided in terms of materials, munitions, and training on the level of billions of dollars,<sup>412</sup> then the inevitable outcome of Ukraine being ground down by sheer numbers would have been inescapable.<sup>413</sup> This would have been regardless of how much of the populace they could mobilize.<sup>414</sup> Instead, what has occurred is a massive outpouring of worldwide support for the beleaguered soldiers of Ukraine.<sup>415</sup> This support has allowed Ukraine to stem the tide of Russian numbers through the

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<sup>408</sup> Zbigniew Rau, interview by Max Bergmann, "Poland and the War in Ukraine: A Conversation with Zbigniew Rau, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, September 27, 2022, [https://csiswebsiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/220928\\_Poland\\_War\\_Ukraine.pdf?M9LUm3uo1xPrmnyjyt2E2zH5ikqy8Mjg](https://csiswebsiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/220928_Poland_War_Ukraine.pdf?M9LUm3uo1xPrmnyjyt2E2zH5ikqy8Mjg).

If a weapon enters Ukraine, it comes across the Polish-Ukrainian border.

<sup>409</sup> Eric Tegler, "Until Ukraine Is Cut Off, Nearly All Roads to Supply It Go through Poland," *Forbes*, March 10, 2022, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2022/03/10/until-ukraine-is-ultimately-cutoff-nearly-all-roads-for-supply-support-go-through-poland/?sh=16912daa5deb>.

<sup>410</sup> The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, "The White Book 2021." (Defense Policy of Ukraine, Ministry of Defence Ukraine, 2021), 36,

[https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/files/whitebook/WhiteBook\\_2021\\_Defens\\_policy\\_of\\_Ukraine.pdf](https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/files/whitebook/WhiteBook_2021_Defens_policy_of_Ukraine.pdf). See Diagram 2.4 .The number of reservists from the ready reserve of the Armed Forces was 234,000 in 2021.

<sup>411</sup> Joe Biden, "Remarks by President Biden Announcing Response to Russian Actions in Ukraine," *The White House*, February 22, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/22/remarks-by-president-biden-announcing-response-to-russian-actions-in-ukraine/>. On February 22, over 150,000 Russian troops were already on the Ukrainian border

<sup>412</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Ukraine Fact Sheet," 1-2.

<sup>413</sup> John Nagl "Will Ukraine Be Afghanistan All Over Again for Russia?: Insurgency could make even victory costly for Putin," *Foreign Policy*, February 22, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/22/ukraine-russia-afghanistan-defeat-insurgency/>. The author at the time forecasted that "Kyiv will likely fall within days, if not hours, of a full-on Russian attack, with horrific human suffering among innocent Ukrainian civilians; casualties could number in the tens of thousands."

<sup>414</sup> Nagl "Will Ukraine Be Afghanistan?"

<sup>415</sup> Mark Milley and Lloyd J. III Austin, "Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley Hold a Press Briefing After the Ukraine Defense Contact Group Meeting at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, June 15, *U.S. Department of Defense*, June 15, 2022, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3064692/secretary-of-defense-austin-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-mille/>. The meeting included Defense Department leaders from over 50 countries.

effective use of donated munitions.<sup>416</sup> This has provided an answer to the Russian 10-to-1 advantage in indirect fire assets.<sup>417</sup> The result is a fire and counter-fire dual between artillery systems on both sides, with neither being to utilize its systems with impunity and each under constant threat of counter-battery fire after every shot.<sup>418</sup> For the most part, this has reduced the Russian ability to counter insurgents through its preferred method of superior applied firepower as it is increasingly dedicated to fighting a conventional war, and every shot risks counter-battery fire.<sup>419</sup>

In fact, it seems that Ukrainian insurgents have been operating extremely successfully not just in Ukraine<sup>420</sup> but well into Russia proper.<sup>421</sup> This is likely because Russia is unable to divert significant numbers of troops to combat what, to this point, has remained a low-grade insurgency in their rear areas. While such dramatic assassinations are a propaganda victory, the insurgency assisting the targeting of supply and command nodes is likely to make more impact.

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<sup>416</sup> Milley and Austin, "Ukraine Defense Contact Group."

<sup>417</sup> Milley and Austin, "Ukraine Defense Contact Group." "So first of all, the Russians do outnumber -- in terms of artillery, they outnumber the Ukrainians. The estimate varies, some say four, five, six to one, others say 10, 15 to one, others say 20 to one. What the true accurate number is, I'll keep our assessments in the classified realm, but they outnumber them and that's important."

<sup>418</sup> Senior Defense Official, "Senior Defense Officials Hold a Background Briefing, June 24, 2022," *U.S. Department of Defense*, June 24, 2022,

<https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3073420/senior-defense-officials-hold-a-background-briefing-june-24-2022/>. The accuracy of artillery systems supplied to Ukraine has been telling against their more numerous foes.

<sup>419</sup> Hird, et al, "Russian Offensive October 3," 1-3.

<sup>420</sup> Tenisheva, "Assassinations of Officials."

<sup>421</sup> Julian E. Barnes, Adam Goldman, Adam Entous, and Michael Schwirtz, "U.S. Believes Ukrainians Were behind an Assassination in Russia," *The New York Times*, October 5, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/05/us/politics/ukraine-russia-dugina-assassination.html>. The daughter of Aleksandr Dugin was killed when her vehicle was car bombed in an attack that is believed to have originated with Ukrainian support.

## The Undying Insurgency

The result is that for Russia to successfully counter the insurgency existing in occupied areas of Ukraine would require a dedication of more forces. This takes into account that political settlement with the insurgents is completely unfeasible as long as the Ukraine-Russian war is ongoing and those insurgents continue to enjoy Ukrainian support. In light of this, the option remaining is to regain the option to utilize overwhelming force. However, these forces must either be mobilized from Russia as a result of a call-up as was ordered by Putin on September 21st<sup>422</sup> or pulled from the front line. This Russian action to mobilize these reserve forces has been fraught with logistic issues<sup>423</sup> and created widespread, if still controllable, unrest across Russia.<sup>424</sup> A constant backdrop to the entire situation is an increasingly combative NATO that has looked on with increasing horror as Russian atrocities come to light in liberated Ukrainian villages.<sup>425</sup> This comes at a time that Russia is publicly considering tactical nuclear weapon use,<sup>426</sup> a threat both the US and the United Kingdom have declared will have a swift and immediate response. This means that pulling troops from the front, where they are engaged in a still undecided conventional war, is impossible, especially in light of a looming NATO threat.

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<sup>422</sup> Vladimir Putin, Executive Order on Partial Mobilization in the Russian Federation," *The Kremlin*, September 21, 2022, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69391>.

<sup>423</sup> Pat Ryder, "Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder Holds an On-Camera Press Briefing," *U.S. Department of Defense*, September 22, 2022, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3168223/pentagon-press-secretary-air-force-brig-gen-pat-ryder-holds-an-on-camera-press/>. There

<sup>424</sup> Ned Price, "Department Press Briefing – September 28, 2022." *U.S. Department of State*, September 28, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/briefings/departments-press-briefing-september-28-2022/>.

<sup>425</sup> Jens Stoltenberg, "Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meetings of NATO Defense Ministers," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, June 16, 2022, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_196623.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_196623.htm?selectedLocale=en).

<sup>426</sup> Jens Stoltenberg, "Press point with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, September 30, 2022, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_207788.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_207788.htm?selectedLocale=en).



In the end, Russia is faced with an impossible decision. They can weaken frontlines in an uncertain conventional war or continue unpopular mass mobilizations. Both options risk defeat and may not bring victory over the Ukrainian insurgency.

## CONCLUSION

### The Real World Implications

While these words are being read, the world may very well be engaged in a great struggle for what may become the fate of Europe.<sup>427</sup> As of October 2022, it is impossible to determine the outcome of the conventional war.<sup>428</sup> However, what is not in doubt is that the insurgency the war and history have spawned will poison attempts at peace. In the opening moves of the war, it was questioned whether a Ukrainian insurgency could not just thrive but succeed in driving the Russians out of Ukraine.<sup>429</sup> Ukrainian conventional military success has made that question moot but raised another.<sup>430</sup> What happens if Ukraine succeeds in returning itself to its pre-annexation of Crimea borders?<sup>431</sup> Does the insurgency end there, or do insurgents carry all the blood and death they have faced into the heart of Russia, making peace impossible and ensuring conflict well into the future? In the end does this become another frozen conflict like that seen in Korea providing a constant threat of large scale war in Europe?

### Future Iterations

The answer to that question ultimately effects the future relevancy of this report. Future iterations and the following editions of this report will consider the change in conditions on the

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<sup>427</sup> Jens Stoltenberg, "Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg previewing the extraordinary Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government Brussels," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, March 23, 2022, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_193610.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_193610.htm).

<sup>428</sup> Hird, et al, "Russian Offensive October 3," 1-3.

<sup>429</sup> Douglas London, "The Coming Ukrainian Insurgency: Russia's Invasion Could Unleash Forces the Kremlin Can't Control," *Foreign Affairs*, February 25, 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-25/coming-ukrainian-insurgency>. The author writing in the opening days of the war, questioned if Ukraine would initially fall only to become an insurgency that would eventually drive the Russians out.

<sup>430</sup> Hird, et al, "Russian Offensive October 3," 1-3.

<sup>431</sup> Liana Fix, and Michael Kimmage, "What If Ukraine Wins? Victory in the War Would Not End the Conflict With Russia." *Foreign Affairs*, June 6, 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-06/what-if-ukraine-wins>.

ground in Eastern Europe. There are three areas that could drastically affect the future of anti-Russian Insurgency. The first is determined by the condition that the international support for Ukraine dries up. The second is a decisive military end to the war. The third is a continuation of the ongoing hostilities with no conclusive end.

The question of international support has two direct impacts on the future of Anti-Russian insurgency. First, without a continued supply of munitions, the Ukrainians will undoubtedly be unable to provide the indirect fire support that has made those insurgents behind the lines very dangerous. Second, without the constant flood of munitions being supplied,<sup>432</sup> the availability of the basic tools of an insurgency will gradually be reduced as existing stockpiles are used up. This would result in a less capable but likely just as motivated insurgency.

A decisive victory in the war by Ukraine will lessen the motivation for anti-Russian insurgency as the goals of territorial integrity established by moderates are met.<sup>433</sup> However, it is likely that the more extreme elements of the Ukrainian military and territorial defense will prefer to continue the war as personal grievances due to Russian tactics and atrocities are sought to be avenged.<sup>434</sup> The result is that a Ukrainian victory does not guarantee an end to anti-Russian insurgency.

A Russian victory, however, would likely be worse as attempts to pacify the region and combat insurgents take place on a mass scale. Russian tactics and disregard for human life have created an internal Ukrainian narrative that there can be no surrender or negotiation with Russia without victory and justice.<sup>435</sup> Their atrocities have ensured that the common citizens will prefer

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<sup>432</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Ukraine Fact Sheet," 1-2.

<sup>433</sup> Zelenskyy, "We will return freedom."

<sup>434</sup> Tompkins, *Human Factor Considerations*, 23-24.

<sup>435</sup> Volodymyr Zelenskyy, "Ukraine has shown that the truth, strength, initiative and confidence in victory are on our side - address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, *The Presidential Office of Ukraine*, September 23, 2022, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-pokazala-sho-za-nami-pravda-sila-iniciativa-ta-vpev-77985>.

to fight on their feet than die on their knees,<sup>436</sup> as that is the only choice they seem to be given. The mass graves in towns liberated by Ukrainian conventional troops have highlighted this fact.<sup>437</sup> A conventional Ukrainian defeat will likely result in a sustained guerilla campaign. This will undoubtedly result in the wholesale slaughter of civilians in urban areas as Ukrainian citizens take up arms and are killed in response.

### **Policy Recommendations**

Due to this uncertain future both NATO and Ukraine have options to decide their fate. For the sake of understanding, policy recommendations are broken into two sections. The first is policy recommendations for the US-NATO coalition as they attempt to support Ukraine in its fight to maintain its territory and return Europe to a peaceful status quo. The second set of recommendations deals with the Ukrainian position in their relation and support for anti-Russian terror, and whether that will prevent any hope they have for peace through victory.

### **Policy Recommendation: NATO Support for Insurgency**

The information outlined regarding reasons why the Ukrainian insurgency's longevity remains strong in outlook suggest that a policy of continued military material and intelligence support should continue to continue to weaken a Russia that is adversarial to NATO interests. The case for a policy supporting anti-Russian insurgency and conventional forces is based on the NATO position that Russia is, and will continue to be, a threat.<sup>438</sup> Admittedly, this depends upon

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<sup>436</sup> This is a variation interpretation of a quote from a republican propagandist during the Spanish civil war than then appeared in a June 19, 1941 Speech by Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

<sup>437</sup> Zelenskyy, "ample evidence," 1-3.

<sup>438</sup> Robert Pszczel, "The consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for international security – NATO and beyond," *NATO Review*, July 7, 2022, [www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/07/07/the-consequences-of-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-for-international-security-nato-and-beyond/index.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/07/07/the-consequences-of-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-for-international-security-nato-and-beyond/index.html).

the logic that a war between Russia and NATO is seemingly only one miscalculation from occurring.<sup>439</sup> As such, it makes sense to support Ukraine as far as possible to weaken an enemy that may have to be fought in the future and to do so on another international actor's territory. The conventional confrontation in Ukraine as well as insurgent operations and hybrid warfare taking place behind the forward line of troops<sup>440</sup> has both sapped Russian strength<sup>441</sup> and immersed Putin in what is becoming a political catastrophe. It is a war he cannot win without further dedication of forces. This would be an exceedingly unpopular escalation to the Russian people who are already protesting the partial mobilization. Such a mass mobilization decision further weakens Putin's position as a successful war leader but may give him the possibility of victory through overwhelming numbers.<sup>442</sup> Unfortunately, the direct supply of NATO arms and materiel to Ukraine has given credence to the Russian accusation that this is no longer a war to de-Nazify Ukraine,<sup>443</sup> but is now rather a proxy war against NATO proper. Consequently, it has become framed by the Kremlin as a war for the survival of the Russian motherland. This has garnered and hardened Russian support for the war despite devastating setbacks on the battlefield by the Russian military.<sup>444</sup>

Advancing a policy of weakening Russia through further NATO support for Ukraine must be made with full acceptance of the risks associated. NATO is directly supporting one side of an active shooting war with nuclear power. This is a nuclear power that has outright declared such interaction as an act of war through its state media and public statements. As such, should

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<sup>439</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "Playing With Fire in Ukraine: The Underappreciated Risks of Catastrophic Escalation," *Foreign Affairs*, August 17, 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/playing-fire-ukraine>.

<sup>440</sup> Zelenskyy, "promenade for Russian."

<sup>441</sup> Detsch, "Russia Is Readying."

<sup>442</sup> Vladimir Putin, "Executive Order on partial."

<sup>443</sup> Putin, "21 February Address."

<sup>444</sup> Hird, et al, "Russian Offensive October 3," 1-3.

NATO continue to funnel increasing lethal support, it must do so with full acknowledgement regarding the risks associated with this course of action.

### **Policy Recommendation: Ukrainian Integration of Insurgents**

The information outlined in the current face of Ukrainian Insurgency suggest that a policy of full integration of insurgents and militia into conventional forces should be conducted to reduce the future risks of unsanctioned anti-Russian violence. Ukraine has encouraged all Ukrainians capable of supporting the war effort to do so.<sup>445</sup> They have made short-term decisions with long-term consequences, such as allowing militias and extremist elements to engage in combat on its behalf in a bid for survival.<sup>446</sup> This is a choice that, as of mid-October 2022, has thus far proven successful in staving off defeat.<sup>447</sup> This conventional success has tied up huge numbers of Russian forces and provided distractions from building Ukrainian unconventional forces in Russian rear areas.<sup>448</sup> These insurgents are beginning to conduct operations with strategic implications, such as assassinations conducted inside Russian borders. This, combined with a widening of the war and seemingly indiscriminate violence on the part of the Russians, has hardened the position of the Ukrainian Populace to resist.

Unfortunately, this has severely limited any Ukrainian-Russian peace prospects as the Ukrainian position has settled on the complete return of pre-2014 borders.<sup>449</sup> Despite ongoing cross-border violence and a raging anti-Russian insurgency already started, victory by the

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<sup>445</sup> Zelenskyy, “Stand firm.”

<sup>446</sup> Zelenskyy, “Stand firm.”

<sup>447</sup> Karolina Hird, George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 1,” *The Institute for the Study of War*, October 11, 2022, 1-16, <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11>.

<sup>448</sup> National Resistance Center, "Occupiers Are Actively Looking for Partisans in Luhansk Region," *National Resistance Center*, October 11, 2022, <https://sprotyv.mod.gov.ua/en/2022/10/11/occupiers-are-actively-looking-for-partisans-in-luhansk-region/>.

<sup>449</sup> Zelenskyy, “We will return freedom.”

Ukrainians over Russian aggression may not be guaranteed.<sup>450</sup> Unfortunately, the same insurgents and dedicated conventional forces that may bring Ukraine the ultimate victory that Ukraine wishes for may not be satisfied with even that. A border is merely a line on a map; if the enemy is just on the other side, what meaning does it have?

By adopting a policy of integrating insurgent forces that have previously operated in rear areas into conventional Ukrainian forces, the central Ukrainian can maintain control and ensure a possibility of future and long last peace in the region. If they cannot control anti-Russian insurgent forces created due to this war, then there will and can be no peace, even if there is a victory that restores Ukrainian territory.

### **No End to Ukrainian Insurgency**

From Zelenskyy's now historic utterance to the United States, "The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride,"<sup>451</sup> the stage was set for conflict to the bitter end. Ukraine has backed itself into a corner where there is no choice but to fight. Its people have lost too much to accept anything else, and for Ukrainian leaders to justify the sacrifice already made, they must have something to show for it. If the ammo and soldiers hold out, the Ukrainian insurgency will endure in one form or another as the increasingly deadly monster that Russia and the world has made it.

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<sup>450</sup> Hirsch-Hoefler, et al., "Harden Your Heart," 845-859.

<sup>451</sup>The Associated Press, "Live updates: Zelenskyy declines US offer to evacuate Kyiv," *AP News*, February 25, 2022, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-europe-united-nations-kyiv-6ccba0905f1871992b93712d3585f548>.

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