Title

Management of political influence: Gerrymandering in the 1980s

Abstract

This article develops an analytical model of partisan redistricting (gerrymandering) in which control of state government is used to promote party and incumbent goals. The model suggests that elected officials confront a tradeoff between margins of victory for their party's House candidates and the number of seats captured. Aregression analysis of 1982 House election results provides empirical support for the model. The findings indicate that a complete reversal of party control of state government prior to redistricting would make it possible for the dominant party to gain 6% to 7% additional House seats, and would permit it to protect between 17% and 25% of its candidates from significant challenges from the other party. Studies which attempt to measure the presence of gerrymandering by concentrating on one measure or the other, but not both, will underestimate the effectiveness of redistricting as a partisan tool.

Department(s)

Economics

Document Type

Article

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9101900402

Publication Date

1-1-1991

Journal Title

American Politics Research

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