Title

Trading volume, management solicitation, and shareholder voting

Abstract

In an investigation of possible relationships between shareholder voting turnout, trading volume after the record data, and the intervals between the record and meeting dates, we find that higher trading volume and more trading days between the record date and the receipt of proxy materials both reduce voting turnout. A longer interval between the receipt of proxy materials and the meeting increases turnout, as does greater solicitation expense. Our tests show that management mails proxies further in advance of the meeting when its proposals require a majority of shares outstanding, as opposed to votes cast, for approval.

Department(s)

Finance and General Business

Document Type

Article

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(93)90024-6

Publication Date

1-1-1993

Journal Title

Journal of Financial Economics

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