Title
Firm founders, boards, and misleading disclosures: An examination of relative power and control
Abstract
The role of firm founders is still being developed in the literature, and the extent to which the presence of founding- CEOs either imposes or minimizes agency costs rlargely unexplored. This study's results indicate that founders are positively associated with the incidence of restatements of prior years' financial results, a finding consistent with an agency-cost interpretation of founder influence. Board tenure, however, appears to reduce the likelihood of misleading disclosures, but does not mediate the influence of founders, suggesting co-optation by the founder.
Department(s)
Management
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
10-9-2009
Recommended Citation
Donoher, William J. "Firm founders, boards, and misleading disclosures: An examination of relative power and control." Journal of Managerial issues (2009): 309-326.
Journal Title
Journal of Managerial Issues
