Date of Graduation
Fall 2025
Degree
Master of Science in Defense and Strategic Studies
Department
School of Defense & Strategic Studies
Committee Chair
John Rose
Abstract
The United States faces numerous security threats now and in the coming decades. Authoritarian and revisionist powers such as China and Russia, along with regional proxies, are destabilizing the international order. The ability of the United States to adequately address these present and future threats is constrained by conventional and nuclear forces in need of recapitalization, a rising national deficit, disagreements over the direction of U.S. foreign policy, and a defense industrial enterprise that has its roots in the Cold War. In a multi-peer threat environment, this situation erodes U.S. credibility and is an invitation for aggression. Coercion, coordinated multi-theater operations, and limited strikes against U.S. interests, including the homeland, are increasingly plausible. In response to such threats, the United States may be forced to capitulate or respond with nuclear escalation; both options are dangerous. This thesis advances a novel non-nuclear deterrence-by-denial strategy that emphasizes operations in space and cyberspace, escalating to precision strikes from space if necessary. The objective is to threaten an adversary’s ability to project power by denying access to global information systems while holding critical leadership and command and control nodes at risk. Should these measures fail to restore deterrence, the United States will retain the capacity to execute overwhelming long-range precision strikes utilizing air, land, and sea platforms. This strategy prioritizes investments and the integration of terrestrial and space-deployed missile defenses to balance the offense-defense equation. An adaptable non-nuclear capabilities approach designed to achieve information dominance provides decision-makers with credible options to signal intent, manage escalation, and, if necessary, deliver a range of effects with minimal collateral damage and risk to U.S. military personnel.
Keywords
cyberspace, cyber warfare, denial, deterrence, information denial, information dominance, non-nuclear, space, space strike
Subject Categories
Defense and Security Studies
Copyright
© Nathan A. Heard
Recommended Citation
Heard, Nathan A., "A Novel Deterrence Strategy: Denial Through Space and Cyberspace" (2025). Graduate Theses/Dissertations. 4107.
https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/4107