Date of Graduation

Spring 2026

Degree

Master of Science in Defense & Strategic Studies

Department

School of Defense & Strategic Studies

Committee Chair

John Rose

Abstract

COVID‑19 demonstrated how a single biological event can strain health systems, disrupt supply chains, undermine national security, and erode public trust. This shock occurred as biotechnology became dramatically more accessible: gene editing and synthetic biology tools once limited to specialized laboratories are now widely available through inexpensive equipment, open‑source data, and decentralized expertise.

This expanded access accelerates innovation but also broadens the threat landscape. The ability to reconstruct pathogens using publicly available sequences and mail‑order DNA shows that complex biological synthesis is no longer confined to state programs. These risks are amplified by opaque biotechnology activities in China, Russia, and North Korea, where limited transparency raises concerns about dual‑use research and strategic intent. In the same vein, DIYbio communities and decentralized practices increase the number of actors capable of attempting biological manipulation while governance frameworks fail to keep pace.

Despite these trends, no enforceable international system regulates synthetic biology, and key safeguards – such as DNA screening – remain largely voluntary. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) lacks verification mechanisms tailored to modern biotechnology, leaving nations exposed as capabilities become more powerful and distributed. A forward‑leaning policy response is required, and the United States is positioned to lead by strengthening domestic safeguards, modernizing oversight, and shaping global standards for responsible innovation.

Keywords

biodefense, biosecurity, gene editing, synthetic biology, COVID-19, bioterrorism, China, Russia, North Korea

Subject Categories

International Relations | Political Science

Copyright

© Nicholas Morales

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